


AD 699 839

**THE MILITARY IN LATIN AMERICAN SOCIOPOLITICAL EVOLUTION: FOUR
CASE STUDIES**

Lyle N. McAlister, et al

American University
Washington, D. C.

January 1970



This document has been approved for public release and sale.

Reproduced by the
CLEARINGHOUSE
for Federal Scientific & Technical
Information Springfield Va 22151

**Best
Available
Copy**

**THE MILITARY
IN LATIN AMERICAN
SOCIOPOLITICAL EVOLUTION:
FOUR CASE STUDIES**

by
**Lyle N. McAlister,
Anthony P. Maingot, and
Robert A. Potash**

January 1970



American Institutes for Research

Center for Research in Social Systems

5010 WISCONSIN AVENUE, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20016

Prepared under subcontract by the Center for Latin American Studies, University of Florida.

This document has been approved for public release and sale; its distribution is unlimited.

THE AUTHORS

Lyle N. McAllister is Professor of History at the University of Florida, Gainesville, where he was head of the History Department from 1959 to 1963, and Director of the Center for Latin American Studies from 1963 until 1966. He earned his M. A. in History in 1947, and Ph. D. in 1950, both from the University of California at Berkeley. He is a frequent participant in professional meetings and a regular contributor to professional journals. Dr. McAllister's publications include The "Fuero Militar" in New Spain, 1764-1800 (Gainesville, Fla., 1957) and "Social Structure and Social Change in New Spain," Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. XLIII (1963), reprinted in Readings in Latin American History, edited by Lewis Hanke (2 vols., New York, 1966), and reprinted in Latin American History: Essays on its Study and Teaching, edited by Howard F. Cline (2 vols., Austin, Texas, 1967).

Anthony P. Maingot holds a joint appointment as Assistant Professor of History and Sociology at Yale University. He received his Ph. D. from the University of Florida at Gainesville.

Robert A. Potash is Professor of History at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. He received his A. B., M. A. and Ph. D. degrees from Harvard University. His publications include The Army and Politics in Argentina, 1928-1945: Yrigoyen to Perón (Stanford, 1969) and "Argentine Political Parties: 1957-1958," Journal of Inter-American Studies, Vol. I (1959).

ABSTRACT

The political role of the Latin American military is analyzed in four case studies—Argentina, Peru, Colombia, and Mexico. Data came from printed sources and informal interviews. The research method relies on objective description of the phenomenon and related variables rather than on analysis of the appropriateness of a political role for the military. Political action by the military in each country is discussed. Common variables assumed to have explanatory value for each case are: attributes of the political system, social structure, civilian image of the military, professionalism, the military mission, social origins, military socialization, internal cleavages, and historical factors.

FOREWORD

This study was conducted under a program designed to encourage university interest in basic research in social science fields related to the responsibilities of the U.S. Army. The program is conducted under contract by The American University's Center for Research in Social Systems (CRESS); CRESS in turn has entered into subcontracts supporting basic research in a number of major universities having a marked interest in one or more of these research fields.

The research program was formulated by CRESS in terms of broad subject areas within which research would be supported, with the scholars themselves selecting specific topics and research design, utilizing information in the public domain normally available to academic and private individuals. Under the terms of the subcontract the authors are free to publish independently the results of such research.

This report is a comparative study of the role of military establishments in four Latin American countries: Argentina, Peru, Colombia, and Mexico. The principal social scientist was Professor Lyle N. McAllister of the University of Florida's Center for Latin American Studies, and the research was conducted under a subcontract between CRESS and the University. Research was begun in the winter of 1963-1964 and was completed in the winter of 1966.

The authors' approach is based on the conviction that the political role of the military in Latin America as a continuing, persistent, and significant social process cannot be comprehended until an objective description of the phenomenon and related variables has been accomplished. This choice does not indicate any lack of sympathy for the aspirations of the Latin American people, nor does it necessarily indicate lack of sympathy for the motivations of scholars whose approach has been essentially critical of the military. Rather, the authors' approach stems from the scientific philosophy that normative approaches add little to an understanding of the phenomenon itself and the reasons for its persistence.

The authors have analyzed the role of the military in the four Latin American cases in terms of environmental, institutional, and historical variables. Environmental factors included attributes of the political system—legitimacy, effectiveness, institutional development, and accepted limits of political behavior—social structure, and civilian attitudes toward the military. Institutional factors examined were military values and professionalism, attitudes toward the general society and their own role, missions and status within society, social origins and military socialization, and internal cleavage and cohesion. Historical factors focus upon the origins and functions of the armed forces in each country and their development around critical historical events.

CONTENTS

The Authors	ii
Abstract	iii
Foreword	iv
Chapter 1. Introduction	1
The Problem	1
Research Orientation	2
Definitions	3
Leading Assumptions and Propositions	3
Environmental Factors	4
Institutional Factors	7
Some Limitations	13
Notes	17
Chapter 2. Peru, by L. N. McAllister	21
The Political Environment	21
Presidential Power	21
Lack of Input Functions	21
Role of Violence	22
The Military Institution	24
Institutional Development	24
Strength and Organization	26
The Military Mission	28
Officer Recruitment	31
Military Education and Socialization	35
The Military As an Interest Group	38
The "Estado Militar"	38
Military Jurisdiction	38
Status of the Service Ministers	39
Control Over Budgets	39
Military Socialization and the Military Ethos	44
Military Attitudes	44
Civil-Military Relations	51
Relationship to the Middle Class	51
Relationship to the Oligarchy	52
Links With Civilian Law Enforcement	52
Cooperation in Developmental Activities	53
Linkage in the Field of Education	53
Public Relations Efforts	54
Public Attitude Toward the Armed Forces	56
Political Action: The Coup d'Etat of 1962 and the Junta Militar	59
Events of the 1962 Election Campaign	59

The 1962 Election and the Military Coup	67
Reaction to the Military Administration	68
Actions of the Military Junta	69
Deposition of General Pérez Godoy	69
The Colonel's Group	69
Factors of the Military Junta's Behavior	69
The Conditions of Military Political Behavior	69
Notes	71
 Chapter 3. Argentina, by Robert A. Potash	83
The Military Institution	83
The Army	86
Legal Missions and Juridical Status	87
The "Estado Militar"	88
Administration	89
Conscription	90
Deployment	91
Budget	92
The Officer Corps	93
Origins	93
Education of Officers	97
Career System	101
Salary	102
Emoluments	104
The Military Outlook	106
Transcendental Political Mission	106
Nationalism and Roman Catholicism	111
Anticommunism	112
Economic Views	112
Interest in Education	113
Industry	114
Banking	115
Politics	115
Notes	121
 Chapter 4. Colombia, by Anthony P. Maingot	127
The Problem	127
The Social System: Its Political Culture	129
The Military System	134
Historical Antecedents	134
Professionalization: Education and Recruitment	144
Organization, Size, and Distribution	159
Salaries and Living Conditions	160
The Budget	162
The Mission of the Military: A Changing Concept	171
Civic Action and Modernization	173
Conclusion	179
Notes	183
 Chapter 5. Mexico, by L. N. McAlister	197
Attributes of the Political System	197
Introduction	197

The Revolutionary Mystique	197
The Official Party	198
The Presidency	199
The Formation of the Mexican Armed Forces	200
Definition of Juridical Status	201
Elimination of Regional Chieftains	201
Reduction in Strength of the Army	203
Professionalization	203
The Army As a Functional Institution	207
The Military Mission	207
External Defense	207
Police Functions	208
Civic Action	209
Cultural Integration	210
Literacy Training	211
Strength and Organization	211
The Military Budget	213
The Officer Corps	214
The "Estado Militar"	214
Officer Recruitment	218
Career Development	223
Pay and Benefits	226
Military Education	228
Attitudes and Values	230
Deterrents of Professionalism	232
The Army and the State	235
Depoliticization and Civilian Control	235
Linkages Between the Army and the Party	236
Conclusions and Prospects	244
Notes	249
Chapter 6. Conclusions	259
Different Levels of Political Role	259
Number and Duration of Interventions	259
Defense Expenditure Percentage	263
Variables Affecting Level of Political Role	264
Legitimacy of the Political System	264
Effectiveness of the Political System	266
Development of Political Institutions	268
Accepted Limits of Political Behavior	270
Social Structure	270
Discussion	271
Public Attitude Toward the Military	271
Institutional Variables Affecting Level of Political Role	273
Professionalism	273
Social Origins and Military Socialization	276
Cleavages Within the Armed Forces	277
Historical Factors	278
General Conclusions	278
Notes	280
Epilogue	281

Distribution List	283
DD Form 1473	285

TABLES

1. Increase of Army Strength	27
2. Peru's Wars With Border Nations	29
3. Annual Allotment of Vacancies for the Escuela Militar de Chorrillos by Geographic Regions	32
4. Relationship Between the Military's Proportion of the Total National Budget and Military Coups	40
5. Comparative Budget Data, 1945-1964	41
6. Discrepancies Between Official Figures and Villanueva's Figures	42
7. Military Share of Budget, 1964-1965	93
8. Military Expenditures Including Obligations Assumed by Treasury and Emergency Credits, 1964-1965 Budget	94
9. Distribution of Military Budget by Ministry or Secretariat, 1964-1965	94
10. Educational and Social Background of Cadets Admitted to the Colegio Militar in 1965	97
11. Selected Government and Military Monthly Base Salaries Compared, 1918-1951 . . .	102
12. Salaries of Officers and Selected Educators As of 1964	103
13. Major Issues and Civil Wars in the Nineteenth Century	129
14. Class Responses to Concepts	132
15. Ethnic Distribution in Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela	137
16. Military Men Expelled from Colombia (1831)	141
17. Military Expenditures in Pesos	143
18. Size of Army and Finances of Colombia (1831-1930)	144
19. Foreign Military Missions in the Twentieth Century	151
20. Five-Year Study Program at the Escuela Militar	152
21. Army Educational and Professional Institutions	154
22. Technical Requirements for Officer Rank (Colombia)	155
23. Number of Military School Graduates in Army (1907-1915)	157
24. Escuela Militar Admissions Data for 1965	158
25. The Distribution of the Colombian Army	159
26. Monthly Salaries of Colombian Military (1913-1965)	160
27. Contributions of Participants in the Caja de Vivienda Militar	162
28. Percentage of Budget Allotments for Education and Military, 1950-1965	163
29. Increased Military Budget, 1956-1960	163
30. Political Leaders' Opinion on Whether the Army Should Be Reduced	165
31. Prestige Accorded Various Occupations in Colombia	170
32. Perception of a Modernizing Mission by Military Journals	175
33. Deaths Due to the Violence	176
34. Military-Civilian Manpower Ratio	205
35. Military School Graduates, 1934-1940	206
36. Military Zone Headquarters	212
37. Navy Territorial Commands	213
38. Military Budgets, 1948-1966	215
39. Graduates of the Heroico Colegio Militar	219
40. Educational Background of Aspirants (1955)	219
41. Occupations of Parents or Guardians of Aspirants (1955)	219

42. Regional Background of Aspirants (1955)	220
43. Mexican Army Commission Grades	225
44. Base Pay and Allowances of Mexican Army Officers (1965)	226
45. Graduates of Advanced Mexican Military Schools, 1948-1962	229
46. Mexican Army and Air Force Officers Studying Abroad, 1960-1962	229
47. Officers Serving As Deputies or Senators in the National Congress	238
48. Officers Holding Appointive Positions in the Executive Branch	239
49. Generals Serving As State Governors	240
50. Successful Military Coups, 1940-1967	260
51. Duration of Military Intervention	262
52. Ranks of Level of Military Political Role Based on Interventions and DEP	263
53. Levels of Military Political Role and Legitimacy of Political Systems	266
54. Levels of Military Political Role and Effectiveness of Political Systems	267
55. Changes in Indicators of Socioeconomic Development	268
56. Levels of Military Political Role and Political Development	269
57. Military Role and Social Structure	270

FIGURE

1. Duration and Identification of Coups	261
---	-----

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

THE PROBLEM

The principal investigators in this study were Dr. Robert Potash, Professor of History at the University of Massachusetts; Dr. Anthony P. Maingot, Assistant Professor of History at Yale University; and myself. All of the above participated in the development of the research design for the project. Professor Potash prepared the chapter on Argentina, Professor Maingot, that on Colombia. I have written the Introduction, the Conclusion, and the chapters on Mexico and Peru. I wish to acknowledge the invaluable research assistance provided by Mr. Stephen Rozman and Mr. Orazio Ciccarelli in connection with the Peruvian study and by Mr. Philip Kelly in the case of the Mexican contribution. Although I think that the views expressed and positions taken in the Introduction and the Conclusion are in general shared by my collaborators, I accept full responsibility for them.

The political role of the military in Latin America is a long standing interest with both Professor Potash and myself. For a number of years Professor Potash has been engaged in a definitive study of civil-military relations in Argentina since 1930 and is the author of an exploratory study on the subject, "The Changing Role of the Military in Argentina."¹ My interest in the subject began with my Ph.D. dissertation, "The Army of New Spain, 1764-1800," completed in 1950,² and continued with the publication of "The Reorganization of the Army of New Spain, 1763-1767," in 1953;³ The "Fuero Militar" in New Spain, 1764-1800, in 1957;⁴ "Civil-Military Relations in Latin America," in 1961;⁵ "The Military," in John J. Johnson, ed., Continuity and Change in Latin America, in 1964;⁶ "Changing Concepts of the Role of the Military in Latin America," in 1965;⁷ and "Recent Research and Writings on the Role of the Military in Latin America,"⁸ in 1966. Professor Maingot's contribution is closely related to his Ph.D. dissertation, "The Social History of the Colombian Army," which was completed in the summer of 1967.⁹

The present study, therefore, represents the culmination of a substantial amount of thinking and research on the political role of Latin America's armed forces. More specifically, like any serious research project, it arises from dissatisfaction with the existing state of knowledge about the subject. The investigators' criticisms of available writings may be summarized as follows:

First, extant descriptions and interpretations tend to be excessively normative. As a consequence of their intellectual predispositions and the pervasive influence of the political experiences of the Anglo-Saxon peoples, students of Latin American political systems and processes have implicitly or explicitly employed a democratic-civilist political system model in which the military is nonpolitical and subject to strict civilian control. Thus, much of the history of Latin America has been written in terms of evolution toward approximation of the model; that is, "The Struggle for Democracy," while political scientists have been concerned with how and why Latin American political systems have deviated from the norm. Within this

frame of reference, instances when the Latin American military have exceeded their normatively proscribed role have been conceptualized as "intervention," a phenomenon which interfered with the perfection of the model.

A second criticism of existing literature is that it is semantically and conceptually confusing. It tends to subsume, under the rubric, "military role," all forms of armed coercion employed for political purposes including not only the actions of regular armed forces but also constabularies, state, party, or private militias, and ephemeral armed bands. A theoretical argument can be made that the political role of the regular forces at the disposal of the state, and structured violence in general, are phenomena of different although related orders and that they involve different sets of relationships with or within the general society. A corollary of this objection is that even when the subjects of study are the regular armed forces, their definition has tended to be amorphous. Their boundaries have not been systematically delineated or their structure and dynamics as institutions or social subsystems systematically analyzed.

Third, explanations or descriptions of military political role have tended to be simplistic, monistic, or have relied on a limited number of explanatory factors or variables. The more traditional literature on the subject is based on the "conspiracy" theory. That is, greedy generals, ambitious colonels, or military factions seize power for selfish aggrandizement.

Fourth, as Samuel Finer observes, the military everywhere pursues its objectives through negotiation and bargaining with civilian components of the polity.¹⁰ In the case of Latin America, however, preoccupation with crisis situations has obscured this less spectacular but nevertheless continuous, persistent, and significant process.

The essential weakness of the above approaches is that the "military in politics" is conceived as a dysfunction in the political system without comprehending either military institutional factors or the nature of Latin American political systems. They really reveal more about how the authors feel about the role of the armed forces in politics than about the phenomenon itself.

Finally, current literature is continental in approach. On the basis of random or isolated observations and impressions, it deals with the role of the military in general in Latin America in general. There are almost no empirical studies in depth of particular national situations which might provide the bases for comparison and sophisticated generalization.

The preceding criticisms are not intended to be pejorative. They reflect rather the peculiar and intrinsically value-laden character of the political role of the military in Latin America, the relatively recent recognition of the phenomenon as a subject for serious research, and the inherent difficulties of acquiring firm data on the military institution and its behavior.

RESEARCH ORIENTATION

The present volume offers case studies of the political role of the military in four Latin American republics—Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru—and a concluding chapter in which comparisons of the four cases are made and some generalizations advanced. To provide the broadest possible basis for comparison, it would have been desirable to prepare case studies on all the Latin American republics. Such an undertaking, however, was quite beyond the time and resources available to the authors. As a compromise the four countries listed above were chosen. While this selection was based in part on the particular interests and

competences of the investigators, it was judged that the four countries represented a broad enough variation in the level and kinds of political role played by the armed forces to permit meaningful comparisons.

In order to facilitate comparison, the country chapters were prepared with reference to a common set of definitions, assumptions, and leading propositions. These are discussed in the following sections of the Introduction. Emphasis is placed on contemporary situations but historical contexts and antecedents are analyzed in some detail.

DEFINITIONS

For purposes of this study, the military are defined as the formal, legitimate, and permanent instruments of armed coercion at the disposal of national governments; that is, regular armies, navies and air forces. They may also include constabularies when the latter appear to have military or paramilitary functions in addition to routine police duties.

Primary emphasis is placed on armies. Although historically navies and, more recently, air forces have been politically active, particularly in Argentina and Brazil, it has been the ground forces which have dominated the political leadership of the military in most of Latin America. Their preeminence may be ascribed to several factors. They are de facto the senior service by virtue of the status acquired as perceived creators and defenders of the new nations in the early nineteenth century. Their greater numerical strength, wider territorial distribution and the nature of their equipment provide them with greater political capabilities, particularly in crisis situations. Also, their distribution throughout the nation and more democratic patterns of personnel recruitment make them more closely attuned to national issues and national politics than navies or air forces.

Within this definition we are primarily concerned with officer corps as the components of the military which are most active politically. Except for a limited number of cases such as the sergeants' revolt in Cuba or the more recent noncommissioned officers' movement in Brazil, enlisted men have been politically passive, or at the most have acted as a constituency of officer leadership. This is not to deny that as they become better educated and more politically aware, enlisted men may emerge as political forces either independently or in alliance with junior officers. Indeed, this may be the next major development in the role of the military in Latin America. At the moment, however, relevant data on noncommissioned personnel are almost non-existent and their acquisition would be an extremely difficult and delicate undertaking.

The concept of "political role" presents some difficulties. In the language of sociology, "role" has acquired a specialized and technical meaning. For lack of a better term, it is used here in connection with "political" to describe the behavior of the armed forces as interest groups pursuing factional or institutional objectives or participating in the formulation of broader national policy. As Samuel Finer points out, this role may vary in level or intensity from persuasion exerted through constitutional channels, through threats and blackmail, to the overt use of force to displace or supplant a government.¹¹

LEADING ASSUMPTIONS AND PROPOSITIONS

Our basic assumption is that the political role of the military in Latin America is not simply a sequence of capricious, unilateral interventions but rather is a function of the interaction of variables operating both within the military institution and in its societal environment.

Their number is theoretically almost unlimited. Existing literature, however, has identified a set which is widely assumed to be of key importance in determining the opportunities for the armed forces to perform an active political role, their motivations and capabilities for doing so, and the forms their political behavior assumes. These factors are discussed below along with propositions about the nature of their influence which have been used as general guides for research.

Environmental Factors

Attributes of the Political Culture and System

Legitimacy. "Legitimacy involves the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society." It is essentially a moral concept in that "Groups will regard a political system as legitimate or illegitimate according to the way in which its values fit in with their primary values."¹² Needless to say, there is rarely a complete consensus on legitimacy. In modern France there are still elements which have never accepted the right to rule of the several republics which followed the overthrow of the House of Bourbon, while significant elements within the German officer corps, civil service and aristocracy refused to regard the Weimar Republic as legitimate.

The concept of legitimacy has, if not a special, at least a ready application to Latin American political systems. After the several nations achieved their independence, the political formulae imported from Europe and the United States proved to be no substitute for the Spanish crown with its associated myths and symbols as a basis for consensus on the right to rule. Thus, "Politics existed then and, for the most part, exist today in a 'legitimacy vacuum'," as Professor Martin Needler so aptly put it.¹³ Or, intermittent "legitimacy crises" occur when contending factions are unable to reach an agreement on the nature and identity of public authority.

Effectiveness. This term means the "actual performance of a political system, the extent to which it satisfies the basic functions of government as defined by the expectations of most members of a society, and the expectations of powerful groups within it which might threaten the system, such as the armed forces." It is essentially a pragmatic rather than a moral concept.

The attribute of efficiency acquires particular significance in nations where social structure is undergoing rapid transformation, where tremendous pressures exist for economic development, modernization and social reform, and where governments are regarded as the principal agencies for planning, implementing and regulating change. In Latin America an elemental and pervasive phenomenon is the emergence of middle social sectors and a class conscious and cohesive proletariat as political forces. At the same time, economic development, modernization, and reform constitute primary national goals as well as being ongoing processes. Considered as goals, new or emerging interest groups as well as traditional ruling elites hold different views as to the proper rate, direction, emphasis and means for their achievement. As processes, at any given time they confer differential benefits or disabilities on the several interest groups and social sectors. As a consequence, political systems, regardless of their degree of legitimacy, are faced with powerful, immediate and frequently conflicting demands for action or redress.

Institutional Development. This concept refers to the vitality of structural components of the political system such as the several branches of the government, political parties, and

interest groups within the context of effective competition and freedom of action. Such attributes tend to be subsumed under "level" of democracy as, for example, in the case of Professor Russell Fitzgibbon's periodic evaluations.¹⁴

Accepted Limits of Political Behavior. A fourth factor to be considered is more properly an attribute of a political culture rather than of that culture's systematic manifestations. It is difficult to define concisely but may be described in terms of accepted limits of political behavior. These may be much broader than those prescribed in constitutional and legal formulae or in the less formal norms to which leaders and electorates give lip service. Thus, violence employed for political ends—by civilians or the military—may be prohibited by law and denounced by politician and press. Yet in certain circumstances it may be widely accepted, condoned or even advocated.¹⁵

Turning specifically to the relationship between attributes of the political system and the role of the military, if the latter is viewed only in terms of its more overt manifestations such as golpes and military juntas, then its correlation with levels of legitimacy or political development may lead to tautologies. Thus, military governments are sui generis undemocratic and probably illegitimate although theoretically they may be relatively effective. If, however, the armed forces' political behavior is considered as representing their reaction to environmental conditions, then the general proposition may be advanced that illegitimacy, ineffectiveness, the absence of vigorous civilian institutions, or the knowledge that violence is an accepted form of political action constitute conditions which tempt, encourage, invite or compel the military to act politically.

More specifically, the armed forces may be called upon for support by civilian parties or factions contending for legitimate status or power; they may act independently in what they conceive to be the national interest to replace or displace governments or systems they regard as illegitimate or ineffective, or they may exploit unstable situations for essentially selfish interests. If the military assume direct power, they automatically invite reaction since their rule is not likely to be regarded as legitimate by the general population and by elements within the armed forces themselves.

Social Structure

This includes such factors as the nature of the class system; the forms of social stratification and their relative rigidity; the extent of ethnic, cultural, and geographical cohesion; and the degree of identification with and participation in a national society.¹⁶

These circumstances may be assumed to affect the political role of the military in at least two ways. First, social structure relates to attributes of the political system discussed above in that it is commonly nations with a highly stratified society and sharp ethnic or cultural cleavages which have particular problems in developing a national political culture and modern, effective and democratic political systems. Social cleavages, moreover, may create political tensions and legitimacy crises. These conditions constitute a chronic source of instability which in turn provides a continuous opportunity for the armed forces to function in the political sphere.

Second, social structure impinges directly on the military through the sources and methods of officer recruitment. Here the basic premises are (1) that officers retain the values and aspirations of the social sectors from which they spring or at least tend to identify with them; (2) that when officer corps and civilian ruling groups derive from the same social background,

rapport exists between them, while if the contrary is the case, they mistrust and misunderstand each other.

Within the Latin American context, it is generally believed that whereas in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, officers were recruited primarily from upper class families, today they come largely from the middle classes.¹⁷ It is the latter social sector, moreover, which is providing civilian political leadership. If these premises and assumptions be granted, however, it is still not clear how the social origins of officers affect their political behavior. Presumably, they will be reluctant to intervene in support of traditional elites. Beyond that, Johnson maintains that "the armed forces may be expected to be more inclined than formerly to gravitate toward positions identified with popular aspirations and to work with the representatives of the popular elements. . . ."¹⁸ This trend, however, may not diminish the political role of the military but simply reorient it. José Nun in his "A Latin American Phenomenon: The Middle Class Military Coup,"¹⁹ provides the most detailed exposition of this point of view. The only assumption that can be made is the fundamental disunity and similarity among the middle classes in Latin America.²⁰ When the masses are given suffrage privileges prematurely, they are forced to compete for power with both upper and lower classes before they are able to unify their position through establishing a well-ordered and organized system. Thus, when the middle classes, because of their organizational weaknesses, cannot cope with critical situations, it is likely that the army (of middle class origin) will come to their rescue voluntarily or they will call upon it for help.²¹

Civilian Attitudes Toward the Military

This is a compound factor made up of a number of separate but related attitudes. These include the extent to which civilians feel that the armed forces are performing a useful or necessary function; civilian reactions to military budgets, pay, and perquisites; and civilian perceptions of the public deportment of men in uniform, including their behavior when exercising political authority. Public regard of the armed forces, furthermore, may relate to social factors. The individual officer may possess a social status based on class or ethnic background and which may not coincide with occupational status. Thus, a general of lowly origin presiding in uniform at a public function may perceive himself and be perceived quite differently than when he appears at the Jockey Club in mufti. When, however, an officer corps is recruited largely from or identified with a single social sector, occupational and social status may tend to merge. Finally, civilian perception of occupational or social status of the military may vary from one social sector to another and according to the service involved. Thus, navy officers are generally assigned a higher position than commissioned personnel in the army.

It is difficult to formulate a coherent set of propositions about the relationship between public attitudes toward the military and their political role. It may be hypothesized in general that sensitivity to civilian regard may have an inhibiting although not a veto effect on the more overt forms of behavior. More particularly, if the armed forces are well regarded by the public, they may feel secure enough to eschew *golpes*. In certain situations, however, they may risk such an action believing that their status will moderate public reaction.

At the other end of the scale, an officer corps which enjoys a relatively low status with reference to civilian elites may harbor resentments and sensitivities which find political outlets. Thus, an intervention accompanied by control of the military budget may create the opportunity to buy status symbols such as expensive automobiles, elegant social clubs, and the like. Or, the exercise of power may compensate in part for social inferiority. However,

as Professor Maingot demonstrates in his chapter on Colombia, a low status relative to civilian elites may depress occupational and corporate pride to the point where the military lack the spirit and the will to exert themselves.

Institutional Factors

The Military Mission

The mission of the Latin American armed forces may be divided into external and internal components. The former consists of defense of the national territory against aggression from neighboring states and, under the provisions of the Inter-American Defense Treaty of Rio de Janeiro, cooperation in resisting aggression against any of the American republics from outside the hemisphere.

It is generally held that the existence of a genuine external threat (or the conviction that one exists) will tend to encourage a high level and continuous political role for the military. It inevitably increases the participation of the armed forces in public policy making, not only in purely military matters but also in such related areas as industrial mobilization, manpower utilization, fiscal policy, and political controls. External threats also tend to increase the self-esteem of the military and their prestige within the general society. Thus, they may be encouraged toward greater political activity and at the same time acquire a civilian "constituency." Finally, the possibility of external warfare provides a justification for larger forces and more equipment, thus providing the military with greater resources for forcible political action.

The internal component of the military mission consists of the maintenance of security and the support of the constitution and the laws. In much of Latin America, precarious political stability results in emphasis on the internal security function of the armed forces. In some instances a police role is performed directly by armies supported by navies and air forces; in others, constabularies are de jure or de facto under military control; in still others, the police and the military are organizationally separate although the military is expected to back up the police; finally, in some countries where armies nominally do not exist, national guards or national constabularies are charged with both external and internal missions.

The internal component of the military mission has greater implications for political role than does external defense. Military establishments whose functions are exclusively or primarily of a police character tend to be in closer contact with internal problems and automatically become involved in decisionmaking in areas quite distinct from military preparedness. They can, moreover, be more easily employed by civilian leaders for political purposes, or they can interpret broadly their responsibility for internal order as a justification for maintaining a high level of political action.²²

The internal mission of the armed forces may also be concerned with the legitimacy and stability of the political system rather than specific disorders. The extent and form of the political role of the military will be affected by how the armed forces interpret their responsibilities. Where legitimacy vacuums exist or legitimacy crises occur or where there is widespread dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of the regime, they may elect a broad interpretation. Lieutenant General Carlos Severo Toranzo Montero, a recent commander in chief of the Argentine Army, while admonishing officers to stay aloof from politics, declared the army "a legitimate force of gravitation in the [nation's] institutional order," and asserted that in the case of national catastrophe, disintegration of normal political processes, or threat of

tyranny, the armed forces were the best guarantors of constitutionality.²³ Thus, emerges the concept of the "Supermission" or of the military as a moderating force within the political system, a concept of mission also frequently associated with the Brazilian armed forces.

Recently the threat of "wars of national liberation" have provided the internal mission of Latin America's armed forces with a new and more urgent dimension: counterinsurgency and the waging of internal war. The magnitude of the threat is debatable but if it does in fact exist or is believed to exist, preparations or operations will be of greater magnitude and duration than in the case of routine police actions, and the military will tend to increase its demands for support and participate more actively in the formulation of national policy. Furthermore, since the very survival of the existing political system is at stake, counterinsurgency involves the defense of the constitution and the laws.

One aspect of the internal mission requiring special comment is military civic action: that is, the employment of the armed forces in developmental type projects such as community action, basic and technical education, and construction of communications systems and public health facilities. While this class of activities is by no means new to the Latin American military, more recently in a number of countries it has been formally designated as an integral element of the military mission and its purposes explicitly defined. These are: (1) to utilize the technical skills, organizational format, and logistical resources of the armed forces in national development and (2) to forestall insurgency by winning among villagers confidence in the national government and pacifying, conciliating, and reconstructing areas affected by insurgency.²⁴

The implications of civic action for military political role are by no means clear. On the one hand, it can be argued that as in the case of other aspects of the internal mission, it involves the armed forces in policy making in matters remote from military strategy and tactics and which may have political implications. It may also serve to improve their public image and prestige, particularly in remote areas where they may be the only visible or effective representatives of the government. On the other hand, it has been contended that civic action, by providing the military with constructive and demanding tasks, will divert their attention from political activism.

The "Estado Militar"

By virtue of their peculiar social function, the armed forces possess a corpus of legally defined attributes, duties, responsibilities, rights and immunities which set them off from the general society. These are commonly referred to collectively as the estado militar. They include a high degree of self-regulatory power over standards of performance; exclusive jurisdiction over service personnel in military and sometimes civil offenses; standard pay scales and criteria and rates of promotion; retirement benefits; and subsidized educational, social, medical, housing, and commissary benefits. The estado militar also involves a hierarchical and disciplined structure accompanied by ritualized behavior such as the salute and prescribed forms of address and by a distinctive dress.

The estado militar is the principal base of esprit de corps and is pervaded with the concept of military honor. In Latin America, the officer's honor is more akin to that of the noblemen of the old regime than that of the bourgeoisie. It is based on perceptions of rank, status, and punctilio rather than such middle class values as industry, exact accounting for a trust, equitable dealings and the like. The concept can be more accurately defined in Spanish as pundonor. Military honor is collective as well as individual; its attributes are possessed by

the entire corps. It is also exclusive; it cannot be shared by other groups or persons, nor does it apply to relations with them. At the same time, it is identified with national honor. The military concept of honor is highly compatible with Iberian tradition.

The estado militar is tied closely to defense budgets. The latter determine the capabilities of the armed forces to perform their perceived mission; they provide arms and equipment which are the sources of corporate self-esteem; and they affect the level of pay and emoluments and the rate of promotion.

On the basis of historical observation, three propositions may be advanced about the relation between the estado militar and the political role of the armed forces. First, the high degree of autonomy which the former confers, provides the military with a sanctuary in which they can plan political action and to which they can withdraw when they have achieved their objectives or when they have been frustrated. Second, the estado militar imposes a substantial degree of social isolation which guards institutionally derived values and attitudes and tends to give the officer a narrow and simplistic view of social, economic, and political processes. Third, as in the case of other interest groups, the military will act politically to improve their institutional status and, conversely, react strongly to efforts to circumscribe or reduce their privileges, immunities, and budgets. Such threats may be interpreted as attacks on military honor. Moreover, although officers may be divided on other grounds, on such a fundamental issue they will close ranks. A long-cherished corollary of the latter proposition is that during periods of military rule, defense budgets may be expected to increase absolutely and in proportion to other government expenditures.

Military Socialization

From the day the officer enters the service, he is socialized; that is, he is subjected to experiences which not only provide him with specialized skills but with a set of attitudes, values and aspirations related to his profession, his country, and the general society of which he is still a part. The military ethos includes loyalty to the state and to the corporation and such values as duty, discipline, honor, courage, self-sacrifice, and patriotism. The military tend to believe that although these values may not be unique to the military service, they are held more strongly by officers than by civilians. The formal devices by which they are instilled include instruction in service schools at all levels, ceremonies glorifying flag and country, and commemoration of great events and heroes in the history of the nation, the service, arm, branch, or unit. They are also transmitted informally by the social atmosphere of camp, garrison, and officers club.

As in the case of the social origins theory of officer behavior, the political implications of military socialization are not immediately clear. A great deal depends on what particular attitudes and values are instilled. In modern armies, it is believed, the basic elements of the military ethos are subsumed under the concept of professionalism. This observation leads to a specific theory about the political role of the military. First, however, some additional definitions are in order.

In the popular concept, the basic distinction is between amateur and professional. The latter may perform the same tasks as the former but he does them regularly rather than intermittently, better, and for pay. Thus, the professional soldier is a regularly compensated career soldier who possesses a higher level of expertise in the art of war than the conscript or the reserve officer.

Samuel P. Huntington provides a more rigorous definition of military professionalism. Its basic elements are: expertise, responsibility and corporativeness. Expertise involves "specialized knowledge and skill in a significant field of human endeavor" which, in the case of the soldier, is the management of organized violence. Responsibility requires the professional to perform not only a useful but an essential function in his society when required to do so by his client which, in the case of the soldier, is the state. "The responsibility to serve and devotion to his skill furnish the professional motive . . . [and] consequently, professional compensation is only partly determined by bargaining on the open market and is regulated by professional custom and law." Corporativeness means that "members of a profession share a sense of organic unity and consciousness of themselves as a group apart from laymen. . . . The sense of unity manifests itself in a professional organization which formalizes and applies the standards of professional competence and establishes and enforces the standards of professional responsibility."²⁵

Military professionalism is also held to have a political dimension; that is, if the soldier is primarily concerned with the military institution and his career within it, his attention is diverted from political matters. Again Huntington provides the most extensive exposition of this view, employing the concepts of "subjective" and "objective" civilian control. The former involves civilianizing the military; it does not recognize their independent status and presupposes their involvement in politics. It is not civilian control in general but control by a particular civilian group and is achieved by maximizing the power of that group *vis-à-vis* the military. Thus, the latter may become a tool of civilian elites.

Objective civilian control is achieved by militarizing the military and recognizing an independent military sphere; that is, maximizing military professionalism so that the armed forces become a neutral tool of the state.²⁶ Within the Latin American context, the basic proposition is that since the arrival of the first European training missions and particularly since World War II, the officer corps of the principal Latin American republics have become increasingly professionalized and that this process is a prelude to their gradual withdrawal from politics.

Mr. Philip Springer has attempted to demonstrate this proposition. By correlating the kind and level of professional training and the degree of political activism of sixty-nine Venezuelan officers, he finds that those who had attended advanced service schools were less likely to be political activists than those who did not and hypothesizes that "advanced military education in Venezuela is not only technical but may also be a mechanism for socializing the officer to conform to norms of subordination to civil authority."²⁷

There is substantial disagreement about the relative influences of social bases of recruitment and military socialization in shaping the attitudes, values, and aspirations of Latin American officers. John J. Johnson agrees with C. Wright Mills that in a highly professional officer corps, social origins are of less importance in shaping the military ethos than in any other social type but does not believe that this view applies to Latin America where, "although the situation is changing, a uniform still does not always make an individual first of all a soldier, and at least until that stage is reached the officer's social background will remain one of the keys to his behavior."²⁸

Lieuwen, however, observes that "Today's officers are lower-middle class in social origin, but their institutional identification is so strong that it obliterates any meaningful identification with civilian social groups,"²⁹ while Needler, commenting on Ecuadorian officers, writes:

Probably the most salient result of the fact that so many military officers originate outside the traditional upper class, then, is rather that they cease

to identify themselves in terms of their social origins but instead transfer their primary group identification to the military service itself, which has created a new style of life for them, and has made it possible for them to advance socially. This is likely to heighten, more than most observers have seemed to appreciate, the extent to which the political decisions of military officers are dominated by concern for the corporate self-interest of "the institution" itself.³⁰

Internal Cleavage and Cohesion

The armed forces are purposive instruments. They are created by fiat to perform certain specifically defined functions which require a high level of central control and a hierarchical command structure. As such, they are the most tightly organized and rational apparatus in the state and the general society.³¹ The degree and type of control, however, may vary from country to country. In some instances the several services are subordinate to a minister of defense whereas in others, each is autonomous and responsible directly to the president of the republic. Also, special units may enjoy a good deal of autonomy as in the case of the Training Regiment at San Isidro in the Dominican Republic before the April 1965 revolution.

The armed forces also possess a structure which may be quite independent of formal command and administrative organization. While it may be postulated that officer corps have a common set of values, beliefs and aspirations, it is also true that more or less sharp cleavages exist within them.³² These may have strictly internal bases such as inter- and intra-service rivalries over budget allocations, prestige and precedence, or differences of opinion over defense policy. They may form along age and grade lines, as in the case of Victor Alba's well-known three-group classification: militares de cuartel (barracks soldiers), militares de escuela (school soldiers) and militares de laboratorio (laboratory soldiers or, perhaps better, military technocrats). They may also reflect different social or regional origins.³³

Cleavages may also form over essentially external issues such as the nature of national goals, the kind and degree of military participation in national planning and development, and the proper posture of the military on political issues in general or in specific situations. Civilian parties and factions, moreover, may have their adherents among officers. Finally, cliques may form around military leaders on the basis of personal loyalties, or hopes for political precedence and spoil. In some cases cleavages may be deep enough to factionalize an officer corps. In others they may be relatively shallow or cohesion may be maintained by discipline, corporate loyalty or the firmness of command structure.

On the basis of observations of particular situations, the proposition may be advanced that both tightly structured, cohesive officer corps and those characterized by organizational weaknesses or deep cleavages may be politically active. The former, however, have, if not the motivation, at least greater capabilities for direct, quick, and unified action.³⁴ Furthermore, their role tends to be collective and institutional rather than factional or personalistic. The role of the latter will tend to be erratic, unstable, and characterized by plots and conspiracies, often in alliance with civilian factions: abortive golpes resulting from lack of general military support and countercoups.

Historical Factors

Each of the factors discussed above has an historical dimension and one method of explaining contemporary military political role is to trace the process by which it came to be what it is. For the purposes of this study, however, we propose to consider only those historical factors which appear to have particular explanatory value and to emphasize types or categories of experiences which facilitate comparability.

One apparently significant historical factor is the circumstance of origin or, as Janowitz puts it, the "natural history" of armies. In his essay on the military in the political development of new nations, he identifies four types: noncolonial, excolonial, national liberation and postliberation. He hypothesizes that these types represent different degrees of Western influence (British, French, Dutch) and particularly different levels of Western military professional standards and values. These, in turn, influence the officer corps' conception of their proper role in state and society. While admitting that the natural history of the armed forces of new nations is not a very reliable indicator of their postindependence political roles, he does not dismiss the idea that the influence of Western professional forms and values has inhibited their political aspirations and contributed, at the least, to the absence of "designed militarism," that is, "the positive and premeditated intent to intervene in domestic politics and to follow expansionist foreign policies."³⁵

Janowitz' typology has little relevance for the Latin American republics since their armed forces came into being at a different time and under different circumstances than those of "new nations." Latin American armies did, however, have different origins which may be related to their contemporary political roles. In terms of natural history, at least three different types may be identified: national liberation armies (in a different historical context than Janowitz employs), revolutionary armies and national constabularies.

During the independence era, national liberation forces were created in most parts of Latin America to fight against Spain. After independence was achieved, they became the national armies of the new republics and, despite various reorganizations, have maintained some institutional continuity to this day. Included in this type are the ground forces of Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, and Chile. National liberation armies, it is commonly asserted, emerged from the wars as self-confident, corporate interest groups which conceived of themselves as the creators, defenders, and arbiters of the new republics. They have retained this conception, it is argued, and when in their view the state is threatened by internal dangers, they reserve the right to intensify their political role in order to set things right. Thus, we have an historical explanation of the "Supermission."

Revolutionary armies refer to those forces created by modern social revolutionary movements and which, after the overthrow of the old order, replaced the traditional military as the regular armies of revolutionary states. Mexico and Cuba fall into this category and possibly Bolivia, although in the latter case the destruction of the old army was incomplete and an institutional continuity was maintained between it and the reorganized armed forces which emerged from the Revolution. Largely on the basis of the Mexican experience, it can be argued that the leaders of revolutionary armies are first revolutionaries and only subsequently and secondarily soldiers. Their goals and values continue to coincide with civilian revolutionaries and the mission of the armed forces becomes the defense and propagation of the revolution. In these circumstances, tension between civilian government and the armed forces is minimized. While the military may not be entirely apolitical, their role becomes simply that of an institutional interest group bargaining for its share of the benefits of the revolution.³⁶

The third type of Latin American armed forces, national constabularies, were created during North American intervention and with North American assistance in the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua. Here they replaced the traditional military as the national armed forces. As suggested earlier, gendarmeries tend to be more politically inclined than formal armies. Their main concern is the maintenance of internal order and their primary loyalty is to the government in power, which is temporary, rather than to the state which is permanent. Nor do they have the professional military attitudes which make them susceptible to objective civilian control. It is widely held that in the Caribbean the gendarmeries which were created in the earlier twentieth century are positively related to extended periods of personalistic military dictatorship.³⁷

SOME LIMITATIONS

In conclusion some caveats must be entered about what can and can't be done to implement the research plan described in the preceding pages.

First, although the three authors are all trained as historians, they have somewhat different concepts of the nature of history and historical method. Professor Potash is inclined toward a more traditional approach. Professor Maingot is strongly sociologically oriented and, in fact, holds a joint academic appointment in the departments of history and sociology. Although self-evaluations may be deceptive, I would place myself more or less in between the two positions. As a consequence, we have employed concepts and propositions in somewhat different ways and with different emphases. These variations inevitably affect the organic unity of the study and the kind of comparisons that can be made. In compensation, however, it is hoped that they will provide a broader view of a very complex problem.

Second, resources available to the investigators and difficulties intrinsic in the subject placed limitations on the quantity and quality of information that could be gathered. As suggested earlier, except in the case of Argentina, existing published materials provide no substantial body of firm data on such key factors as officer recruitment, military socialization and internal cleavage and cohesion which would provide a solid base of departure. Furthermore, such data is not easy to come by. Quite aside from the normal difficulties of social science research in Latin America,³⁸ field work was undertaken at a time when some hostility to North American investigators was beginning to develop in the area. Furthermore, the armed forces as a subject for study present particular problems. Because of their peculiar function, they are highly sensitive and tend to surround even their most routine activities with security restrictions. In Peru, for example, the Oficina Nacional de Racionalización y Capacitación de la Administración Pública (ONRAP) published in 1964 a Directorio del Gobierno Central which was intended to list the names, titles, addresses, and telephone numbers of senior functionaries in the executive, legislative and judicial branches. The compilers, however, were unable (or reluctant) to obtain the necessary data for the Ministries of War, Marine and Aeronautics so that in their sections appear only the notation, "sín información oficial."

Furthermore, the North American scholar and the military subjects of his research may have very different perceptions concerning the appropriateness and the purposes of gathering information and of what meaning that information might have. These different perceptions may stem from differences in individual and professional philosophies and training, in intellectual styles, in their experiences, in the practical problems they face, and in those perceptions that come from the dominant issues of a particular era in the history of their different cultures. As a consequence, perception of the line between social science data collection from military

subjects and espionage is not one on which they can easily agree, especially when the scholarly researcher belongs to a culture different from that of his military subject. When a scholar attempts to do research on the armed forces in another culture, therefore, he may at best be frustrated and at worst find his project aborted and himself persona non grata.

It is theoretically possible, of course, for an aggressive investigator who is not too concerned about the niceties of interpersonal relations to make a successful research "raid" and return home with substantial results. No harm is likely to come to him unless he wishes to return to the country. However, he may leave behind him a residue of ill will or suspicion which will adversely affect the reception of those who follow him.

It was this set of problems which caused Frank Bonilla to lament that since the Latin American military are powerful enough to shield themselves from serious study by Latin American or other scholars, there is little chance of obtaining reliable answers to many questions. The possibilities for good and useful research on such questions are just too few.³⁹

In any case, it was decided at the outset not to employ extensive survey research. Rather we have relied primarily on published materials including histories, both general and military; general and monographic studies of political systems and civil-military relations; accounts of specific contemporary events; general legislation, military ordinances and regulations; newspapers and periodicals; and military service journals. Although Professor Potash and I had access to classified materials in the United States, none of these have been incorporated into this study. All printed or manuscript sources cited are available to the general public. The value of classified materials lay in the fact that they sometimes suggested questions that could be answered using nonclassified sources.

Documentary sources were supplemented insofar as circumstances permitted by open-ended interviews and informal conversations with civilians and military personnel. The use of this material, however, raised an additional problem, essentially ethical in character. Many informants, civilian and uniformed, expressed themselves freely and voiced no objections to attribution. Others spoke confidentially, sometimes on matters which could be construed as sensitive, and indicated or implied that they would prefer not to be identified by name, position and occasionally by rank. For purposes of exposition, however, the several kinds of information cannot always be separated and the danger exists that individuals who spoke freely on non-controversial subjects might be identified with more sensitive opinions or points of view which inevitably must appear in a study of military institutions and their political role. In respect for the confidence of our informants, therefore, we have decided that in citing sources, all persons interviewed will remain anonymous. We feel particularly strongly on this point because of the cordial, cooperative, and yet professionally correct reception we received from Latin American officers, many of whom we regard as personal friends. While this procedure requires a compromise with the norms of scholarly citation, we hope that readers will accept our assurance that all information attributed to anonymous sources has been carefully evaluated and checked for consistency with other data.

Third, there is a widely held belief that United States influence exerted through military assistance programs,⁴⁰ the training of Latin American officers in the United States,⁴¹ and recognition policy has an important effect on the political role of the armed forces in Latin America.⁴² We have not attempted to investigate this problem in any detail. The omission derives not from a denial that North American policy has no relevance but from the conviction that over the long run it is secondary to indigenous forces and that within the resources available to us, the latter should receive priority.

In view of these caveats, we do not pretend that the findings offered in the country chapters are definitive. Furthermore, the same difficulties coupled with the lack of reliable quantifiable data on environmental factors, such as the attributes of political cultures and systems or social structure inhibit any parametric correlations. Instead comparisons will necessarily be descriptive and judgmental. We believe, nevertheless, that findings, comparisons and generalizations represent a substantial advance in what is known about the political role of the military in Latin America.

NOTES

1. Robert A. Potash, "The Changing Role of the Military in Argentina," Journal of Inter-American Studies, Vol. III (October 1961), pp. 551-578.
2. Lyle N. McAlister, "The Army of New Spain, 1764-1800" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Berkeley, 1950).
3. Lyle N. McAlister, "The Reorganization of the Army of New Spain, 1763-1767," Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. XXXIII (February 1963), pp. 1-32.
4. Lyle N. McAlister, The "Fuero Militar" in New Spain, 1764-1800 (Gainesville, Fla., 1957).
5. Lyle N. McAlister, "Civil-Military Relations in Latin America," Journal of Inter-American Studies, Vol. III (July 1961), pp. 341-350.
6. Lyle N. McAlister, "The Military," Continuity and Change in Latin America, edited by John J. Johnson (Stanford, Calif., 1964).
7. Lyle N. McAlister, "Changing Concepts of the Role of the Military in Latin America," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. CCCLX (July 1965), pp. 85-98.
8. Lyle N. McAlister, "Recent Research and Writing on the Role of the Military in Latin America," Latin American Research Review, Vol. II (Fall 1966), pp. 5-36.
9. McAlister, "Recent Research," contains a discussion of the present state of knowledge and contemporary research trends.
10. Samuel Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (London, 1962), p. 86. I am very much in debt to this work not only on this particular point but for many of the basic assumptions and concepts I have employed.
11. Ibid., pp. 86-87.
12. The concepts and definitions of "legitimacy" and "effectiveness" are taken from Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," The American Political Science Review, Vol. LIII (March 1959), pp. 69-105 and particularly pp. 86-90.
13. Martin Needler, Latin American Politics in Perspective (Princeton, N. J., 1963), p. 38.
14. Russell H. Fitzgibbon, "Measurement of Latin American Political Phenomena: A Statistical Experiment," The American Political Science Review, Vol. XLV (June 1951), pp. 517-523; "A Statistical Evaluation of Latin American Democracy," Western Political Quarterly, Vol. IX (September 1956), pp. 607-619; Fitzgibbon and Kenneth F. Johnson, "Measurement of Latin American Political Change," The American Political Science Review, Vol. LIV (September 1961), pp. 515-526; Fitzgibbon, "Measuring Democratic Change in Latin America," Journal of Politics, Vol. XXIX (February 1967), pp. 129-166.
15. See the remarks of William S. Stokes, "Violence as a Power Factor in Latin-American Politics," Western Political Quarterly, Vol. V (September 1952), pp. 445-468, and John J. Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America (Stanford, Calif., 1964), p. viii.

16. See Gino Germani and Kalman Silvert, "Politics, Social Structure and Military Intervention in Latin America," European Journal of Sociology, Vol. II, No. 1 (1961), pp. 62-81, for a discussion of the bases of social structure in Latin America and their relation to the political role of the military.
17. This view is rather fully developed by Johnson in The Military and Society. See particularly p. 150.
18. Ibid., p. 152.
19. José Nun, "A Latin American Phenomenon: 'The Middle Class Military Coup,'" Trends in Social Science Research in Latin American Studies (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of International studies, 1965), pp. 55-91.
20. Ibid., p. 79.
21. Ibid., pp. 90-91.
22. On the political implications of the internal police role of the military see Janowitz, The Military, pp. 38-40, and Edward Glick, The Nonmilitary Use of the Latin American Military (Santa Monica, Calif.: Systems Development Corporation, July 18, 1964), p. 3.
23. Gen. Carlos Severo Toranzo Montero, speech, March 14, 15, as quoted in Arthur P. Whitaker, "The Argentina Paradox," Latin America's Nationalistic Revolutions, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, edited by Robert Burr, Vol. CCCXXXIV (March 1961), p. 106.
24. The objectives of military civic action are discussed in U.S. Army, Civic Action Branch, Civil Affairs Directorate, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Military Civic Action (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1963). For a description of an ongoing program see Perú. Ministerio de Guerra, El ejército del Perú en acción cívica (Lima, 1965).
25. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1959), pp. 8-10.
26. Ibid., pp. 80-85.
27. Philip Springer, "Social Sources of Political Behavior of Venezuelan Military Officers: An Exploratory Analysis," Il politico. Rivista di scienze politiche, Vol. XXX, No. 2 (1965), p. 351.
28. John J. Johnson, The Military and Society, p. 105.
29. Edwin Lieuwen, Generals vs. Presidents. Neomilitarism in Latin America (New York, 1964), p. 104.
30. Martin Needler, Anatomy of a Coup d'Etat: Ecuador, 1963 (Washington, D.C., 1963), p. 45.
31. Finer, The Man on Horseback, p. 7.
32. See Janowitz' analysis of cleavage and cohesion in The Military, pp. 67-74.
33. Victor Alba, El militarismo (Mexico City, 1959), pp. 56-72.
34. Finer, The Man on Horseback, p. 7; Janowitz, The Military, pp. 31-32.
35. Janowitz, The Military, pp. 13-16.
36. For a version of this view see Karl Schmitt, "The Role of the Military in Contemporary Mexico," The Caribbean: Mexico Today, edited by A. Curtis Wilgus (Gainesville, Fla., 1964), pp. 52-61.

37. See for example Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America (rev. ed., New York, 1961), pp. 179-187.

38. These problems are discussed by Frank Bonilla, "Survey Techniques," Studying Politics Abroad (Boston, 1964), pp. 134-152; and Stanley Rothman, "The Lamentable Side of Researching in Chile," American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. VIII (September 1964), pp. 18-19.

39. See the discussion of Nun's paper in Trends in Social Science Research, p. 93.

40. See for example the observations of Lieuwen, Arms and Politics, pp. 230-231.

41. Morris Janowitz makes some interesting observations on the influence of North American officers on the military of new nations, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations (Chicago, 1964), pp. 96-97. See also John J. Johnson, "The Latin American Military as a Politically Competing Group in Transitional Society," The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, by John J. Johnson et al. (Princeton, 1962), p. 129.

42. A thoughtful statement of this position may be found in Martin Needler, "United States Recognition Policy and the Peruvian Case," Inter-American Economic Affairs, Vol. XVI (Spring 1962), pp. 61-72.

CHAPTER 2

PERU

by L. N. McAllister

THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

Presidential Power

Peruvian political culture and its structural and functional expressions display many attributes which have been identified as more or less common to the several Latin American republics. Among these is the extensive power enjoyed by the chief executive. This phenomenon is commonly attributed to an authoritarian tradition inherited from the Spanish colonial regime. It may reflect also, however, a real need in poorly integrated political systems for concentration of decisionmaking authority. In any case, the president of Peru may in effect exercise almost dictatorial powers without violating constitutional norms. This arrangement derives not only from authority specifically invested in his office but from the relative debility of other institutions of government. The regular legislative session, for example, lasts only 120 days annually and during the rest of the year the president may take actions prohibited when congress is in session. In the latter circumstance, and even when faced by an opposition majority in congress such as the present Aprista-Odrista coalition confronting President Belaunde Terry, the executive's legislative programs may be obstructed but he may issue decrees and resolutions having the force of law and he possesses extensive control over the distribution of funds, patronage, privileges, and other political goods. He also enjoys special emergency powers such as the right to suspend constitutional guarantees upon declaring a state of siege.¹

There are two significant concomitants of the superordinate powers of the president. First, individuals and interest groups look directly to him for satisfaction of their wants and redress of their grievances in much the same way as their colonial predecessors looked to the Spanish crown. Second, the struggle for the control of the executive office dominates overwhelmingly the Peruvian political process. It is intense and unremitting. The incumbent must be ruthless and astute to remain in office; for the opposition, no means are too extreme to effect his discomfiture and, hopefully, his displacement.²

Lack of Input Functions

A second and closely related attribute of the Peruvian political system is the underdevelopment of input functions. At a very basic level, the Peruvian middle sectors have failed to serve as a bridge between polar groups and to perform the function of articulating and aggregating a broad range of moderate interests and aspirations in the manner posited by writers who based their theories on the role of the middle class in the United States and Western Europe. On the contrary, they have lacked homogeneity and cohesion; they are dependent on the oligarchy for their value system and to a large extent their occupational opportunities. Dependence is accompanied by a basic feeling of insecurity and resentment against the rich

and powerful on whom they must depend. Being themselves unstable and undynamic, they cannot perform a stabilizing or positive political role.³

At another level, input functions are adversely affected by the invertebrate character of Peruvian interest group structure. Each group tends to be a closed association excessively concerned with its own status, privileges, and aspirations. Political recruitment involves induction by birth, training, or co-option into a particular group rather than into a national civic culture; socialization consists of indoctrination in the ideology or pragmatic aspirations of the group. Political communication among them is limited, tentative, and distrustful. This situation is accompanied by and perhaps explains the absence of effective political parties whose membership cuts across basic interest-group boundaries and which can perform a broadly aggregative function. It is one of the most striking anomalies of Peruvian and, indeed, Latin American politics that APRA (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana), which possessed a high aggregative potential, has been blocked from power by the hostility of the oligarchy and the armed forces as well as its own intransigent attitudes and obstructive tactics.

During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, although it might not have conformed to the norms of Western constitutionalism, the Peruvian political system functioned reasonably well. The only significant interest groups were the oligarchy, the church, and the military and their demands were essentially negative; that is, they were primarily concerned with the preservation of their traditional privileges and immunities and their interests were really not in conflict. The political process consisted of struggles among civilian, military, or civilian-military factions for control of patronage which was achieved through the occupation of the presidential palace. More recently, however, new groups have entered the political arena—labor syndicates, intellectuals, agrarian associations, and the like—with positive and sometimes doctrinaire programs. Moreover, modern communications systems have made all groups intimately aware of the affluence enjoyed by "developed" nations. Thus, not only has the emergence of new interest groups created a broader range of wants and aspirations but their absolute volume has increased all along the range. At a collective level these are expressed in terms of demands for modernization and reform and at the individual level for specific goods and benefits.

In the absence of aggregative devices, and in view of the position of the chief executive as the greater provider and arbiter, a rapidly escalating and often conflicting body of demands is presented to the president in raw form. Today the president must yield to pressures for agrarian reform but without employing radical measures which would affront conservative supporters. He must satisfy the demands of the armed forces to curb communism in the universities without alienating his intellectual supporters; funds must be provided for education, health, and welfare without changes in fiscal policies which would bring down upon him the wrath of the commercial-banking component of the oligarchy. And demands must be met today. There is no time for deliberate and careful processing. He must perform, moreover, in the face of intransigent resistance from his opposition to anything he wants to do and the awareness that if his impatient supporters are not obliged promptly they may defect. In short, he is under unremitting, heavy, and almost intolerable pressures.

Role of Violence

A third attribute of Peruvian political culture is the acceptance of violence as a political instrument, not only by the insurgent left but by all groups and classes. Violence may be anomic as in the case of jacqueries in the sierra or urban riots, but more often it is structured

in the form of military golpes and objective-oriented strikes and demonstrations. Professor Robert Payne writes:

Analytically it is impractical to view Peruvian politics in a constitutional framework, for constitutionalism is not the modal pattern of interaction. To treat violence and the military coup as aberrations places one in the awkward position of insisting that practically all significant political events of the past half-century are deviations. Demonstrations, clashes with the police, military takeovers: these are normal in a purely descriptive sense. They happen frequently and they are significant.⁴

Payne then advances five propositions about the Peruvian political system which serve to interrelate the several attributes described earlier:

1. The conflict for control of the presidency is intense.
2. Opposition forces are disposed to employ extreme methods to destroy an incumbent president—including the use of physical violence.
3. The armed forces will remove a president when widespread "dissatisfaction" exists and incidents of violence become frequent.
4. The president, when his tenure is threatened by the use of violence, will attempt to prevent violence by making concessions to those groups which threaten its use.
5. Therefore, politically structured violence is a highly effective weapon for those groups which can employ it.⁵

The tacit acceptance and regular employment of structured violence have further consequences in that they affect the basic legitimacy of governments; that is, the belief on the part of the governed that the regime in power has the right to their obedience even when its actions do not coincide with the subject's personal interests and where obedience is not merely the result of habit. The problem was first posed, Professor Martin Needler observes, "[when] the Wars of Independence succeeded in sweeping away the colonial system, in eliminating any possibility of relying on the idea that legitimate authority comes from above, from the royal succession sanctioned by the grace of God, without replacing it with a system based on the belief that legitimate authority comes from below, from the popular will."⁶ During the first days of the republic, therefore, opposition groups felt no inhibitions in deposing and replacing by violence a government whose moral foundations were not universally accepted. But the new regime, by virtue of the circumstances of its creation, had even less claim to legitimacy and was more vulnerable to violence, so that a self-perpetuating relationship—illegitimacy-violence-illegitimacy—was formed. In Peru, few governments have come to power without violence or the threat of violence and few, if any, have existed whose legitimacy has been universally accepted. Although the administration of Belaunde Terry is widely regarded as democratic and enjoys substantial popular support, its legitimacy is slightly tainted for Apristas and Odristas who point out that it might not be in power but for the cancellation by the military of the election results of 1962.

In summary, structural and functional weaknesses in the Peruvian political system have historically made for endemic instability. Although recent developments suggest, perhaps, that foundations for more viable processes are being established, the present arrangement can best be described as being in unstable equilibrium. The implications of this situation for the political role of the military are obvious. First, the armed forces are themselves a de

facto interest group with constant or intermittent demands to be met. Moreover, they have at their disposal almost a monopoly of organized violence. Second, instability may invite, tempt, or require them to extend their role beyond constitutional or normative limits.

THE MILITARY INSTITUTION

Institutional Development

Army

The institutional history of the Peruvian ground forces may be traced back to the units which fought beside Argentine and Colombian expeditionaries during the Wars of Independence. The army did not, however, begin to develop as a professional organization until the 1890's. During the preceding decades of the century its internal administration and economy had been guided by Spanish regulations and ordinances, in some cases inherited from the colonial period and often indifferently observed. Despite constitutional proscriptions to the contrary, enlisted personnel were recruited by irregular impressment (reclutamiento) from the lowest and most defenseless classes of society—Negroes, Indians, and mulattos—and terms and conditions of service were frequently determined by "military necessity."⁸ The selection and promotion of officers were based on battlefield performance, personal allegiances, and family connections, or were a form of political patronage. Professional training was equally irregular. Although several attempts were made to establish schools and colleges for the instruction of officers and cadets, the quality of instruction in these institutions was low and their operation was intermittent because of frequent external wars and internecine strife which drew students from the classroom into the camp. Military expertise, where it existed, was acquired through field apprenticeship and through the studies of individual officers.⁹

The impetus toward professionalization was provided by Peru's disastrous defeat by Chile in the War of the Pacific (1879-1883). Both military and civilian leaders believed that if the nation was to avoid further humiliation and territorial dismemberment, the armed forces and particularly the army would have to be revitalized and trained as a modern fighting force. Moreover, Nicolás de Piérola, civilian president of the republic (1895-1898) who provided the initiative, hoped that professionalization would not only improve the army's combat capabilities but would change its internal status from what historically had been that of a predominant political faction to a nonpartisan national institution.¹⁰

Four major steps were taken during the Piérola administration to implement these goals. First, the government contracted for a French military mission which, headed by Colonel Paul Clément, arrived in Lima in September 1896. The contract was successfully renewed so that French officers were the principal preceptors of the Peruvian army from that year until the outbreak of World War I and again during the years between the two world wars.¹¹

Second, in 1898 a law of military recruitment and administration was promulgated. Its recruitment articles established the principle of obligatory military service for all male Peruvians within defined age limits, and regulated enlistment procedures and the terms and conditions of enlisted service. Other sections of the law established new and more modern norms for internal administrative and tactical organization, fiscal management, and promotions. Third, in the same year a new code of military justice, based on French and Spanish codes then in force, was adopted. This instrument modernized both the substantive and procedural features of Peruvian military law.¹²

Fourth, and perhaps most significant, in 1898, under the guidance of the French mission and the directorship of Colonel Clément, the Escuela Militar de Aplicación was established in Chorrillos, a community on the outskirts of Lima where, since the 1850's most of the capital garrison had been stationed. The function of the school was to prepare competitively selected cadets for officer commissions, provide specialized instruction for officers of the several arms and services, and train noncommissioned officers.¹³ Renamed in 1900 the Escuela Militar de Chorrillos (EMCH),¹⁴ it graduated in the following year its first class (promoción) consisting of six officers and through 1962, produced a total of 3,786 officers, of which 1,780 were commissioned in the infantry, 757 in the artillery, 608 in the cavalry, 492 in the engineers, and 149 in administration and finance.¹⁵ The army proudly describes the EMCH as its alma mater.¹⁶

Shortly thereafter, in 1904, the Escuela Superior de Guerra (ESG) was founded to provide captains, majors, and lieutenant colonels with instruction in military tactics and in command and staff duties.¹⁷ The training provided by the EMCH and the ESG has been instrumental in the professionalization of the officer corps of the Peruvian army.

Navy

The institutional history of the Peruvian sea forces follows in some respects the same lines as that of the army. The navy had its origins in the ships and men that fought for independence from Spain;¹⁸ throughout the nineteenth century it was poorly equipped and the professional qualities of most of its officers and men were low; in the late part of the century a French naval mission was imported to reorganize and train it.¹⁹ Initially, however, the rehabilitation of the navy lagged behind that of the army and it was not until after World War I that it began to develop as a modern, professional organization. The initiative in this case was provided by President Augusto B. Leguía; the instrument was a United States naval mission which arrived in Peru in October 1920.²⁰

Under the guidance of the mission and its successors, during the next ten years internal administration was thoroughly overhauled, and more modern ships and equipment were acquired. In 1929 the ministry of marine and aviation was established. Previous to that year the navy had subsisted under the army-dominated ministry of war. The new ministry provided an agency which could concern itself more directly with naval affairs and could represent the navy at cabinet level in interservice competition for budgetary allocations.²¹ Complete naval autonomy was achieved in 1941 when military aviation was detached from the combined ministry and given its own ministerial status.²²

During the same period the naval school system was expanded and modernized. In 1921 the school of naval aviation was organized to train officers for the air arm; two years later the cadet-training institution, the Escuela Naval, which had been established under French aegis in the early part of the century, was reorganized and its curriculum modernized; in 1930 the foundations were established for the Escuela de Guerra Naval, which was designed to train middle-rank officers in naval tactics and in command and staff duties. As in the case of their army counterparts, the two institutions provided the instruments for the creation of a modern professional officer corps.²³

Air Force

Although military aviation existed in Peru as early as 1915, the Peruvian air force was a post-World War I creation. As in the case of the army and the navy, efforts to develop a

modern air arm began with the importation of a French mission which arrived in Lima in September 1919. The following year a school of aviation was established at the aerodrome of Bellavista, where French instructors began training both military and civilian pilots. Shortly thereafter the school was moved to Maranga on the outskirts of Lima. Initial efforts, however, were abortive. In 1921, the French mission withdrew and the direction of instruction was taken over by an English major and a North American pilot. A year later the school itself was moved to Las Palmas and formally christened the Escuela de Aviación Militar Jorge Chávez, after the Peruvian pilot who in 1909 had distinguished himself in European air sport competition and who in 1910 flew over the Alps for the "glory and pride of Peru." Its principal function was to provide flight and mechanical training for army personnel.²⁴

Initially, military aviation was regarded merely as an auxiliary service of the army and was administered through a Dirección General de Aeronáutica placed under the ministry of war. In 1925 it was raised in status by the creation of the Cuerpo de Aviación Militar which, although still a component of the army, was provided with its own administrative and command structure. Four years later, military aviation was grouped with the naval air arm as the Cuerpo de Aviación del Perú, under an Inspección General de Aviación, which in turn was lodged in the newly created ministry of marine and aviation. The inspector's office also had direct control of all civil and commercial aviation in the republic. In 1941, in recognition of the air corps contribution during the border war with Ecuador and the growing importance of civil aviation in the national communications system, military and civil aviation were detached from the ministry of marine and aviation and placed under an autonomous ministry of aeronautics.²⁵ Finally, in 1950 military aviation was designated as the Peruvian air force which, under the ministry of aeronautics, enjoyed a status equal to that of the army and the navy.²⁶

The administrative and organizational development of Peruvian military aviation was accompanied as in the case of the army and navy, by the creation of a system of professional schools. The Escuela de Aviación Militar Jorge Chávez, subsequently renamed the Escuela de Oficiales de Aeronáutica, evolved into a university type academy for the training of air cadets which in 1936 graduated its first class.²⁷ Seven years later an Academia de Guerra Aérea, the counterpart of the command and general staff schools of the army and navy, was established.²⁸

Strength and Organization

Army

As table 1 shows, since the army began to assume its modern form its strength has increased from approximately 2,000 to 33,000 men, with the latter figure including some 3,500 active officers.²⁹ The increase may be attributed in part to normal—and inevitable—institutional growth. The sharp increment between 1941 and 1947 appears to be a response to two situations: the border conflict with Ecuador in 1941 and hemispheric defense responsibilities undertaken in connection with World War II. Following an almost universal pattern, however, after 1945 strength did not revert to prewar levels because of continued world tensions and apprehensions about Ecuadorian irredentism.³⁰

The Peruvian army is today organized tactically into six light infantry divisions and one armored division grouped into two army corps; a number of separate engineer, artillery, and infantry battalions and special units attached to the two corps or directly under army command, and the cavalry and infantry of the presidential guard.³¹ Administratively, the nation is divided into five military regions with headquarters respectively in Piura, Arequipa, Lima, Cuzco, and

Iquitos. Regional commands provide administrative and logistical support for tactical units and an administrative organization for personnel recruitment, reserve training, and mobilization.³²

TABLE 1
INCREASE OF ARMY STRENGTH

<u>Year</u>	<u>Approximate Strength</u>
1901	2,000
1903	3,000
1912	7,000
1925	9,445
1927	7,556
1930	9,045
1937	11,700
1941	14,551
1947	30,000
1965	33,000

Formal command structure within the army runs from the commander in chief in Lima to the commanders of corps, regions, and units and stations attached directly to general headquarters. The commander in chief is assisted by a traditional general and special staff supervised by a chief. His general command status is, however, only nominal. The minister of war, although a cabinet minister appointed by and responsible to the president of the republic and despite constitutional provisions against professional activities on the part of ministers, is an officer on active duty. In effect, he is nominated by the army to represent it and is de facto the senior commander of the ground forces with the nominal commander in chief serving as his deputy.³³

Navy

Turning to the navy, its personnel strength including the air arm is some 650 officers and 6,500 other ranks. This force is supplemented by a company of marines. Its forces afloat include no capital ships but consist of light cruisers, destroyers, destroyer escorts, submarines, naval aircraft, and smaller combat, auxiliary, and service vessels.³⁴ Its submarine service is generally regarded as its best trained and equipped component and places Peru as number one among Latin American submarine powers.³⁵

The navy is organized into two operational commands, naval forces Pacific with headquarters in Callao and naval forces Amazon with headquarters in Santa Clotilde. Major shore establishments include the naval bases at Callao, Iquitos, and Santa Clotilde and the several service schools. Formal command structure leads from the commander in chief to

the commanders of operational forces, shore installations and schools. The commander is assisted by a traditional staff headed by a chief and the conventional bureaus. As in the case of the army, however, de facto general command is in the hands of the minister of marine, a naval officer on active duty. In addition to his naval command, the minister has directly under him the directors general of port captaincies and merchant marine.³⁶

Air Force

The third service, the air force, has a personnel strength of some 4,000 officers and men. Operationally, it consists of four groups that are supported by ground installations and service units. Overall command is formally assigned to a commander in chief who is assisted by a general air staff. As in the case of the other services, however, real command is exercised by the minister of aeronautics, an air force officer on active duty. Within his ministry are included not only military aviation but also the bureaus of civil aviation, meteorology, and aerial photography.³⁷

For purposes of overall administration, Peru has not seen fit to superimpose a ministry of defense on the three services. Instead, their respective ministries independently formulate policy and manage budgets within broad limits imposed by the constitution and the laws. Neither do the armed forces have in peacetime an overall operational command. Such coordination as exists is affected by the joint command (Comando Conjunto), which was created in 1957. Its membership is composed of a president selected from one of the three services on a rotational basis, the commander in chief of each service, and a permanent joint staff. Its primary function is planning, and its status and authority are limited by the fact that the real command in each service is exercised by its minister rather than by its nominal commander.³⁸

The Military Mission

The constitutionally defined mission of the Peruvian armed forces is to safeguard the rights of the republic, to enforce compliance with the constitution and to maintain public order.³⁹ As is the case with constitutional provisions in general, this definition is open to interpretation and has been formally supplemented by more specific laws and ordinances and by more informal decisions and actions on the part of the military.

Safeguarding the rights of the republic means, specifically, defending the national territory against external aggression. This responsibility has two aspects: defense against hostile actions of neighboring states, and participation in hemispheric defense in alliance with the other American republics.⁴⁰

While foreign observers may believe that inter-American security agreements make the external missions of the Latin American military unnecessary, the Peruvian armed forces take their responsibility for national defense seriously, and do not propose to delegate it to any international agency. Their attitude is based on an historical awareness that their country is bordered by five nations with all of which they have had serious and prolonged border disputes and with four of which they have been at war, formally or informally, at least two times as indicated in Table 2. Although disputes with the fifth, Brazil, have never led to significant hostilities, they have produced armed border incidents.

TABLE 2
PERU'S WARS WITH BORDER NATIONS

<u>Dates</u>	<u>Wars</u>
1828	War with Bolivia
1828-29	War with Gran Colombia
1835-36	War with Bolivia
1836-39	War with Chile
1841-42	War with Bolivia
1859	War with Ecuador
1864-66	War with Spain
1879-83	War with Chile (War of the Pacific)
1903-1904	Border incidents with Brazil
1932-34	Leticia dispute with Colombia
1941-42	War with Ecuador

While the issues which provoked these conflicts have largely been resolved, discomfitures suffered in them are deeply embedded in the memory of the armed forces. A particularly dark recollection, even after the lapse of nearly a century, is the War of the Pacific which resulted in the loss of an entire province to Chile and the occupation of the national capital for three years by Chilean troops. This disaster was and still is blamed on military unpreparedness. In the meantime, two sensitive spots remain. First, Ecuador does not accept the settlement of 1942 and Peruvians feel that they must be prepared for Ecuadorian irrendentism. Second, while they do not regard Brazil as hostile, they are aware of her history of dynamic frontier expansion. In the meantime, therefore, they feel it is only prudent to guard and effectively occupy their Amazonian territories. For the time being both defense and occupation are military tasks.⁴¹

With respect to a hemispheric mission, many Peruvian officers privately recognize that the nation's armed forces could react only in a limited way in case of aggression from outside the continent, and believe that the burden of defense would have to be assumed by the United States. Officially, however, there is little disposition to renounce a mission that provides the three services with their principal source of modern equipment and training, along with the pride and prestige derived from an alliance with one of the two greatest military powers in the world.⁴²

The internal mission of the Peruvian armed forces, enforcement of the constitution and the laws, is less clearcut. Traditionally it has ranged from the routine supervision of national elections through backing up the guardia civil in riot control to the suppression of major insurrection.

Counterinsurgency

Since the Cuban Revolution, the internal security mission of Peru's armed forces has acquired a new and more specific dimension in the form of counterinsurgency; that is,

operations against Maoist-Castroist type revolutionary warfare. This development is largely the result of persuasion from the United States, where hemispheric defense planners now visualize the primary function of the Latin American armed forces as the destruction of internal subversion, rather than conventional operations.⁴³ Counterinsurgency, because of its land-based character, is regarded primarily as an army responsibility, although the air force, the guardia civil, and to a lesser extent the navy are supposed to play supporting roles. Preparation for the new mission has included general staff contingency planning, the introduction of instruction in counterinsurgency doctrine and tactics in service school and troop training, the formation of special counterguerrilla units, and the posting of Peruvian military personnel to the School of the Americas in the Panama Canal Zone for counterinsurgency training.⁴⁴

Military Civic Action

Coincident with emphasis on counterinsurgency, the military has acquired a new mission, civic action, that is not even implied or anticipated in the constitution. In its broadest sense, civic action is the employment of the technical, organizational, and logistic resources of the armed forces in the process of national development and modernization. Such a role is by no means new. In the course of their routine military functions, the Peruvian military have for many years provided literacy training to conscripts; explored and mapped remote parts of the national territory; and developed land, sea, and air communications. In the early 1960's, however, military civic action was more explicitly defined and new features added to it.⁴⁵

Increased emphasis on the public service role of the armed forces derived from several circumstances. First, positive counterinsurgency doctrine called for military participation in community development projects with the hope that by demonstrating the interest of the national government in the welfare of all the people, it would forestall insurgency or reconcile disaffected areas.⁴⁶ Theory was given a practical application when, in January 1963, the army undertook a program of road construction and land reform in the La Convención region in response to agrarian unrest attributed to Communist instigation. Second, the army regarded civic action as an excellent device to enhance its public image.⁴⁷ Third, the mildly reformist military junta of 1962-1963 encouraged the direct participation of the armed forces in development and modernization.⁴⁸ A final impetus was provided by the election, in 1963, of President Fernando Belaunde Terry who appealed to the armed forces to "join with civilians, using their discipline and technical skills in making war on unacceptable social conditions." As a consequence of these circumstances, civic action was formally adopted in 1963 as a component of the military mission and was regarded as the military's contribution to Belaunde's program of Acción Popular.⁴⁹

Among the three branches of the service, the ground forces appear to be the most strongly committed to civic action and the most active participants in it. Army leadership may be attributed to several factors. In the first place, because of its numerical strength, territorial distribution, and training and equipment it is best adapted to participate; second, because of its recruitment procedures, training, and functions it is more closely attuned to national needs; finally, the army has been more consistently concerned with its public image than the other services.

As of 1965, army civic action programs in operation included a substantial range of services to urban and rural communities; mapping and surveying of the national territory; literacy training for some 6,000 conscripts and some 30,000 civilians annually; vocational training centers in the capitals of each military region for conscripts in their last three months of service; a similarly organized agricultural training program in the Cuzco region;

and the full-time employment of six engineer battalions in the construction and maintenance of access roads across the sierra into the Amazon Basin. In addition, planning is well along for colonization projects in trans-Andean Peru.⁵⁰

Although the navy and the air force are not as deeply involved in civic action as the army, each has its own programs and provides logistical support for army projects.⁵¹ Navy activities historically have included the employment of its shipyards for the construction and servicing of merchant marine vessels and oceanographic research in support of Peru's burgeoning fishing industry. In reaction to the atmosphere of the early 1960's, however, the navy has developed, in cooperation with civilian agencies, programs of medical, educational, and agricultural assistance to isolated communities along the waterways of the Amazon Basin and to a lesser extent around Lake Titicaca and on the Pacific Coast. It also assists the army's road construction activities in the selva by providing water transport of heavy equipment.⁵² The air force's contribution historically consisted of providing air transportation for personnel, mail, and equipment to areas that civilian lines did not serve. As in the cases of the other services, however, in 1963 it explicitly adopted civic action and expanded its air service to provide transportation for technicians working on community development projects and for army personnel and equipment employed in road construction.⁵³

Finally, it must be added, civic action is not entirely divorced from the primary military mission. As the army's official publication on its program puts it, "The army is efficient in proportion to the level of development of the society which supports it, and the defense of a nation becomes more difficult when its people do not have material goods to defend, or possess the level of culture permitting them to be inculcated with patriotism in the degree necessary."⁵⁴ More specifically and concretely, roads constructed or under construction lead to frontiers with Ecuador, Brazil, and Bolivia and colonization will occupy empty national territory abutting on neighboring countries.⁵⁵

Officer Recruitment

Army

Except for technical services such as the medical corps, cadetship in the Escuela Militar de Chorrillos has been the primary route to a commission in the Peruvian army since the founding of the school in the late nineteenth century. Applicants for admission must be Peruvians by birth, physically and morally fit, single, at least sixteen and not over twenty years of age as of January 31 of the year of admission, at least 1.63 meters in height if under eighteen years and 1.65 if over, at least 53 kilograms in weight, and must have completed five years of secondary school at the time of admission.⁵⁶

Beyond these general requirements, annual vacancies are allotted by geographic region as shown in Table 3.⁵⁷

Within general admission requirements and geographical quotas cadets are selected from among applicants who rank among the top five students in classes graduating from public high schools (colegios nacionales) and the first ten in those from military preparatory schools (colegios militares) located in Lima, Arequipa, Chiclayo, and Trujillo. Such "select" candidates are not required to take a general academic type entrance examination but must pass rigorous physical, psychological, and aptitude tests. After these tests have been completed, any remaining vacancies are filled through a competitive examination administered to applicants who, regardless of regional origin, possess basic qualifications for admission.⁵⁸

TABLE 3
ANNUAL ALLOTMENT OF VACANCIES FOR THE ESCUELA MILITAR
DE CHORRILLOS BY GEOGRAPHIC REGIONS

<u>Department in Which the Fifth Year of Secondary School is Taken</u>	<u>Percentage of Vacancies Allotted</u>
Tumbes, Piura, Cajamarca, Amazonas, Lambayeque, and La Libertad	20
Ancash, Lima, Ica, Junín, Pasco, Huancavelica and the Constitutional Province of Callao	50
Arequipa, Moquegua, Tacna, and Ayacucho	15
Cuzco, Puno, Apurímac, and Madre de Dios	10
Loreto, Huánuco, and San Martín	5
Total	100%

There is every evidence that the army is vitally concerned with attracting promising young men to the military profession. Publicity points out the advantages of an officer's career: an assured place in life; an income providing for a decent living; complete medical care for himself and his family; secure retirement; a chance for advanced education not only in military schools but through assignments requiring courses in civilian institutions; an occasion to appreciate the extent and diversity of the national territory and to mix with different social, professional, and economic groups through normal rotation of posts and assignments; and opportunities for foreign travel through attendance at schools abroad, assignments as military attachés, and the like.⁵⁹ Publicity is disseminated through service publications, recruiting offices functioning in the capitals of military regions, and annual visits of officers to the nation's secondary schools. Also, each year the high command arranges for promising fifth-year secondary school students to visit the Escuela Militar where they view and briefly share the life of cadets.⁶⁰

It was not practicable to obtain figures on the proportion of applications to admissions. Other evidence suggests, however, that selection is generally competitive and that an officer's career is attractive to Peruvian youth. An occupational preference survey made in 1963 among 1,834 male students in public and private secondary schools revealed that the military profession was second only to engineering in attraction. The authors observed that in general Peruvian youths preferred positions of power to careers in economic production but that the armed forces continue to be regarded as a principal route of upward social mobility for persons of modest or low social origins.⁶¹ Closely related to the latter circumstance is the fact that although the Escuela Militar does not formally grant a B. A. or B. S., graduation from it is officially declared to be the academic equivalent of a baccalaureate degree from a civilian institution.⁶² Thus, it provides a completely subsidized university-level education for young men to whom it might not otherwise be available.⁶³

The above conclusions are supported by interviews or conversations with Peruvian officers. Of the 27 who expressed themselves on career motivations, 24 affirmed or intimated

that one of the principal reasons they sought commissions in the army was because it provided a means of improving social and economic status, because officership was the most secure of all professions in an unstable and rapidly changing society, or because of some combination of these factors. Almost invariably, however, such responses were accompanied by statements that a military career provided an opportunity to serve the nation. None openly admitted that they sought power, but in a few instances there were intimations that this motive was at least subconsciously present in decisions to become officers.

Peruvian army officers affirm that their corps is the most democratically recruited in Latin America, since admission to the Escuela Militar is based solely on merit. No discrimination, they insist, is practiced on the grounds of class, color, or region. As a consequence, the army officer corps is truly a national institution. In terms of intent, this contention appears to be substantially true and, as the following analysis of regional and social origins suggests, the corps is in fact a broadly representative group.

Material employed in determining regional and social origins falls into three categories: published biographical data, oral statements of officers about their preservice backgrounds, and oral and written generalizations made by both soldiers and civilians.⁶⁴ In the case of regional origins, analysis of 45 cases reveals that no particular province (department) predominates nor does the present membership of the officer corps generally correspond to the assigned regional quotas tabulated above. Rather, the pattern of recruitment is scattered and nationally representative, except that there are disproportionately more officers from rural districts and small and medium-sized provincial communities than from large urban areas. Admittedly, the sample is small and quite possibly unrepresentative. Results, however, are consistently supported by generalizations of officers and civilians.

Turning to social origins, evidence at hand suggests that the officer corps of the army is overwhelmingly middle class and predominantly petite bourgeoisie. Published biographical data are not very revealing on family background. An indirect indicator, however, is generally included; that is, preservice education of the officer. Here it is assumed that graduation from a public secondary school strongly implies middle class origins, since the upper class and even the upper middle class normally send their children to private or parochial institutions or to preparatory schools abroad; in most cases a secondary school education is beyond the means of lower class families. Of the 52 samples collected, 47 entered the Escuela Militar from public high schools. In the case of interviews and conversations, all officers, regardless of rank, who commented on their social background identified themselves as middle class. The generalizations they made about their corps generally took the form, "We are all middle class." A few said they had colleagues whom they regarded as upper class; a somewhat larger number affirmed that they knew of others of lower class and particularly of Indian background. They believed, furthermore, that the proportion of lower class personnel was increasing in junior ranks and in incoming classes of cadets. The predominantly middle class character of the army officer corps, as determined from biographical data and as observed by officers themselves, was confirmed by talks with civilians. With respect to the presence of upper class elements, an additional check was made by comparing the names of 200 army officers on duty in 1964 with a membership list of the exclusive and aristocratic Club Nacional. The exercise revealed that only two were members.

Biographical data collected were not very revealing on the percentage of officers who were sons of army men. The estimates of ten officers who expressed themselves on the subject, however, ranged from 15 to 20 percent, with the figure for those who had relatives in the service running somewhat higher. Six of the ten believed that intraservice recruiting was increasing while the remaining four had no opinion.

There is no evidence that middle class predominance in the army officer corps is the result of deliberate selection. Rather it derives from professional considerations involved in the selection of officer aspirants together with the changing economic and social structure of the republic. On the one hand, as intimated above, the requirement of five years of secondary education for admission to the Escuela Militar in effect discriminates against lower social sectors although, it must be added, selection based on educational requirements prevails in all modern officer corps. It has also been suggested that the minimum height requirement of 1.65 meters disqualifies some 70 percent of Indian young men since their average height is only 1.56 meters. On the other hand, officership in the army has never held a strong attraction for the sons of the elite whose economic and social status was secure and to whom the life of barracks and field was distasteful. Since World War II, somewhat the same reaction has developed among upper middle class youth for whom economic expansion has broadened career opportunities and provided alternative routes to wealth and status. Thus, it is precisely the offspring of lower middle class families who possess the combination of opportunity and motivation for commissioned careers in the army.⁶⁵

Navy

Except for certain classes of specialists, Peruvian naval officers are graduates of the Escuela Naval, the marine counterpart of the Escuela Militar. Data available on their social and regional backgrounds are more limited than for army officers and consist largely of published or oral generalizations and scattered biographical information. The evidence is sufficient, however, to indicate that officers and cadets are largely of upper middle class origin with a perceptible sprinkling of upper class representatives. This pattern may be attributed to several factors. Navies universally and traditionally have been the aristocracy of the armed forces. Their status derives from or is at least related to the fact that navies generally provide more attractive conditions of service—stations, assignments, quarters, social opportunities, and the like—than do ground forces. Their relatively modest personnel requirements, moreover, permit them to be more selective in officer recruitment. In any case, naval officership in Peru has been more attractive to members of upper social strata than commissions in the army. Quite aside from the data on which these observations are based, differences in the social background of army and navy officers are easily observable in their contrasting phenotypes. In moving from the Ministerio de Guerra or the Escuela Militar to the Ministerio de Marina or Escuela Naval a distinct "whitening" is apparent.

In terms of regional origins, up to 90 percent of naval officers come from urban areas and particularly from greater Lima. This pattern appears to correspond roughly to the distribution of the types of families from which naval officers are recruited. It may also be attributable to the concentration of a large part of the naval establishment in the Lima-Callao area, and the fact that the navy has no policy of regional allocation for admission to the Escuela Naval.

The upper class urban character of the naval officer corps tends to persist because of circumstances of recruitment. Although admission to the Escuela Naval is open to all qualified applicants on a competitive basis, youths who have received their primary and secondary education in naval preparatory schools (*liceos navales*) have had a distinct advantage in the rigorous entrance examinations required. Students in these institutions have been almost exclusively the sons of naval officers or of their close relatives or friends. It should be added, however, that the exclusiveness of the navy appears to be eroding slowly. With the overall expansion of educational opportunities in Peru and improved quality of instruction, more lower middle class and occasional lower class youths now enter the Escuela Naval. The

trend, however, is not spectacular. Officers with such backgrounds, moreover, tend to serve in the technical and specialized branches of the service rather than as line officers and rarely reach flag rank.⁶⁶

Air Force

In terms of the preservice backgrounds of its officers, the Peruvian Air Force falls somewhere between the army and the navy. During the early stages of development of military aviation, its novelty, and the adventure and career prospects it offered, attracted young men from diverse social backgrounds, and this circumstance is still reflected among senior officers. However, although an offshoot of the army, the air force has oriented itself toward the more aristocratic tradition of the navy. It has, moreover, been able to be more selective than the ground forces in recruiting cadets for its Escuela de Oficiales. Its personnel requirements are even more modest than the navy and it can offer special incentives such as the glamour of "wearing the eagles," and extra risk pay. As a consequence, its officer corps is largely middle class but with the balance falling toward the upper rather than the lower sectors. It also contains a sprinkling of upper class elements. It has not, however, been in existence long enough to develop a self-perpetuating and exclusive officer corps, nor does it appear to be inclined to do so. With respect to regional background, no formal allocation exists for incoming cadets. In 1965, about 40 percent of active air force officers were from the Lima area, some 15 percent from Iquitos, and the remainder of scattered provincial origin.⁶⁷

In summary, the three services may be ranked according to the preservice social status of their officers in the descending order: navy, air force, army. Or the difference may be put in another way; that is, since enlisted personnel of all services are of lower class origins, the social gap between officers and men in the navy is wide, less so in the air force, and still smaller in the army. This pattern would seem to have differential effects on the ease of communication between officers and other ranks in the three services. In terms of regional background, navy officers are recruited largely in urban areas, and particularly in Lima; in the air force, officers from Lima also predominate but urban origins are less obvious than in the case of the navy. It is undoubtedly true that the officer corps of the ground forces is more representative of the nation, and the army more democratically organized than the other two services, a fact which it does not hesitate to publicize.

Military Education and Socialization

An officer in the Peruvian army spends an average of 30 percent of his active career in school. His professional education begins in the Escuela de Oficiales, the cadet-training component of the Escuela Militar de Chorrillos. The Escuela de Oficiales provides a four-year, university-level curriculum for officer aspirants except for prospective engineers who must take a fifth year of work. Graduates are commissioned as second lieutenants (subtenientes or alfereces). Instruction is organized into three departments: military, academic, and physical education. The military component consists of one year of basic training and three devoted to specialized instruction in the arm to which the student is assigned at the end of his first year. The academic department provides courses in history, the humanities, language, and the natural and social sciences. Instruction in these areas is related to the professional role and duties of the officer not only in a traditional context but with reference to countersubversive tactics, psychological warfare, military civic action, and civil-military relations. The faculty includes profesores civiles employed on a full- or part-time basis, and which in 1962 totaled forty-two as against thirty-one military members. Physical education is concerned with

personal hygiene, body building, and the development of sportsmanship and team spirit. Throughout the curriculum, heavy emphasis is placed on moral training designed to develop the military virtues of

'honor, loyalty, self-abnegation, valor, perseverance, honesty, dignity, discipline, responsibility, spirit of sacrifice, devotion to duty and patriotism. . . . Essentially it is intended to arouse the primordial sentiment of love of the army and respect for the orders of superiors, the fundamental base of institutional equilibrium and discipline.'⁶⁸

Military and patriotic values are inculcated not only through formal class instruction, but through such extracurricular activities as religious services, cadet associations, visiting speakers, and a wide variety of commemorative ceremonies. They are reinforced by the austere ambience of the physical plant; the ubiquitous presence of statues and portraits of national heroes, past commandants, and distinguished graduates; and by monuments and plaques commemorating heroic events in the past of the nation and the armed forces.⁶⁹

The intermediate level of military education consists of the military specialty schools (*escuelas de aplicación*) which provide a year of specialized training for junior officers in their arm or service. The first of these was established in the mid-1930's. Today the schools are artillery, cavalry, infantry, engineer, administration and finance (*intendencia*), ordnance, and signal.⁷⁰

Following World War II, and implementing plans for a "military university" conceived in 1923 by Colonel Paul Goubax of the French Military Mission, the Escuela Militar and the arms and service schools were grouped together administratively and physically in the Centro de Instrucción Militar del Peru (CIMP). This complex, finally inaugurated in December 1949, was provided with new buildings, eventually totaling some 82, which are located on 100 hectares of land in Chorrillos.⁷¹

The next level in the hierarchy of army education is the Escuela Superior de Guerra (ESG). This institution is situated immediately adjacent to the Centro de Instrucción Militar in an edifice which was the home of the Escuela Militar before the construction of the latter's new quarters. It provides two courses of instruction. One, the Curso de Oficiales del Estado Mayor (COEM), is of two years duration and is designed to prepare army captains and majors for duty with the general staffs of the arms corps, and divisions. Classes normally include a few navy and air force officers who are assigned to prepare them for participation in joint operations, and a sprinkling of representatives from other Latin American countries.⁷² Most of the 3,000 hours of instruction provided deal with purely military subjects, although some time is allocated to the study of national socioeconomic problems as they may affect military planning and operations.⁷³ Each class, moreover, is sent on a series of guided tours of the nation, not only to make strategic appreciations in the tradition of Prussian General Gerhard Scharnhorst's staff training journeys, but to acquaint its members with national problems and potentials.⁷⁴ Graduates are awarded the title Diplomada del Estado Mayor and an accompanying insignia—symbols of distinction which are displayed with great pride. The other component of the school's offerings is a one-year tactical course intended to prepare lieutenant colonels for the command of regiments and larger units.⁷⁵

The capstone of Peru's system of military education, not only for the army but also for the other services, is the Centro de Altos Estudios Militares (CAEM), which was founded in 1950.⁷⁶ The center occupies quarters in Chorrillos, immediately adjacent to the Escuela Superior de Guerra and constitutes a superior war college whose curriculum is concerned

with national defense in the broadest sense and at the highest level. Its founder and moving spirit, General José del Carmen Marín, was convinced that effectiveness of national defense was in proportion to the value of that to be defended. Initially, therefore, seven months out of the school's ten-month term were devoted to the study of national social and economic problems.⁷⁷ Annual classes averaged about forty men of which somewhat less than half were army colonels regarded as having general officer potential. The remainder were representatives from the other armed services, and functionaries from civilian ministries. Some 45 percent of the faculty were distinguished engineers and social and physical scientists. Civilian professors were selected regardless of their ideological orientations. Thus, the radical socialist Gregorio Garayer taught there for three years.⁷⁸

In 1960, CAEM's curriculum was revised so that a much smaller proportion of time was allocated to nonmilitary subjects.⁷⁹ In 1965, the nine-month officer course provided for two months of work on the Peruvian political system and on national problems, potential, and planning. The remaining seven months were concerned primarily with strategies of internal security and external war. A six-month course for civilians was devoted to general problems of national defense, with emphasis on the role of civilian sectors in mobilization.⁸⁰

During the first ten years of its existence, the Centro de Altos Estudios Militares produced a generation of military intellectuals whose education, interests, and concerns transcended military tactics and strategy, and developed the philosophic foundations of military civic action. Despite curriculum changes, it continues to retain a highly competent faculty and graduates officers who have had a sophisticated introduction to the sociology and economy of modern Peru.

The training received by Peruvian officers has been based heavily on doctrines developed by major Western military powers. During most of the first half of the twentieth century the predominant foreign influence was French and was exercised in two ways: (1) through the presence of military missions whose members frequently served not only as advisors but held assignments within the army's command and staff structure or as commandants of the Escuela Militar and the Escuela Superior de Guerra; (2) the posting of Peruvian officers to France for specialized or advanced instruction.⁸¹

After World War II, North American influence replaced European. In 1945, the first of an uninterrupted series of United States army missions arrived in Peru. Although its members have not, as in the case of their French predecessors, held Peruvian commands, they advise actively in school instruction and troop training. Furthermore, the largest number of Peruvian officers who are sent abroad for training attend the School of the Americas, the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, or specialized arms and service schools in the United States rather than Saint Cyr, Fontainebleau, Saumur, or Vincennes. English, moreover, has replaced French as a second language in the Escuela Militar. The United States military presence in Peru is further strengthened by the heavy dependence of the latter on North American equipment.⁸²

The formal classroom instruction of the officer is supplemented by extracurricular activities that reflect the broadening scope of Peruvian military education.⁸³ The Escuela Superior de Guerra's summary of its activities for the academic year 1963 affirms that "time was provided for various cultural activities as a contribution to the intellectual development of the officer and his overall training, since today a member of the general staff has to function in an environment much broader than the purely military."⁸⁴ And, throughout the academic year, various distinguished civilian authorities lectured at the Centro de Instrucción Militar on a variety of subjects such as "The Impact of Philosophy and Science on Historical

Development," "The Methodology of Descartes," "Characteristics of Underdevelopment," and "The Peruvian Chemical Industry."⁸⁵

Another significant instrument for the education of the Peruvian army officer is service journals. These include the Revista de la Escuela Militar de Chorrillos, established in 1927; the Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra, founded in 1953; the Revista del Centro de Instrucción Militar del Perú, which began publication in 1959; and the more general journal, Revista Militar del Perú, which has been published since 1919. Their contents reveal the changing intellectual orientation of the army. The Revista Militar del Perú for the years 1947-1950 was concerned almost exclusively with narrow technical and professional subjects. In contrast, an analysis of the Nos. 648-669 (September/October 1958-March/April 1962) reveals 152 items of a traditional professional character, 30 dealing with counterinsurgency, 5 with civic action, 29 with general cultural subjects, 11 with general scientific problems, 46 with general history, 69 with military history, 45 with world affairs, 9 with national socioeconomic problems, and 6 with civil-military relations. Although no systematic analysis was made of other army journals, a scanning of recent issues of the Revista de la Escuela Militar de Chorrillos and the Revista del Centro de Instrucción Militar reveals a similar orientation.⁸⁶ Some indication of the type of item under discussion may be provided by the following examples: "Introduction to the Study of Sociology," "Hipólito Unanue," "Economic and Monetary Reality," "The Agrarian Reform in Bolivia," "Peruvian Architecture in the Pre-Incaic Epochs," "The Army, the Officer and Politics," and "Critique of Marxist-Leninist Doctrine."⁸⁷

The new dimensions of Peruvian military education are probably a reflection of the philosophy developed in the Centro de Altos Estudios Militares. The increasing emphasis on the broad intellectual formation of the officer that has taken place since 1960 may be attributed to several factors. First, they appear to be associated with the ideas of Army Commander General Nicolás Lindley López, a graduate of CAEM and subsequently leader of the junta militar de gobierno of 1962-1963.⁸⁸ Second, the experience of the junta may well have indicated the need for more broadly educated officers if the army was to be directly responsible for the implementation of developmental and reformist policy.⁸⁹ Third, it undoubtedly reflects the adoption of military civic action and counterinsurgency as formal components of the military mission. Finally, the army's concern with its public image has encouraged it to produce a more perceptive and sophisticated leadership.

THE MILITARY AS AN INTEREST GROUP

The "Estado Militar"

The Peruvian armed forces are something more than a functional institution providing constitutionally specified services to the state. By law and by convention they constitute a corporate entity separated from the general society by well-defined boundaries; they enjoy a substantial measure of self-regulatory power, and they possess a collective set of attitudes, values, and interests. These attributes affect directly their motivation and capacity for political action.

Military Jurisdiction

The juridical basis for their corporate and quasi-autonomous status is the Código de justicia militar,⁹⁰ which provides military tribunals with extensive jurisdiction over armed forces personnel. These courts enjoy exclusive competence in cases of military crimes

committed by service personnel—treason, espionage, rebellion, sedition, desertion, insubordination, abuse of authority, dereliction of duty, cowardice, and various other kinds and degrees of dishonorable conduct.⁹¹ The military jurisdiction also extends to common crimes committed by enlisted and commissioned ranks while on duty. Off-duty offenses technically pertain to the cognizance of civil tribunals,⁹² but in practice the Peruvian military have sought to exercise exclusive criminal jurisdiction over all their members regardless of time, place, or circumstance of the offense and have met little resistance from civil authorities. It is rare for a soldier, sailor, or airman to be tried and sentenced in a civilian court, still rarer for an officer. The military guards its jurisdiction jealously on the grounds that it is essential to the maintenance of internal discipline. Another factor in its attitude, however, is its sense of corporate unity expressed in this case by a reluctance to leave the fate of its members to the discretion of extraneous—and possibly hostile—agencies.⁹³

Status of the Service Ministers

A second factor contributing to the military's self-regulatory power is the status of the three service ministers. The national constitution provides that members of the cabinet (council of ministers) be appointed and removed by the president of the republic on the proposal and with the agreement of the president of the council of ministers. Moreover, ministers censured by the congress are required to resign.⁹⁴ In practice, however, although there may be consultation between the Chief Executive and the high commands of the armed forces about selection, service ministers are invariably nominees of the armed forces themselves, and appointment in effect constitutes a promotion to the highest rank in the respective service. Thus, following the installation of President Belaunde Terry in 1963, the commanding officers of the army, navy, and air force became the ministers of their respective services. Under these circumstances, they are not the president's agents for administering executive policy as it affects their departments, nor are they responsible to him or to the congress. Rather, they are the commanders in chief of their services, the representatives of the armed forces in the cabinet, and are responsible to their military constituencies. Although they may be dismissed by the president or censured by congress, neither action has taken place in recent years. Furthermore, should they be dismissed, censured, or resign in protest against government policy, they would have to be replaced by other service representatives. If appointments were to be made without the consent of the armed forces, at best, the ministers would be ineffectual and formal communication between the executive and military broken; at the worst, such action would precipitate a major politicomilitary crisis. Such arrangements provide the armed forces with immense leverage in promoting and guarding their interests and, in contrast to the other government departments, an unbroken continuity of leadership.


Control Over Budgets

The self-regulatory and quasi-autonomous status of the military is further enhanced by the degree of control which they exercise over their vital sustenance; that is, their annual budgets. Such control exists at two levels: first, total amounts allocated; and second, expenditures within these sums. In the first instance, service ministers, because of their peculiar status, are in a strong position to negotiate for budgets they consider necessary or desirable and, if negotiation fails, they have at their disposition the ultimate persuader—force.

In the latter connection, it is part of the conventional wisdom about the political role of Latin America's armed forces that dissatisfaction with budgetary allocations has been a primary factor in precipitating military coups. In the case of Peru, Víctor Villanueva contends

that a constant relationship has existed between the military's proportion of the total national budget and their political behavior. An administration which reduces the percentage is invariably deposed; the government installed by the coup invariably increases it. The relationship as worked out by Villanueva is shown in Table 4.⁹⁵ Table 5 shows comparative budget data for the years 1945 through 1964.

TABLE 4
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MILITARY'S PROPORTION OF THE
TOTAL NATIONAL BUDGET AND MILITARY COUPS



The succession of superior lettered and inferior numbered vertices represents the following events:

1. Golpe of February 4, 1914, which overthrew President Guillermo Billinghurst.
- A. President Benavides delivered the government to president-elect José Prado in 1915.
2. Golpe of July 4, 1919, which brought Augusto B. Leguía to the presidency.
- B. Leguía was reelected president.
3. Golpe of August 22, 1930, which deposed Leguía.
- C. Benavides came to power in 1933 through election by Congress.
4. Golpe of February 19, 1939, which, although abortive, obliged President Oscar Benavides to call for elections and relinquish power.
- D. President Prado delivered the government to Bustamante y Rivero in 1945.
5. Golpe of October 27, 1947, which overthrew the government of President Bustamante y Rivero.
- E. Manuel Odría delivered the government to Prado in 1956.
6. Golpe of July 18, 1962, which deposed President Manuel Prado.⁹⁶

TABLE 5. COMPARATIVE BUDGET DATA, 1945-1964

Year	Total		War		Navy		Air Force		Total Armed Forces		Government and Police		Public Education	
	Amount	Percent of Total	Amount	Percent of Total	Amount	Percent of Total	Amount	Percent of Total	Amount	Percent of Total	Amount	Percent of Total	Amount	Percent of Total
1945	546.6	100	64.4	11.8	20.7	3.8	28.6	5.2	113.7	20.8	68.2	12.5	58.8	10.8
1946	716.5	100	81.1	11.3	25.6	3.6	47.6	6.6	154.3	21.5	95.1	13.3	111.0	15.5
1947	946.0	100	108.0	11.4	36.9	3.9	54.7	5.8	199.6	21.1	119.8	12.7	147.9	15.6
1948	927.0	100	110.3	11.9	35.6	3.8	52.7	5.7	198.6	21.4	139.6	15.1	143.4	15.5
1949	1,150.0	100	144.3	12.5	40.0	3.5	58.6	5.1	242.9	21.1	160.1	13.9	183.1	15.9
1950	1,644.5	100	216.6	13.2	58.0	3.5	82.6	5.0	357.2	21.7	219.3	13.3	246.4	14.9
1951	1,938.7	100	273.5	14.1	75.1	3.9	91.4	4.7	440.0	22.7	295.2	15.2	292.9	15.1
1952	2,563.9	100	303.6	11.8	82.9	3.2	102.1	4.0	488.6	19.0	343.5	13.4	317.0	12.4
1953	2,779.8	100	356.5	12.8	91.1	3.3	107.9	3.9	555.5	20.0	--	--	345.0	12.4
1954	3,011.5	100	378.7	12.6	99.1	3.3	116.3	3.9	594.1	19.7	--	--	381.9	12.7
1955	3,358.7	100	398.0	11.8	114.1	3.4	130.4	3.9	642.5	19.1	470.0	14.0	466.1	13.9
1956	3,885.5	100	493.8	12.7	127.1	3.3	165.0	4.2	785.9	20.2	499.3	12.9	559.9	14.4
1957	4,803.8	100	541.0	11.3	251.8	5.2	289.6	6.0	1,082.4	22.5	573.4	11.9	725.6	15.1
1958	5,359.1	100	604.3	11.3	259.3	4.8	369.5	6.9	1,233.1	23.0	635.2	11.9	796.3	14.9
1959	6,846.3	100	725.4	10.6	296.4	4.3	398.8	5.8	1,420.6	20.7	828.5	12.1	1,153.1	16.8
1960	7,869.4	100	807.5	10.3	338.6	4.3	393.9	5.0	1,540.0	19.6	970.2	12.3	1,366.0	17.3
1961	9,890.0	100	950.4	9.6	399.2	4.0	485.6	4.9	1,835.2	18.6	1,167.7	11.8	1,762.4	17.8
1962	11,291.2	100	1,031.2	9.1	457.5	4.0	482.2	4.3	1,970.9	17.4	1,306.9	11.6	2,266.5	20.0
1963	14,021.2	100	1,268.2	9.0	667.7	4.8	678.6	4.8	2,614.5	18.6	1,676.1	12.0	2,579.2	18.4
1964	13,593.8	100	1,281.4	9.4	608.8	4.5	609.6	4.5	2,499.8	18.4	1,752.3	12.9	3,093.8	22.8

Figures taken from Peru. Ministerio de hacienda. Presupuesto general para el año. . . . (Lima, 1945-1964). Amounts given are in millions of soles.

There are, however, several problems in evaluating and analyzing Latin American military budget data. Published gross figures may not include certain allocations hidden in other departmental budgets. In Peru, for example, it would be difficult to separate functionally monies budgeted for the three armed services, and funds provided for internal security in the budgets of the ministry of government and police and the president's office. Published figures, moreover, reveal only amounts allocated rather than actual expenditures, and gross figures showing annual variations do not reveal proportions devoted to nonrecurrent expenses such as heavy outlays for aircraft or naval vessels. In identifying his percentages, Villanueva uses only the designation "military expenses" (*gastos militares*) and does not identify his sources. If his figures are compared with percentages derived from consolidated official annual budgets for the army, navy, and air force since 1945 (see Table 5) the following discrepancies appear (see Table 6):

TABLE 6
DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN OFFICIAL FIGURES
AND VILLANUEVA'S FIGURES

<u>Vertices</u>	<u>Official Figures</u>	<u>Villanueva</u>
D, 1945	20.8%	25%
5, 1948	21.4	19
E, 1956	20.2	23
6, 1962	17.4	17

Regardless of discrepancies, the largest percentage decline shown by both official figures (2.8 percent) and Villanueva (6 percent) is for the period 1956-1962; that is, during the administration of President Manuel Prado. Villanueva's correlation shows that Prado was deposed following the decline. Other sources, furthermore, indicate some restlessness within the armed forces during the period, particularly in the air force, which twice received an absolute reduction in its budget.

There is, however, another way of looking at budget figures. While the armed forces' share of the national budget (according to official figures) declined from 20.8 to 17.4 percent during the period 1945-1962, the absolute amount allocated to them during the same period increased from 113.7 million to 1,970.9 million soles; and between 1956 and 1962, the period of the sharpest percentage decline, the amount jumped from 785.9 million to 1,970.9 million.

Turning to the individual services, the army received an increase each year between 1945 and 1962 and the total increase for the period was from 64.4 million to 1,031.2 million soles. The navy's budget increased each year except 1948, with an overall increase from 20.7 million to 457.5 soles. The air force's allocation increased each year except 1948, 1960, and 1962, with an overall rise from 28.6 to 482.2 soles. During what appears to be a critical period, 1957-1966, the army's allocation jumped from 493.8 to 1,031.2 soles; the navy's from 127.1 to 457.5, and the air force's from 165.0 to 482.2.

Villanueva is a former army officer whose budget data may be more realistic than official published figures and who was undoubtedly privy to military thinking about budgetary matters. His opinions, therefore, cannot be discounted. In terms of absolute amounts received, however,

the Peruvian armed forces have fared quite well, even during periods when their percentage of the total budget declined. The increase in absolute amounts, furthermore, occurred over a span of years during which civilian sectors of society and their demands on government revenues were expanding much more rapidly than military requirements. Although disgruntlement over budgetary allocations has undoubtedly been intermittently present in the services, and has been an element in military coups, this factor alone does not provide an adequate explanation of the recent political behavior of the Peruvian armed forces.

With reference to the military coup of 1962, Villanueva states that the armed forces did not act primarily for budgetary reasons but did take advantage of their position to increase their benefits.⁹⁷ Official figures do show, in fact, that between 1962 and 1963 the defense budget increased sharply—from 1,970.9 to 2,614.5 million soles—with most of the increment going to the navy and the air force. This pattern may have represented the military junta's response to unrest in the two services and their reward for cooperation in the coup.

Turning to a level of lower budgetary control, certain categories of military expenses such as salaries are fixed by law. Also, military accounts are subject to internal and external audit and to parliamentary inquiry. Even so, when the armed forces so wish, they can employ security considerations to limit investigations of their activities; they are formidable opponents to challenge; and attacks on their prestige and honor are subject to prosecution in their own tribunals. Consequently, accountants, treasury officials, congressmen, or newspaper sleuths are not inclined to inquire too carefully into the military's internal fiscal management. No evidence has been found that they use their legal and *de facto* immunities to cover misuse of public funds. On the contrary, they appear to be free of the major peculations which have appeared from time to time in certain other Latin American military establishments, and the service ministries are generally regarded as the best administered of all major government agencies.⁹⁸ Their protective devices, however, do permit them to enjoy considerable fiscal autonomy in areas where schedules of expenditures are not established by law.

As is the case in other nations, the Peruvian military enjoy a substantial autonomy in the determination of tactical and administrative organizations, selection of equipment, officer procurement and assignment, promotion policies, and the like. Although such matters are governed by general and special ordinances and regulations whose provisions must conform to the constitution and laws of the land, the executive and legislative branches of the government have shown little disposition to question norms and procedures proposed by the armed forces. In one highly sensitive area, however, the constitution and the laws place significant limits on the self-regulatory power of the military. Promotions to the rank of colonel (or the navy equivalent, *capitán de navío*) and above, which are initiated in the services and recommended by the president, must be approved by congress. The latter, moreover, may make such promotions on its own initiative "for eminent services which deserve the gratitude of the nation."⁹⁹

The quasi-autonomous juridical and administrative status of the Peruvian armed forces is complemented by social and physical segregation. As is the case with other functional groups, their specialized interests encourage social herding. Intercourse with civilians, moreover, is inhibited by the peculiar nature of their function—the management of violence—which is less understood and appreciated by the community than the skills of the other professionals such as doctors and lawyers. The unique situation of the military is emphasized by their exclusive commissaries, sports facilities, and social clubs. Their illnesses and those of their families are treated by service doctors; they are hospitalized in service installations. The distinctiveness of the military career is visibly manifested in a uniform style of dress and a highly formalized system of interpersonal relations based on rank and hierarchy. The

soldier thus lives in a largely self-sufficient environment. He may emerge from it but departures are temporary and generally at his own convenience.

Military Socialization and the Military Ethos

Military socialization is pervasive and unrelenting. It takes place not only in the classroom, barracks, and field but in officers' clubs, in professional associations, through service journals, and in innumerable ceremonial occasions. It is intended to instill in the officer the basic military virtues; an appreciation of the nature, function, and worth of his profession; and a sense of loyalty to it and to its members. It immerses him in the history and traditions of his arm or branch, his service, and the armed forces in general. At the same time, it includes deliberate attempts to eradicate attitudes and values regarded as incompatible with the well being of the military institution.¹⁰⁰ Symbolically, it involves induction into the brotherhood of officers. Military socialization produces a set of attitudes and values which in some combinations are complementary, in others inconsistent. They may be conceptualized as (1) professionalism, (2) institutional conservatism, (3) the survival of an historically rooted image of the role and status of the armed forces, and (4) an institutional commitment to positive participation in national development.

MILITARY ATTITUDES

Peruvian officers in all three armed services affirm with confidence and pride that they are professionals. As employed hitherto in this chapter, the term describes a more or less sophisticated level of skill in the military techniques of command, tactics, administration, and logistics. As developed by Samuel P. Huntington, however, it subsumes the total system of values and attitudes held by the professional soldier toward his status and role in the general society of which he is a part, and its level may be measured in terms of expertise, responsibility, and corporativeness.¹⁰¹

There is little doubt that since President Piérola undertook to professionalize the Peruvian army, and particularly since the outbreak of World War II, the expertise of the armed forces has steadily increased. Today, although they lack a highly developed knowledge of advanced weapons systems and the capacity to manage complex organizations, their level of competence in the command, administration, and logistical support of small and medium size tactical units compares well with that of the armed forces in the most advanced Latin American nations. In one area, submarine warfare, it is probably superior. Internally, the armed forces are capable of maintaining security except, perhaps, in the case of a well organized insurrection of national proportions.¹⁰²

Along with the development of technical expertise, the Peruvian armed forces have undergone a rationalization of their internal management, which has strengthened their sense of corporate identity and unity. They have achieved a substantial tightening of internal discipline and a loyalty structure based more on a formal command system and less on personal affiliations. They have developed a system of career advancement determined more by merit and less by connections and influence; they have acquired a standardized schedule of pay and emoluments which, although not princely, is adequate to maintain middle class levels of existence; they enjoy substantially improved working conditions. An increased awareness of the dignity and social worth of officership reinforces the formal system of rewards and sanctions governing the individual and collective behavior of the officer corps.¹⁰³

At this point reservations must be made. What has been described as the professionalization of the Peruvian military is a process underway, not fulfilled. The general level of expertise in all the services is still below that prevailing in the armed forces of Western Europe and the United States. By no means have all officers a highly developed sense of professional responsibility; corporativeness is weakened by intra- and interservice cleavages. Supplementing differences of opinion within each service over the nature of the military mission and implementing strategy, disagreements exist over the desirability of basic structural reforms in Peruvian society, the rate at which reform should proceed, and the role which the armed forces should play in the process. Such divisions tend to conform to the hierarchical structure of the officer corps, with the strength of the urge toward reform and activism varying in inverse proportion to rank and seniority. Differences of opinion on the desirability and rate of reform also relate to arm or branch affiliations, with the most progressive elements existing in the technical rather than the combat components of each service. Finally, cliques and factions develop on the basis of personal loyalties and allegiances. Dynamic and ambitious military leaders attract clienteles by virtue of their popularity and their existing or calculated capacity to disperse patronage in the form of promotions and choice assignments.¹⁰⁴

Turning to cleavages at the interservice level, disagreements certainly exist among the three components of the armed forces over the nature and scope of military tasks and strategies and the role of each service within them; competition occurs among them for budgetary allocations; the traditional preeminence of the army engenders some jealousy in the navy and the air force, while army officers may resent the higher social status enjoyed by the junior services. It might be expected, moreover, that without a mediating defense ministry, interservice rivalries would have freer play. Indeed, the air force and the navy have resisted the establishment of a superordinate agency on the grounds it would be controlled by the army, thus institutionalizing the latter's preeminence, and would diminish the considerable autonomy they now enjoy. In fact, however, a *modus vivendi* appears to prevail. The *de facto* predominance of the army is accepted by the other two services, though the ground forces are careful not to overplay their position, and they support the basic interests and aspirations of the navy and air force.¹⁰⁵

Still following Huntington's theory of civil-military relation, professionalization is held to produce depoliticization, and indeed it is the official doctrines of the Peruvian armed forces that they are apolitical. Unquestionably, professionalization has been paralleled by internal depoliticization. The officer's time is increasingly occupied by demands of the service, and the military system provides him with the means to satisfy a wide range of aspirations. Thus, he is less likely to involve himself in extraservice intrigues. The institutionalization and rationalization of the conditions of officership, moreover, discourage the emergence of the traditional-type personalistic military head of state (*caudillo*).

With respect to cleavages within the armed forces and their political implications, two important circumstances must be noted. First, they are based increasingly on military issues and personalities rather than on the intromission of factional and party politics into the military system. The efforts of the Apristas to form political cells in the three services in the 1930's and the 1940's failed; the attempts of a group of officers to create a political movement (Comando Revolucionario de Oficiales del Ejército) within the army during the Manuel Prado administration (1939-1945), and to ally themselves with APRA, aborted;¹⁰⁶ more recently, support of, or opposition to, Belaunde or Odría have not crystallized into organized factions. Second, the formal command structures of the three services are strong enough to reconcile or suppress cleavages within each, while intraservice conflicts are adjusted before they disrupt the essential unity of the armed forces. As a consequence, the contemporary Peruvian military appears to be outgrowing the factionalism which characterized it in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and which continues to disrupt the Argentine armed forces.

There is, however, another aspect of the relationship between professionalization and the political role. Internal depoliticization is not the same as institutional depoliticization. Huntington's theory of civil-military relations postulates not only that a professional military does not intrude in politics but that politicians do not intervene in the legitimate internal affairs of the armed forces.¹⁰⁷ The relationship between professionalism and an apolitical military, furthermore, is not an independent one. Professionalization must be paralleled by the development of political systems healthy and viable enough to function without depending on military participation, if the connection posited by Huntington is to hold. Although Peru may have taken a major step toward political maturity in the past five years, its political system continues to contain endemic elements of instability which could suddenly create crisis situations. Such developments could very well halt or reverse the internal depoliticization of the military. Alternatively, the armed forces might act vigorously but in an institutional way to defend their professional status.

The trend toward professionalism is complemented by the essentially conservative character of the military ethos. As Alfred Vagts observed:

It takes many years to organize and equip an army, a long time stability in the structure and functions of the society in which the preparation is made. Hence the army by the very nature of things depends for its existence, honors, emoluments, and privileges upon the order in which it takes form; and in self-defense, if nothing more, it is conservative in relation to the order in which it thrives, whether that order be agrarian, capitalistic, or communistic.¹⁰⁸

Thus, although individual officers may hold radical views on social and economic matters, and the armed forces support a broad range of developmental activities, the military are collectively conservative in the sense that they insist that change and reform must not proceed at a rate or in directions that would threaten the integrity or security of the armed institution. They are disposed to use the means at their disposal to see that this does not happen.

The urge toward professionalization—and depoliticization—within the Peruvian military is partially counteracted by a self-image whose roots lie deep in institutional memory. The armed forces conceive of themselves as the creators of the nation and the guardians of the integrity of the national territory. Independence was won, however, only with the indispensable assistance of Argentine, Chilean, and Colombian expeditionaries. Thereafter, with the exception of the heroic defense of Callao against the Spaniards in 1866, and the successful blitz against Ecuador in 1941, the Peruvian armed forces have met with some serious reverses in defending the national territory. Early wars with Gran Colombia, Bolivia, and Chile produced no resounding victories and some embarrassing discomfitures. The results of the war with Chile in 1879-1883 were disastrous for the nation and for the armed forces themselves. This record has produced from time to time gibes and shafts from civilians, which have been extremely rankling to the military.¹⁰⁹ The latter's reaction to their own shortcomings and to civilian criticism has followed a familiar pattern of rationalization; that is, they attribute their frustrations to the unwillingness of the nation to support them adequately or to civilian betrayal. It has also involved a strain of what Samuel Finer calls morbidly high self-esteem,¹¹⁰ expressed in a negative way by a suspicion of the motives and capacity of civilian leadership, and positively by the creation of an elaborate cult of military heroes and martyrs.¹¹¹

In the absence of a great native liberator, José de San Martín and Simón Bolívar have been given prominent positions in the pantheon, but it also includes distinguished national military leaders. Although the Peruvian armed forces can point to few great victories, they have had no

lack of individuals who lived or died gloriously in defeat. The roster includes Admiral Miguel Grau, commander of the Peruvian navy during the war with Chile, who held off a vastly superior enemy force for six months until, in a final bold encounter, he went down with his flagship, the Huascar, in October 1879. Colonel Andrés Cáceres rallied his poorly trained and equipped Indians to win an heroic but Pyrrhic victory at Tarapacá in the same year, while Colonel Francisco Bolognesi, also a hero of Tarapacá, subsequently died gloriously in the sturdy but futile defense of Arica.

Homage to heroes is an integral element in military socialization. It begins for the potential officer in the primary schools, extends into the secondary, and is intensified in the military academies. In the Escuela Militar de Chorrillos, the busts of deceased heroes overlook the Patio de Honor, the principal plaza of the institution; the four-year curriculum is replete with references to their glorious conduct and with ceremonies commemorative of their deeds; graduating classes select the name of one of them or of the battles in which they fought, to distinguish their promoción.¹¹² The various arms and branches of the service possess their patron, and render homage to him on the annual "day" of the infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineers, or other branch.¹¹³

The cult of heroes and martyrs is institutionalized and provided by the military with temples such as the Panteón de los Próceres and the Cripta de los Héroes de la Guerra de 1879. The former, established in 1921, holds the ashes of those Peruvians who lived or died for the independence of the nation, as well as the busts of San Martín, Bolívar, Ramón Castillo, Tupac Amaru, Pumacahua, and others. The latter, created in 1906, guards the remains of Grau, Bolognesi, and Cáceres, and displays plaques dedicated to other heroes of the war with Chile.¹¹⁴

The Peruvian armed forces conceive of themselves not only as the creators and defenders of the nation but as its tutelary institution and its vertebral column. After liberation from Spain was won, they became the guarantors of unity and order in the midst of strife and turmoil, the guardian of the national spirit, the repository of national virtues, the "healthiest, best disciplined and most patriotic component of the nation,"¹¹⁵ and the most democratic sector of society: "Anyone can rise to the highest rank in the army with no other credentials than his own merit and true valor."¹¹⁶

The army, moreover, regards itself as the preceptor of the nation's youth. Thus, in Peru as elsewhere in the modern world, young men are disoriented, addicted to false heroes—cinema stars and television personalities—exposed to barbaric music, and constantly tempted toward juvenile delinquency. Upon induction into the service, however, they are subjected to rigorous discipline, invigorated by participation in sports, provided with technical and moral training, inspired by the heroes of the past, and their lives are enriched by the companionship of arms. After two years in the army they return to civilian life reoriented, adjusted, and prepared to assume the responsibilities and privileges of citizenship.¹¹⁷

The military is quite conscious that it has played a turbulent, dominant, and often decisive political role in the nation's past.¹¹⁸ It rationalizes its performance on the grounds that in a country where chaos and disorder were the heritage of independence, the appearance of military strongmen was a logical consequence in view of "the antagonism and weakness of the same civilians who fomented anarchy."¹¹⁹ Indeed, the armed forces contend, it was under the leadership of military presidents that the nation experienced its greatest stability and progress, and the most significant reforms were achieved.¹²⁰ Thus General Ramón Castilla (1845-1851, 1855-1862) gave Peru its first really effective administration, defended the common people against the oligarchy and, in the face of determined opposition from the great landowners, manumitted

the slaves.¹²¹ As president, 1933-1939, Marshal Oscar Benavides provided honest and effective leadership and concluded the Protocol of Friendship and Amity with Colombia which terminated the Leticia dispute and prevented what might have been a devastating war. General Luis M. Sánchez Cerro (1931-1933) not only overthrew the civilian tyrant, Augusto B. Leguía, but undertook the construction of the access road from Huánuco to Pucallpa via Tingo María, a project of immense importance for the development of the Peruvian oriente. He was, furthermore, the father of the Constitution of 1933 under which Peru is still governed.¹²² More recently, General Manuel Odría (1950-1956) is given credit for a period of rapid economic development, for a body of modern social legislation, and for the nation's first large-scale public works and public housing program. The military junta of 1962-1963 enacted the first agrarian reform law.¹²³

A second traditional influence counteracting modern professionalism is a concept of corporativeness which transcends the limits defined by Huntington. As suggested earlier, it involves not only a necessary measure of self-regulation, a pride in officership, and a sense of military brotherhood, but the enjoyment of privilege and the denial of ultimate civil control of the military. These notions of role and status may very well be an inheritance from the colonial regime, in which state and society were viewed not as a republic of citizens enjoying equal rights and responsibilities but as an association of classes and corporations possessing special and unequal juridical personalities that were defined in general codes or in particular fueros.¹²⁴ In any case, since their creation in the early nineteenth century, the Peruvian military have enjoyed in law and fact privileges and immunities setting them off from the general society.¹²⁵

The convergence of professionalism, conservatism, and traditionalism, as well as contradictions among these influences, is illustrated by the attitudes of the armed forces toward two ideological movements, communism and Aprismo. The three services are intransigently anti-Communist.¹²⁶ Their hostility may derive in part from middle class values acquired in preservice years or absorbed from the societal environment. Its primary source, however, is an apprehension that should communism or a Communist-influenced government achieve power, it would destroy the regular military establishment and replace it with a militia. This is what happened in Cuba, officers are fond of pointing out. Following a familiar process of rationalization, moreover, they are inclined to regard any group which threatens their existence or their integrity as Communist. Thus, the Mexican and Bolivian revolutions, which resulted in the complete or partial destruction of the regular armies of the two nations, are still commonly regarded by the military as Communist movements.¹²⁷

The military's long enmity toward Aprismo grew out of the movement's original radical and quasi-Marxist ideology and its disruptive political tactics which combined to threaten the stability of the established order and thus the military institution. More specifically, the armed forces reacted strongly to the doctrinaire antimilitarism of the Apristas along with their attempts to infiltrate and subvert the services. The military have feared that if the movement came to power it would, like the Communists, destroy their institution. Indeed, despite the fact that APRA has lost its radical character, older officers still identify it with communism.¹²⁸ The fundamental hostility of the armed forces toward the movement was sharply exacerbated by two particular incidents—the Aprista-inspired naval mutiny in Callao in 1948 and the earlier massacre of army personnel by Apristas in Trujillo in 1932.¹²⁹ These constituted grave injuries to the honor and dignity of the services and have not been forgiven or forgotten. Each year the Trujillo bloodletting is recalled ceremonially. Thus, on July 9, 1965, in the general cemetery of Lima, the armed forces paid homage to their fallen comrades in a "manifestation strictly institutional." Present were the president of the joint command; the commanders in chief of the army, navy, and air force; the director general of the guardia

civil; the commanding general of the guardia republicana; and numerous ranking officers of the several services. Similar ceremonies took place in all the barracks of the nation in commemoration of the 'heroic sacrifice of the defenders of internal order, social peace, and the security of the nation.'¹³⁰

In summary, despite pronouncements by the military that they are now professional and apolitical institutions, and despite the convictions of individual officers, traditional concepts of role and status are still pervasive among them. Duty and responsibility correspond to fulfilling the imperatives which history has imposed on them, including the performance of a transcendental mission when, in their judgment, the state of the bodies politic and social require it. While the officer swears allegiance to the constitution and the state, his primary loyalty is to his corps and, within its hierarchy, his superiors. Honor is identified with privilege and with the status of the officer and the corps to which he belongs.¹³¹

These values are associated with an extreme sensitivity to any extraneous force which threatens the unity, integrity, and honor of the armed forces. In 1957, the military met in the Aero Club of Lima to protest a series of articles that had appeared in the press and were regarded as insulting to the Peruvian soldier. Present were not only the Minister of War, General Alejandro Cuadra Rabines, and the commander in chief of the army, but also the President of the Joint Command, General Manuel Cossio, the ministers of marine and aeronautics, the commander in chief of the air force, the chief of staff of the navy, and numerous high-ranking officers. General Cossio gave an address attacking the detractors who, he charged, forgot that the soldiers they were criticizing were the same as those who had won independence, who gave their blood in defense of the national territory and the national honor, and who today guard order and tranquility within the nation. Turning to the minister of war, he affirmed that 'the Armed Forces, solidly united and free of all sordid self-interest, align themselves with you in defense of the honor of the army.' 'We take this position,' he continued, 'because if such attacks are permitted to exceed reasonable limits, liberty will be transformed rapidly into libertinage, order will disappear, and assaults will be made on the democratic way of life itself.'

After prolonged applause, General Cuadra thanked General Cossio and accepted his manifestation of the solidarity of the armed forces.

We close files today determined to defend the constitution energetically and to combat infiltration or disruptive doctrines regardless of their source. . . . In our country the Armed Forces ought to be the vertebral column of order, the jealous guardian of two basic principles: First, the sacred defense of the territorial integrity of the nation; second, the loyal support of the legally constituted government; the former, the honor of the country; the latter, the mandate of the people.

Cuadra denied that the armed forces wished to intimidate a free press; rather, they only wanted the respect they deserved. They were ready to accept constructive criticism, but would not tolerate attacks on their honor and dignity. He was constantly interrupted by applause.¹³²

This ceremony should not be taken lightly nor the remarks of Generals Cossio and Cuadra dismissed as empty oratory. Although uttered nearly ten years ago, the sentiments expressed constitute as precise a description as may be found of the Peruvian military's image of its status and role and the ambivalence therein. It should be added that defense of military honor is not limited to protests. A new code of military justice adopted by decree law of the

1962-1963 military junta extended the jurisdiction of military tribunals to "outrages to the nation and its representative symbols and to the armed institutes," regardless of whether the offender was a soldier or civilian. Under the terms of the code, imprisonment may be imposed on those who, "by spoken or written word, whatever the medium may be, or by deed, publically injure or offend the Armed Forces or Auxiliary Forces, with the goal of undermining their prestige, impairing their discipline, or provoking their disintegration."¹³³

The trend toward professionalism and depoliticization is not only counteracted by traditional influences but exists in some tension with the newer dimensions of the military's responsibility. A number of professionally conservative officers, particularly in senior grades, fear that explicit assignment of a high priority to counterinsurgency will divert resources from their primary mission, which they continue to regard as external defense, and will compromise their professional status, which they identify with that mission. Also, the army is anxious to avoid operations which might cast it in the role of oppressor of the people.¹³⁴ Thus, when violence broke out in Huancayo in the summer of 1965, the administration was unwilling for political reasons to designate the irruption as insurgency, and referred to the guerrillas simply as bandits. The army, however, insisted that, if this was the case, the responsibility for punitive action pertained to the guardia civil. It was only after the latter had been mauled, and President Belaunde had officially declared the lawbreakers to be insurgents, that the army with air force support moved against them.¹³⁵

Apprehensions also exist in the same military circles that extensive and prolonged commitments to developmental programs will divert attention and resources from their primary task and feel that road construction, agricultural and mechanical training, and community development, unless directly related to military needs, detract from their professional status. An argument is also advanced that, if the armed forces are to act strictly within the limits of their constitutionally defined mission and at the same time adopt a developmental and modernizing role, the constitution should be amended to permit explicitly such new military tasks.¹³⁶ Carrying these arguments one step further, civic action inevitably involves the armed forces, if not directly in politics, at least in policymaking and policy implementation, in a wide range of activities extraneous to the traditional military mission. It should be remembered that the Spanish language does not clearly separate policy from politics; the same word, política, serves for both concepts. Thus, there is some apprehension in more conservative military circles that extensive and prolonged involvement in developmental activities may tend to politicize the armed forces.

At another level, the philosophy that it is the duty of the armed forces to contribute their resources to great national goals—development and modernization—raises the question as to where this obligation begins and where it ends. An officer corps which is intimately aware of critical national problems, which is skeptical of the capacity of civilian leadership to solve them, which has been indoctrinated in the philosophy of the social utility of the military, and which has lodged in its historical memory the concept of a transcendental mission may very well ask itself the same question posed by then Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser: "If the Army does not do this job, who will?"¹³⁷ Certain officers have in fact thought along these lines and continue to do so. This is a situation of concern both to civilian leadership and to professionally minded senior military commanders.¹³⁸ It has been speculated that the elimination of much of the nonmilitary content from the curriculum of the Centro de Altos Estudios Militares was prompted by the conviction of the government and the high command that undue concern with political, social, and economic problems in a military school was not only unprofessional but was politically hazardous.¹³⁹

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

The concept of civil-military relations is used here not in the limited sense of the distribution of power as between civil and military components of the state. Rather, it subsumes the totality of interactions between military and civilian sectors of society that affect the motivations, opportunities, and capabilities of the armed forces for political action.

Although the boundaries of the military system are sharply defined, they are protective, not rigid or impervious. Structural links exist between the military and civilian social sectors. As observed earlier, the majority of new officers for the armed forces are recruited from civilian youths, although there appears to be a trend for the establishment of military families in all the services. With respect to marriage patterns, a survey of the social news in service publications indicates that most army officers marry into civilian families. No firm data have been collected on the air force or the navy. Observations and impressions offered by officers from both these services indicate that a larger number of intraservice unions take place within them than in the ground forces. This is particularly true of the navy. In general, however, most officers in all services take civilian brides. In view of the social bases of officer recruitment, and the fact that officers tend to marry girls of their own class, it appears that with some exceptions (decreasing in number from the navy through the air force to the army) the basic social relationship between the officer corps and civilian society is along a middle class axis.

Relationship to the Middle Class

This association relates, of course, to the "middle class origins" theory of military political behavior.¹⁴⁰ It may be assumed that young cadets of civilian origin bring with them into the armed forces some of the aspirations, frustrations, convictions, and prejudices of the classes from which they spring. In view of the close-knit character of the middle class Latin American family, they unquestionably maintain close contact with their relatives, as does the officer and his civilian bride with the latter's family. Officers, although lightly represented in the Club Nacional are active in the membership and leadership of the Club de la Union and other subelite clubs and associations in Lima.¹⁴¹ In the provincial capitals, and in more remote communities where there are military installations, commanders are usually members of the local elite. Thus, in Cuzco, the commanding general of the military district, the archbishop, and the prefect-mayor are at the center of social, municipal, and patriotic functions.

The extent to which these relationships affect the attitudes, values, and political behavior of the military is difficult to determine without a large-scale research effort, which at the moment does not appear to be feasible. Unquestionably, Peruvian officers aspire to middle class amenities: comfortable suburban homes; adequate educational opportunities for their children; and automobiles, television sets, and the like. At an institutional level, the military has goals which are commonly identified with the middle class: development, modernization, and, to a lesser extent, political and social reform. Since the 1962 elections, the military has supported a middle class government. Whether their individual and institutional objectives are a direct consequence of social linkage with the civilian middle classes is debatable. The material aspirations of officers may be simply absorbed from a modern environment shared by all but primitive peoples, rather than transmitted directly through family ties. It is as easy to hypothesize that the societal goals of the military derive from institutional and professional interests as that they reflect the middle class affiliations of the officer corps. Armed forces' support of Acción Popular is as easily attributable to their security under an administration which they helped bring to power, and which is obligated to and dependent on them, as it is to class factors.

It would be imprudent to deny that some positive correlation exists between the middle class origins and connections of Peruvian officers and their basic attitudes, values, and patterns of behavior. The evidence and impressions I have gathered, however, indicate that through military socialization civilian values brought into the service by cadets are superseded by or transmuted into a military ethos and that the civilian bride is absorbed into the military environment. In short, what the officer believes to be important is based primarily on institutional associations, and his identification with the service increases as his career advances. In an increasingly professionalized military establishment, officership confers status and security to lower middle class persons. It is also the military that provides officers with the pay, emoluments, benefits, and privileges which permit them to satisfy their material wants, and imposes sanctions for incompetence or misbehavior.¹⁴²

Relationship to the Oligarchy

A related problem is the conventional belief that a close tie exists between the Peruvian armed forces and the oligarchy. This relationship has probably been overemphasized and does not appear to have been or to be structural in character. Historically, it has involved concessions and favors from the wealthy and well born to the ambitions and aspirations of the military in return for services rendered in protecting the established order.¹⁴³ It is reported that officers now may obtain loans from Manuel Prado's Banco Popular easily and under favorable conditions. Army officers affirm strongly, however, and sometimes indignantly that they are not tools of the oligarchy, and that the actions of the armed forces today are guided by institutional and national interests.¹⁴⁴ More basically, the military-oligarchy relationship has taken the form of alliances of convenience against a common foe. The most recent and prolonged of such leagues was a common front against APRA, which began in the early 1930's.¹⁴⁵ With the evolution of the latter movement into a moderate and middle class party, the basis of the alliance has weakened. The military and the oligarchy, however, still are united by a common aversion to radical changes and, more specifically, to communism.

Links With Civilian Law Enforcement

At the institutional level, structural links also exist between the armed forces and civilian sectors of society. They tend, however, to assume the form of military penetration of activities that are normatively regarded as civilian domains rather than a balanced inter-penetration. Historically, a major military intrusion has been in the area of law enforcement. While the first-line national police force, the guardia civil, is administratively under the ministry of government and police, it is a paramilitary institution and so regards itself. Its organization and training parallel that of the army; the pay and emoluments of its officer corps are essentially the same as in the army, and its personnel are subject to the Code of Military Justice.¹⁴⁶ After its establishment as a professional body, its officers were for some time selected from the army. Today its leadership is drawn largely from graduates of its own Escuela Policial but still includes former army officers, and in times of national emergency it comes under operational control of the army.¹⁴⁷ The guardia civil is, in effect, a military and political dependency of the army. While there exists within it an impulse toward more autonomy and some sense of competition with the regular ground forces, it lacks the physical and organizational resources to assert itself independently and the army will not permit it to acquire them.

The second-line gendarmery, the guardia republicana, is also a paramilitary institution, and is more completely dominated by the army than is the guardia civil. Although like the

latter it is administratively under the Ministry of Government and Police, the law requires that its director general be an army officer and its officers and noncommissioned officers are drawn largely from retired army personnel.¹⁴⁸

Military penetration of the national police system is accompanied in peacetime by jurisdiction over civilians in a substantial range of offenses classified by their nature and by the place of commitment. In the latter category are included all common crimes committed in military camps, posts, stations, and schools. In the former, military tribunals have competence over civilians charged with rebellion, sedition, and treason. Military jurisdiction over civilians also extends to assaults on military personnel, interference with military recruitment, adulteration of provisions for troops, and slander by spoken or written word against the representative symbols of the nation, including the national anthem, the memory of notables and consecrated heroes, and, as indicated earlier, the armed forces themselves.¹⁴⁹

Cooperation in Developmental Activities

More recently, the broadening intellectual interests of the military and their increasing involvement in developmental activities have increased the sectors of civil-military linkage. At the national administrative level, allusion has already been made to air force control of civil aviation and navy management of the merchant marine, dockyards, ports, and fisheries. Army road construction, navy and air force transport services, and the community development activities of all the services involve liaison with civilian ministries. At the local level, Acción Popular provides for the establishment of civic action committees whose membership includes commanders of military garrisons, alcaldes and other municipal officials, businessmen, and representatives of local institutions and societies. Initiative in the formation of such bodies, however, should, in the view of the military, be taken by themselves in order to weed out "all sorts of useless and time-consuming proposals."¹⁵⁰

Linkage in the Field of Education

Perhaps the most extensive linkage between civil and military institutions lies in the field of education. At the university level, although service academies and advanced schools have specialized functions, they are regarded as integral components of the national system of higher education. In the Pan American Union's series of listings of "Instituciones de Enseñanza Superior," the roster for Peru makes no distinction between military and civilian institutions. It is led by the Centro de Instrucción Militar del Perú, with sublistings for its components, followed by the Escuela Naval del Perú. Footnotes point out that both institutions enjoy university rank. The fact that the two service schools appear first on the list is a matter of alphabetical arrangement, since civilian institutions are listed as universidades.¹⁵¹ It is perhaps symbolic, however, that in the list for Colombia, major civilian universities and colleges are listed first, while the military academies appear at the end in the category "Otras Instituciones de Enseñanza Superior."¹⁵² Illustrative of the integration of the military and public school systems was the Summer Institute for Secondary School Teachers, which was established in 1961 with the collaboration of the Organization of American States, the National Science Foundation, the Ford Foundation, SECPANE, and the Centro de Instrucción del Perú. In 1962, the Institute was held at the Escuela Militar de Chorrillos.¹⁵³

At the postgraduate level also, Peruvian military schools are regarded as elements in a total national system. Jorge Basadre, the distinguished Peruvian historian, observes that the Escuela Superior de Guerra has produced over the years

a succession of graduating classes of trained and capable senior officers, has developed studies and prepared reports of great professional and national interest, and has had a silent and effective continuity. . . . The military were the first, and for many years have been the only group of Peruvian professionals who have systematically improved and deepened their expertise after finishing their university level studies.¹⁵⁴

A rather striking special instance of the participation of the military in the intellectual life of the nation is the Centro de Estudios Histórico-Militares (CEHMP), founded in 1944 to encourage and support the study of military history. It includes the Biblioteca Militar Nacional de los Institutos Armados, the Archivo Histórico Militar, and the Biblioteca del Instituto "Libertador Ramón Castilla." Its publications include catalogues of its holdings, documentation drawn from its archives, monographs, and an historical journal.¹⁵⁵ It also serves as custodian of national shrines such as the Cripta de los Héroes de la Guerra de 1879 and the Panteón de los Próceres.¹⁵⁶

Because of the inseparability of Peruvian general and military history, the center's activities inevitably transcend strictly institutional interests. Thus it collaborated with the Provincial Council of Callao in the preparation of the booklet, Real Felipe. Fortaleza inexpugnable de fe, heroísmo y libertad, 1er centenario de la Provincia Constitucional,¹⁵⁷ and it serves as a patron of the historical profession in the nation. It sponsored the First (1954), Second (1958), and Third (1962) National Congresses of Peruvian History, a symposium on the Inca Garcilaso de la Vega, and the First Symposium on Books on the History of Peru. In introducing the published proceedings of the latter meeting, the Director of CEHMP, General (ret.) Felipe de la Barra, affirmed that the purpose of such symposia was the "establishment of the integral History of Peru which includes Civil History and Military History" (emphasis mine).¹⁵⁸

At a more pragmatic educational level, Whyte and Flores point out that "no discussion of adult education in Peru would be complete without mentioning the role of the Armed Forces."¹⁵⁹ In the area of literacy instruction, it has been stated that each three months the army returns some 3,000 recruits to civilian society with a knowledge of at least the rudiments of reading and writing and a card testifying to their accomplishments.¹⁶⁰ In recognition of this function, in 1964 the Agency for International Development made a grant of \$12,000 to the Peruvian army for the acquisition of literacy training materials. The plan was that some 3,500 recruits, due to be discharged in June, would be prepared to teach at least ten relatives or friends to read and write and would be provided with literacy training kits. The army's technical training program for recruits also receives support from AID, and it is recognized as part of a national rather than merely an institutional effort.¹⁶¹

Public Relations Efforts

The cases cited above represent the participation of the military in educational and intellectual activities that have general societal objectives. Another dimension of penetration, however, is military-oriented education in the public school system. In its more overt form, it consists of military drills and exercises beginning at the primary level and continuing with increasing sophistication into the secondary schools. In a more subtle way it pervades other elements of the curriculum. Since the great events of Peru's past have been military actions and the great heroes soldiers, patriotic and civic training for Peru's schoolchildren consists in a large part of indoctrination in the cult of military heroes and martyrs.¹⁶²

The newer dimensions of the armed forces' mission have undoubtedly contributed to an increase in the speed and volume of communications between military and civil sectors. This process, furthermore, has been accelerated by deliberate and organized public relations efforts on the part of the services and particularly the army.

The aims of army public relations are well summarized by Captain Jorge Rendón Gallegos, writing in the Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra. The army's increasing exclusiveness and isolation from the people due to security reasons, he observes, have led to a declining public understanding of its functions, declining public support, and a belief that it is a useless burden on the nation. "The army," he states, "must try to move closer to the people, abandoning any egotistical attitudes it might have. The army must always treat civilians with whom it deals as equals." Further, the people provide its money and its men; they have a right to know what it is doing when it is not fighting wars. The army must win and keep the support, confidence, and understanding of the people. This is to be done by continuous diffusion of information and professional opinion to the public, participation in community life, and maintaining a high level of conduct among uniformed personnel.

It is now, more than ever, important to keep the civilian masses informed of the army's activities. The concept of total war makes civilians part of the nation's security apparatus. The new concept of revolutionary warfare, . . . brings the army and civilians together in the anti-communist struggle."¹⁶³

To implement these objectives, in 1962 the army established a public relations agency, the department of civil-military affairs, which was lodged in general headquarters, and public relations officers were assigned to or designated in major installations and units down to battalion size.¹⁶⁴ Public relations activities include providing civilian news media not only with information on the army and its activities, but also with publicity disseminated directly by the military. The army, in 1962, began presenting every Friday night, over Radio Nacional del Perú, a half-hour program entitled "El Perú y su Ejército,"¹⁶⁵ and in the same year, it established a fortnightly illustrated magazine, Actualidad Militar, which was designed to disseminate information on a wide range of service activities to both military personnel and the civilian population.¹⁶⁶ Actualidad Militar is not only distributed throughout the service but appears on public news stands. The contents of its first number illustrate its objectives: news items on the "Día de la Ingeniería Militar," the "Día de la Artillería," the beginning of the twelfth annual term in the Centro de Altos Estudios Militares, election of the directing committee of the Círculo Militar del Perú (officers' club); an essay on the "Social Role of the Army"; a graphic supplement on military civic action; a poem by a lieutenant; items on engagements, marriages, births, baptisms, birthdays, deaths, and travels of army personnel and their families; news from the provinces; jokes; and a sports page.

Other public relations activities include short courses for army personnel in civil-military affairs, and assignment of officers to civilian schools for special training in mass communications.¹⁶⁷ At a more informal level, officers are encouraged to join national and international service clubs, and their wives to participate in social and charitable work. Thus, in Cuzco in 1965, the commanding general of the military region was a prominent member of the Rotary Club, and three colonels were affiliated with the Lions.¹⁶⁸ Led by the wife of the commanding general, officers' ladies were active in the Liga Femenina del Niño Desamparado, the Patronato Privado de Menores, and hospital and asylum auxiliaries.¹⁶⁹

It may be added that in a manner typical of civil-military relations in Peru, the army is an integral part of a national public relations system. In 1965, in a ceremony presided over by the ministry of labor and indigenous affairs, and with the chief of public relations

of the army representing the minister of war, a new directing committee of the Peruvian public relations association was installed, with an army lieutenant colonel serving as pro-treasurer.¹⁷⁰

In summary, the Peruvian armed forces are linked closely to the national life of Peru, but in ways largely determined by the military themselves. The boundaries of the military system remain secure against invasion from without. The pervasive presence of the armed forces is symbolized by their sheer physical visibility. The quarters of the ministry of war and the joint command, though not elegant, are prominently located on Avenida Arequipa, one of Lima's main thoroughfares. The impressive new ministry of aeronautics looms just off the avenue on the Campo de Marte, and the construction of the new ministry of marine on the former site of the Hipódromo is eminently noticeable. The Círculo Militar is prominently located on the Plaza de San Martín. The cult of heroes and martyrs is everywhere represented by shrines and monuments as well as plazas, avenues, and streets named after major and minor military personages and encounters. And the great military complex of Chorrillos, on the north, and the armored division's barracks in Rimac, on the south, bracket the city.¹⁷¹

Public Attitude Toward the Armed Forces

At a high level of generalization, it may be said that the attitude of Peruvians toward their armed forces displays an ambivalence that is universal in the Western world. On the one hand, the military are resented for the inconveniences and burdens they impose on the country.¹⁷² The army is criticized for its recruiting methods. Although all Peruvian youths are subject to military service, it is charged that only the poor are actually drafted. The sierra Indians are the principal target and often are forcibly inducted despite laws against reclutamiento. The special privileges of the military—their immunity from civil jurisdiction, their subsidized commissaries, and the like—are also widely resented, as is their often superior and sometimes arrogant behavior.¹⁷³ On the other hand, the armed forces are viewed as a truly national institution, as the principal mark of national sovereignty. The civilian population accepts the image of the armed forces as the creators of the republic, the guarantors of the integrity of the national territory, and as an internal integrative force.¹⁷⁴ The military cult of heroes and martyrs is a national cult. Jorge Basadre summarizes this collective view:

But despite [its numerous abuses], the army represented the nation. Without Junín and Ayacucho the nation would not have emerged. In the face of threats of mutilation, disintegration, or dissolution, men in uniform preserved the national identity. Where would Peru have been without its army during the period extending from the internal-international crisis of 1827-1829 to that of 1841 and 1842? It would have lost sections of its patrimony, the basic elements of its existence, its name itself. Confronting difficulties which were then formidable, and geographical diversity, the armed forces were distributed throughout the national territory, and attracted personnel from different regions. Despite ethnic differences and social and economic inequalities, they recruited on a basis of equality men from all sectors, performing in this manner a democratic function and instilling in their personnel, in addition to professional concepts, a sentiment of nationality. One should not, therefore, speak only of political disturbances and the expenses represented by salaries and pensions when evaluating the role of the armed institutions during the first years of the republic.¹⁷⁵

Concerning the present functions and status of the military, Victor Villanueva claims that the mentality of the Peruvian people is militaristic and chauvinistic.¹⁷⁶ This evaluation

is a bit too morbid. Nevertheless, mindful of past wars and discomfitures, and present and potential threats to the territorial integrity of the nation, the public regards the external mission of the armed forces as legitimate and essential.¹⁷⁷ All except the revolutionary left, moreover, see the military as a guarantor of internal order in the face of disruptive forces and particularly as a bulwark against communism.¹⁷⁸

Although civilian skepticism exists about depth and continuity of the military's commitment to civic action, in general their efforts are approved and applauded. Thus El Comercio of Lima and El Tiempo of Piura praised the "extraordinary" work of the army in providing flood relief on the Bajo Piura and the Catacaos rivers. La industria of Chiclayo reported with approval that when floods threatened Illimo, men from the 7th Light Infantry Division helped to check the waters and later contributed to preventive measures. When the troops returned through the city to their barracks, continued the report, they were warmly applauded by the citizenry.¹⁷⁹

Public attitudes toward the political role of the armed forces show a special ambivalence. On the one hand, civilians deplore in principle military plots and coups and condemn the unruliness of past military behavior. On the other hand, they accept or approve such actions when existing governments fail to perform at expected levels or when a coup appears to be in support of popular objectives. Particular civilian interest groups are not averse to accepting or seeking military support. Villanueva puts it more strongly: "The people, incapable of solving their own problems, want and ask for the Armed Forces to intervene to give them a solution."¹⁸⁰

The above generalizations develop variations when the attitudes of particular sectors and groups are examined. The oligarchy retains a traditional image of the military as a socially inferior group but also as supporters of the traditional order.¹⁸¹ The middle class view is more positive because of its social linkages with the officer corps and a set of interests that coincides with those of the military. Like the oligarchy, they regard the armed forces as a bulwark against extremism and social revolution, but they also look to it for cooperation and leadership in evolutionary change.¹⁸²

The attitudes of the proletariat have traditionally been hostile or at best apathetic, since it is the class which has felt most directly reclutamiento and other forms of military oppression. On the other hand, the armed forces enjoy some prestige among lower social sectors. Sons of innumerable families have served in the ranks, and the net impact of this experience appears to be favorable to the military. Noncommissioned officers return to their communities after three years of service possessing leadership qualities and a relatively sophisticated knowledge of affairs, which provide them with superior status; they often become prefects and, still in uniform, preside at public functions. Undoubtedly, also, the reputation of the military has been improved in particular instances by military civic action programs. It is a great occasion for the inhabitants when the army engineers push a road into isolated communities in the sierra of the selva. In a more urban environment, social workers in the Barriada Alianza para el Progreso in Lima reported that they had encountered no general antimilitary feelings. On the contrary many inhabitants expressed, if not affection for, at least trust in the army. The informants inclined to attribute this attitude to the fact that two enlisted men were residents in the community and five others stationed outside of the capital had their homes there and returned on leave occasionally. All seven were well regarded by their neighbors. Also inhabitants were impressed by the army's promise to dredge the Rimac River which in March 1965 had flooded and washed away six homes.¹⁸³ Lower class attitudes also involve the expectation that the military institution or military presidents may be their best hope for social reforms that civilian leadership has failed to produce. This hope derives

in part from a favorable image of the accomplishments of the Odría administration, an image which continues to provide support for the former president and general among the urban proletariat.¹⁸⁴ It is also based in part on an awareness of social reformist sentiments in the armed forces and a conviction that the military possess the power to act if they chose to do so.

Intellectuals as a class tend to be doctrinairely antimilitary, and the more radical among them regard the armed forces as the principal obstacle to social revolution. The attitudes of many, however, are modified by circumstances. A close link exists between civilian technocrats—engineers, economists, and sociologists—and their military counterparts. Moreover, many intellectuals teach in military schools and are dependent, directly or indirectly, on military support for their activities.

Among university students in Lima, the most politically alert appear to be decidedly antimilitary but substantial variations in attitudes exist. The Communist-oriented leadership of the Universidad Nacional de Ingeniería expressed the doctrinaire views that the armed forces are in league with the oligarchy against social and economic justice for the masses, that their inflated budgets are a waste of national wealth, which might be spent more constructively, and that their arms are used only against popular aspirations. Differences of opinion exist, however, as to what should be done. Moscow-line Communists advocate a revolutionary reform of the armed forces; the Peking-oriented faction favors their abolishment and, in their place, the organization of a people's militia.¹⁸⁵

Among Belaundistas at San Marcos, moderates believed that the military are an essential institution performing a legitimate function. The radicals, however, shared with the Communists the conviction that the army is the tool of reaction and an obstacle to social progress.¹⁸⁶

Aprista students were also antimilitary but largely for historical reasons. Their attitude, they maintained, was simply a reaction to the anti-Aprismo of the armed forces, and felt that if the latter would moderate their hostility, they would reciprocate.¹⁸⁷ Student views, it might be added, reflect the posture of the party as a whole. APRA's attitudes toward the military have been changeable and have had a strong dash of expediency. Initially, the movement was doctrinairely anti-armed forces. Subsequently, it sought to ally itself with military factions.¹⁸⁸ Today, it feels that the issues which once separated the two institutions have faded. They share a common interest in stability and moderate reform, and both are strongly anti-Communist. Party leaders believe, therefore, that, as memories of ancient wrongs fade, reconciliation and perhaps an alliance with the armed forces might be achieved.¹⁸⁹

In summary, the Peruvian armed forces today enjoy widespread popular support. This status is a product of several factors: their historical role as the creators, defenders, and integrators of the nation; their structural ties with all social sectors; their professionalization, which has made them more capable of performing a publicly approved mission and which has curbed individual and institutional military misbehavior; their restraint when governing the country; their involvement in national development and modernization; and, finally, their public relations efforts.¹⁹⁰ Thus, on the 143rd anniversary of national independence, La Prensa reported:

Along Avenida Brasil, before the presence of the Chief of State, high dignitaries of the Government and the Diplomatic Corps . . . twelve to fifteen thousand troops of the garrisons of Lima and Callao paraded.

That this parade was very brilliant was demonstrated by the warm and sincere applause of the multitude, some 200,000 persons who jammed the edges of the streets for the thirty blocks the troops marched. More persons, perhaps half a million, followed the parade on television screens.

In contrast to past parades, on this occasion the military forces displayed a singular might and were equipped with armament worthy of the major armies of the world. This is said without hyperbole. The soldiers, moreover—and it is only just to say so—were well uniformed, better shod and appeared fit and healthy. All this is what the multitude applauded.

When it is considered that the Armed Forces and Auxiliaries are ready to defend our frontiers, that another of their missions is to enforce the constitution and the laws, the enthusiasm of the crowds is explained. And their applause is more deserved than ever because the armed forces have added to their military tasks a series of projects to aid the national society.¹⁹¹

POLITICAL ACTION: THE COUP D'ETAT OF 1962 AND THE JUNTA MILITAR

The basis and form of the political role of the Peruvian armed forces may be concretely illustrated by an analysis of key situations and developments in the political history of the nation, from the germination of the coup of July 18, 1962, to the election of President Fernando Belaunde Terry in June 1963. It is frankly admitted that what is being offered is an interpretation, and an interpretation, moreover, based in part on hearsay evidence and even political gossip. Even if all political and military leaders of the period were accessible to the researcher and expressed themselves frankly about their actions, it is impossible to explain particular events or individual attitudes and behavior with scientific accuracy. In many cases, motivations were ambivalent and not completely understood by the actors themselves. In the passage of time, moreover, memory fades, recollections are subjectively altered by subsequent events, and different individuals may recall the same event in quite different ways. The available data, therefore, may be interpreted by other students of the period in quite a different way. The present writer can only maintain that his explanation is internally consistent.

Events of the 1962 Election Campaign

The principal candidates in the presidential election of 1962 were Raul Haya de la Torre, venerable leader of APRA; Belaunde Terry, candidate of Acción Popular; and General Manuel Odría, the head of the Unión Nacionalista Odrista (UNO). Very early in the campaign, charges of irregular and padded voter lists began to fill the air. Odría, at the time of his nomination, denounced the "coming electoral fraud,"¹⁹² and, in February, Belaunde observed that the possibility of fraud could not be ignored.¹⁹³ The culprits, specified or implied, of such accusations were APRA and incumbent Manuel Prado's Movimiento Democrático Peruano (MDP), which favored Haya's candidacy. The two parties controlled the national election board (Jurado Nacional de Elecciones) and voter lists in many electoral districts.¹⁹⁴

As the weeks advanced, charges and countercharges thickened, and rumors of impending violence and bloodshed spread throughout the nation. Belaunde continued to speak darkly of the possibilities of fraud and, on April 3, added that if in fact it occurred there would be a revolution.¹⁹⁵ On May 13, he went one step further to say that if irregularities in the electoral process denied him victory he himself would lead an uprising.¹⁹⁶ The UNO took the same line and on April 2, Julio de la Predra, one of Odría's supporters, accused the minister of government and police as the principal culprit.¹⁹⁷

The position of the armed forces was equivocal. On April 3, army general headquarters informed the public that military participation in the election would be limited to performing the duties prescribed by Article 124 of the Electoral Statute, which read: "The armed forces will take the necessary actions to insure the free exercise of the right to vote, the protection of the electoral authorities in the fulfillment of their duties, and the proper custody of electoral materials and associated documents."¹⁹⁸ On April 27, however, Minister of Marine Guillermo Tirado stated to a press conference in Bogotá that the armed forces would not accept a government of the extreme left.¹⁹⁹ When queried about Tirado's statement, Minister of Aeronautics Salvador Noya Ferré asserted that he had not read it, while Minister of War Alejandro Cuadra Rabines remarked aloofly, "I cannot say anything regarding a declaration by a colleague. It is better that you do not ask me."²⁰⁰ Upon his return to Lima, the minister of marine stated: "The armed forces do not belong to any party. They will only comply with their constitutional mandate which proscribes communism in Peru."²⁰¹ Although Tirado did not identify the leftist or Communist forces which the military opposed, there is little doubt that he had APRA in mind.

There were, in fact, substantial differences of opinion within the armed forces about the merits of the three major presidential candidates. General Odría had some support but most of the senior officers who had benefited from his patronage had retired. Moreover, the army leadership which had replaced them had some specific antipathies against the general. They had been antagonized by his attempt to make a deal with APRA during the elections of 1956 whereby the latter would support Hernando Lavalle, Odría's choice.²⁰² Probably more important, however, was the army's newly developed concern with its public image, a factor which had not been operative when it had placed him in power. Their former comrade in arms had been a highly personalistic president and, although he was no longer a soldier, it was feared that the public would continue to identify him with the military institution and with military dictatorship.²⁰³

With respect to the other two major candidates, Haya de la Torre had a small sprinkling of support, particularly among younger officers, but it was unorganized and, because of institutional attitudes toward him, largely clandestine. The majority of officers with political preferences inclined toward Belaunde. The Acción Popular candidate had family ties linking him with army leadership,²⁰⁴ his reformist program appealed to more progressive officers, and it was not too radical for conservative elements.²⁰⁵

By and large, however, collective military attitudes toward the upcoming elections were negative. The prospect of an Aprista president, and particularly Haya de la Torre, was viewed with apprehension throughout the officer corps of the three services. It was a question of what posture the armed forces should adopt. Within army leadership, one group, represented by Minister of War Cuadra, held that the voters' decision should be accepted regardless of the victor. Cuadra insisted, however, that the military should have the right to nominate the three service ministers in the new president's cabinet. General Lindley López was opposed to any direct action, at least until after the elections had clarified the situation. The army Chief of Staff, General Humberto Luna Ferreccio, was reported to favor preventative action before the elections and the establishment of a military junta. Within the air force, Minister of Aeronautics Noya Ferré tended to favor a constitutionalist position, but General Pedro Vargas Prada, who became commander in chief on March 22, was a hard line anti-Aprista. Luna Ferreccio's and Vargas Prada's views appear to have been shared by Admiral Tirado.²⁰⁶

Although they might disagree on means, armed forces leaders were in substantial agreement on the end. An Aprista administration must be forestalled. Their principal weapon was alleged irregularities in election procedures. The army set up its own system for checking

electoral lists and detecting voter preferences, and as early as February, army general headquarters requested the electoral board to require all male voters to present their military identification cards at the polls.²⁰⁷ On March 15, this request was denied on the grounds that the only identification required of a voter by law was his registration card (*libreto electoral*).²⁰⁸ In the meantime, the armed forces proceeded with contingency planning, including an effort to ascertain the likely reaction of the United States in the event they should decide to execute a coup.²⁰⁹

Apristas reacted to the charges of their oponents by denying any involvement in electoral conspiracies or frauds and, in a rally of May 15, swore that if necessary they would die to foil any coup, civil or military, which attempted to deny election results.²¹⁰ Three days later, however, Secretary General Ramiro Pirale took a more conciliatory tone by affirming that APRA was not against the army so long as the latter did not turn its back on the people. "We need not organize militias," he asserted, "nor shall we cease to respect the military hierarchy which is respectable as long as it knows what to respect."²¹¹

On May 25, Judge Antonio Villar Vicuña reported on an investigation of voting lists undertaken by the electoral board. Much to the disappointment of anti-Aprista forces, he found only 190 irregularities rather than some 200,000 charged by Acción Popular. The *agente fiscal* of the board found ten more, for a total of 200 among 2,000,000 listed voters.²¹² Although the number of irregularities detected was minuscule, the fact that they existed provided the armed forces with a justification for declaring that an intent to commit fraud existed. In a communique of May 26, the three service ministers reiterated their request that military identification cards be required at polling places. With respect to the legality of such a procedure, they pointed out that while the electoral law referred only to registration cards, it conferred on the board ample power to prescribe any supplemental procedures it deemed necessary to ensure electoral honesty.²¹³ On this occasion the board accepted.²¹⁴

The settlement of the military registration issue, however, did little to calm the situation. Belaunde supported the military communique, praised the electoral board's acquiescence,²¹⁵ but revealed his apprehensions by affirming that he would "accept whatever results the election produced if the electoral process did not differ fundamentally from the principles set forth by the armed forces," adding that "we are confident that those who wear the uniforms of the homeland will not tolerate the thwarting of the popular verdict."²¹⁶ In other statements, moreover, he continued to hint darkly of revolution.²¹⁷

General Odría not only agreed with the communique but demanded the dismissal of the entire Prado cabinet, or at the least Minister of Government Ricardo Elías Aparicio, and called for the total control of the elections by the armed forces.²¹⁸ Subsequently, in an open letter to President Prado dated June 3, he asked for "the broadest guarantees in the electoral process since APRA, with the condescending collaboration of the authorities, is perpetrating all kinds of criminal attempts against Peruvians and the headquarters of [his] party. . . ." "A civil war is blossoming," he warned, "and if the government does not avoid it . . . you [Prado] will be responsible before history for the national misfortune."²¹⁹

APRA also agreed to the use of military identification cards in voting but continued to deny that it had any intention of achieving power through fraud. And, in an apparent attempt to both conciliate and instruct the armed forces, Haya praised them at a huge public rally in Lima on June 5, stating that they "must aid the nation to save itself from the totalitarian menace and must bring it forth from its state of underdevelopment."²²⁰

Thus, on the eve of elections the public statements of party leaders made it clear that they all anticipated that the armed forces would have the final voice in determining the outcome of the elections. Belaunde appeared to rely on it.²²¹ The military themselves continued to prepare for whatever eventualities the elections might bring forth. Some 50,000 troops and auxiliaries were detailed to police the polls, and provisions were made for a military vote counting service whose results would be available to the high command.²²² At the same time, their leaders issued guarded or equivocal statements.

On June 7th, persistent rumors were circulating about the imminent prospect of a military cabinet. On the following day, Air Force Minister Noya Ferré stated flatly, "There is no reason for a military cabinet," and War Minister Cuadra stated that the rumor was "absolutely false." When asked, however, if the armed forces would recognize the election of an APRA ticket, Cuadra replied, "The ministers of defense have decided to not make political declarations in an isolated form."²²³ The following day the service ministers clamped a ban on all contact between armed forces personnel and the political parties involved in the election.²²⁴

On the same day, an extraneous element was introduced into the situation. In a speech in the United States Senate, Senator Hubert Humphrey praised APRA as a worthy representation of the non-Communist left and warned that a military coup denying victory to it would have adverse effects on relations between the United States and Peru.²²⁵ Most Peruvians did not receive kindly such obvious intervention in their internal affairs. The strongest criticism of Humphrey's remarks appeared, of course, in the anti-APRA El Comercio.²²⁶

The 1962 Election and the Military Coup

On Sunday, June 10, 1.7 million out of 2.2 million eligible voters went to the polls, and the day passed without major incident.²²⁷ As partial results began to accumulate on the following day, Odría declared himself the winner. The New York Times, basing its statement on "informed sources," reported that a secret military tabulation showed Belaunde to be the victor.²²⁸ Belaunde himself made a public declaration to that effect and praised the election as free. On Wednesday, however, as results began to turn against him, he charged that fraud had not been controlled in Cajamarca, Amazonas, La Libertad, and Lambayeque, where Haya de la Torre had piled up large majorities.²²⁹ On June 14, the army high command decided that the election had been won by Belaunde, with 570,215 votes. Haya followed with 554,198, and Odría was third, with 485,315.²³⁰ The official results, however, remained to be determined and certified by the electoral board.

As the board proceeded deliberately with its tabulation, public doubts grew about the claims issued by Odría and Belaunde, as well as the figures of the army. On June 28, the armed forces issued a communique to the effect that while various periodicals had carried news items affirming that the military had guarded the purity of the elections, they had only the responsibility for maintaining order during the voting and for other duties assigned by Article 224 of the Electoral Statute. They did not, however, have complete control over the electoral process. The commanders of military zones, continued the communique, had reported grave irregularities in various departments. Proof would be made public after the documentation had been turned over to the electoral board.²³¹ The departments named in the armed forces' charges were those in which Haya appeared to have won overwhelmingly.²³²

On June 29, the electoral board announced the official tally, which showed Haya with 558,528 votes, Belaunde with 544,528, Odría with 421,288, and other candidates with a total of 109,525.²³³ Haya had triumphed but had not received one-third of all ballots cast as required

for election by the constitution.²³⁴ The contest, therefore, was thrown into congress where APRA controlled the largest bloc of votes but not enough to elect its candidate.²³⁵

Earlier tentative negotiations between contending parties were therefore stepped up in an effort to create a coalition in congress that could produce enough votes to elect a president. Belaundistas met with Apristas, and the latter with their old enemies, the Odristas. President Prado supported these efforts.²³⁶

The armed forces continued to collect evidence of fraud and prepared a series of documented charges, which ultimately led to a formal demand to the electoral board and to President Prado that the election results be annulled. At a less-official-level, military leaders held almost daily policy meetings.²³⁷ On July 9, an unusually large number of military men gathered for the annual homage to their comrades massacred in Trujillo. When it was remarked to General Cuadra that such a display was unprecedented, he replied, "That is a matter for your judgment. Observe and draw your own conclusions."²³⁸

The uncertainty of the election outcome and the constant meetings of civilian and military leaders and their public pronouncements created a situation of extreme tension. Rumors of revolt and rebellion swept Lima and the provincial capitals. Belaunde contributed further to public apprehension. Apparently anticipating a rapprochement between APRA and UNO, and apprehensive that the electoral board would stand its ground, he denounced the latter body in a television address of July 9 and asked it to resolve the electoral stalemate within three days. The Acción Popular candidate concluded his remarks by affirming that "We wish to tell the armed forces that we are on their side because we believe that an offense to them is an offense to Peru and scorn of them is scorn of the nation."²³⁹ On July 12, he hurried to Arequipa, where his followers had been threatening rebellion and ordered them to set up barricades and stand behind them until he received a response to his demands.²⁴⁰ On the same day, APRA and UNO issued a joint communique announcing that both parties were united in their efforts to find a formula which would terminate the tense political situation and bring about national unity.²⁴¹ The New York Times reported that "high military sources" would agree to a solution by which APRA would support Odrfa in congress.²⁴² Other sources, however, indicated that if such an agreement existed it was not unanimous.²⁴³

During the week of July 16, affairs reached a climax. On that date, the cabinet led by Admiral Tirado resigned. No explanation was given except that President Prado should have a free hand to deal with the crisis.²⁴⁴ The real reason appears to be associated with the demand of the armed forces that the elections be annulled.²⁴⁵ Prado, however, accepted only the resignation of Admiral Tirado.²⁴⁶ On July 17, the electoral board refused the military's demand for annulment, and declared the elections valid.²⁴⁷ On the evening of the same day, UNO and APRA reached an agreement to support jointly the candidacy of Odrfa in congress, apparently believing the General's military ties would make the arrangement acceptable to the armed forces.²⁴⁸

The politicians, however, overestimated Odrfa's influence among his former colleagues, and underestimated the military's hostility to APRA. "This has come too late," one colonel is reported to have said; "the election has been a fraud and nothing legal can be built on that."²⁴⁹ On the night of July 17, the military moved. Shortly before midnight, the army chief of staff removed the commander of the armored division, who was then escorted to his home under guard. At 3:00 the next morning, tanks and troops of the division crossed the Rimac, and twenty-five minutes later had surrounded the presidential palace where President Prado, members of his cabinet, and family and friends were esconced. By 4:03, the president had been deposed, and Generals Cuadra Rabines and Noya Ferré were under guard.²⁵⁰ Aprista leaders went into hiding.

Before noon on July 18, a military junta was established headed by four copresidents who also served as ministers: Lieutenant General (army) Ricardo Pérez Godoy, also President of the Joint Command and now Minister of the Treasury and Commerce; Lieutenant General Nicolás Lindley López, replacing General Cuadra as Minister of War; Vice Admiral Juan Francisco Torres Matos, replacing Admiral Tirado as Minister of the Navy; and Major General Pedro Vargas Prada, minister of aeronautics in place of General Noya Ferré.²⁵¹ The rest of the junta and cabinet was made up of general officers from the three services. Lower ranking officers moved into secondary posts in the government ministries, and at the local and provincial levels, military personnel replaced prefects and mayors.²⁵²

On the evening of the 18th, Pérez Godoy delivered a radio and television message to the nation. The reason for the military's action, he affirmed, was electoral fraud and the political tension that had persisted so long. He also promised that new elections would be held within a year, that the junta's members had no political ambitions, that it would respect Peru's international obligations, and that it would attempt to solve the nation's pressing economic and social problems.²⁵³ Pérez Godoy's assurances were supplemented by a statement from Minister Vargas Prada that the junta would maintain "full freedom of the press," and an armed forces communique pledged "full guarantees for all citizens without discrimination."²⁵⁴

Reaction to the Military Administration

During the first days of the military administration the situation was unsettled. Public reaction to events was mixed, and the junta undertook a number of repressive measures. On the day of the coup, constitutional guarantees were suspended for one month,²⁵⁵ and deposed President Prado and other officials of his government were placed in detention.²⁵⁶ The headquarters of APRA and its national organ, *La Tribuna*, were occupied by commandos for two days and party archives sequestered.²⁵⁷ The national guild of newspapermen protested the intervention of *La Prensa* as an infringement on freedom of the press.²⁵⁸ Immediately following the takeover, demonstrations of youths broke out in the Plaza de Armas, the Plaza de San Martín, and near the University of San Marcos. These were broken up by riot police backed up by army troop carriers.²⁵⁹ In Arequipa, 200 students demonstrated against the junta, and in the north 60,000 sugarworkers struck.²⁶⁰ APRA attempted to organize a general strike of the 350,000 workers of the Confederación de Trabajadores del Perú (CTP), but only 35,000 took part.²⁶¹

Major opposition to the coup came from APRA, UNO, and the lesser political parties. As anticipated but also discounted, the United States immediately suspended diplomatic relations with Peru and broke off all aid to the country except for humanitarian programs.²⁶²

Reaction in other quarters if not positive was at least neutral. As might be expected, Acción Popular welcomed the military's action, and its leaders attended the swearing-in of the junta. Belaunde declared that the coup was a lesson to all those who dared employ fraud as a political device.²⁶³ The junta was recognized by the supreme court, whose chief justice, Roberto Carmendia, promised that it would maintain with the junta "the relations necessary for the attainment of the high goals of the State."²⁶⁴ Speaking in the name of his organization, Raúl Ferrero, the Dean of the College of Lawyers of Lima, supported the coup and affirmed: "We back the patriotic and constitutional action taken by the armed forces who have the right to denounce cases of coercion and fraud."²⁶⁵ Cardinal Landázuri, the Primate of Peru, acknowledged the authority of the junta, expressing the hope that traditional church-state relations would be maintained. On July 28, in the presence of the junta and cabinet, members of the supreme court, and other dignitaries, the Cardinal conducted the traditional Te Deum in the cathedral of Lima.²⁶⁶

Business leaders generally supported the coup. A group of Peruvian financiers, representing the major corporations and banks of the nation, paid its respects to the junta, which, in response, promised to support free enterprise and free exchange.²⁶⁷ Members of the American business community, though remaining openly neutral, criticized the action of their government, which appeared to identify it with APRA.²⁶⁸ In the ranks of labor, at the time of the abortive general strike, 3,000 members of the CTP marched to the presidential palace and promised not to participate. They said they were tired of having "permanent" officers and wished to hold new elections.²⁶⁹

In general, public reaction to the coup was mild and was not based on constitutional or moral positions. The posture of major interest groups conformed to their evaluation of how the military government would affect their welfare and status. The mass of the Peruvian people did not react strongly in either a positive or a negative fashion.²⁷⁰

Actions of the Military Junta

Within a month after the coup, the junta was firmly in control of the nation. Constitutional guarantees were restored earlier than promised, and political prisoners were released.²⁷¹ On August 17, the United States renewed diplomatic ties and economic assistance.²⁷² Throughout its tenure the military, retaining the capability for repression, used its powers sparingly. Its treatment of the Apristas was surprisingly mild. Their leaders were permitted freedom of movement, and after two days of occupation La Tribuna was permitted to resume publication.²⁷³ Minister of Government General Juan Bossfo Collas, observed that "the policy of persecution has done nothing but strengthen APRA." Therefore, it was best to leave them alone.²⁷⁴ However, the military government remained basically anti-Aprista and for a time tried to undermine the party by supporting Communist leadership within the labor movement. This policy was abandoned when the Communists exploited their position by fomenting strikes.²⁷⁵ APRA continued to oppose the junta, but after the failure of the general strike, limited its efforts to verbal criticisms.²⁷⁶

With respect to positive programs and actions, the junta was not overly active. It drew up a law which was to initiate Peru's first official land redistribution program, debated a tax increase, undertook a literacy campaign, and stepped up military civic action. Its actions or lack of them indicated that it regarded itself primarily as a caretaker regime whose principal responsibility was to maintain political stability, to guarantee that the elections it set for June 1963 be conducted in an orderly fashion, and to ensure that the right candidate would win. To the latter end, in September 1962, a new electoral law was promulgated which required that, to be eligible to enter candidates, all parties must submit a petition signed by a minimum of 60,000 eligible voters. This act had the effect of forcing out of the running the several minor parties (mainly leftist) that had participated in the 1962 elections and of inducing the Partido Democrático Cristiano to support Belaunde's candidacy.

Deposition of General Pérez Godoy

The main problems the junta encountered came from within its own ranks and its military constituency. General Pérez Godoy, primus inter pares of the presidents by virtue of his military seniority, soon incurred the displeasure of other military leaders. From the outset, he occupied the limelight. His picture appeared daily in El Peruano, the official gazette, and he performed regularly on a television program entitled "La Opinión Pública y el Gobierno."²⁷⁸ He also pushed through a tax increase against the wishes of the other members of the junta,

particularly Lindley López, and threatened to nationalize the International Petroleum Company properties at La Brea.²⁷⁹ Pérez Godoy, furthermore, had reached retirement a month before the coup but refused to leave the service.²⁸⁰ Military reaction was an internal coup on March 3, 1963, which deposed him and reduced the junta to three members. Lindley López became first among equals.²⁸¹

The precise motives which induced the armed forces to eliminate Pérez Godoy are impossible to determine. Influential banking and commercial interests opposed his tax increase, and this consideration may have influenced the other members' actions. Certainly the increase was repealed within three weeks after his deposition.²⁸² The military may have been apprehensive that his threats against International Petroleum might lead to retaliation by the United States in the form of reduction or termination of military and economic assistance. Martín Needler attributes the internal coup to Pérez Godoy's willingness to return the country to constitutional government on the basis of a formula whereby APRA congressmen would support Odría. Lindley López and Vargas Prada, Needler continues, opposed this solution because they had personal and family ties with Belaunde and because they feared that the Apristas would receive key posts in the government in return for supporting Odría.²⁸³

The reason offered by the joint command for Pérez Godoy's deposition was the excessive personalism of his leadership, a posture which conflicted with the armed forces' cherished claim that their actions before, during, and after the elections of 1962 were strictly institutional.²⁸⁴ Although not denying the influence of specific disagreements between Pérez and other military leaders, the present author supports an institutional explanation. The political ambitions of Pérez Godoy, his apparent efforts to develop a cult of personality, and the prospects of another Odría alienated active officers. Lindley López was a general's general.²⁸⁵ When he assumed leadership of the junta, he canceled its television program, otherwise avoided publicity, and devoted his efforts to preparing for the forthcoming elections.²⁸⁶

During the tenure of the junta, institutional unity was threatened at another level. The nature of the threat is illustrated by a story which is probably apocryphal but which nevertheless went the rounds after the coup of 1962. Upon being chided by an oligarch for the affair, a certain general retorted: "Well, you should be thankful. If we, the generals, had not moved, the colonels would probably have done so and they are nasseristas. And, if the colonels had done nothing, the junior officers would have acted; they are fidelistas."²⁸⁷

The Colonels' Group

In any case, there did exist a "colonels" group within the armed forces and particularly the army. Its members, most of whom were graduates of the Centro de Altos Estudios Militares, were strongly reformist minded.²⁸⁸ When the military cabinet was established, it was they who moved into key secondary positions in government ministries. Reputedly with the support of Minister of Government General Bossío Collas, they felt that as long as the armed forces were in power, they should seize the opportunity to effect essential but overdue structural reforms in Peruvian society, even if it meant the postponement of the elections and the indefinite prolongation of military rule.²⁸⁹ The extent of their organization and the strength of their determination are not clear. It is another indication of the internal discipline of the Peruvian armed forces, however, that they took no overt action. Elections were held as scheduled, Belaunde duly won, and the soldiers returned to their barracks with no irreparable damage to their public image.

In concluding this brief account of the military coup of 1962 and the junta militar which followed it, at least two points require further comment. First, there is the question of the existence or extent of fraud in the elections of 1962. The junta produced a bulky "White Book" intended to document its charges.²⁰⁰ If the military's case was fabricated or exaggerated, it was and still is accepted by the majority of the officer corps. The findings of the electoral board, though indicating the existence of irregularities, deny that they were sufficient to justify invalidating the elections. The positions of Peruvian writers on the issue pretty much conform to their political allegiances or sympathies. Latin American liberals and most North American commentators are skeptical of the military's claim and have deplored the coup on doctrinaire grounds. I tend to go along with the skeptics, but I regard the question as irrelevant to the purposes of this paper, which is to explain rather than to judge the actions of the Peruvian armed forces. The important thing is that they did not want a government controlled by the Apristas and were able to justify their actions to themselves and to a large number of their countrymen.

Factors of the Military Junta's Behavior

Second, the caretaker posture of the military regime, its fulfillment of its promise to schedule new elections, and its relatively mild character have all been attributed to a desire to placate the United States.²⁰¹ Undoubtedly this was a factor in its thinking. Armed forces leaders were aware, however, that suspension of North American diplomatic relations and military and economic assistance was a doctrinaire gesture. Unless the junta behaved very badly indeed, the exigencies of hemispheric defense would cause the United States to relent.²⁰²

A more fundamental factor in the armed forces' behavior was a genuine reluctance to mount a coup and to establish a military government. The generals and admirals were fearful that such actions would undermine the internal discipline and politicize the service; they were apprehensive that their overt political role would tarnish the military's public image, and the more sophisticated among them were skeptical about their capabilities to govern an increasingly complex society. The coup and the junta were essentially defensive measures. They were adopted because the armed forces felt themselves mortally threatened.²⁰³

THE CONDITIONS OF MILITARY POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

The conditions of the political behavior of the armed forces in contemporary Peru may be summarized as follows.

First, they continue to be a powerful political interest group or groups. In pursuit of their interests they constantly interact with other groups within the political system. This relationship is generally recognized, accepted, and sometimes encouraged by practically all civilian sectors. Major political parties would not hesitate to seek military support if they felt it to be necessary to obtain office and to stay in power. In terms of descriptive political theory, therefore, the concept of "military intervention" does not appear appropriate in Peru. If the armed forces are an integral part of the system, they cannot very well intervene in it.

Second, the primary concerns of the armed forces are institutional self-preservation and the survival and well being of the nation. The latter includes not only the defense of the national territory and the maintenance of internal stability but a positive military role in national development. While professionally conservative officers may wish to limit the latter function to civic action, a "radical" military element continues to exist, particularly within the

army. Its members are radical in that they believe basic structural reforms in Peruvian society are essential if modernization and development are to be achieved in Peru. They are convinced, however, that only the armed forces possess the will, power, and sense of national responsibility to define, initiate, guide, and control such reforms. I am unable to evaluate the strength of this group but offer the proposition that their numbers and influence will vary in response to the effectiveness with which governments handle critical national, social, and economic problems.

Third, institutional interests and national interests are closely identified in the military mind. In a manner reminiscent of former U.S. Defense Secretary Charles Wilson's identification of the welfare of General Motors and the country, the Peruvian military believe that what is good for them is good for Peru. Conversely, a threat to the military institution is a threat to the nation.

Fourth, the Peruvian armed forces are increasingly reluctant to use the force at their disposal as a political tool. This development is attributable in part to the growth of professional responsibility and the sincere conviction of many officers that in the interests of their institution and the nation, their political activities should not transcend constitutional norms—unless absolutely necessary. It also derives in part from the apprehension of the military that the more overt forms of political action would again tarnish their public image which they have taken such pains to improve. Finally under the present administration, they can afford a virtuous attitude. The Belaunde government is providing stability; it is promoting reform but not at too rapid a rate, and the status of the services in it is secure.

Fifth, despite their formal adoption of an apolitical stance, the armed forces have not completely and finally eschewed force as a political instrument. Under various circumstances or combinations of circumstances, troops from Chorrillos and tanks from Rimac would move again.

A sixth basic condition of the political behavior of the Peruvian armed forces is their powerful sense of unity combined with strong leadership from senior officers. Cohesive forces overbalance tendencies toward cleavage, particularly when the armed institution is threatened. Therefore, the form of future military political role, regardless of its level of intensity, is more likely to be institutional and less likely to be factional or personalistic.

Seventh, the armed forces are in a strong position to intensify their political role should they wish to do so. Their quasi-autonomous status and their freedom from civilian scrutiny give them a secure base from which to operate; their penetration of civilian structures provides them with strong leverage; and, if intensified political action appears to the public as a move to depose a discredited regime or maintain stability, they would encounter little organized civilian resistance and receive substantial popular support. Finally, their organizational and physical resources are more than adequate for any political action they might wish to undertake.

Given the preceding attitudes and conditions within the armed forces, the question remains of what circumstances in their societal environment might induce them to intensify their political role? It is increasingly unlikely that the political ambitions of individual officers would provide the motivation; that a new shipment of tanks from the United States would provide the temptation; that concern with North American reaction would serve as a major deterrent; or that specific grievances such as a cut in the military's proportion of the national budget would constitute a primary provocation. Though such interests and influences might be contributory, it is much more likely that military reaction would be to a general set of conditions indigenous to Peru.

Four situations of this type might be hypothesized. One is the deterioration of economic or political conditions to the level where, in the military's opinion, the stability of the established order was threatened. A case in point would be the outbreak of leftist violence that the government was unwilling or unable to restrain. The appearance of insurgency in Huancaayo in the summer of 1965 made the armed forces quite restless and discontented with Belaunde's initial reluctance to take a strong stand. One source claimed that "the military men are anxious for a clear indication of Belaunde's leadership," and quoted one general as saying, "Most of us do not want another military dictatorship . . . but if the civilians are blind to the communist danger, we would feel duty-bound to step in."²⁹⁴ The president, however, soon took the proper attitude.

Another circumstance would be a political impasse or economic stagnation, which by frustrating popular demands created a potentially revolutionary situation. The armed forces were unhappy with the initial obstructionist tactics of APRA and UNO in congress, which blocked Belaunde's "Popular Action" program, and it was reported that they had urged the president to dissolve congress and to implement reforms by decree. His difficulties with the legislative branch, however, appeared to be relieved when, in September 1965, he appointed seven Apristas to cabinet posts and named an Aprista prime minister.²⁹⁵

The armed forces would also be motivated strongly to prevent the election of an administration which was committed to radical change without their sponsorship or guidance or which was regarded by them to be hostile to the military institution. In the summer of 1965, several officers informed the author that if in the future it appeared that APRA might come to power, military reaction would be the same as in 1962. It is likely, however, that the feud between Apristas and the armed services will be of decreasing importance as a factor in Peruvian politics. As indicated earlier, the strong anticommunism of both parties constitutes a solid basis for rapprochement. Furthermore, APRA appears willing to forgive and forget and, as the generation of officers that was personally involved in the violent phases of the struggle retire, the armed forces will probably reciprocate.²⁹⁶ Belaunde's aforementioned appointment of Aprista ministers produced no strong military reaction.

Finally, if the military element defined above as radical should achieve a dominating position within the officer corps the armed forces might act directly to initiate and guide structural reforms in Peruvian society.

NOTES

THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

1. Martin Needler, "Cabinet Responsibility in a Presidential System: The Case of Peru," Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. XVIII (Spring 1965), p. 156.
2. James Payne, "Peru: The Politics of Structured Violence," The Journal of Politics, Vol. XVII (May 1965), p. 336.
3. François Bourricaud, "Structure and Function of the Peruvian Oligarchy," Studies in Comparative International Development, Social Science Institute, Washington University, St. Louis, Mo., Vol. II, No. 2 (1966), pp. 26-27.
4. Payne, "Peru," p. 363.
5. Ibid., pp. 365-366.
6. Martin Needler, Latin American Politics in Perspective (New York, 1963), p. 37.

THE MILITARY INSTITUTION

7. Carlos Delleplane, Historia militar del Perú, 2 vols. (Buenos Aires, 1941), Vol. I, pp. 61, 78, 135-136, 143, passim. A detailed account of the origins and subsequent history of Peruvian army units may be found in César García Rosell, Historial de los cuerpos de tropa del ejército (Lima, 1951).
8. Jorge Basadre, Historia de la república del Perú, 10 vols., 5th ed. (Lima, 1963-1964), Vol. II, p. 551.
9. Basadre, Historia, Vol. VII, pp. 3148-3152; Historia de la Escuela Militar del Perú (Lima, 1962), pp. 18-30.
10. Basadre, Historia, Vol. VII, pp. 3147-3148; Gen. Juan de Mendoza Rodríguez, "El ejército," Visión del Perú en el siglo XX, ed. by José Pareja Paz-Soldán, 2 vols. (Lima, 1962-1963), Vol. I, pp. 295, 298.
11. Basadre, Historia, Vol. VII, pp. 3152-3153; Mendoza R., "El ejército," pp. 297, 299-300, 311-312.
12. Basadre, Historia, Vol. VII, pp. 3153-3156.
13. Historia de la Escuela, pp. 36-37.
14. Ibid., p. 46.
15. The figures are based on a count of graduating classes in ibid., pp. 330-438.
16. Ibid., p. 609.
17. Mendoza R., "El ejército," p. 299; Escuela Superior de Guerra, Cincuentenario de la Escuela Superior de Guerra, 1904-1954 (Chorrillos, 1954), pp. 1, 3, 7-10.

18. Comandante José Valdizán Gamio, "137 años de tradición naval," Revista de marina, Vol. XLIII (January-February 1958), pp. 65-66.
19. Comandante José Valdizán Gamio, "La marina de guerra," Visión, Vol. I, p. 363.
20. Basadre, Historia, Vol. IX, pp. 4158-4169.
21. Ibid., p. 4169-4170; Valdizán G., "La marina," pp. 369-370.
22. Col. V. E. Arce, "La fuerza aérea del Perú en el siglo XX," Visión, Vol. I, p. 421.
23. Basadre, Historia, Vol. IX, pp. 4169-4170. Valdizán G., "La marina," pp. 369-370.
24. Basadre, Historia, Vol. IX, pp. 4157-4158; Arce, "La fuerza," pp. 401-402; Perú. Ministerio de Aeronáutica, Breve reseña histórica de la FAP, pp. 2-3.
25. Basadre, Historia, Vol. IX, p. 4170; Arce, "La fuerza," pp. 401-403, 421.
26. El peruano, August 4, 1950.
27. Maj. Gen. Mauro Ocampo R., "33 años de fuerza aérea," Aviación, Revista de la fuerza aérea del Perú, Vol. XXVIII, Nos. 423-424, pp. 39-40; Perú. Ministerio de Aeronáutica, La preparación académica del cadete en la FAP, pp. 1-2; El peruano, August 6, 1962, p. 1.
28. Arce, "La fuerza," pp. 425-430; Perú. Ministerio de Aeronáutica, El curso de alto mando o la enseñanza superior en la FAP, pp. 1-2.
29. Official data on the present strength of the Peruvian army are classified. Figures presented were compiled from nonclassified sources including Basadre, Historia, passim; Armaments Yearbook (Geneva, 1924-1937), The New International Yearbook (New York, 1907-), and the Statesman's Yearbook (London, 1864-).
30. Víctor Villanueva, El militarismo en Perú (Lima, 1962), p. 108; José Luis Bustamante y Rivero, Tres años de lucha por la democracia en el Perú (Buenos Aires, 1949), pp. 269-270.
31. Information is based on Argentine Republic. Ministerio de Guerra, Manual de informaciones, Vol. V, Nos. 1-2, 1963, p. 15; and interviews.
32. Interviews.
33. Interviews.
34. Jane's Fighting Ships, 1965-1966 (London, 1898-), p. 203; interviews.
35. Ministerio de Guerra, Manual, Vol. V (1963), p. 17.
36. Interviews.
37. Interviews.
38. Mendoza R., "El ejército," pp. 334-335; Ministerio de Guerra, Manual, Vol. V, pp. 14-15; interviews.
39. Peru, Constitution (1933), art. 213.
40. Mendoza R., "El ejército," pp. 341-344.
41. Observations based on interviews. An example of the military's view of the importance of its mission is provided by Lieutenant Colonel Augusto Cáceres Echandi's article "¿Las fuerzas armadas son improductivas?" Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra, Vol. V (April-June 1958), p. 13. When some countries (unidentified) expand their armed forces, Cáceres argues, Peru must do the same so as not to be victimized by the former. If the

external threat did not exist, the resources spent on the Peruvian military establishment could be diverted to social programs.

42. Interviews.

43. The changing character of United States hemispheric defense policy and the evolution of counterinsurgency doctrine is discussed in Willard F. Barber and C. Neale Ronning, Internal Security and Military Power. Counterinsurgency and Civic Action in Latin America (Columbus, Ohio, 1966), pp. 24-48 and passim.

44. Interviews; Barber and Ronning state that 805 Peruvian officers and enlisted men graduated from the School of the Americas from its establishment in 1949 through 1964, Internal Security, pp. 144-145.

45. These activities are summarized in Comandante Eduardo Angeles Figuero, "Participación de la fuerza armada en el desarrollo del Perú desde 1900 hasta 1945," Aviación, Vol. XXVIII (1964), Part I, Nos. 423-424, pp. 31-38; Part II, Nos. 425-426, pp. 20-26.

46. See the remarks of Gen. Juan Mendoza Rodríguez, "Ponencia del Perú en la Junta Interamericana de Defensa," Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra, Vol. VIII (April-June 1961), pp. 113-114. (Cited hereinafter as RESG.)

47. Lt. Col. Enrique Gallegos Venero, "Un combate victorioso en guerra contrarevolucionaria," RESG, Vol. X (July-September 1963), pp. 7, 17-25.

48. Interviews.

49. Frederick B. Pike, "The Old and the New APRA in Peru: Myth and Reality," Inter-American Economic Affairs, Vol. XVIII (Autumn 1964), p. 36.

50. The best account of army military civic action in Peru is Perú. Ministerio de Guerra, El ejército del Perú en acción cívica (Lima, 1965). See also Peruvian Times, March 5, April 2, 1965; and United States Military Group-Peru, "Country Civic Action Progress Report; Peru-1964," January 1, 1965 (mimeographed). For an account of the army's road construction activities see Col. Marco Fernández Baca and Lt. Col. John G. Waggener, "El programa de construcción de carreteras por acción cívica en el Perú," Lima, May 22, 1965 (mimeographed), a paper presented at the Regional Conference of the International Highway Conference.

51. U. S. Military Group-Peru, "Country Civic Action."

52. Some of the navy's particular contributions are described in Capt. Jesús Polar Valdivia, "La marina y el plan de desarrollo del Perú," Revista de marina, Vol. CCLXXXVIII (March-April 1964), pp. 1-6; and in Comandante Alberto Jiménez de Lucio, "La marina de guerra y la industria pesquera," Revista de marina, Vol. CCLXXVIII (July-August 1962), pp. 459-465.

53. See, for example, Comandante Eduardo Angeles Figuero, "La fuerza aérea y la sociología," Aviación, Vol. XXVIII (November-December 1964), pp. 40-43; Saniel Toboada V., "Las relaciones públicas en la FAP," Aviación, Vol. XXVIII (November-December 1964), pp. 16-19.

54. Perú. Ministerio de Guerra, El ejército, p. 5.

55. Mendoza R., "Ponencia," pp. 113-114.

56. Escuela Militar de Chorrillos, Prospecto de admisión, 1965, pp. 14-15. (Cited hereinafter as EMCH.)

57. Ibid., p. 14.

58. Ibid., p. 16.

59. Ibid., pp. 8-9.
60. Actualidad militar, October 31, 1962, p. 9.
61. William F. Whyte and Graciela Flores, La mano de obra de alto nivel en el Perú (Lima, 1964), pp. 52-56.
62. Supreme decrees, March 3, 1934, cited in EMCH, Prospecto, p. 5. The withholding of formal baccalaureate degrees was attributed by one informant to a deliberate policy aimed at preventing the loss of graduates to talent-hungry civilian sectors.
63. EMCH, Prospecto, pp. 12, 56. The state provides cadets with quarters, food, uniforms, equipment, books, medical care, laundry, and a small stipend.
64. Published biographical data were drawn largely from military service journals and from the official government gazette, El peruano.
65. See also the observations of Anibal Ismodes Cairo, "La conducta política de los militares peruanos," Panoramas, No. 2 (March-April 1963), p. 69.
66. Interviews supplemented by Robert E. McNicoll, "Recent Political Developments in Peru," Inter-American Economic Affairs, Vol. XVIII (Summer 1964), p. 78; Villanueva, El militarismo, pp. 170-171, and the same author's La tragedia de un pueblo y un partido (Lima, 1956), p. 60.
67. Interviews; Villanueva, La tragedia, p. 61.
68. "Iniciación del año académico," address by the commanding officer of the EMCH, Revista de la Escuela Militar de Chorrillos, Vol. XXXVIII (I Semester 1964), pp. 113-117 (cited hereafter as REMCH). The academic organization of the EMCH is discussed in more detail in Historia de la Escuela, pp. 609-621.
69. These impressions were garnered during a visit to the EMCH on July 12, 1965.
70. Mendoza R., "El ejército," p. 313; Ministerio de Guerra, Manual, Vol. V (1963), p. 15.
71. Mendoza R., "El ejército," pp. 312-314; Historia de la Escuela, pp. 102-106; Percy MacLean Estenós, Historia de una revolución (Buenos Aires, 1953), p. 132.
72. ESG, Cincuentenario, pp. 3-6, 21-22; "Integrantes de la XXIX promoción del COEM," RESG, Vol. IX (October-December 1964), p. 120.
73. Interviews.
74. Basadre, Historia, Vol. VII, p. 3318; "Crónica del viaje de estudios de la XXIX promoción del COEM," RESG, Vol. X (October-December 1963).
75. ESG, Cincuentenario, p. 3; interviews.
76. Ley No. 11432, July 14, 1950, art. 27.
77. Whyte and Flores, La mano, pp. 51-52; Villanueva, El militarismo, pp. 174-176.
78. Interviews; Andrés Townsend Ezcurra, "Frente a la ley, los tanques," Panoramas, No. 2 (March-April 1963), p. 59.
79. Whyte and Flores, La mano, p. 52.
80. CAEM. Departamento académico, Anexo 2 (cuadro anual de distribución de tiempo) al plan de estudios e investigaciones del CAEM. Curso de altos estudios militares. XV promoción (N.p., 1965).

81. Historia de la Escuela, p. 198ff.; ESG, Cincuentenario, pp. 7-10; Mendoza R., "El ejército," pp. 312-313.

82. Mendoza R., "El ejército," pp. 316, 337-344; ESG, Cincuentenario, pp. 8-10; Col. Edgardo Mercado Jarrín, "La Escuela de Comando y Estado Mayor de Fort Leavenworth y algunas diferencias son la nuestra," RESG, Vol. V (April-June 1958), pp. 22-23.

83. Maj. Melitón Granda Peralta, writing in the RESG, notes the need to train army officers in the social and economic sciences, social organization, social values, public opinion, and the like (RESG, Vol. X [January-March 1963], pp. 61-66), while in 1964 the commander in chief of the air force is quoted as remarking that if he had not become a soldier he would have been a sociologist (Angeles F., "La fuerza," p. 42).

84. "Visión retrospectiva del año 1963," RESG, Vol. X (October-December 1963), p. 5.

85. Respectively in "Actividades culturales," Revista del Centro de Instrucción Militar del Perú, Vol. IV (March-April 1962), cited hereafter as RCIMP; "Crónica general," RESG, Vol. X (April-June 1963), Vol. XI (April-June 1964).

86. See Lilsa North, Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, Chile, and Peru (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1966), pp. 52-53.

87. Respectively in RESG, Vol. X (January-March 1963), (April-June 1963), Vol. XI (January-March 1964); RCIMP, Vol. IV (March-April 1962), Vol. V (October-December 1963).

88. Lindley was influential in the development of CAEM, interviews; North, Civil-Military, p. 55.

89. North, Civil-Military, pp. 55-56. Even before the coup of 1962, Comandante Alberto Jiménez de Lucio, writing in the Revista de marina, notes the important representation of the armed forces at the ministerial level, and that a large number of military men have occupied the presidency. This, Jiménez continues, is "a constant reminder that our armed forces are and have been intimately bound to the highest national politics, and that the theme of the preparation of the heads of the armed forces for the performance of these high duties requires our preferential attention" ("Nuevos conceptos sobre educación militar," Vol. CCLXXV [January-February 1962], pp. 18-19).

THE MILITARY AS AN INTEREST GROUP

90. Código de justicia militar (Lima, July 25, 1963).

91. Ibid., Libro Primero, Secciones III-IX.

92. Ibid., arts. 334-335.

93. Interviews.

94. Peru, Constitution, arts. 158, 173.

95. Villanueva, El militarismo, p. 298.

96. Ibid., pp. 299-300.

97. Víctor Villanueva, Un año bajo el sable (Lima, 1963), p. 93.

98. Interviews.

99. Peru, Constitution, art. 123, par. 13.

100. In military schools, for example, officers receive anti-Aprista indoctrination (Oscar Bueno Tovar Las fuerzas armadas y el Apra [Lima, 1963], *passim*).

MILITARY ATTITUDES

101. Huntington's terms are defined in Chapter 1 of this work, p. 10.

102. These comments are based on interviews with United States and European military personnel stationed in Peru.

103. Interviews. This trend is also clearly indicated in the content of service journals.

104. Interviews. Thus, during the presidential administration of General Odría, the president had a clientele in the armed forces consisting of senior officers who had acquired appointments and emoluments through his patronage. Another faction formed around General Zeñon Noriega, Minister of War, who also controlled substantial patronage. Members of both groups tended to be professionally and politically conservative and could be identified with Víctor Alba's militares de cuartel (El militarismo: Ensayo sobre un fenómeno político-social [Mexico City, 1959], pp. 56-63). A third group consisted of younger generals, colonels, and lieutenant colonels, most of whom were graduates of CAEM and were trained by U.S. advisors and in U.S. service schools. These officers corresponded to Alba's militares de escuela, (El militarismo, pp. 63-70). They were committed to military professionalization and, while politically conservative, they recognized the need for basic structural reforms in Peruvian society, and felt that the army should play a positive role in bringing them about.

105. Interviews.

106. Villanueva, Tragedia, pp. 24-25, 30, 32-35, 49, 59-60.

107. Huntington, The Soldier, pp. 83-84.

108. Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism (New York, 1960), p. 28.

109. Luis Humberto Delgado, in his historical study, El militarismo en el Perú, 1821-1930 (Lima, 1930), states that following the War of the Pacific, "the Army was unjustly condemned. The environment in which Peruvian soldiers lived was hostile. Officers and recruits were met with scorn and indifference when they passed by" (p. 16).

110. Samuel Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (London, 1962), pp. 67-70.

111. See the remarks of Major Guillén Cusirramos, "El ejército y la nacionalidad," RESG, Vol. IX (October-December 1962), p. 56; "Los símbolos de la patria," Actualidad militar, April 30, 1965.

112. "Nombres de las promociones de la Escuela Militar," Historia de la Escuela, p. 689.

113. Service journals regularly carry accounts of these ceremonies.

114. Centro de Estudios Histórico-Militares del Perú, Santuarios patrióticos. Panteón de los próceres (Lima, 1954); Santuarios patrióticos. Cripta de los héroes de la guerra de 1879. Guía histórica y biográfica (Lima, 1957).

115. Quotation from interviews. See also Guillén C., "El ejército y la nacionalidad," pp. 55-57.

116. "Rol social del ejército," Actualidad militar, April 22, 1962, p. 3.

117. "La juventud peruana en formación a través del cumplimiento de su servicio en los institutos armados," Aviación, Vol. XXVIII (November-December 1964), pp. 24-25.

118. The most comprehensive treatments of the theme are the previously cited Villanueva, El militarismo en el Perú, and Luis Humberto Delgado, El militarismo en el Perú, 1821-1930. See also Leonidas Castro B., Golpismo (Lima, 1964). A shorter interpretive synthesis may be found in Stephen L. Rozman, "The Military Role in Peruvian Politics," The University of Florida Latin Americanist, May 6, 1966, pp. 1-4.
119. Angeles F., "Participación de la fuerza armada," Part I, p. 32.
120. Interviews. Edwin Lieuwen observes that the Peruvian armed forces' "deep and constant involvement in the nation's politics gave them a great sense of self-importance, a feeling of natural superiority over civilian politicians," Generals vs. Presidents (New York, 1964), p. 28.
121. Villanueva, El militarismo, pp. 20, 24-25.
122. Angeles F., "Participación de la fuerza armada," Part I, pp. 37-38.
123. Interviews.
124. This thesis is developed in Lyle McAllister, The "Fuero Militar" in New Spain, 1764-1800 (Gainesville, Fla., 1957), particularly pp. 5-10.
125. Villanueva, El militarismo, pp. 165ff.
126. While the armed forces are anti-Communist, a strain of Marxism or at least anti-capitalism exists in the thinking of more progressive elements. Thus, Navy Commander Luis F. Villena G. attacks laissez-faire doctrine and observes, "In a certain manner, from a merely social viewpoint, communism is nearer to Christianity than the majority of capitalist solutions" ("Un imperativo análisis de la época actual," Revista de marina, CCLXXVI [March-April 1962], pp. 188-189). Villena also asserts that investors who put their funds in real estate are always selfish and lacking in social conscience, and criticizes those who put their money in foreign banks. There is a crying need, he maintains, for public housing, improved public education, and agrarian and tax reform. Such reforms are in the spirit of Christian ideals ("La Alianza para el Progreso y la ayuda militar," Revista de marina, Vol. CCLXXX [November-December], p. 740).
127. Interviews. The anti-Communist theme pervades the service journals.
128. Interviews; aspects of military-APRA hostility are treated in Oscar Bueno Tovar's previously cited work, Las fuerzas armadas y el Apra.
129. Interviews; Ismodes Cairo, "La conducta," p. 66; Enrique Chirinos Soto, Cuenta y balance de las elecciones de 1962 (Lima, 1962), p. 70.
130. El comercio, Saturday, July 10, 1965, p. 1.
131. The somewhat ambivalent attitudes of the armed forces toward their political role are brought out in Lt. Col. Carlos Bobbio C., "El ejército, el oficial y la política," RCIMP, Vol. IV (March-April 1962), pp. 3-7.
132. "Manifestación de solidaridad de los institutos armados," Aviación, Vol. XXI (May-June 1957), pp. 9-12.
133. Código de justicia militar, arts. 100-103.
134. Interviews.
135. Interviews; Visión, July 9, 1965, p. 15; The Visión Letter, August 18, 1965, pp. 2-3.
136. Capt. Alberto Jiménez de Lucio, "Misión de la fuerza armada y algo sobre desarrollo nacional," Revista de Marina, Vol. CCLXXXVII (January-February 1964), pp. 15-27.

137. Quoted in Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Army and the Founding of the Turkish Republic," World Politics, Vol. XI (July 1959), p. 520.

138. Interviews; Townsend Ezcurra, "Frente," p. 59.

139. Whyte and Flores, La mano, p. 52.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

140. See Chapter 1, p. 6, and notes 18-21.

141. Villanueva, El militarismo, p. 166; social notes in service publications. Thus, after the reunion of the Peruvian Air Force promoción of 1945, Comandante Leonardo Alvarino Herr held a reception in the Club de la Unión (Aviación, Vol. XXVII [January-February 1964], p. 5); and in April 1965, Army Col. and Señora Jesús Zagarra Villar held a reception in the Club de la Unión on the occasion of their silver wedding anniversary (Actualidad militar, April 30, 1965, p. 12).

142. See the observations of Angeles Figueroa, "Participación," Part I, p. 35.

143. This is a principal theme in Villanueva, El militarismo. See also Bourricaud, "Structure," pp. 25-26, and McNicholl, "Recent," p. 78.

144. Interviews.

145. Bourricaud, "Structure," p. 30.

146. Col. Ernesto Delhonte Tijero, "La policía en el siglo XX," Visión del Perú en el siglo XX, Vol. I, pp. 458-459, 460, 465, 468, 473; Código de justicia militar, art. 141.

147. Delhonte, "La policía," pp. 459, 464, 471, 474.

148. Ibid., pp. 470, 482.

149. Código de justicia militar, arts. 332, 336.

150. Sánchez Campos, "El comité," pp. 45-48.

151. Department of Educational Affairs, Bulletin of Information. Instituciones de enseñanza superior (Peru, 1966).

152. Instituciones de enseñanza superior (Colombia, 1966).

153. "Actividades culturales," RCIMP, Vol. IV (January-February 1962), pp. 96-97.

154. Basadre, Historia, Vol. VII, p. 3797.

155. Including Archivo Castilla, Vol. I (Lima, 1956-); Revista del Centro de Estudios Histórico-Militares de Perú, Vol. I (Lima, 1948-); Revista del Instituto "Libertador Ramón Castilla", Vol. I (Lima, 1953-).

156. See note 26, Chapter 4.

157. Real Felipe. Fortaleza inexpugnable de Fe, heroísmo y libertad, 10 centenario de la Provincia Constitucional (Callao, 1957).

158. Actualidad militar, September 30, 1962, p. 2; CEHMP, Actas y trabajos del II Congreso de historia del Perú, 2 vols. (Lima, 1959), Vol. I, p. 1; CEHMP, Primer simposio sobre libros de historia del Perú (Lima, 1962), p. 5.

159. Whyte and Flores, La mano, p. 51.

160. Information from United States Army Mission, Peru.
161. Ibid.
162. Villanueva, El militarismo, pp. 159-160.
163. Rendón Gallegos, "El ejército y la información pública," Vol. IX (April-June 1962), pp. 83-92. On the philosophy of army public relations see also Colonel Zanabria Zamudio, "Un aspecto de relaciones públicas," RESG, Vol. VI (October-December 1959), pp. 40-45; Maj. Luis Figari Ferreyra, "La información pública en tiempo de paz," ibid., pp. 23-31; Lt. Cromwel Mendoza Herrera, "El ejército y los asuntos civiles," Revista militar del Perú, Vol. LVIII (January-February 1963), pp. 126-136. For an air force view on the value of public relations see the previously cited Saniel Taboada V., "Las relaciones."
164. Mendoza Herrera, "El ejército," p. 127; Figari Ferreyra, "La información," p. 26.
165. Actualidad militar, April 23, 1962, p. 5.
166. The first issue appeared April 23, 1962.
167. Actualidad militar, July 31, 1962, p. 12.
168. Interviews.
169. Actualidad militar, June 30, 1965, p. 24.
170. Ibid.
171. Villanueva comments on the paucity of plazas, streets, and monuments named after civilian statesmen, poets, and intellectuals as compared to those honoring soldiers and conquerors (El militarismo, p. 160).
172. Alba, El militarismo, p. 155.
173. Interviews.
174. See the observations of Pike, "The Old," p. 30.
175. Basadre, Historia, Vol. II, p. 552.
176. Villanueva, Un año, p. 264.
177. Interviews; Villanueva observes that the Peruvian people cheer when large sums are invested in the acquisition of military equipment (El militarismo, p. 257), and that, when President Prado suggested an inter-American conference on arms limitations, Peruvian public opinion derided him and accused him of trying to disarm the country (ibid., p. 293).
178. Quoted in Actualidad militar, May 15, 1965, p. 13.
179. Quoted in ibid., April 30, 1965, p. 26.
180. Villanueva, El militarismo, p. 207.
181. Interviews; Chirinos Soto, Cuenta p. 28.
182. Interviews.
183. Interviews.
184. Chirinos Soto observes that in the 1962 presidential election Odría received the votes of the very rich and the very poor (Cuenta, p. 28). Odría also ran very strong in Lima (Needler, "Peru Since the Coup," p. 80).
185. Interviews.

186. Interviews.
187. Interviews.
188. Manuel Seone, Obras apristas 1931 a 1948 (Lima, 1958), p. 72; Pike, "The Old," pp. 8-9, 34; Villanueva, El militarismo, p. 88, Tragedia, pp. 18-20, 25; Villanueva, Un año, p. 35.
189. Interviews.
190. This evaluation is based on a strong impression gathered from interviews, observations, and published sources. Pike is in agreement, "The Old," p. 35.
191. Revista dominical, August 2, 1964, pp. 3-4.

**POLITICAL ACTION: THE COUP D'ETAT OF
1962 AND THE JUNTA MILITAR**

192. Hispanic American Report, Vol. XV, No. 1, p. 59.
193. Ibid., No. 2, p. 158.
194. Ibid.
195. La prensa, April 4, 1962, p. 2:1.
196. Ibid., May 14, 1962, p. 2:4-5.
197. Ibid., April 30, 1962, p. 8:3.
198. Ibid., April 4, 1962, p. 2:1.
199. Ibid., April 28, 1962, p. 3:2.
200. Ibid.
201. Ibid., May 1, 1962, p. 2:1.
202. Eulalia Maria Lahmeyer, Análise do panorama político de 1956. Argentina-Chile-Peru (Washington, D.C., 1957), p. 71.
203. Interviews.
204. Martin Needler, "Political Development and Military Intervention in Latin America," American Political Science Review, Vol. LX (September 1966), p. 623.
205. Interviews.
206. Interviews.
207. La prensa, March 5, 1962, p. 8:2.
208. Ibid., March 16, 1962, p. 2:3-4.
209. Martin Needler, "United States Recognition Policy and the Peruvian Case," Inter-American Economic Affairs, Vol. XVI (Spring 1962), pp. 61-72.
210. La prensa, May 16, 1962, p. 2:4.
211. Ibid., May 20, 1962, p. 3:1.
212. Ibid., p. 1:6-7.
213. Ibid., May 27, 1962, p. 2:1-2.

214. Ibid., May 29, 1962, p. 1:5.
215. Ibid., p. 3:1-2.
216. New York Times, June 7, 1962, p. 18:4.
217. La prensa, June 2, 1962, p. 2:7-8.
218. Ibid., May 29, 1962, p. 1:8.
219. Ibid., June 4, 1962, p. 1:2.
220. Ibid., June 6, 1962, p. 1:6.
221. See the remarks of Martin Needler, "Peru Since the Coup," The World Today, Vol. XIV (February 1963), p. 79.
222. La prensa, June 10, 1962, p. 1:2; June 11, 1962, p. 6:5.
223. Ibid., June 9, 1962, p. 1:3-4.
224. New York Times, June 9, 1962, p. 10:3.
225. Ibid., June 10, 1962, p. 31:1.
226. Ibid.
227. Hispanic American Report, Vol. XV, No. 6 (1962), p. 539.
228. New York Times, June 12, 1962, p. 1:2; June 13, 1962, p. 18:4.
229. La prensa, June 14, 1962, p. 2:6.
230. New York Times, June 15, 1962, p. 9:1.
231. La prensa, June 29, 1962, p. 1:6.
232. Ibid., June 28, 1962, p. 10:3; p. 1:1-2.
233. Townsend Ezcurra, "Frente," p. 53.
234. Peru, Constitution, art. 138.
235. Ibid., art. 148; Hispanic American Report, Vol. XV, No. 6 (1962), p. 540; Townsend Ezcurra, "Frente," pp. 53-54.
236. La prensa, July 3, 1962, p. 1:7-8; Villanueva, El militarismo, p. 213.
237. La prensa, July 1, 1962, p. 1:2-3; July 4, 1962, p. 1:7; New York Times, July 11, 1962, p. 9:2.
238. La prensa, July 10, 1962, p. 2:6.
239. Ibid., p. 2:2.
240. Ibid., July 13, 1962, p. 1:3-4.
241. Ibid., July 13, 1962, p. 1:8.
242. New York Times, July 14, 1962, p. 4:2.
243. Interviews, New York Times, 1962, p. 22:1.
244. La prensa, July 17, 1962, p. 1:5-6.
245. New York Times, July 17, 1962, p. 1:6.
246. La prensa, July 18, 1962, p. 1:4-5.

247. Ibid., pp. 1:7-8; 2:7-8.
248. Ibid., p. 1:2-3.
249. New York Times, July 18, 1962, p. 8:6. Copyright 1962 by the New York Times Company. Reprinted by permission.
250. Ibid., July 19, 1962, p. 3:1-2; La prensa, July 18, 1962, p. 3:5-8.
251. Hispanic American Report, Vol. XV, No. 7 (1962), p. 637; El peruano, September 29, 1962, p. 1.
252. Villanueva, Un año, p. 96.
253. La prensa, July 19, 1962, p. 2:1-2.
254. New York Times, July 19, 1962, p. 3:1. Copyright 1962 by the New York Times Company. Reprinted by permission.
255. El peruano, July 19, 1962.
256. Townsend Ezcurra, "Frente," pp. 51-55.
257. La prensa, July 18, 1962, p. 3:8.
258. Ibid., July 20, 1962, p. 1:7-8.
259. Ibid., July 19, 1962, p. 1:5-8; London Times, July 19, 1962, p. 10a; New York Times, July 20, 1962, p. 3:2; July 23, 1962, p. 9:3.
260. New York Times, July 21, 1962, p. 1:3; La prensa, July 20, 1962, p. 1:2-3.
261. New York Times, July 24, 1962, p. 11:1.
262. Ibid., July 20, 1962, p. 3:2.
263. Ibid., July 19, 1962, p. 3:2-3.
264. Hispanic American Report, Vol. XV, No. 7 (1962), p. 638.
265. Visión, August 10, 1962, p. 13.
266. Hispanic American Report, Vol. XV, No. 7 (1962), p. 638.
267. Ibid., p. 639.
268. New York Times, July 23, 1962, p. 11:1.
269. Hispanic American Report, Vol. XV, No. 7 (1962), p. 638.
270. Needler, "Peru Since the Coup," pp. 88-89. See also the observations of Villanueva, El militarismo, pp. 196-207.
271. New York Times, July 29, 1962, p. 24:5; July 30, 1962, p. 2:5.
272. Military assistance, however, was not renewed until some two months later (Needler, "Peru Since the Coup," p. 82).
273. Hispanic American Report, Vol. XV, No. 7 (1962), p. 637; La prensa, July 20, 1962, p. 1:7-8; Hernando Aguirre Gamio, Liquidación histórica de APRA (Lima, 1962), p. 17.
274. Visión, August 10, 1962, p. 14.
275. Llouwen, Armas, p. 31; Townsend Ezcurra, "Frente," pp. 59-60.
276. Villanueva, El militarismo, p. 225; Aguirre Gamio, Liquidación histórica, pp. 16-17; New York Times, July 26, 1962, p. 1:5.

277. Villanueva, Un año, pp. 66, 140-142, 151-152. Richard Patch, "The Peruvian Elections of 1962 and Their Annulment," American Universities Field Staff Service Reports, West Coast South American Series, Vol. X (July 1963), passim.

278. Villanueva, Un año, p. 132.

279. Ibid., pp. 48-49, 237-239.

280. Ibid., p. 225.

281. El peruano, March 4, 1963, p. 1.

282. The president of the Corporación Nacional de Comerciantes (CONACO) was an uncle of Lindley López.

283. Needler, "Political Development," p. 623.

284. Official communiqué of March 3, 1963, cited in Villanueva, Un año, pp. 222-223.

285. Interviews; Patch, "The Peruvian," pp. 5-7.

286. Villanueva, Un año, p. 133.

287. Ismodes Cairo provides a version of the story, "La conducta," pp. 61-62.

288. Interviews; Townsend Ezcurra, "Frente," p. 59.

289. Interviews.

290. República peruana, La fuerza armada y el proceso electoral de 1962 (Lima, 1963).

291. A general argument for the influence of United States recognition and assistance policies on the political behavior of the Latin American military may be found in Martin Needler's previously cited "United States Recognition Policy and the Peruvian Case."

292. Lieuwen suggests that the Peruvian military leaders may have been influenced by the fact that, despite its warnings and implied threats, the United States placed no sanctions on the Argentine armed forces for their coup of March 29, 1962—some three months earlier (Arms, p. 116).

293. These conclusions result from interviews and conferences with both civilians and military personnel in Peru, as well as an interpretation of a wide range of published sources.

THE CONDITIONS OF MILITARY POLITICAL BEHAVIOR IN PERU

294. Time, September 24, 1965, p. 44. Speculation about a military solution was common in Lima (see for example "Solo les falta el general," Oiga, July 9, 1965, pp. 2-6). One version had it that if the government did not demonstrate its capacity to maintain order, through the medium of congress the presidency would be declared vacant and a senior officer of the armed forces would be selected as chief executive "in a Brazilian style solution" (Visión, July 9, 1965, p. 15).

295. Interviews; New York Times, September 8, 1965, p. 12; September 11, 1965, p. 9; September 14, 1965, p. 2; Latin American Times, September 15, 1965, pp. 1-3.

296. Interviews; Pike, "The Old," p. 35, n. 57; Visión, September 17, 1965, p. 15.

CHAPTER 3

ARGENTINA

by Robert A. Potash

THE MILITARY INSTITUTION

Although the Argentine army traditionally celebrates its origin in the forces that fought against Spain after 1810, and accordingly claims for itself a key role in the creation of the state, the military establishment of today is of much more recent creation. The units that participated in the independence movement disappeared with the subsequent failure to organize a national government, and their place was taken by local forces that served provincial or partisan interests. With the unification of the country under a single constitution in 1860, a national army again emerged but it was not until the 1880's that it became the unchallenged instrument of internal order.¹

Thereafter, and until the Sáenz Peña law of 1912 paved the way for honest elections, minority army elements participated in a series of civilian-led conspiracies aimed at breaking the political power of the ruling conservative minority. These conspiracies resulted in open uprisings in 1890, 1893-1894, and 1905, but in each case the loyalty of the majority of officers doomed them to failure.² Nevertheless, the persistence of discontent with the existing electoral system, which was reflected in military as well as in civilian ranks, contributed to the decision whereby Conservative President Sáenz Peña opened the gates to political power to the Radical Party.³ This party, under the leadership of Hipólito Yrigoyen, had been the principal organization pressing for electoral reform since 1891, and became the chief beneficiary of the Sáenz Peña law.

The election of Yrigoyen to the presidency in 1916 marked the entry into power of a party whose entire previous experience had been spent in opposition, often in conspiratorial activity, and brought into the highest office a man whose mode of leadership aroused passionate support among the mass of the populace and equally passionate opposition on the part of the established classes. His highly personal way of running the government and his total domination of his party created strains and divisions that alienated many of his erstwhile supporters among the more conservative elements within the Radical Party. Nevertheless his popular base remained strong and for fourteen years he was the outstanding political personality of the country, choosing his own successor after his first six-year term and winning overwhelming reelection in 1928 at the age of 76. Two years later, suffering the physical and mental effects of advanced age and confronted with a range of problems aggravated by the world depression, he was deposed by a military coup.

This revolution of 1930 marked the first successful ouster of a national government since 1862 and the first time in 25 years that military elements acted openly against the constituted authorities. The movement itself was the work of a small minority of the army allied with conservative opposition elements, but the majority of the officer corps, themselves alienated from the Yrigoyen administration, stood by indifferent to its fate.⁴

The events of 1930 proved to be a watershed in the history of military involvement in politics. Ever since that year the support of the military has been the key to the exercise and transfer of political power. Five times since 1930, at increasingly shorter intervals, the Argentine army has used its power to oust an administration. On four occasions the army, joined to a greater or lesser degree by the other services, assumed direct political control for periods ranging from eighteen months to three years. Such rule was terminated in two instances with the election of an army officer as president for the next constitutional period—General Agustín Justo in 1932 and General Juan D. Perón in 1946. In 1958, however, and again in 1963, military candidacies were barred and civilian rule was reestablished under Dr. Arturo Frondizi and Dr. Arturo Illia, respectively.

The number of successful coups gives no indication of the number of instances in which officers engaged in conspiracies or sought to determine an administration's policies without seeking its overthrow. Probably in no period since 1930 were such efforts more persistent than during the four years of the Frondizi administration or in the quasi-constitutional government of Dr. Guido that followed it (March 1962-October 1963).⁵ Yet in this period of intensified golpismo two characteristics were present: first, it was individual officers or groups of officers rather than the army as a whole who took the initiative; and second, these elements acted with the advice and support of civilian politicians from established political parties.⁶

The deterioration of discipline that was the inevitable consequence of military involvement in political action was one of the factors that persuaded the army leaders who rose to the top in the internecine struggle of 1962 and 1963 to work for prompt restoration of civilian government. The election of Dr. Illia as president in July 1963 and his inauguration in October returned the military to its professional tasks. But as it turned out, this situation was to last for only three years. The optimism generated by the restoration of constitutional government was soon dissipated by its failure to provide prompt solutions to fundamental problems. This, in turn, encouraged what seems to be the inevitable tendency of substantial numbers of both civilians and military to look to a military coup as the logical means for meeting those problems. In June 1966, with practically no one stepping forth to defend it, the Illia administration was terminated by action of the three branches of the armed forces. Once again and for an indefinite period the military have assumed complete responsibility for running the government.⁷

The Army

This chapter seeks to examine the army, and to a certain extent the other military services, within the context of contemporary Argentine society. Of concern here are not questions relating to military capabilities but those that relate to an institution that has played and is playing a key role in the political process of the country. To understand this role in all of its ramifications, it is essential to look below and beyond the surface of political events, to inquire into such questions as the juridical status of the military establishment, its relationship to other governmental institutions, its fiscal requirements, and its economic functions. Equally important is the need to understand the forces that shape the outlook of the men who direct the institution. It is this inner life of the army revolving around the recruitment, training, career experience, and expectations of the officer corps that will be given detailed discussion in the following pages.

The final part of this chapter will seek to explore the extent to which the military are involved in nonprofessional functions, particularly in the economy, and to examine how Argentine army officers construe their responsibilities in a political system subject, as experience has shown, to periodic crises of confidence in the efficiency and legitimacy of existing authorities.

Legal Missions and Juridical Status

The legal mission of the Argentine armed forces is set forth in the national constitution and, more precisely, in the regulations of the individual services. The Argentine Constitution, which was adopted in 1853, does not have a separate title devoted to the armed forces as does the current Brazilian Constitution, and its provisions concerning the military and their duties and obligations are given scattered expression in the Preamble and in various articles, of which Articles 21 and 22 are the most important.

The Preamble to this constitution, which was drawn up after a long period of internal strife, stipulates among the basic goals of the government "insuring domestic tranquility" and "providing for the common defense."⁸ The means for assuring these goals is authorized by Article 21 which states:

Every Argentine citizen is obliged to take up arms in defense of his country and of this constitution in accordance with the laws passed by congress and the decrees of the national executive.

From the text of the Preamble and of Article 21, it can be inferred that the basic mission of the armed forces is the defense of the country against external attack, the insurance of domestic order, and the preservation of the constitution itself. And lest this give rise to an interpretation that permits the military to supplant the civil powers created by the constitution, Article 22 states clearly:

The people do not deliberate or govern except through their representatives and authorities created by this Constitution. Any armed force or meeting of persons assuming the rights of the people and petitioning in the latter's name, commits the crime of sedition.

The legal mission of the military is set forth also and in concise fashion in service regulations. Army regulations, for example, state it in these terms:

The mission of the Army is to safeguard the highest interests of the Nation. To this end it must always be ready to defend its (the nation's) honor, the integrity of its territory, the Constitution of the Argentine Nation and its laws, guaranteeing the maintenance of internal peace and assuring the normal development of the institutions.⁹

The obligation to defend the constitution and what might be called the normal order of affairs is thus clearly defined. What is less clear is how the military should fulfill that obligation in periods of tension when the state of siege becomes the "normal" condition of life, when the civil authorities elected under the constitution are themselves accused of violating its provisions; when, in short, a crisis of legitimacy occurs. Such circumstances have occurred with considerable frequency in the last 35 years, and military men have found themselves in sharp disagreement as to where their primary obligation lay; whether to the existing authorities or to a concept of constitutionalism that transcended loyalty to the actual individuals exercising the executive and representative powers of the nation. The notion of this "higher loyalty" or supermission will be treated below. Suffice it to state here that on five occasions since 1930 high-ranking military men, absolving themselves of their sense of loyalty to the existing authorities, ousted the president, dissolved the national legislature, and proceeded to exercise that power, so clearly prohibited in Article 22, of deliberating and governing. On the other hand, on each of these occasions strong pressures developed within the military forces

to return power to civilian rule as soon as possible. This may be taken as evidence of a sense of discomfort, of uneasiness, on the part of substantial elements in the military at the contradiction between their political role and the express provisions of the constitution, whose defense was a value that had been inculcated in them since cadet days and whose preservation was in large measure the justification for their existence.

The "Estado Militar"

In their day-to-day activities the members of the Argentine armed forces are bound by specific obligations and entitled to specific rights as prescribed by the laws and regulations in effect. This complex of rights and duties constitutes a special legal status known as the estado militar. The estado militar is held by those military personnel who comprise the permanent force and by those in the reserve for such time as they are on active duty. Whereas the latter, whether they are officers, noncommissioned officers, or conscripts, lose the estado militar once they leave active service, the members of the cuadro permanente retain it even after retirement. For them the estado militar once acquired continues throughout their lifetime unless they voluntarily resign from the service, or are dropped as a result of legal action and penalties imposed by a military court, or are condemned by a civil court for offenses of comparable gravity to those that would bring dishonorable discharge in a military trial. Loss of the estado militar also results when the individual has been declared in a state of rebellion.¹⁰

The rights that inhere in the estado militar have been spelled out in military legislation, especially the Law for Military Personnel, which was adopted in 1958. For active-duty personnel these rights may be summed up as follows: possession of one's grade and the right to use its title within the limits prescribed by regulations; the right to be given an assignment that befits the grade; the wearing of the uniform, insignia, and other appropriate emblems; the military honors that go with the grade and assignment; the right to the pay and allowances that go with the grade, assignment, and situation; and finally, the right to retirement pay, and for one's heirs a military pension.¹¹

The duties imposed by the estado militar on active duty personnel are likewise spelled out in laws and regulations. Essentially, they consist of the acceptance of military discipline in the discharge of assigned functions and the exercise of the powers of command, and of the subjection to military jurisdiction as defined by the code of military justice. This code, adopted originally in 1898 and thoroughly revised in 1951, establishes the organization and procedures of the military court system, including special tribunals of honor for officers. The code details the specific obligations and duties that apply to military personnel, defines the limitations on their freedom of action, and prescribes the penalties for violations.¹²

Among the specific obligations placed upon active-duty personnel are those that relate to nonmilitary functions. The Law for Military Personnel states clearly that such personnel shall not accept any post, function, or employment alien to military activities without prior authorization from the competent military authority. Moreover, it is expressly stated that they shall "not accept or discharge elective public office nor participate directly or indirectly in the activities of political parties."¹³ This provision of the 1958 law was deliberately drafted to close a loophole left in the 1950 law for military personnel, which the Perón regime had promulgated and which permitted officers to serve in elective posts.¹⁴

The crisis engendered by the ouster of the Frondizi government in 1962 led to additional efforts to inhibit armed forces personnel from engaging in partisan politics. Thus a decree-law of November 1962, forbade active-duty personnel from even affiliating with a political party

and declared retired personnel ineligible to accept nomination for public office or to hold office in a political party until a year after they had left active service.¹⁵

Administration

Under the Argentine Constitution, the president of the nation is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. However, this same constitution requires that the president exercise his authority through cabinet ministers without whose countersignature his measures can have no validity. In this century, the ministers of war (guerra) and navy (marina) constituted the key officials charged with administration and control of the nation's armed forces until the mid-1940's and the advent of Perón. At that time the air force became a separate service; and a general reorganization of the cabinet structure, authorized by the constitutional reform of 1949, saw the creation of a ministry of national defense. This was abolished, together with the 1949 constitution, by the Aramburu provisional government after Perón's overthrow in 1955.

In view of the growth of government functions and the need to reconcile the existence of various cabinet-level departments with the express provision of the restored 1853 constitution limiting the number of ministries to eight, the Argentine Congress in 1958 entrusted cabinet representation of the three armed forces to a single minister of national defense, while redesignating the heads of the three military services as secretaries of state. Under this legislation, the minister of national defense has the role of coordinating the activities of the three services and of serving as the intermediary between the military secretariats on the one hand and the president and the congress on the other. All decrees affecting the armed forces must bear his signature and it is he who must respond to interpellations by congress. Moreover, he is the designated official for engaging in international negotiations that affect the military forces. Since the creation of this post in 1958, the several individuals who have occupied it under the Frondizi, Guido, and Illia administrations have all been civilians.¹⁶

Despite the broad powers vested in this ministry, effective control over the military forces has remained in the hands of the secretaries of war, navy, and air force. Their loss of formal cabinet status has not materially lessened their authority over the day-to-day operations of their respective services. It is they who prepare the initial budgets of their services and recommend to the president, via the defense minister, the strength and distribution of the forces, the appointment of the key commands, and the promotion of senior grade officers. They have direct control over the organization, training, and employment of their respective forces including the arsenals, shipyards, and other enterprises that have been placed under military jurisdiction.¹⁷ Moreover, unlike the defense minister the service secretaries are military men. Only during the first Yrigoyen presidency (1916-1922) were civilians appointed to head the armed force ministries, and even Yrigoyen turned to military men during his second term (1928-1930). In recent years the custom has been to appoint retired officers of general or flag rank to these posts.¹⁸

Although named to the position by the president, the function of the service secretary is to represent the views of his service to the president and the cabinet. A recent secretary of war holding office in the period between the ouster of Frondizi and the restoration of constitutional government described his duties in these terms: "First, to collaborate with the Executive Power in the achievement of political objectives aiming at normalization of the country. Second, to represent in the heart of the Cabinet the aspiration and objectives of his service. . . so that it has the feeling of being fully represented in this sense."¹⁹

This representative function has not been an easy one to perform when, as in recent years, sharp divisions have existed within the officer corps itself. The unseating of a succession of service secretaries during the Frondizi and Guido regimes was a reflection of these divisions as well as evidence that the secretary is responsible not only to the president who appoints him but to the high ranking officers of his service.

The commander-in-chief or, in the case of the navy, the chief of naval operations is the most powerful single officer in each service. It is not too much to say that on the relationship that exists between these three commanders and the executive power rests the stability of the government. Although appointed to their posts by executive decree signed by the president and the secretary of the respective service, their authority over their service is clear and direct, and, as its highest ranking officer, each commander-in-chief defines and speaks for the aspirations and ambitions of his institution.²⁰

The Argentine military establishment, as already indicated, consists of three separate services: army, air force, and navy, the latter with its own naval air arm and marine infantry component. Separate from the army but under its control is a frontier security force, the national gendarmerie, with about 12,000 men, while under navy supervision there is a coast guard known as the national maritime prefecture. Completing the internal security picture are the federal police, a 25,000 man force that operates under the control of the ministry of interior, and the various provincial police forces.²¹

Conscription

The size of the military establishment has fluctuated over the years partly for policy reasons but largely because of budgetary considerations. The armed forces reached their greatest strength under the Perón regime. In the early 1950's they numbered about 145,000 men, of whom somewhat over 100,000 were in the army, about 25,000 in the navy, and 15,000 in the air force.²² Since Perón's ouster, overall strength has declined but the annual level varies considerably depending on the number of conscripts inducted. As of 1964, the army had about 85,000 men, the navy 23,000, and the air force 20,000, for a total of about 130,000.²³

The overwhelming majority of these men are neither professional soldiers nor volunteers, but citizen-soldiers conscripted for one or two years' service. To meet its need for military manpower, Argentina adopted a system of universal military service just after the turn of the century.²⁴ Under this system all Argentine males must register for military service on reaching eighteen years of age. Each year a designated number of 20-year-olds are called into service by means of a lottery system which assigns them either to the army, the air force, or the navy. Those assigned to the navy must serve two years as against one year in the other services. Although the system was conceived of as universal, in point of fact only about half of a class of 20-year-olds puts on the uniform, the rest being exempted for physical reasons, dependency considerations, participation in reserve programs, and budgetary factors that limit the number to be trained.

Of the three military services it is the army which absorbs the largest number of conscripts. The air force because of the nature of its equipment is reluctant to utilize conscripts in anything but relatively menial tasks and relies primarily on long-term volunteers. The navy, too, depends on volunteers for a substantial part of its strength, but with a two-year service period it is able to give more effective training to its conscripts than the air force. It is the army which relies most heavily on conscripts and in which the overwhelming majority of 20-year-olds take their training. In 1964 some 65,000 men were called into the army as against about 20,000 in the other two services.²⁵

The training experience for the army conscript often lasts less than a calendar year. Until recently the practice has been to induct the entire class of twenty-year-olds chosen for army service at one time and to assign them to units for training in the month of March. The training cycle would then close in October and, starting in November, a portion of the class would be released. Additional groups would be released in December and January, and the remainder after the induction of the new class in March.²⁶ This has meant that some conscripts serve for only eight months while others serve for twelve. Moreover, it has meant that the strength of the army fluctuates considerably over the year. In terms of availability of trained men, the lowest level has existed in the months between January and March. This is one reason, perhaps, apart from the summer heat, why in the past military takeovers or attempted takeovers occurred at other times of the year, usually in the June to September period.

Recently, consideration has been given to staggering the induction of conscripts at three month intervals throughout the year. The advantages of such a system, which has been introduced experimentally in certain military districts, are that an even manpower level can be maintained throughout the year and each inductee will serve the same length of time.²⁷

Deployment

The deployment of the Argentine army within the national terrain reflects the dual missions of preparing for external defense and conserving domestic peace. Traditionally, the heaviest concentrations of troops have been in the Buenos Aires area close to the national capital. The country's most important army base is the Campo de Mayo some twenty-five miles away. But major units are also deployed in the provinces adjacent to the frontiers. At present the army has ten brigades of which two are in Patagonia under the V Army Corps, headquarters Bahía Blanca; three in Cordoba, Mendoza, and Tucuman provinces under the III Army Corps, headquarters Cordoba; and three in the provinces adjacent to the Uruguayan, Brazilian, and Paraguayan borders under the II Army Corps, headquarters Rosario. The remaining two brigades are in the Greater Buenos Aires area under the I Army Corps.²⁸

The fact that only two brigades are located in or near the federal capital is, however, somewhat deceptive as an indication of troop strength available in that area. For one thing there are two independent regiments stationed in the capital itself; secondly, the two brigades contain most of the army's mechanized strength; and finally, the location in the capital, or in Greater Buenos Aires, of numerous army schools makes for a sizeable concentration of men and equipment.

Moves to deploy more of the army out of the Buenos Aires area and toward the frontiers have been attempted at various times. Under Perón the Campo de Mayo garrison, after 1951, was sharply depleted of troops with both its tactical and school units transferred to interior bases. Some of these units in Cordoba and Curuzu Cuatía were later to take part in the uprising that resulted in Perón's 1955 ouster.²⁹ More recently, in 1964, a plan for the redeployment of army units was prepared by the general staff and approved by the then Army Commander-in-Chief, General Onganía. According to published reports, the plan envisaged the consolidation of certain units, the elimination of others, and a staged process of relocation that would, by 1973, remove army cadres from the political centers of the country. While parts of the plan have been carried out, financial stringencies have precluded the heavy expenditures for building new bases required for implementation.³⁰

Whether the physical redeployment of army units would significantly lessen the army involvement in national politics is a debatable issue. The army bureaucracy would presumably

remain in Buenos Aires and the army would retain the capability of moving troops into the city should the need arise. What is significant about the redeployment plan, however, is that it indicates a serious concern at the highest levels of army leadership with emphasizing the external defense mission, with giving it a visibility that has been obscured in recent years by the intensification of political activity.

Budget

The cost of the Argentine military establishment has been the subject of considerable controversy with some critics insisting that it absorbs half the annual budget while other sources claim that it receives only ten percent.³¹ Such widely varying claims reflect the use of different methods of calculating budget outlays. One method is to aggregate the national, provincial, and municipal budgets so as to show the cost of defense as against the cost of all governmental services in the country.³² While such an approach can be justified to compare outlays for defense with those for education or social welfare, which are distributed at the three levels of government, the more usual practice is to relate military expenditures to the outlays of national government alone. Even here the budgetary concept that is employed must be carefully defined.

Recent national budgets present expenditures under several categories: central administration; special accounts; decentralized agencies; and contributions to state enterprises. A further distinction is made between outlays financed from general revenues and those financed by credits. Depending on whether the central administration budget alone is being discussed or one or more of the other categories, the armed forces percentage will naturally vary.

Table 7 presents data from the 1964-1965 budget showing the projected outlays authorized for the ministry of national defense and each of the three service secretariats, under the three major categories, central administration, special accounts, and decentralized agencies. These figures show that the military services account for almost 23 percent of total central administration outlays but when the special accounts and decentralized agencies are included the percentage drops to 18.9. However, if the treasury's contributions to the deficit-ridden state enterprises are also included and adjustment is made for double counting, the 59,847 million pesos assigned to the military constituted only 17.3 percent of the total national budget of 346,423 millions.

The table includes under the military services only those outlays assigned in the budget to the ministry of national defense and the three armed forces secretariats. The possibility cannot be ruled out, however, that military-related expenditures are included in other rubrics. Indeed an examination of the annexes that make up the central administration budget revealed, under a catch-all rubric called "Treasury Obligations" (Obligaciones a cargo del Tesoro), the sum of 2,392 millions specifically assigned to the military; and under another general rubric called "Emergency Credit," the sum of 2,438 millions specifically designated for the military services. By including these sums under the appropriate ministries as is done in Table 8, the military share of central administration outlays rises to 25.3 percent. Differentiating these outlays into those financed from general revenues (191,512) and those financed from credits (14,870), the military share of general revenues (47,879) is exactly 25 percent. Thus one peso out of every four collected from general revenues is expended on or by the armed forces. But measured against the total national budget, as shown in Table 8, total military expenditures are still under nineteen percent.

TABLE 7
MILITARY SHARE OF BUDGET, 1964-1965

<u>National Budget Categories</u>	<u>A</u> <u>Military</u>	<u>B</u> <u>General</u>	<u>¢ A/B</u>
I. Central Administration	<u>47,292</u>	<u>206,383</u>	<u>22.9</u>
Ministry of Defense	239		0.12
Secretariat of War	20,723		10.04
Secretariat of Navy	15,717		7.62
Secretariat of Air	10,613		5.14
II. Special Accounts	<u>5,370</u>	<u>19,329</u>	<u>27.8</u>
Ministry of Defense	43		
Secretariat of War	1,397		
Secretariat of Navy	3,297		
Secretariat of Air	633		
III. Decentralized Agencies	<u>7,185</u>	<u>90,991</u>	<u>7.9</u>
Ministry of Defense	397		
Secretariat of War	6,749		
Secretariat of Navy	24		
Secretariat of Air	15		
<u>Subtotal</u>	<u>59,847</u>	<u>316,703</u>	<u>18.9</u>
IV. Contributions to State Enterprises		55,132	
Less transfers		- 25,411	
<u>Totals</u>	<u>59,847</u>	<u>346,424</u>	<u>17.3</u>

Source: Camara de Diputados de la Nacion. Comision de Presupuesto y Hacienda. Presupuesto y calculo de recursos para el ejercicio 1965 (Buenos Aires, 1964), pp. 9-17. The amounts are in millions of pesos.

The distribution of the military budget not surprisingly makes the army the principal beneficiary. As Table 9 shows, close to half of the entire sum is assigned to that service (48.2 percent of the sum as given in the published budget or 46.7 percent of the adjusted totals). The navy receives about two-thirds the army budget, while the air force comes up a poor third. Spending by the ministry of national defense constitutes a tiny fraction of the military budget although it might be noted that the inclusion of the sums to be paid out as obligations of the treasury more than doubled the defense ministry share. What these sums were to be used

for was not explained but they may well have gone into pensions and retirements for the three services.

In summary, then, the armed forces account for one-quarter of the scheduled expenditures of the central administration, one-fifth of the outlays when the special accounts and decentralized agencies are included, and just under 19 percent when contributions to state enterprises are added.

TABLE 8
MILITARY EXPENDITURES INCLUDING
OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED BY TREASURY AND
EMERGENCY CREDITS, 1964-1965 BUDGET

<u>National Budget Categories</u>	<u>A</u> <u>Military</u>	<u>B</u> <u>General</u>	<u>1 A/B</u>
I. Central Administration	52,122	206,383	25.3
II. Special Accounts	5,370	19,329	27.8
III. Decentralized Agencies	7,185	90,991	7.9
<u>Subtotal</u>	<u>64,677</u>	<u>316,703</u>	<u>20.4</u>
IV. Contributions to State Enterprises		55,132	
Less transfers		- 25,441	
<u>Totals</u>	<u>64,677</u>	<u>346,423</u>	<u>18.7</u>

Amounts are in millions of pesos.

TABLE 9
DISTRIBUTION OF MILITARY BUDGET BY
MINISTRY OR SECRETARIAT, 1964-1965

<u>Ministry or Secretariat</u>	<u>Original</u>		<u>Augmented</u>	
	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Ministry of Defense	679	1.2	1,909	2.9
Secretariat of War	28,869	48.2	30,168	46.7
Secretariat of Navy	19,038	31.8	19,781	30.6
Secretariat of Air Force	<u>11,261</u>	<u>18.8</u>	<u>12,820</u>	<u>19.8</u>
Totals	59,847	100.0	64,678	100.0

Amounts are in millions of pesos.

The Officer Corps

An understanding of the influence exerted by the armed forces on Argentine society requires a detailed consideration of the officer corps. The lower ranks have rarely acted in a political fashion in the past and while it is possible that the noncommissioned officers may play a larger role in the future, it is the commissioned ranks, including many on retired status, whose aims and ambitions have affected and will continue to affect the pattern of Argentine politics. The following section concerns itself with the size, origins, training, career system, and outlook of the Argentine officer corps.

Army, navy, and air force officers on active status number about 8,000, but this figure includes both line officers (cuero de comando) and administrative officers (cuero de intendencia), and professionals of various kinds: doctors, dentists, pharmacists, veterinarians, lawyers, musicians, physical educationists, etc. The line officers are the most numerous as well as the most significant element in the armed forces. As of early 1964 there were said to be 5,820 such officers of whom 3,338 were army, 1,300 navy, and 1,182 air force.³³

This army line officer strength of 3,338 represents a reduction of over 500 officers from the level authorized by regulations issued in 1952. At that time the table of organization provided for 3,877 line officers, of whom no more than 70 could be generals and no more than 220 colonels.³⁴ The reduction in line officer strength from Perón's day has been accompanied by an even sharper drop in the number of generals. From a peak of 78 in 1951 the number sank to 54 a decade later and stood at only 40 in 1964.³⁵ The Argentine army thus had one general for every 2,125 men in uniform in 1964, as against one for every 1,333 in 1951.

Origins

The Argentine armed forces draw their permanent line officers exclusively from the three service academies: the army's Colegio Militar, which was founded in 1869 and has been located since 1937 at El Palomar in Buenos Aires Province; the navy's Escuela Naval Militar, founded in 1872 and located at Rio Santiago just below La Plata; and the air force's Escuela de Aviacion Militar, which was created in 1925 and has its quarters near the outskirts of Cordoba. To be sure, reserve commissions can be secured by university students and by graduates of military-operated secondary schools (liceos militares o navales) but the permanent officers are the ones who dominate the services and the only path to the permanent line officership passes through the classrooms and practice fields of the service academies.³⁶ The admissions and educational policies of these schools, therefore, play a crucial role in determining the makeup of the officer corps.

Admission to the military academies in Argentina does not require appointment by a congressman as in the United States but is secured through competitive entrance examinations. The educational requirement varies from service to service and, indeed, has changed over time. As late as 1930 the Colegio Militar accepted young men with only a fifth- or sixth-grade education, although most entrants had some secondary schooling. At present, completion of three years of secondary school is the minimum for applying for admission.³⁷

The specific educational requirement depends upon the course to be taken. The Colegio Militar at present offers a one-year preparatory course (curso preparatorio) as well as the regular four-year programs for line and administrative officers. To gain admission into the curso preparatorio requires only the three years of secondary work but to enter the regular courses four years is the minimum. The age of admission also depends on the course elected.

For those seeking to attend the preparatory course, the range is 15 to 20; for those entering the regular course the range is 16 to 21. Provision also exists for admitting qualified regular army non-commissioned officers into the academy up to the age of 28. In any case the applicant must be a native-born Argentine or if born of Argentine parents abroad he must have declared for Argentine citizenship.³¹

For a country that has received massive immigration, this requirement has ruled out a military career for young men who came to Argentina as children, attended its schools, and identified with it. The validity of this requirement in view of the constitutional guarantee of equal treatment for naturalized citizens was challenged successfully at the close of the last century and for a time the services were forced to accept naturalized youth, but current legislation explicitly requires native birth.³²

No religious qualification is stipulated for admission to the service academies but in actual practice few non-Catholics have attended in the past and at present none are found in the cadet body at the Colegio Militar. Argentina's non-Catholic population is very small (under 7 percent) and there is no evidence that any significant number of Jewish, Protestant, or other non-Catholic youth have ever sought admission. Contributing to this reluctance, no doubt, has been the prominent role that Catholic religious ceremonial traditionally plays at the academies, and in military life in general, and the fact that the existing officer corps is almost entirely, if not entirely, Catholic. On the other hand, the academies appear to make little effort to recruit candidates from qualified non-Catholic youth.³³

Although the Colegio Militar is a national institution, its student body is now drawn overwhelmingly from the city and province of Buenos Aires. In the 1965 entering class, 143 out of 234 cadets or 61 percent of the total came from the Federal Capital and the adjacent province; the next largest contingents came from Cordoba and Santa Fe provinces, each of which sent 15 cadets, followed by Entre Rios with 14 and Mendoza with 12. Four Argentine provinces did not contribute a single cadet while five others were represented by only one each. In terms of geographical distribution, then, the Colegio Militar reflects, but in even more exaggerated form, the existing uneven distribution of the national population between the Federal Capital and Buenos Aires province, on the one hand, and the rest of the country on the other. What this suggests is that the cadet comes to the academy much more familiar with the characteristics of life in the great metropolis of Buenos Aires than he is with the problems of the interior. For many an army officer, then, the first personal contact with provincial realities comes after graduation from the Colegio Militar when he is assigned to an interior garrison.³⁴

That the cadets are drawn from urban middle class families has often been assumed. What is of interest, however, is to note the sectors of the middle class from which the bulk of the future officers are now drawn. Table 10 shows the distribution of the 1965 entering cadets according to the occupation of the father and type of secondary school attended. It will be noted that the largest single category, almost one-third of the total, are sons of military men. This represents a substantial increase over the 10 to 20 percent that was characteristic of the 1920's and 1930's, and reveals that the military family is now a more important source of officer recruitment than a recent study based on a sampling of generals would have us believe.³⁵

Next in significance to military families as suppliers of cadets to the 1965 entering class are the families of employees, followed closely by professional men. Businessmen sent far fewer of their sons to the academy and landowners only a mere handful (less than 3 percent). That employee families, comprising a dependent sector of the middle class, should send a substantial number to the academy is not surprising. In terms of income they probably constitute, as a group, the least prosperous of the sectors represented and a military career for

TABLE 10
EDUCATIONAL AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF CADETS
ADMITTED TO THE COLEGIO MILITAR IN 1965

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
<u>Type of secondary school</u>		
Public schools	125	53.4
Private schools	75	32.1
<u>Liceos militares</u>	<u>34</u>	<u>14.5</u>
Totals:	234	100.0
<u>Occupation of father</u>		
Military	76	32.5
Employee	64	27.3
Professional	60	25.6
Merchant/entrepreneur/ businessman	28	12.0
Landowner	<u>6</u>	<u>2.6</u>
Totals:	234	100.0

their sons still represents an opportunity for improving their social status. What is more surprising, however, is the prevalence of sons of professional men. The fathers are presumably university graduates enjoying the prestige and opportunities that a professional degree still conveys in Argentine society. That the military career still holds attractions for their sons is of considerable significance for the future, in that a basis is being preserved in family relationships for communication between military and professional men.

The secondary school affiliations of the incoming cadets as set forth in Table 10 indicate that the public school is still the principal avenue for entry. The military secondary schools (liceos militares), although they turn out an average of 200 graduates each year, send very few to the Colegio Militar to continue in a military career. Private schools are a more important source of cadet recruits. Unfortunately, the available data do not differentiate between Church-run and other private schools, but in any case Catholic schools could account at most for less than a third of the 1965 entrants. In view of the increasing tendency of wealthy families in Argentina to send their children to private schools, the prevalence of public school products in this class reinforces the generally held view that the well-to-do are not sending their sons into military careers.⁴³

Education of Officers

The education imparted at Argentina's service academics seeks to cast the future officers in a common mold. At the Colegio Militar, for example, the regulations place the cadet under a constant discipline and supervision designed to promote in him habits of work, study, and

behavior, and sentiments of honor, character, and pride appropriate to an officer and a gentleman. The product of this training is expected to be an officer fully conscious of his responsibilities and one who places duty and honor above all other interests "however valued or sacred they may appear." But at the same time that the academy is trying to shape cadet character, its avowed objective is a well-rounded officer "intellectually formed in the learning of universal culture and in basic contemporary military knowledge," and "professionally qualified for the military career in the life of the modern society in which he will have to act."⁴⁴

The curriculum of the Colegio Militar has evolved over the years in keeping with its transformation from a sub-par secondary school to an institute of higher learning. At the beginning of the century, when the course lasted three years, the nonmilitary subjects consisted of a smattering of geography and history, two years of math, one year each of physics and chemistry, two years of Spanish, and three of French. By the mid-1930's, when the generation that occupies the top positions in today's army was at the academy, the number of hours per week spent in the classroom had increased significantly as had the complexity and sophistication of the courses. In the then four-year program, the science and mathematics component was expanded to include five year-long courses in mathematics, three in physics, three in chemistry, and one in geology. Four courses in history were now being taken apart from one in military history and the nonmilitary curriculum also included courses in logic, psychology, and anatomy and physiology. Foreign language training continued as at the beginning of the century to emphasize French although a year of Portuguese was added in the senior year.⁴⁵

In the current curriculum the curso preparatorio has taken on new importance since over sixty percent of the entering cadets do so at this level. The function of this one-year course is to round out the general knowledge which incoming cadets should possess. The students in this course are housed separately from the regular cadets and devote a larger share of their time to strictly academic subjects. These are (with the hours per week indicated in parentheses) biological sciences (2), philosophy (3), Argentine geography (2), Argentine history (3), foreign language (3), literature (3), moral education and religion (1), physics (3), mathematics (4), and inorganic chemistry (3). The foreign language studies is either English or French, but over 70 percent of the students now choose English.⁴⁶

In the regular program, the classroom work is divided between humanities, technical-mathematical courses, and military subjects. The last-named occupies only a minor place in the first two years (2-4 hours a week) but increases in the last two (7-10 hours). Foreign language study is continued only in the first year but there is continued emphasis on history, geography, and literature as well as on mathematics and physics. Since the function of the future officer is to train conscripts, the curriculum includes two courses in psychology and one in educational methods. In the senior year a course on sociology is introduced as well as a course on ethics and leadership. The hours spent in classroom work in the regular course amount to 24 per week out of the 45 assigned to instruction of all types. Physical activities and military training comprise the rest of the curriculum.

It is in the military instruction phase of the educational program that the academy seeks especially to mold the future officer, not only through imparting technical knowledge but in developing faith in the values he is expected to defend. To quote a recent statement, "A purely technical-professional efficiency has no meaning if it is not based on deep convictions, and on full faith in the values that are defended and in the success of the ideological struggle that divides the world. Only in a military personality basically formed and possessing a deep and coherent structure is it possible to develop a solid professional capacity." The importance of leadership training is seen in its spiritual and moral shaping of the cadet "so that he assumes

full consciousness of the values which support our conception of the world, based on the principles of liberty and dignity of the human being and of military virtues."⁴⁷

Argentine service academies in contrast to those in the United States are still small enough to permit a high degree of personal contact among the cadets of a given class and even across classes.⁴⁸ The incoming cadet is quartered with other cadets who select the same arm of the service and much of his time is spent in the cadet company, squadron, or battery into which he is incorporated. In the four years of the regular course as older cadets graduate and new ones enter, he can get to know the future officers in his own arm of service from seven different classes. Of course it is his own class or camada for which he feels the strongest ties and which provides the basis for some of his closest relationships.

The military academy experience is the beginning rather than the end of professional training for the Argentine officer. Each service maintains advanced professional schools through which pass selected groups of officers. If it is true that the academy plays a major role in defining the profile and character of the officer corps as a whole, it is no less true that these advanced schools exert a strong influence on the officers destined for the highest ranks. In the army the principal institutions for training such officers are: the Superior War School (Escuela Superior de Guerra—ESG), the Superior Technical School (Escuela Superior Técnica—EST), the Center for Intelligence Instruction (Centro de Instrucción de Inteligencia—CII), and the Center for Higher Studies (Centro de Altos Estudios—CAE). The other services maintain comparable schools and operating under the ministry of national defense is the National War College (Escuela Nacional de Guerra), which trains a small group of officers from all services as well as civilians.

The oldest and probably the most influential over the long run of these advanced schools is the army's Superior War School for training general staff officers. Founded in 1900 on the German model, its first director and four of its original nine instructors were contracted German officers. After the outbreak of World War I, Argentine officers were appointed as instructors but they were chosen from among top-flight graduates of the ESG who had been sent to Germany before the war expressly to prepare for future assignment to the instructional staff. The ESG has always been receptive to a certain amount of foreign influence. German officers gave courses there prior to World War II; French officers served as advisors to the ESG after 1957, and more recently United States officers have served in that capacity.

The ESG traditionally devoted its principal attention to training a carefully selected group of captains and first lieutenants from the various arms of the service for later exercise of high command positions or as general staff officers. Until recently, admission to the three-year program was by competitive examination and was limited to between 30 and 45 officers. A certain number after completing two years were given a certificate and reassigned; the officer-students with the highest grades were encouraged to continue for the third year and were given either the diploma of ayudantia superior or the diploma of general staff officer (oficial de estado mayor). Over the first thirty-five years of its existence the ESG awarded the coveted title of oficial de estado mayor to an average of less than seven officers per year.⁴⁹ They and their successors constituted an intellectual elite within the Argentine army.

In recent years the educational function of the ESG has been broadened in keeping with a new plan that calls for periodic cycles of instruction for all officer personnel. Introduced in 1965, the plan calls for all captains eligible for promotion to major to attend a one-year basic command course. Most of these officers, as majors, proceed to other assignments but a select group continues for another year at the ESG in a specialized course that qualifies them as general staff aids. An even more select group continues for a third year to qualify as general

staff officers. Regardless of their specialty, all lieutenant-colonels in their first year in grade also are to be assigned to the ESG for a one-year advanced command course. The capstone of this educational structure is the course for new colonels given at the Center of Higher Studies which is discussed below. What the new plan provides is an opportunity for all officers at crucial points in their careers to spend a year at the ESG to broaden their capacity to handle the problems that will confront them as they rise in the hierarchy and as their responsibilities increase.⁵⁰

The technical counterpart of the ESG is the Escuela Superior Técnica (EST), which was created in 1930 by the military government of General Uriburu to meet a need for technically trained officers that was not being filled by the existing postgraduate courses offered at the Colegio Militar. In one sense the creation of this school was the logical consequence of the post-World War I emphasis in Argentina on developing facilities to manufacture armaments. Officers were needed to direct the operations of the various plants whose products ranged from small arms to airplanes. But the rationale for this school lay also in the need for a center to study the technical problems related to the development of basic industries that could enhance national defense. The first director of the EST, Lt. Col. (later General) Manuel Savio, was the embodiment of military insistence on the need for heavy industries. Both as director (1931-1934) and as professor of industrial mobilization and industrial labor organization, Savio shaped the thinking of numerous officers and paved the way for the legislation that created the General Directorate of Military Factories and the state-owned steel enterprise at San Nicolas.⁵¹

The EST recruits its students from officers of the rank of lieutenant, or first lieutenant, who have had five years of service, high efficiency ratings, and who can pass the entrance examination. The course given at the EST lasts four years and leads to the degree of military engineer (ingeniero militar). The first two years comprise a general engineering course required of all officer-students; the last two years involve specialization in either one of a half-dozen war materiel fields or else in the geographic service. The faculty of the EST consists of civilians as well as military, many of the former being drawn from the teaching staffs of the national universities. Over the decade 1950-1960 the EST turned out some 219 graduates not including officers from other services and other countries. The Argentine officer graduates of the EST provide personnel for the farflung operations of the General Directorate of Military Factories and for the geographic and geodetic work carried on by the Military Geographic Institute (Instituto Militar Geografico).⁵²

The most advanced study program currently offered by the Argentine army for its officers is the colonels' course given at the Center of Higher Studies (CAE). This course, introduced for the first time in 1943, is now taken by full colonels in their first year in grade. It therefore provides a key group of officers, from whom are eventually selected the brigadier generals, an opportunity to explore together not only professional military subjects but current social, economic, and political problems. Recent innovations in the program of studies have led to the inclusion of courses in sociology and psychology and to the introduction of the research seminar as a method of instruction. Indicative of the range of problems that preoccupy current army leadership are the titles of the four seminars scheduled for the 1965 course: (1) Problems of Contemporary General and Military Strategy; (2) The Organization of American States and World Economic Problems; (3) The Southern Cone (Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay); and (4) The Argentine Army and Its National Community, 1900-1930. While the last-named carefully limits itself to a period that can be regarded as past history, the underlying concern is with the continuing crisis in Argentine domestic affairs and its implications for the military as an institution.⁵³

Career System

The promotion and assignment system of the Argentine army is carefully spelled out in laws and regulations the details of which, it may be assumed, are well known to every graduating cadet from the military academy. Commissioned as a subteniente, a status that is temporary until confirmed after two years' service, he is at the lowest of the ten grades that make up the army hierarchy. The first four of these are called subaltern officers (oficiales subalternos) and consist of subteniente, teniente, teniente primero, and capitán. The next two grades, mayor and teniente coronel, are designated as jefes; and the top four, coronel, general de brigada, general de division, and teniente general, are known as superior officers (oficiales superiores). Appointment to and within this category requires senate approval.⁵⁴

The newly commissioned subteniente knows that his first assignment will be to a troop unit that normally cannot be in the Greater Buenos Aires area; that only once in his career can he serve as an aide-de-camp and then only for a maximum of two years; that he will have troop assignments continuously until he reaches captain, and that if he succeeds in crossing the line that will make him a jefe, he can look forward to a year at the headquarters of a military district or comparable unit. As a lieutenant colonel his second year will be in a troop unit and again, if he is elevated into the rank of an oficial superior, his second year as a colonel will normally involve service with a troop unit or operational headquarters.⁵⁵

The minimum time for scaling the rungs of the military ladder in peacetime has been sharply reduced in the last twenty years. Prior to 1944 a newly commissioned subteniente could expect to serve at least eleven years before attaining a captaincy and fifteen to achieve the rank of major. In that year and again in 1950 the minimum time in grade was cut down so that at present it is six years to the captaincy and ten to the grade of major. What these changes mean is that an officer fortunate enough to be promoted to each successive grade with just the minimum time spent in each could rise from subteniente to brigadier general in nineteen years as against twenty-seven years under the rules that applied to 1944. The actual pattern of promotions is considerably slower. While some officers are known to have advanced through the first six grades at the minimum intervals, the colonel who gains a generalcy in just three years is a rarity. The usual time involved for those who make it is four to six years.⁵⁶

Promotions in the Argentine army are made annually at the end of December except when politico-military disturbances suspend the operation of the system as in 1962. Each year evaluation boards are convoked to examine individual records and rank the officers in an order of merit. The rankings are the basis for decisions to promote, retain in grade, or send into retirement. Retirement is compulsory for officers of field grade and above who remain in grade three times the minimum, which means nine years under current law. However, other officers in these grades may also be asked to retire if this is needed to create sufficient vacancies for promotion purposes, the choice falling on those at the bottom of the merit list.⁵⁷

While the regulations provide for a reasonably objective system of officer evaluations, political considerations have inevitably played a part in promotion and assignment decisions. This has been particularly true of the senior officers whose political reliability in the sense of loyalty to the government or to the group in control of the army at a given time has been a key factor in their future. In the intra-army factional struggles that have been waged, at times silently, at times openly, since Perón's fall, the price of open identification with the losing side has been premature retirement. Scores of high-ranking officers have had their active military careers terminated in this manner. For those on the winning side, choice assignments and promotions have been the reward.

Salary

Argentine officers enjoy a salary scale that compares very favorably with that of civil servants and is substantially superior insofar as regularity of payment and adjustment to inflation are concerned. Postponement of pay days for government employees has been a frequent occurrence in recent years causing considerable hardship among pensioners as well as active employees. While military pensioners have also suffered from these delays, the active lists, from all indications, have always been paid promptly.

Salary adjustments for military personnel, viewed historically, have also come more frequently than for the civil service, with the result that officers have been considerably upgraded vis-à-vis their civilian counterparts. Table 11 compares the salaries paid to generals and colonels with those of selected civil servants at intervals over the period 1918-1951. The figures are for base salaries and in the case of the military do not include the general supplementary allowances that are paid to all officers in the form of additional percentages of base pay for length of service; nor do they include the representation allowance assigned to cabinet ministers. As the table shows, in the comparison of the lieutenant general's pay with the cabinet minister's, the difference that favored the latter was considerably reduced in relative terms over the period. In the comparison of the cabinet undersecretary with the major general, the initial inferiority in pay of the latter was converted by 1920 into superiority, and this relationship continued throughout the period. The most startling change, however, occurred in the salary relationship of colonels to rectors of the principal national secondary schools (colegios nacionales). As of 1918 the two received exactly the same salary but the colonel was jumped ahead by 1920 and continued to increase his advantage so that by 1951 he was receiving 2 1/2 times as much as the rector.

TABLE 11
SELECTED GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY MONTHLY
BASE SALARIES COMPARED, 1918-1951

<u>Position or Rank</u>	<u>1918</u>	<u>1920</u>	<u>1941</u>	<u>1950/51</u>
Cabinet minister	2400	2400	2400	6000
Lieutenant general	1600	1850	2200	5000
Cabinet undersecretary	1400	1400	1400	4000
Major general	1350	1550	1900	4300
Brigadier general	1150	1350	1600	3800
Rector, Colegio Nacional (national secondary school)	800	800	800	1250
Colonel	800	1000	1300	3100

Source: Budget laws for 1918, 1920, 1941, 1950. Military salaries for 1951 as established by Decree 21,087/1951. Anales de legislacion argentina, XI-A, 536. The amounts are given in pesos.

The available data on the current salaries of military and teaching personnel do not permit precise comparisons but it is evident that the advantage enjoyed by the former continues into the present. Table 12 lists at the top the monthly salaries of officers as published by the government in February 1964. The official announcement stated that these figures include base salaries plus all general supplements computed as of the first year in rank, but do not show the 8 percent deducted for retirement. The figures as given thus represent 92 percent of the gross salary. At the bottom of Table 12 is listed the monthly salaries of selected educators. These figures give the basic monthly salary assigned to each post and do not include increments for length of service. Neither salary schedule as shown includes family allowances.

With the understanding that the figures shown in Table 12 are only approximations of the actual salaries received, it is evident that the educators fall far behind. The highest paid are the eight national university rectors but their base monthly salary of 54,165 pesos is less than that earned by a colonel in his first year in rank. The lieutenant-colonel emerges with a

TABLE 12
SALARIES OF OFFICERS AND SELECTED
EDUCATORS AS OF 1964

<u>Title</u>	<u>Monthly Salary</u>
Lieutenant general	87,630
Major general	75,950
Brigadier general	66,950
Colonel	60,265
Lieutenant colonel	45,195
Major	35,855
Captain	28,215
First lieutenant	23,260
Lieutenant	17,705
Sublieutenant	11,250
<hr/>	
President (Rector) of a National University	54,165
President, National Primary Schools (Consejo Nacional de Educacion)	43,815
Professor, full-time, National University	43,815
President (Rector) Teachers' College for Secondary Level	23,115
Rector, Secondary School	20,110

Sources: Military salaries as published in La Nacion, February 6, 1964; educators' salaries calculated from index numbers established by Law 14,473 of 1958 and peso equivalents of 345 = 1 as announced in La Nacion, August 7, 1964. The salaries are given in pesos.

larger salary than any educator save the university presidents. This situation, combined with the previously mentioned delays in payment to the civil servants, undoubtedly contributes to the resentment which many teachers, and their students, feel toward the military establishment.

Whatever advantages military personnel may enjoy over civil employees, their salaries, particularly at the lower grades, are not large compared to what comparably trained individuals can earn in the private sector. The military, like other groups with fixed incomes, also suffer from the effects of the continuing inflation which has eroded the purchasing power of whatever salary they receive.

Emoluments

The Argentine military apart from salaries receive a variety of benefits including medical care for themselves and dependents, and moving allowances and differential pay when stationed abroad. Noteworthy in a country which has suffered for decades from a housing shortage and scarcity of mortgage money are the special arrangements that have enabled military personnel to acquire their own homes. Since 1952 the ministry of war has been authorized to sell real estate it no longer finds useful and to apply the proceeds to the construction of homes or apartment houses for resale to army personnel. The housing so constructed has created military communities near various garrisons but the terms on which the units are purchased preclude their alienation save under stipulated conditions. A much more flexible instrument for assisting military personnel has been the provision of mortgage money on very easy terms. Since 1946 the Instituto de Ayuda Financiera, the military retirement and pension fund agency, has been authorized to issue mortgage loans. More recently, it was also authorized to purchase existing homes or to construct homes and sell them on liberal terms to contributors to the military pension fund. The purchaser could secure a mortgage with up to 50 years to repay, depending on his age, at annual interest rates of about 4 to 7 percent. The substantial advantage conveyed by these terms has been reflected in the modern apartments which many officers own in recently built cooperative structures in the Federal Capital.⁵⁸

The Argentine military enjoy the benefits of a generous retirement system. Prior to 1934 they made no contribution to it and the total cost was defrayed from general revenues; in that year a contributory plan was initiated involving a 5 percent deduction from monthly salaries to create a retirement fund. In 1946 the deduction was raised to 8 percent and the Instituto de Ayuda Financiera was created as an autonomous agency to assume responsibility for operating the system. The general treasury, however, still transfers funds to the Instituto to enable it to meet its obligations.⁵⁹

Retirement from military service may either be voluntary or compulsory. An officer who has 20 years of service can retire voluntarily with substantial benefits. However, an officer who is forced to retire for whatever reason and who has served at least ten years is also entitled to retirement benefits. On the other hand, an officer who is dropped from the army (*dado de baja*), regardless of his grade or length of service, is not entitled to retirement pay although his dependents may be eligible for a pension. For officers compelled to retire for reasons of disability there is no minimum service requirement to be eligible for benefits.⁶⁰

The amount of retirement pay an officer receives is a function of his length of service as computed for retirement purposes and of the pay and general allowances assigned by current laws and regulations for active duty officers of the same grade and longevity. Should the remuneration of active duty personnel be altered, the retired officer's pay is adjusted accordingly. The percentage of the pay and allowances that the officer receives in retirement is

determined by his length of service, which in turn may include bonus time as well as ordinary time. Bonus time is earned at the rate of 100 percent of ordinary time for service during time of war or, what is more relevant to Argentina, during a state of siege. It is also earned at the same rate for service in certain isolated Andean posts and for various types of hazardous duty; and at the 50 percent rate for extended service in mountain troops. It should be noted that bonus time can be computed only if the officer is eligible for retirement pay, that is, if he has served 20 years' ordinary time in the case of a voluntary decision, or ten years' ordinary time in the case of forced retirement.⁶¹

The percentages of current pay and general allowances that retired officers receive range from 100 percent after thirty years' service down to 30 percent after ten. An officer with the minimum ordinary service for voluntary retirement, twenty years, receives 60 percent. In recent times, however, an officer who has served twenty years' ordinary time probably has accumulated another ten years in bonus time because of the prolonged periods in which a state of siege was in force. An officer who entered the military academy at age 18 could thus retire under 40 with the entire base pay and general allowances of his grade. But even without bonus time he could retire at full pay at age 48. While the regulations authorize retirement at 100 percent of base pay and general allowances for those who have accumulated thirty years of computed time, an even more favorable situation is authorized for those officers who retire with thirty-five years of ordinary service or forty years computed time of which thirty are ordinary. Such officers not only retain the entire base pay and general allowances but also any other emoluments received on active duty such as the additional specific allowances authorized for certain types of duty, for service in certain locations, or for assignment as a military professor.⁶²

For officers who retire for reasons of disability the retirement regulations provide for additional benefits. If the disability is produced through an act of service, the officer's retirement will be based on the pay and allowances of the next higher grade and with an additional fifteen percent if he is totally incapacitated for pursuing a civilian career. If the disability was unrelated to acts of service, the officer is entitled to simple retirement at the rate of 3 percent of his salary and allowances for each year in service up to ten years and then according to the standard percentages mentioned above.⁶³

While most retired officers, unable to find civilian outlets for their skills, have had little choice but to lead inactive lives, a certain number have been able to pursue new careers. The opportunities for the retired officer have in fact broadened with increasing industrialization and with the problems of operating businesses in a state-controlled economy. Forty years ago the principal outlet for a retired officer was service in a provincial or national police force. The National Gendarmerie when first organized in 1938 had a particular appeal since service in it, apart from providing pay at army rates, enabled the officer to retain his retirement status and accumulate additional years of service that could later be used to increase it.⁶⁴

The proliferation of state enterprises during the 1940's provided additional outlets for retired officers who were and are permitted to hold down a civil service post and still retain their retirement pay. The growth of new private industries, especially in metallurgical, automobile, and chemical fields, has created an additional outlet for the technically trained officer. But what is relatively new is the appointment of retired superior officers to corporate boards of directors where, like some of their American counterparts, they play essentially a public relations role. A major function of such officers is to handle matters that require action by official agencies. The delays that characterize the normal operation of the government bureaucracy are such as to create a need on the part of private companies for expeditors. The prestige of high military rank, plus experience in handling men are apparently regarded as assets for the performance of this function.⁶⁵

THE MILITARY OUTLOOK

Transcendental Political Mission

The self-image of the officer is not fixed or immutable. It tends to reflect his concept of the primary mission of the armed forces and on this there is no longer agreement. The traditional concept as embodied in regulations and inculcated still in military schools sees the military as the instrument of the state for defending its sovereignty and guaranteeing domestic order. In the nineteenth century the Argentine army actively performed these roles, contributing thereby to the territorial expansion and political organization of modern Argentina. In keeping with this conception of the military's role, the officer views himself as the heir to the heroic tradition established by San Martín in the war for independence, a tradition that emphasizes self-sacrifice and devotion to duty. The military career is likened to a priesthood (sacerdocio de las armas), and the permanent officer is seen as possessing a mystical and passionate dedication, and a professional style, Sanmartinian and heroic.

This image which most officers accepted as an ideal, whatever their actual performance, has been altered by changing domestic and international conditions since World War II. At home, the participation of military men in politics became a persistent phenomenon; internationally, the hemispheric security system has practically ruled out the possibility of war with a neighboring state. The principal justification for a national army was thus undermined. In response to this situation the Argentine army sought to give new content to the profession and strengthen the rationale for its existence by accepting as doctrine the theory of revolutionary war. In so doing it provided the officer with a new self-image. He was now encouraged to see himself as the defender of Christian civilization against the dissolvent forces of communism. And he was tempted to regard the military as the last bulwark of Argentine nationality while he viewed with suspicion other sectors of the community, especially the universities, labor unions, and civilian politicians.⁶⁶

Not all officers by any means were willing to accept the new emphasis, for they saw it as reinforcing the tendency of certain officers to intrude into politics by committing the army to a role of censor of civilian authorities. While agreeing to the need for combatting communism, they felt this could be better achieved by strengthening the constitutional authorities and ending military indiscipline. For these officers the great need was for a sense of national purpose, an agreement on national aspirations, which ultimately could come only from the civilian community.⁶⁷

After the restoration of civilian constitutional government in 1963, a beginning was made within the army in developing a new conception of its role, that of sharing responsibility with the civilian sector for promoting social and economic development, stimulating scientific investigation, and strengthening spiritual and cultural values. It was even suggested by no less a figure than the secretary of war that one of the army's missions was to promote the general welfare.⁶⁸ While this may be viewed simply as an attempt to find a raison d'être for the institution and thereby justify its expense, it reflected the growing belief within the army that it could and should serve as an instrument of economic change. In the words of the director of the Superior War School and Center of Higher Studies, the armed forces in countries like Argentina

are to contribute also, and decidedly, to social and economic development, and in the measure of their possibilities without interfering with civilian activity, to constitute themselves as active agents of modernization promoting the basic sectors of their respective economies.⁶⁹

From the belief that the army had a shared responsibility with the civilian authorities for promoting economic and social development it was perhaps only logical that army officers would assume the role of critic and judge of civilian performance.⁷⁰ The ouster of the Illia government in June 1966 was a reflection of this attitude and indicates that the military now view themselves as the altruistic agents of national transformation. In the words of the revolutionary proclamation:

The present revolutionary act must be looked upon as having the sole and genuine purpose of saving the republic and of placing it definitely on the path to its greatness. . . .

Today, as in all the decisive stages of our history, the armed forces, representing the highest common interest, assume the inalienable responsibility of assuring national unity and of making possible general well-being, bringing into the country modern cultural, scientific and technical elements which, by permitting a substantial transformation, will give the country the place to which it is entitled by reason of the intelligence and the human value of its inhabitants and of the riches which Providence has bestowed upon its territory.⁷¹

If it is true that the self-image of the officer corps has undergone change, it is no less true that its public image is not of one piece. Rather, it is a mixture of respect, resentment, and resignation. That the exercise of political power rests ultimately on the consent of the armed forces rather than on that of the governed has been a basic proposition of Argentine politics that few would deny. The news media accordingly are extremely sensitive during civilian regimes to any indication of military discontent and give wide publicity to the acts and words of military spokesmen. The frequency with which rumors are circulated concerning the alleged political ambitions of General X or Colonel Y is further evidence of a fatalistic attitude toward the nature of Argentine politics.

Discontent with this situation is voiced by intellectuals, students, politicians, labor leaders, and other interest groups. The most vociferous criticism, understandably enough, comes from students. Aware of the financial difficulties confronting the schools and universities and of the disparity in the amount and promptness of payment as between military and educational personnel, they tend to see the military as a burden to society rather than its protector. In a 1964 survey of student opinion at the National University of Buenos Aires, only 2 percent of the respondents felt that a military man at the head of government would be worthy of all confidence and capable of subordinating his own interests to those of the country, while 44 percent felt that he would not.⁷²

The image held of the military naturally bears a relationship to the political orientation of the beholder. Writers on the left have traditionally depicted the armed forces as a self-centered institution that has obstructed economic and social progress through its financial demands and through its restless energies subverted the political order. This view was given classic expression in the polished prose of Martínez Estrada thirty years ago, not long after the 1930 revolution:

Without doubt the Army has, like no other organization, a definite structure; but developed and arranged in such a way that it is a powerful organism of defense converted into a powerful organism for danger. Concrete, rigid, omnipotent, it receives prestige and power from the fact that it constitutes a caste, a nation, a guild, a state, a technique, and a religion. . . . All Argentine history is a military history; it may be said of the civil and

political, apocryphal history of legendary books. . . . Defense being the constitutional function of the army, in the absence of true dangers it assumes the defense of institutions, most especially those over which it has lost its moral tutelage. It is equipped in the expectancy of events which do not occur and in the meantime consumes in its sustenance huge sums drawn away from other activities. . . .

This army, maintained for possible defense needs, cannot maintain itself in inactivity; even those who take refuge in retirement devote themselves to other civil functions. The more remote are the possibilities of entering into activities appropriate to the arm, the greater the extraordinary activities. The purely bureaucratic function is incompatible with the idiosyncrasy of the soldier and with his sense of honor. . . . The soldiers who hatch revolutions wish to eat their bread without remorse. In the absence of international conflicts. . . these well-fed corps have to turn prophetically against the domestic scene and make of revolt and usurpation of power their winter maneuvers.⁷³

In contrast to the antimilitarism of the left, nationalist writers have tended to exalt the military and to depict the officer corps as a somewhat mystical body possessing civic virtues and political wisdom far superior to civilian Argentines. This idyllic view, set forth frequently in the 1930's, was shattered for some nationalists by their direct experience with military government after 1943. Writing in 1945, the nationalist intellectual Leonardo Castellani observed:

[The permanent army] is a non-sacred, artificial professional and class structure which has over it this fearful condition: that it is not useful or necessary except in case of an immense calamity, which is modern war; and when there is no war, it is continuously close to idleness, the father of many vices, especially our excessively pampered army; idleness is understood also to mean getting stirred up in a vacuum. That is our army, in its upper ranks, and not the myth of holiness and patriotism. . . .⁷⁴

Current views of the military continue to reflect the political orientation of the various groups, but they have been reshaped by the almost continuous involvement of the armed forces in Argentine politics over the past twenty years. The fact that for ten years the armed forces were a major support of the Perón regime, and that for the last ten years they have served as the principal obstacle to its restoration, makes for a complex situation in which consistency of view is not to be expected.

The political emergence of Argentine workers during the Perón regime left them with a favorable image of the army which subsequent events have not entirely effaced. Despite the repressive action taken by the military against the Peronists after 1955, the workers preferred to believe that this was essentially the work of the navy or of a minority in the army rather than the army as a whole. Dislike for the navy is intense among the working masses who seem to view it as a praetorian guard for the traditional upper classes. It is not surprising that the term gorilla, originally a reference to the physical appearance of navy marines marching under full field equipment, became the popular designation for the extreme anti-Peronists, whether military or civilian.

Although politicians of the major parties frequently denounce the political presence of the military, they appear to have greater faith in the latter's integrity than they have in one another. This is evident when it comes to elections. The practice of having the armed forces

supervise national elections was first introduced in 1946 as a guarantee against the fraud that characterized the polling and counting of votes in the previous decade. When the Illia government suggested in 1965 that the practice be abandoned and supervision be entrusted to the civilian-controlled police forces, opposition parties, fearful that the police would act to favor the party in power, insisted that the military continue in the supervisory role and the government acquiesced.⁷⁵

The image of the military as set forth currently by the extreme left is a selective one as befits a revolutionary ideology that now seeks to win over military support for a "movement of national liberation." Heterodox Marxist writers like Jorge Abelardo Ramos, rejecting the simple antimilitarism of earlier decades, have taken over from the nationalists the view that the army was often a force for good rather than an unmitigated evil. They hold up for praise the builders of the modern army, Generals Roca and Ricchieri, and the military proponents of economic nationalism, Generals Mosconi and Savio, while they see General Perón as the audacious spirit who, recognizing historical necessity, linked the military to the working classes. To account for the role of the military in supporting regimes that welcomes foreign capital or that favored the interests of the landed classes, Ramos sets forth the concept of two traditions or indeed two armies: one, the "great" tradition, going back through Perón and Roca to San Martín, which is defined as national and popular; the other, a tradition that is denounced as petty, self-serving, and anti-national. This latter tradition is ascribed to Mitre and the Buenos Aires liberals of the nineteenth century, to Uriburu and Justo in the 1930's, and to the military leadership of recent years. Despite the denunciation of the current leadership, care is taken to depict the majority of the army officers as coming from the hard-working middle sector and as susceptible to a program of accepting labor's participation in government, and of working together to promote a new society, socialist, industrialized, and independent of external control.⁷⁶

The orthodox Argentine Communist view, differing from the above, continues to reflect a traditional anti-militarist position. It depicts the armed forces as top-heavy with officers, excessively large, and as consuming an inordinate share of the budget at the expense of other sectors. It directs attention to the ties between high-ranking officers and monopolistic business ventures, both foreign owned and mixed. While it does differentiate between pro-imperialist senior officers with pro-latifundist tendencies who would like to see a return to the old order, and young officers who believe more or less in anti-imperialism, and while it calls for the restoration of the army to its anti-colonial tradition, the Communist approach is essentially negative toward and condemnatory of the armed forces.⁷⁷

Apart from the views of the specific groups and writers mentioned above, what can be said of the attitude of the public at large toward the military? One indication perhaps is the changing response of young men to the prospects of a military career. In the 1930's about ten boys applied for each opening at the Colegio Militar; now only three do. A similar situation exists with respect to the Escuela Naval. The explanation for this decline is multiple. Many new civilian careers exist today as a result of economic and social changes that did not exist then. Family customs and mores have changed in the direction of greater independence for the young. The military academy with its rigid discipline and little time off for leisure accordingly has less appeal than when home life was characterized by close supervision and little freedom. Finally, political events have taken away from the military career the stability it once enjoyed while increasing the prospect of involvement in civil confrontations. But whatever the reason, the fact is that a military career no longer holds the prestige it once did among the middle class families that traditionally send their sons to the officer corps.⁷⁸

The tendency of army officers to join in informal cliques or groups is as old as the military service itself. Equally longstanding, though more sporadic, has been the practice

of organizing secret associations (logias) for the purpose of exerting influence on or effecting changes in the government, or the military establishment, or both. In the course of the nineteenth century at least a half-dozen such associations came into existence of which the best known have been the Logia Lautaro and the Logia Militar. The former, which had Masonic overtones, was introduced into Argentina by José de San Martín and two other officers in 1812 on returning from Europe and it played a significant role in the politics of the day. The Logia Militar, on the other hand, was organized among a number of junior officers who participated in the unsuccessful civil-military insurrection of July 1890. It is worth noting that the formal constitution of this association took place in the home of a sublieutenant, Jose F. Uriburu, who forty years later as a retired lieutenant general led the successful overthrow of the Yrigoyen government.⁷⁹

Two other associations that were to have grave political consequences in their day were the Logia General San Martín founded in 1921 and the Grupo de Oficiales Unidos or G.O.U. which became active some two decades later. The Logia General San Martín was organized by a group of field grade and junior officers in reaction to the military policies of the first Yrigoyen government (1916-1922). Although voluntarily dissolved in 1926, many of its former members participated in the Uriburu-led coup of 1930 and provided support for the subsequent administration of General Justo.⁸⁰ The G.O.U. was the highly nationalistic group of essentially field grade officers that helped oust President Castillo in 1943 and played a major role in the policymaking of the military administrations that succeeded him.

The last fifteen years seem to have witnessed the formation of various logias militares, but their secret character and the lack of reliable information make commentary about them tentative to say the least. On the basis of the data available, it seems clear that at least one logia was organized against Perón in late 1951. This was the Logia Sol de Mayo, which was formed under the leadership of a retired officer, Colonel José Suarez, and embraced in its membership both civilians and retired officers including members of the original G.O.U.⁸¹ During the Frondizi administration there seems to have been a proliferation of logias, some with exotic names: The Green Dragon (El Dragon Verde), the Piston (El Piston), The Word (Verbo), and The Forty (Los Cuarenta). It is quite possible, however, that one or more of these organizations existed more in fantasy than in reality.⁸²

Military logias have not conformed to a single pattern of membership. The group known as El Piston was said to have been made up of military engineers, presumably all former students at the Escuela Superior Técnica. The group known as Los Cuarenta on the other hand was based on rank and consisted, according to reports in April 1961, of forty colonels with troop commands. While most of the logias of recent years were formed by active-duty personnel, the Logia Sol de Mayo as already noted was directed by a retired officer and included both active and retired personnel. El Dragon Verde was said to have been founded by Colonel Manuel Reimundes while on active duty but continued to function apparently even after he was forced into retirement. In both of these groups, moreover, civilian participation has been noted. The inclusion of civilians was a feature of the Logia Lautaro and other nineteenth-century associations but ever since 1890, except for those noted above, the logias have been exclusively military.

The logias militares have tended to come into existence in periods of general political tension. Their formation, however, has responded to a variety of factors, institutional and personal as well as political. Concern over the deterioration of discipline within the army or with the adequacy of existing armaments has played a part in their establishment. And so has ambition for attractive assignments and promotions. It is difficult to assess the strength of ideological considerations as a factor in their formation. The G.O.U. has generally been

regarded as an ideological group, yet it counted among its founders men of diverse political views, some of whom apparently looked forward to a more-or-less democratic government under Radical Party auspices, others to an authoritarian regime along Falangist if not outright fascist lines.⁸³

Historically, the military lodges have proved to be short lived as formal organizations. The Logia Militar of 1890 collapsed after the July revolution and while the Logia General San Martín of 1920 lasted five years, the G.O.U. had an existence of only one year. Its transformation from its original purposes into the political instrument of Juan Perón alienated many of the original members. The more recent associations have apparently also led ephemeral existences. The dissolution of these associations, however, did not and does not put an end to the political interests or activities of the former members. Indeed, the very officers attracted to such groups are likely to be the ones with the strongest political drives.⁸⁴

Since the end of the Perón regime, the major divisions among the military have related in one way or another to the issue of how to handle the Peronists. This issue has been reflected in the logias but more importantly in the deep splits that have affected the armed forces as a whole. The basic cleavage has been between those officers who flatly rule out legal political activity by the Peronists and who were therefore prepared to limit the democratic process for an indefinite period in favor of what is sometimes called "democratic dictatorship"; and those officers who, without being willing to see Peronism gain power, favored accommodations of various sorts that would accord it a legal role in the political process. Each of these groups has had affiliations with civilian political forces.

The hard-line anti-Peronist officers known as Colorados maintained ties with and received support from likeminded civilians. The latter were to be found in various traditional political parties, especially the Conservative, Progressive Democrat, Democratic Socialist, and also in the People's Radical Civic Union (U.C.R.P.). Many of these individuals, military and civilian, suffered imprisonment or exile at the hands of Perón and participated jointly in conspiracies to oust him. The ties thus established before September 1955 were to link them in a common political outlook thereafter. They deplored Frondizi's electoral victory with the help of Peronist votes in 1958; they were quick to criticize his domestic and international policies; they participated in or applauded the military moves that led to his ouster; and out of fear of Peronist voting strength they sought to postpone indefinitely the holding of elections that restored constitutional government in 1963.⁸⁵

Disagreeing with them in many of these positions were the officers known at times as the legalists and subsequently as the Azules. These officers did not share a specific political orientation. Some were nationalists with links to civilian nationalist leaders; others had ties to progressive elements within the Christian Democratic movement; others were in the camp of ex-President Aramburu. A reluctance to see the military openly and continuously involved in politics prior to the ouster of President Frondizi and a desire to see an elected constitutional government assume control as soon as possible thereafter were the views they held in common.

Nationalism and Roman Catholicism

The Argentine officer regardless of service tends to have strong national pride and to feel that his country is in a separate class from the rest of Latin America. Underlying this feeling is a consciousness of the historic role of his forefathers in helping to liberate other countries during the war for independence; an awareness of his country's size, natural wealth, standard

of living, and cultural advances; and a belief in the superiority of its population by reason of its racial homogeneity and essentially European extraction. Linked to this sense of patriotism for most officers, and often interwoven with it, is a strong attachment to Roman Catholicism. This is not to say that all officers are personally devout. Indeed there have probably been a good many nonbelievers, including a leading major-general today; and there are many more who are only nominal Catholics as is the case with most Argentine males. Nevertheless, the ties between the military services and the Roman Catholic Church are well established and for many officers, particularly those in the army and air force, defense of the church's position in Argentine society shares a place in their outlook with defense of the state.

Anticommunism

Related to this is the fervid anticommunism that characterizes the Argentine military. Sensitivity to the threat of communism, real or imagined, has been a consistent factor in military thinking on international political issues as well as on the decisions to intervene on the domestic political scene from 1930 to the present. This sensitivity in turn has provided ambitious elements, civilian and military, with an instrument for manipulating military opinion for their own purposes. For example, the ouster of President Frondizi in 1962 was preceded by a well-prepared campaign among the military depicting him as a Communist. The dangers of an unreflective anti-communism that fails to differentiate reformers from revolutionaries, and which relies exclusively on repressive measures, are recognized by at least some high-ranking officers.⁸⁶

While all Argentine officers may be described as nationalists, there are distinctions and gradations to be made with respect to their attitudes on specific issues. In the foreign affairs field, the navy has tended to be the least nationalist of the services. Linked through training and equipment first to the British, and then to the United States, navies, Argentine navy officers in the main have tended to identify national interests with the security system of the West. Even in World War II, when Argentine policy followed a neutralist course, there was considerable sympathy in the navy for cooperating with the allies.⁸⁷

Army officers, on the other hand, have traditionally tended to take a more nationalistic view of Argentine interests. In World War II, as is well known, the Argentine army was the chief advocate of neutralism and in the postwar decade it supported the "third position" followed by Perón. It was only after Perón's ouster in 1955 that the earlier reluctance to enter fully into the inter-American system was overcome. Today most army officers seem to accept the proposition that the defense of Argentine interests requires a commitment to continental solidarity. The acceptance of a U. S. military mission by the army in 1960, the last of the three services to do so, its action in organizing an expeditionary force to assist the U. S. in the 1962 Cuban crisis, and its desire to participate in the inter-American force in Santo Domingo in 1965, all reveal the depth of this feeling. Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that for many officers an independent approach to foreign relations is still an integral part of their outlook.

Economic Views

Nationalist attitudes among the military are clearly revealed in their approach to economic issues. Even here, however, there have been adjustments in outlook over the years. The position of the military, and specifically the army, twenty years ago could have been summed up thus: a determination to promote the development of heavy industry, a preference for state-operated as against private enterprise, and a deep suspicion of foreign capital. The subsequent

inability of the Argentine economy to generate sufficient capital to finance the desired expansion in the iron and steel, petroleum, and automotive fields, and the partial discrediting of state agencies during the Perón regime, have led to a modification of the earlier views. The army is just as anxious as before to have the Argentine economy develop its industrial potential, but there is now greater recognition of the need for the collaboration of foreign capital and a willingness to concede a somewhat larger role to private enterprise.⁸⁹

The relaxation of earlier views began actually in the last years of the Perón regime with the transfer of installations formerly operated by the State Mechanical and Aeronautical Industries, (IAME) to the foreign-financed Kaiser automotive works and Fiat tractor plant that were being established in Cordoba. Under the Frondizi administration, in what was a notable reversal of an earlier position, the military went along with inviting foreign companies under special contracts to participate in the expansion of the petroleum industry. The Illia government to be sure later rescinded the petroleum contracts on the grounds they were illegally entered into, but this decision cannot be ascribed to military pressure.

Despite the acceptance of what may be described as a more realistic view toward the need for foreign capital, the military are by no means disposed to abandon the special role they have acquired in the economy through the operations of the General Directorate of Military Factories (DGFM) and various other enterprises (for details, see below). Rather, they see themselves as making significant contributions to the inventory of skilled personnel at managerial as well as lower levels, creating new industries on the basis of domestic mineral resources, and in general enhancing economic development.

Interest in Education

Argentine military men show considerable interest in certain areas of public education, specifically the primary, technical, and engineering schools. The statement of former War Secretary Avalos, that "Education is national defense and for that reason the army makes a specialty of favoring the primary school," may seem somewhat glib, but it does reflect the longstanding concern with the problem of illiteracy.⁹⁰ Because of the system of universal training, the armed forces are confronted each year with a certain number of illiterate or semi-literate 20-year olds. In 1962, according to official figures, these constituted almost 15 percent of the total manpower inducted into the army. The armed forces in accordance with well established practice undertake to teach these young adults in schools operated in their own installations, and apparently with a good deal of success; but the root of the problem lies in the inadequacy of the public schools in the less developed parts of the country and with the high dropout rate elsewhere.⁹¹ Material assistance to isolated rural schools is often rendered by nearby military detachments and especially by the National Gendarmerie, but there has been little military support for the thesis that the best contribution to the improvement of public education would come from a reduction in overall military expenditures.

Military interest in technical and engineering education is partly related to the professional needs of the services but also to their longstanding commitment to an industrialized economy. Officers writing in military journals in the 1930's and early 1940's were already making the connection between the two and urging the need for technical schools oriented toward industrial specialties. It is not surprising then that the basic legislation regulating the industrial apprenticeship system and providing for the operation of factory schools was issued by a military-run government in 1944 or that in the same year the army instituted a scholarship plan to train students at the secondary and university levels as technicians. More recently the General Directorate of Military Factories has sponsored a graduate teaching and

research program in metallurgical engineering in cooperation with the engineering school of the University of Buenos Aires.⁹²

Military thinking about education has tended naturally to concentrate on the practical values as seen from the viewpoint of the armed services. The idea that education creates social capital and is therefore essential to economic progress is also found in current Argentine military writing. But it is perhaps noteworthy that some writers pay at least lip service to the humanistic aspect, to the liberating effect of education on the individual and his capacity to choose his path in life. Indeed, the army's own system of training schools is described as seeking "not only that which is its specific professional need but also all that contributes to the total improvement of the student."⁹³

What is involved here seems to be an attempt to acquire for the armed forces, and specifically the army, the favorable image of an institution concerned with cultural development. The same note reappears whether in the informal remarks of a war secretary who goes out of his way to engage university students in discussion and insists that education is national defense, or in the formal address of the director of the army's Center of Higher Studies who defines as the four preeminent objectives of the military, promotion of economic-social development, stimulation of scientific and technical research, strengthening of cultural and spiritual values, and respect for the constitution and legally constituted authority. Taken together these various expressions of military thinking seem to have one overriding aim: to narrow the gap between the army and the community and to overcome the loss of prestige resulting from its role as a political force.⁹⁴

Industry

The Argentine armed forces have been able to acquire a major and, at times, a controlling, voice in the formulation of national policy dealing with those sectors of the economy that relate to their defense missions. In the case of the army, its early interest in munitions manufacture led to the enactment of legislation in 1941 that created the General Directorate of Military Factories (Dirección General de Fabricaciones Militares-DGFM). This agency was given broad responsibility for the exploration and exploitation of industrial ores and for the development of heavy industries either on its own account or through joining with private capital in mixed enterprises.⁹⁵

At present the DGFM operates a series of military factories that supply civil users as well as the military with industrial materials and even with consumer goods. Its most significant enterprise is the integrated steel mill at San Nicolas, which is owned by a mixed entity (Sociedad Mixta Sidurúrgica Argentina-SOMISA). Army generals, however, serving as president and vice-president of the corporation have a dominant say in its management. The DGFM as the representative of army interests is an active participant in all government policy decisions affecting the use of strategic resources or the iron and steel industry.

The navy, although it operates a shipyard of its own, has not gone so far as the army in assuming ownership or control of commercial enterprises. The state-owned merchant fleets, ELMA (Empresa Líneas Marítimas Argentinas) and EFFE (Empresa Flota Fluvial del Estado Argentina), operate under the supervision of the ministry of transportation rather than the navy. Nevertheless, the fact that navy officers (in retired status) hold the principal managerial positions in these enterprises is a guarantee of navy influence.

Of the three military services the air force has the greatest control over the civilian sector that relates to its interests. The formulation of national policies in the commercial

and civil aviation field is a responsibility which it exercises. The principal regulatory agency in this field, the National Bureau of Civil Aviation, is under the secretariat of the air force, and so is Argentina's major domestic and international airline, Aerolineas Argentinas.

The various roles which the armed forces play in industrial development and in the aviation and shipping fields constitute a normal part of Argentine life. It has also become routine to assign officers to positions in nonmilitary government bureaus and agencies. For example, the law governing the Banco de Crédito Industrial, an autonomous state agency, requires that three of its eight directors be appointed by the three service secretaries.⁸ The Illia government to be sure civilianized the public administration more than any of its predecessors. Not a single cabinet or subcabinet position was in the hands of a military man save of course for the armed service ministries, and both the head of the federal police and the governor of the National Territory of Tierra del Fuego were civilians after long years of military incumbency. On the other hand, the military role in the shipping, aviation, and heavy industry fields was left intact.

Banking

It is worth noting moreover that President Illia at the beginning of his term chose a retired admiral to head the Banco de la Nación, the country's oldest and largest public bank; and in what turned out to be his last month in office, he appointed a retired colonel to head the state-owned telephone company. In the first instance the appointment was intended apparently to restore confidence in the bank after its reputation had been damaged by allegations of irregularities under the Frondizi administration. In the second instance the appointment was designed to reduce a wave of criticism against the inefficient and politics-ridden communications enterprise.⁹

Politics

This turning to a military man as a means of assuring the public of honesty or efficiency of administration has not been an isolated phenomenon in Argentine life. Mention has already been made of the practice of entrusting the supervision of national elections to the armed forces. The preference which political parties have shown since the 1940's for military personnel to watch over the polling and counting of the ballots is indicative of course of persisting distrust among the political parties themselves.

In the light of the foregoing paragraphs it is clear that the military presence even under a civilian administration has not been limited to the barracks, ships, and airfields. What then is the political significance of the varied activities in which they have been involved? Is the prominence of the military in the heavy industry and aviation fields evidence that they are a modernizing force in Argentina? Does their role in economic policymaking, in administering state entities, and in supervising elections strengthen their propensity to assume a tutelary role over civilian politics, or are these unrelated to the forces that lead the military to intervene? The answers must be sought in an analysis of the military's concept of their mission and in the history of recent crises.

Argentine military men are not given to writing lengthy treatises on the theory of political intervention, but neither are they content to let events speak for themselves. In manifestos, communiques, speeches and letters, in historical studies, and in occasional books, they discuss and take positions on the right of the armed forces to assume control of the state.

The case for such a right is sometimes based on the premise that the loyalty of the military is not to the person who occupies the presidency but to the constitution and the laws. A forthright statement of this view was given by the late General (Ret.) Urbano de la Vega in a historical work published in 1960. Writing of the decision of an Argentine general to accept the leadership of the civil-military revolution of 1890, he comments:

To accept such a post is not an imputation of disloyalty since all military men know that their promise of sworn loyalty is not to the president of the Republic but to the Constitution and the laws, which ought to begin by not being violated by the president himself; and from the moment that he has violated them, revolution is "an obligation, a right and a duty" in general more costly as regards personnel than leaving wrongs unrighted.⁹⁸

The idea set forth here that a single presidential act can justify military intervention is too simple to find wide acceptance. Yet there are writers, civilian and military, who have argued that such intervention is warranted in a major crisis such as would develop through "attack on the economic interests of the Nation or the effort to change its soul in order to affect its spiritual tradition."

The implications of this interventionist thesis have been examined by General (Ret.) Rattenbach, one of the most thoughtful students of the problem. If the military are to be encouraged to react to major crises, he asks, can they be expected to stand aside in minor ones? Who is to indicate if the crisis is big or small and who is to assume the task of getting a uniform response from officers and men who normally differ politically? Rattenbach does concede that the military cannot remain aloof in truly exceptional situations but he feels these are not likely to occur more than once in a century.⁹⁹

Rattenbach condemns the interventionist thesis and the military pressure groups whom he sees as self-seeking minorities of officers, whose actions can only lead to militarism on the one hand and the decomposition of the armed forces on the other.¹⁰⁰ He does, however, try to spell out the exceptional situation that alone would warrant intervention:

... when the free play of state institutions is incapable of containing disorder and the disruption of the state machinery, when democracy is a fiction, when the basic conditions... no longer exist for the existence of the democratic State, then the military "pressure group" will be temporarily justified in its existence. In this case the armed forces, as the last bulwark of the nationality, will assist the country to emerge from the chaos, impose order and respect for law, and set the normal life of the people in the right track through the route of the Constitution.¹⁰¹

Here, too, one may note the dilemma the author himself pointed out earlier. Who is to judge that the situation is of such a critical nature as he describes, and can it be assumed that all officers will see it in the same light? Or will differences of criteria prevail and therefore produce the internal conflicts within the armed forces that he deplors? If it be argued, and Rattenbach does not go into this, that the decision should rest with the highest military authorities, is this not tantamount to subordinating the president's discretion to that of his military ministers or of the service commanders-in-chief? This is precisely what took place in the Frondizi ouster of March 1962 and the result was not unity but a tragic series of clashes that left the armed forces in disarray.

Underlying and often explicit in the views of all military men who treat the problem of civil-military relations is the belief that the armed forces constitute the ultimate reserve,

the "last bulwark of nationality," to use Rattenbach's phrase. Theirs is the function of safeguarding the highest interests of the nation; on them, to quote Gen. Osiris Villegas, "falls the final responsibility for the preservation of the national spirit against any attempt to enslave it which escapes control of civil groups and of civil opinion."¹⁰²

That the obedience owed by the military to the constitutional authorities is essentially conditional was clearly set forth in 1964 by the then outstanding exponent of military professionalism and legalism, Lt. General Juan Onganía. Speaking at West Point the then army commander-in-chief stated:

Obedience is due a government when its power is derived from the people, and for the people pursues the constitutional precepts set forth by the people. This obedience, in the last instance, is due to the constitution and to the law, and it should never be the result of the mere existence of men or political parties who may be holding office because of fate or circumstances.

It should, therefore, be clear that the duty of rendering such obedience will have ceased being an absolute requirement if there are abuses in the exercise of legal authority that violate the basic principles of a republican system of government, when this is done as a result of exotic ideologies, or when there is a violent breakdown in the balance of independence of the branches of government, or when constitutional prerogatives are used in such a way that they completely cancel out the rights and freedoms of the citizens.¹⁰³

General Onganía went on to argue that under such circumstances the people would regain the right to resist oppression but since they are often unarmed and can't make use of such a right on their own, the power is transferred to those institutions which are authorized to bear arms and which have been given the mission of upholding the constitution.

Onganía's views spelled out what many Argentine officers, regardless of other differences, have held in common: that the military have a special responsibility, a special mission that transcends their obligation to existing authorities. General acceptance of the existence of this special mission, however, has not always meant agreement as to how it should be exercised.

For some officers the logic of this responsibility requires the military to serve as a kind of shadow government that watches over the civil authorities and reserves the right to oppose specific policies or appointments which they deem subversive. Thus, General Toreanzo Montero, army commander-in-chief in the period June 1959-March 1961 affirmed:

The Army is a political institution. Force is in its hands and the State takes it into account for the reason that the State makes politics with the force it has. But what is forbidden is that its members act in different domestic political factions.¹⁰⁴

This blunt claim that physical force entitled the army to political power was immediately denounced by other officers as a violation of constitutional principles, an attack on the very basis of Argentine democracy, and as an invitation to chaos within the armed forces. A leading critic of the Toreanzo position, retired Colonel Manuel Reimundez, accused him of trying to elevate occasional anomalies in army behavior into institutional doctrine.

The Army is indeed force, but that force is not in its hands since it is subordinate to law without which force is inevitably converted

into arbitrariness, tyranny, despotism. Nor do the armed forces share the responsibility of power which the Constitution and the laws grant to other elements of the State, nor do they constitute a parallel power which, possessing force, lend it in greater or lesser degree or simply deny it as they consider convenient.¹⁰⁵

In repudiating the Toreanzo Montero doctrine, however, Reimundez was not taking the position that the army should be inert or indifferent to the course of public events. The army, he wrote, is not

dumb and blind, since the facilities of seeing and discussing are absolutely available to it; the virtue of abnegation and the duty of obedience do not becloud these faculties. But its action is to be adjusted within the framework of constitutional possibilities. That is to say, it must not set itself up as a "power factor" or "pressure group"; simply as a fundamental institution which makes its collaborative voice heard through the medium of the responsible authority with the force that its undeniable hierarchy provides it.¹⁰⁶

Those who shared this restrained view of the appropriate way for the military to exercise its responsibilities were unable to withstand the pressure for ousting President Frondizi precipitated by the Peronist electoral victory in March 1962 and actively supported by various civilian political forces. But in the subsequent months basic differences among the officers produced a series of confrontations culminating in the victory of the constitutionalists, now called the Azules (Blues), over the opposing Colorados (Reds), whose preference for indefinite continuation of military-dominated government reflected the Toreanzo doctrine.

The position of the Azules calling for early return, via elections, to constitutional government was set forth in the now famous Communiqué No. 150 of September 23, 1962. This same document stated their concept of the military's role in politics:

We believe that the armed forces ought not to govern. On the contrary they should be subordinate to the civil power. This does not mean that they should not gravitate in the institutional life. Their role is at once silent and fundamental. They guarantee the constitutional pact which our ancestors bequeathed us and they have the sacred duty of forestalling and containing any totalitarian enterprise which may arise in the country whether from the government or the opposition.¹⁰⁷

Even in a summons to return to civilian government, the claim of the supermission remained intact.

The general election of July 1963, followed by the inauguration in October of the Illia administration, restored constitutional government to Argentina and opened a new if brief chapter in the military's political role. Under the leadership of Azulist officers, the armed forces in general and the army in particular, acted in a restrained manner for about two years. This is not to say that their relations with the civil authority were without incident or that the policies of the latter aroused enthusiasm in military circles, but at least there was no disposition on their part to harass the administration and it was spared the periodic demands and threats that punctuated the Frondizi presidency. Indeed, the military were careful to avoid the impression that they desired to exercise political authority or to participate in any extra-constitutional fashion in the policymaking process.¹⁰⁸

The relative calm that characterized the Illia government's relations with the military, however, began to deteriorate noticeably in its third year in office. A significant development was the resignation of Lt. General Juan Onganía as army commander-in-chief in November 1965. This was a symptom of the increasing alienation of the military and of an irreversible tendency that culminated on June 28 when the commanders of the army, navy, and air force constituting themselves as a military junta deposed President Illia, dissolved all elected bodies, and named General Onganía as president with full powers, both legislative and executive.

How can the action of the military be explained? Why should the very officers who in 1962 and 1963 insisted on the restoration of civilian government, who took up arms against fellow officers committed to military dictatorship, now turn against the constitutional authority? In 1964 a political observer had postulated five circumstances that might lead the military to take over: the return of Perón; the expansion of Communist guerrilla activity beyond the limits of security; a government attempt to break the existing command structure; economic or social chaos; and the transformation of the government into an oppressive regime.¹⁰³ The deterioration of relations with the military occurred, however, without any of these circumstances materializing. There was no immediate crisis of an economic, social, or political nature apart from that derived from the alienation of the military to justify their action in June 1966.

The explanation for their action, it would seem, must be sought in a complex of considerations of a medium and long term nature. In the former category was their desire to anticipate the crisis that the 1967 gubernatorial and congressional elections were likely to bring, and thus avoid a repetition of what took place in 1962 when a Peronist victory was followed by the ouster of Frondizi and the nullification of the results. If the armed forces had to take power it was preferable to do so under circumstances that did not place them in the position of depriving Peronists of the fruits of an electoral victory. But this was only one consideration underlying their decision. More important perhaps was their belief that only a government that owed nothing to the political parties could overcome the Peronist-anti-Peronist political dichotomy and that only such a government could make the hard decisions essential to overcoming the syndrome of chronic budgetary deficits, inflation, and economic stagnation that had characterized the country for the past decade and a half. Having claimed in the past a share in the task of promoting economic development, the military, with what may prove to be a grave miscalculation of the difficulties, have taken on themselves the complete responsibility for its achievement. A transformed Argentina, and not a temporary holding of power, appears to be their goal. But whether they have the requisite capacity as well as the determination to overcome the forces that have served hitherto to foster political divisiveness, produce social tensions, and obstruct economic growth, remains for the future to reveal.

NOTES

THE MILITARY INSTITUTION

1. Col. Augusto G. Rodríguez, Reseña histórica del ejército argentino (1862-1930) (Buenos Aires, 1964), pp. 13-17. It was only in 1880 under Law 1072 that the provinces were forbidden to maintain military establishments.
2. Rodríguez, Reseña, pp. 89-92, 125-126.
3. For references to military attitudes in the period 1905-1912, see Ricardo Caballero, Yrigoyen, la conspiración civil y militar del 4 de febrero de 1905 (Buenos Aires, 1951), passim.
4. The most authoritative account is Gen. José María Sarobe's Memorias sobre la revolución del 6 de septiembre de 1930 (Buenos Aires, 1957).
5. Carlos A. Florit, Las fuerzas armadas y la guerra psicológica (Buenos Aires, 1963), p. 64.
6. Cf. Florit, Las fuerzas, p. 57ff. for a discussion of the manipulation of a military minority by civilian groups.
7. For a survey of the state of public opinion on the eve of the 1966 military takeover, see "Argentina: ¿Quiénes (sí - no) quieren el golpe?" Primera Plana, Vol. IV, No. 183 (June 28-July 4, 1966), pp. 16-20.
8. All quotations from the Argentine constitution are taken from the English language edition published by the Pan American Union in 1960.
9. Reglamento Servicio Interno, No. 2, reproduced in General Order No. 2, published in La Nación, May 12, 1962.
10. See Chapter 2 of the Law for Military Personnel (Law 14,777, enacted in 1958). The texts of all laws and decrees cited in this chapter may be found in Anales de legislación argentina, 1941-1964, 24 vols. (Buenos Aires, 1942-1965).
11. Law 14,777, article 8.
12. Ibid., article 7.
13. Ibid., article 7, paragraph 6.
14. Cf. Law 13,996, enacted in 1950, article 5, paragraph 6, and article 54, paragraph 5, also Law 14,777, article 9.
15. Decree-Law 12,530 (issued November 19, 1962), articles 12 (2) (c), and 15.
16. Organization of the Ministries of the National Executive Power (Law 14,439, issued July 1958, articles 1-7, 13).
17. Ibid., articles 25-27.

18. President Illia departed from this custom in November 1965 in appointing a brigadier general on active duty as secretary of war, a fact which contributed directly to the resignation of the then Commander-in-Chief Lt. General Juan Onganía.

19. Remarks of Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Benjamin Rattenbach, published in La nación (international edition), October 29, 1962, p. 5.

20. The ouster of President Illia by a junta consisting of the three service commanders is a clear illustration.

21. The 1965 budget allocated 24,913 positions to the federal police.

22. Published military strength figures vary with the source and should be regarded as approximations. Before World War II the Argentine budget furnished such data but the practice was then suspended. A rare exception was the 1950 budget that placed army strength at 104,000. For other strength estimates for the early 1950's see the annual issues of Statesman's Yearbook (New York, 1864-).

23. The Europa Yearbook, 1964, 2 vols. (London, 1964), Vol. II, p. 21. Somewhat lower figures are given for the navy in the Statesman's Yearbook, 1964-1965. In view of the expansion of navy manpower after Perón's ouster, it is possible that the figures given in both these sources err on the conservative side.

24. Laws 4031 and 4707 of 1901 and 1905 laid down the bases of the system.

25. See sources cited in note 23.

26. This was the pattern followed in the early 1960's. See La prensa, September 19, 1959 for a typical schedule of induction and release dates.

27. See La nación (international edition), March 28, 1966, p. 3 for the application of this system in the III Brigade area. Elsewhere conscripts were to be inducted in stages over a three month period. La nación (international edition), January 17, 1966.

28. The daily press, especially La prensa and La nación as well as news magazines, regularly publishes information on the location of military units. This paragraph and the following one are based on such data.

29. See Bonifacio del Carrío, Crónica interna de la revolución libertadora (Buenos Aires, 1959), and Luis Ernesto Lonardi, Dios es justo (Buenos Aires, 1958).

30. Primera Plana, No. 108 (December 1, 1964), p. 8.

31. Compare Carlos Fuentes, et al., Whither Latin America (New York, 1963), p. 18, with The Europa Yearbook 1964, Vol. II, p. 21.

32. On this basis in December 1964 the then Secretary of War Avalos claimed that defense outlays constituted 12.3 percent whereas education received 13.6 percent of overall expenditures for the 1964/1965 fiscal year. La prensa, December 2, 1964.

33. See the weekly column "La Semana Política" published in La nación (international edition), January 6, 1964 for statistics on line officers.

34. Decree 11,321 of November 21, 1952.

35. See note 33 for the 1964 figure. The 1951 and 1961 figures come from Secretaría de Guerra, Dirección General del Personal, "Nomina de los S. S. Generales que se encontraban en actividad en el año 1936, 1941, 1946, 1951, 1956, 1961," MSS. in possession of José de Imaz of Buenos Aires. I am especially indebted to Professor Imaz for generously allowing me to make photocopies of these charts which were especially prepared for him by army authorities. A summary of the data included in the charts appears in Imaz' valuable study, Los que mandan (Buenos Aires, 1964), pp. 52ff.

36. Law 14,777, article 27.
37. Secretaría de Guerra, "Nomina"; Secretaría de Guerra, Comando de Institutos Militares, Colegio Militar de la Nación (Buenos Aires, 1965), p. 37.
38. Ibid., pp. 37-38.
39. Ministerio de Guerra, Digesto de Guerra. Leyes, reglamentos, decretos y disposiciones militares. . . dictados hasta el 1º de Octubre de 1909. (Buenos Aires, 1909).
40. Prior to 1930 a small number of Argentine Jews did attend the Colegio Militar and were commissioned as officers; in recent years the only non-Catholic cadets have been one or two exchanges from the United States.
41. I am indebted to Gen. Juan C. Marchi and the staff of the Colegio Militar for furnishing me with the statistics quoted in this and the following paragraphs.
42. Cf. Imaz, Los que mandan, pp. 58-59 and notes.
43. La prensa of December 2, 1964, p. 10, reported Secretary of War General Avalos as stating that a large percentage of senior officers came from low economic levels.
44. Quoted phrases are taken from semi-official statements on the Colegio Militar published in the Revista universitaria, Vol. IV, No. 61 (1935), p. 155 and the Revista militar, No. 656 (1960), pp. 365-368.
45. Ministerio de Guerra, Digesto de guerra, p. 88; Revista universitaria, Vol. VI, No. 61 (1935), pp. 151-153.
46. The data for this and the following paragraph are taken from a twelve-page report prepared by the authorities of the Colegio Militar in July 1965 at the request of the author and entitled "Informe Sobre el Plan de Enseñanza." This report sets forth in detail the philosophy, curriculum, and educational goals of the Colegio Militar.
47. Ibid.
48. The entire enrollment at the Colegio Militar in 1965 was only 818. During the Perón era the cadet student body reached 1369 in 1950, but in general it has run between 600 and 850. The graduating class in 1964 numbered 132 which is comparable to the size of graduating classes in the decade before Perón.
49. "Escuela Superior de Guerra," Revista universitaria, Vol. VI, No. 61 (1935), pp. 135-138; also Revista militar, No. 656 (1960), p. 370.
50. Based on information supplied by the Director of the Centro de Altos Estudios and the Escuela Superior de Guerra.
51. "La Escuela Superior Tecnica del Ejército," Revista universitaria, Vol. VI, No. 61 (1935), pp. 127-234; for Savio's ideas see his "Bases para la industria del acero en la Republica Argentina," Revista militar, No. 501 (1942), pp. 701-717.
52. Revista militar, No. 656 (1960), p. 372.
53. Secretaría de Guerra. Comando de Institutos Militares. Centro de Altos Estudios, Curso de Coroneles. Materias, Cursos y Seminarios (Buenos Aires, 1965).
54. Law 14,777, article 44 and annex 1.
55. Decree 20,493 of October 12, 1951. Reglamentación para el Ejército de la Ley No. 13,996 "Ley para el Personal Militar," I Parte "Cuadros Permanentes y Reserva," art. 47 as amended.

56. Cf. article 65 of Law 9675 of 1915; article 126 of Decree 29,375 of 1944; article 74 of Law 13,996 of 1950; article 46 of Law 14,777 of 1958.

57. Articles 47 and 67 of Law 14,777 of 1958. Promotion procedures are spelled out in detail in the Reglamentación para el ejército de la Ley No. 14,777, Tomo II: "Reclutamiento y Ascensos" issued by the Secretariat of War in 1962.

58. See Law 14,135 of 1952; Decree 13,641 of 1946 as amended by Law 14,308 of 1965.

59. Article 32 of Law 11,821 of 1934; Decree 13,641 of 1946.

60. Articles 61-80, Law 14,777.

61. Ibid., especially articles 69, 73, 74.

62. Ibid., article 76, paragraph 1a and article 79.

63. Ibid., article 76, para. 2 and 3.

64. Congreso Nacional, Diario de Sesiones de la Cámara de Diputados Año 1940, Vol. V, p. 98.

65. The number of retired officers serving on corporate boards has been variously estimated. According to the unsupported statement of Rogelio García Lupo, La rebelión de los generales (Buenos Aires, 1962), p. 92, some 200 generals, admirals, and air force brigadiers are so employed, generally in U.S.-owned enterprises. However, the present writer was only able to identify some 60 retired officers serving as corporation directors or officials in the more than 6000 corporations listed in the "Guía de Sociedades Anónimas," Anuario Kraft Edición 1962-63 (Buenos Aires, 1963), Vol. I, pp. 1-167.

THE MILITARY OUTLOOK

66. An example of military writings advocating the theory of revolutionary war is Gen. Osiris G. Villegas, Guerra revolucionaria comunista (Buenos Aires, 1963).

67. See Lt. Col. (Ret.) Mario Orsolini, La crisis del ejército (Buenos Aires, 1964).

68. Remarks of Gen. (Ret.) Ignacio Avalos to a university student group in La prensa, December 2, 1964.

69. Brig. Gen. Juan E. Guglielmelli, "Iniciación de los cursos de 1965 en la Escuela Superior de Guerra y Centro de Altos Estudios," Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra, Vol. XLIII, No. 358 (March-April 1965), p. 8. (Hereafter referred to as Revista ESG).

70. The changed viewpoint is best illustrated in the thought of Lt. Col. (Ret.) Mario Orsolini. Cf. his Ejército Argentino y crecimiento nacional (Buenos Aires, 1965).

71. Message of the Revolutionary Junta to the Argentine People, June 28, 1966 reproduced in La nación (international edition), July 4, 1966, p. 8.

72. Primera Plana, No. 86 (June 30, 1964), p. 22.

73. Ezequiel Martínez Estrada, Radiografía de la pampa, 5th ed. (Buenos Aires, 1961), pp. 273-276.

74. Quoted from Castellani's epilogue to Marcelo Sánchez Sorondo, La revolución que anunciamos (Buenos Aires, 1945), p. 279.

75. "La Semana Política," La nación (international edition), February 8, 1965.

76. Jorge Abelardo Ramos, Historia política del ejército argentino (Buenos Aires, 1959), passim.
77. Rodolfo Ghioldi, "Argentine Militarists in the Service of Reaction," World Marxist Review, Vol. VI (March 1963), pp. 9-14.
78. Information obtained from interviews with active and retired officers in 1962 and 1963.
79. Col. (Ret.) Roque Lanus, "Logias en el ejército argentino en el siglo xix," La prensa, July 1, 1950.
80. Juan V. Orona, La logia militar que enfrentó a Hipólito Yrigoyen (Buenos Aires, 1965).
81. La nación, May 22, 1952, p. 2; García Lupo, La rebelión, p. 61.
82. For a journalistic description of these logias, see the news magazine Usted, November 12, 1960, April 11, 18, 25, 1961; also García Lupo, La rebelión, pp. 62-63. For a skeptical view, doubting the existence of these logias, see "Las Logias Militares," Confirmado, No. 5 (June 25, 1965), pp. 12-13.
83. The political divergencies were reflected in the initial proclamation drawn up to explain the military movement of June 4, 1943. See G. G. Levene, Historia Argentina, 3 vols. (Buenos Aires, 1964), Vol. III, p. 253.
84. An example is the late Col. Urbano de la Vega who participated in nationalist revolutionary plots in 1936 and 1941, was a founding member of the G.O. U. in 1943, and a member of the anti-Peronist Logia Sol de Mayo in 1952.
85. The aims of the Colorados and the identity of their civilian supporters were well revealed in their abortive revolt of April 2, 1963. For a journalistic account of this movement see Primera Plana, No. 22 (April 9, 1963), pp. 2-8; for UCRP ties to the Colorados see La nación (international edition), November 2, 1964, p. 3.
86. Carlos Florit, Las fuerzas armadas y la guerra psicológica (Buenos Aires, 1963), pp. 62-63. Orsolini, La crisis, pp. 51-53.
87. Evidence of this attitude is seen in the willingness of the Argentine navy to sign a contingent agreement providing for cooperation. See Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers 1942 (Washington, 1962), Vol. V, pp. 381-382.
88. A reflection of this dualistic outlook is seen in the speech of the Director of the Superior War School, General Guglielmelli, cited above in note 69. Referring to Argentina's special role in the southern cone, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, Chile, and Argentina, he stated: "Confrontations belong to the past. The Southern Cone, with a common policy, is not only from the military viewpoint an improvement in the system of security but a counterpoise to the great power of the North, but associated with it in the achievement of a world of peace, progress and liberty." "Iniciacion de los cursos de 1965," p. 7.
89. For an attack on deficit-ridden state-run enterprises as a contributing factor to economic stagnation and an obstacle to economic growth see Orsolini's Ejército, pp. 205-213. This work foreshadowed the Onganía policy. Cf. the official release, "Políticas del Gobierno Nacional" published in La nación (international edition), July 18, 1966.
90. La prensa, December 2, 1964. Recognition of this concern was given by the Illia government in designating the secretary of war as one of eight members of the National Literacy Commission created to stamp out illiteracy and resolve shortage of school buildings. La nación (international edition), November 9, 1964.

91. "La obra del ejército," Revista ESG, Vol. XLII, No. 352 (January-March 1964), p. 80.
92. Ibid., pp. 78-80; Decree 14,538 of June 3, 1944; Maj. Ricardo Maraimbo, "Hacia la autarquía industrial," Revista Militar, No. 447 (April 1938), pp. 861-878; Lt. Col. Franklin Reyes, "El primer congreso de la población y los problemas demográfico-militares," Revista militar, No. 491 (December 1941), pp. 1279-1302.
93. "La obra del ejército," pp. 76-77.
94. La prensa, December 2, 1964; Revista ESG, Vol. XLII, No. 352 (January-March 1964), p. 158.
95. Law 12,709 of 1941.
96. Decree 6325 of 1953.
97. Rear Adm. (Ret.) Lorenzo J. Arufe, appointed to head the bank, had been the leading investigator into the alleged irregularities; for Colonel (Ret.) Eppens' appointment to head the Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones and its significance, see La nación (international edition), June 13, 1966, pp. 2, 5.
98. Urbano de la Vega, El General Mitre (Buenos Aires, 1960), p. 407. He had been an active conspirator himself at various times from the 1930's to the 1950's.
99. Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Benjamin Rattenbach, Sociología Militar (Buenos Aires, 1959), pp. 128-129.
100. Ibid., pp. 155-158.
101. Ibid., p. 159.
102. Villegas, Guerra, p. 180.
103. "The Government, the Armed Forces, and the National Community," address delivered by Lt. Gen. Juan Carlos Onganía at West Point, August 6, 1964.
104. La nación, January 10, 1962.
105. La nación, January 19, 1962.
106. Ibid.
107. La nación, September 24, 1962.
108. See Mariano Grondona, "Las respuestas de Onganía," Primera Plana, No. 96 (September 8, 1964), p. 5.
109. Ibid.

CHAPTER 4

COLOMBIA

by Anthony P. Maingot

THE PROBLEM

The young captain of the Colombian army who asked the author to flag the taxi they were to take because "they do not like to stop for men in uniform"¹ was showing none of the arrogance and haughtiness usually associated with the behavior of the Latin American officer. It soon became clear that that young captain's behavior reflected one of the great paradoxes of contemporary civil-military relations in Colombia: the increasingly important role of the military institution within the social and political system accompanied by great insecurity and relatively low occupational and social status of individual military men.

During his months of research in Colombia, the author had a distinct feeling that most of the officers he knew and/or interviewed showed definite signs of this anxiety and uncertainty concerning their career in terms of advancement, remuneration, and more so about retirement and entry into the civilian market place. They showed even greater uncertainty concerning their social status.²

This is not to say that the Colombian military appear to have ever before enjoyed a higher status or a more stable and self-confident image of themselves. On the contrary, the situation is probably better now than it ever has been. The Colombian stereotype of the military man is best portrayed by Antonio García who, in his short story entitled "Servicio militar," depicts the protagonist wandering aimlessly through the city seeking employment after his military service and encountering nothing but ingratitude and contempt among the civilians he has to beseech for work. "I am stupid. Everyone will notice that I am stupid," the young man keeps repeating, realizing the hopelessness of it all. "Felix Balata," says Antonio García, "had been educated in the cuarteles for something else. Now, confronted with life, in the face of reality, he is impotent."³

That the situation of the soldier, put in literary form by García, also affects the officer, is confirmed by the 2,213 pages of testimony at the trial of ex-President General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla before congress in which Rojas, a graduate civil engineer, finds himself time and time again compelled to demonstrate that he is not the illiterate he was being held to be and

... to answer those charges of the press that the military, regardless of what rank, are all crude sergeants (sargentones chafarotes) who barely know how to read and write.⁴

It was because this low status and negative civilian image of the military were realities that another general of significance in recent Colombian history, the ex-Minister of War, Rufz Novoa, could claim with some justification that the second greatest accomplishment of his

command had been "the implantation of a new institutional conscience with which to bring the Armed Forces out of the state of political, social and intellectual prostration in which they have traditionally been kept."⁵

This prostration was evidenced in the manner of inferiority with which officers and noncommissioned officers were treated; they were called "chafarotes" and were considered ignorant failures.⁶

Or perhaps this attitude, predominant in educated urban sectors, is best reflected in the sarcastic comment of the wife of an ex-president that she "would like to be appointed Minister of War,"⁷ a comment made at the height of military dissatisfaction over what some officers considered disrespectful treatment. It is difficult to equate this attitude with the commonly held theoretical notions of corporate pundonor and dignidad attributed to military structures in Spain and Latin America.

Contrary to the generalized view of an all-powerful military structure and the haughty, self-contained military man, the author received the impression of a military which was subordinate as a group and apparently submissive as individuals to the civilian elite of Colombia.⁸ The problem then becomes one of defining an unclear status. More important than the matter of describing that status is that of asking the "why" question. What were the causes which led to the present pattern of Colombian civil-military relations?

The explicit framework utilized in this case study is clearly stated so that in a sense the study becomes a test of the framework. An individual's status is the position he enjoys in the social structure. The contention here is that in Colombia the status of an individual or group is determined by what Max Weber calls "a specific, positive or negative, social estimation of honor" or social prestige. Weber calls this the individual's "social status" or "status situation." He notes that society is stratified primarily on the basis of the "style of life" that is developed, particularly the type of occupation pursued; secondly, on the basis of inherited charisma, which arises from the successful claim to a position of prestige by virtue of birth; and finally, on the basis of the appropriation of political or hierocratic authority as a monopoly of socially distinct groups.⁹

The explanation which this study advances is that Colombia began its history as a nation with a weak and socially discredited military institution, and that given the nature of Colombia's political culture and social structure, that initial position endured.¹⁰ Although the continuity of this essential pattern of low status on the part of the military has shown outward signs of change and perhaps can even be shown to have changed somewhat in certain sectors due to the military's public relations efforts during the Ruiz Novoa period, there are signs that the unfavorable image of the military still endures and is constantly reinforced by a social structure and political culture which themselves show more signs of continuity than change.

This study is a search for the historical antecedents of contemporary civil-military relations. The sociological assumption on which it is based is that the manner in which the early problems of nationhood were solved did to a large extent determine not only the history of political institutions, but also the society's particular pattern of orientation to political actions,¹¹ herein referred to as the society's political culture. The manner in which the early problems of nationhood were solved thus becomes a matter of serious enquiry. Were they solved incrementally or by salient crises (wars, revolution)? "While incremental problem solving has an important effect on political beliefs," writes Verba, "it is the salient crises that are most likely to form a people's political memory."¹²

THE SOCIAL SYSTEM: ITS POLITICAL CULTURE

Instances of violence are possible in any society. Even in societies such as that of the United States where consensus and compromise have become part of the social process there is still the possibility of intensely violent outbursts like that which occurred in Watts, California, in 1965. In Latin America early interpretations of the violent tradition in politics are not lacking, and the interest of contemporary social science in the phenomenon continues unabated.

Violence as an occurrence in time and space does not necessarily reflect the nature of the social processes of a given people. It might simply be a reflection of a temporary breakdown in communications or a misunderstanding of the pliability of the spheres of vital interests beyond which consensus is no longer possible. Even the sociologist must admit to the possibility of such "unique" events. The concern here, however, is with the recurrent; that is, the particular way in which a people characteristically respond to given situations.

In Colombia, men have tended to act out certain roles in a more conflictive manner than others. The political process, especially during the nineteenth century, was characterized by conflict rather than consensus. The issues dividing society can largely be summarized in the changes in the constitutional framework of the system. Table 13 provides a quick overview of the history of conflict.

TABLE 13
MAJOR ISSUES³ AND CIVIL WARS⁴ IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Major Constitutional Revisions	National Civil Wars	Number of Deaths	Local Conflicts	Number of Conflicts	Number of Deaths
	1810	211,000	Cartegena	-	202
1811	1812	915	Cauca	5	866
	1814	309	Antioquia	5	1,312
1821	1830-31	2,200	Bolivar	5	530
1830	1839-41	3,400	Magdalena	6	777
1832	1851	1,000	Santander	2	998
1843	1854	4,000	Cundinamarca	6	201
1853	1860-62	6,000	Tolima	3	133
1859	1876-77	9,000	Boyaca	5	198
1863	1895	3,000	Panamá	15	1,104
1896	1895	2,000			
	1899-1902	150,000			

To a large extent the form which conflict has taken in the twentieth century has been influenced by the political violence of the preceding century, since the way in which the major national problems were solved, or at least confronted, had a strong influence on the shaping of the political culture. The form that conflict takes within a given society will also be a function of the type of social structure within which the process takes place.¹⁵ When there are multiple memberships in different groups, conflicts tend to be varied. Concentration of focus and of allegiance and commitment to a particular group, which claims that these allegiances be complete and unconditional, is avoided. This variety of membership is possible only in "open" societies with diversified social structures.

Colombia was not and is not today characterized by such an "open" social structure. One can hardly generalize about "Colombian society" as a whole, since the social structural realities of a city such as Popayán will differ considerably from those of Medellín in Antioquia. Then, too, the rapid rate of urbanization is no doubt eroding some traditional forms of behavior and social relationships, creating an ever-increasing urban culture complex distinct from the rural one. Nevertheless, the conclusion of the Misión "Economía y Humanismo" in 1958, that "Colombian society taken as a whole still appears more as a society of castes than as a society of classes," can still be defended.¹⁶ But one must realize that in a country with the difficult geography and peculiar demographic patterns of Colombia, there is not to be found one caste or even a few. Rather, the pattern is that of a horizontally stratified two-class system. In different areas, most of them difficult of access, there exist a small upper class with caste-like tendencies (though not completely impermeable) and a large lower class. An essentially amorphous middle "sector" is located somewhere in the wide span between the two clearly defined classes. This middle sector is growing rapidly in urban areas.¹⁷

The critical point to be made here is that although there certainly is not one homogeneous caste, much less an "oligarchy," there is an oligarchical or caste-like form of behavior, the standards of which are set by the dominant class. A significant study concludes that in Popayán, Colombia, the upper class controls the power, establishes the particular way of life, and sets the pattern of behavior.¹⁸ In other words, these classes serve as the "reference groups" of the society. Their values and attitudes show strong cultural persistence despite structural changes as, for example, in the economic sphere. Their survival is due largely to the role played by the family and the educational system in transmitting them to the society as a whole.¹⁹

How the socialization process of the youth transmits and perpetuates the political culture is clearly demonstrated by the following autobiographical note:

Our [Liberal] generation (1880-1900) was educated in this manner: At home, the Liberal mystique, exaggerated by the recent defeats; at school, the corrupting influence of mixing politics and religion, which teachers and professors, more ignorant than perverse, knew how to administer, whether to be able to survive or to support a [Conservative] regime which was initiated through fraud, deceit and ignorance. The result of such an education could not help but be a product of battle: combative, rebellious, anxious for liberty, for truth, for dignity.²⁰

In a political system where the foundations for the establishment of legitimacy were never laid, the opposing party could be conceived as holding power only through fraud. The only "worthy," "dignified," or "honorable" posture in that case is to see that the "usurpation" is stopped by force if necessary.

There are indications that a closer scrutiny of political party organization in the nineteenth century and into the twentieth would demonstrate that much emphasis was placed on the military preparedness of those parties, whether based on the hopes of winning power through force of arms or the projection of aggression onto the opposition.

Colombia is one of the few Latin American countries that developed a two-party system with each party having a strong philosophical undercurrent.²¹ Whether the issue was regionalism versus centralism, or church versus state control over education, cemeteries, and matrimony, the two parties had both ideas as well as traditions that outlasted the caudillos who espoused them. Politics was dominated by civilian factions which, although they might not have formed a homogenous oligarchy, did set standards of behavior and criteria for membership which were oligarchic in nature. Political behavior was not primarily personalistic; even such towering figures as Tomás Cipriano de Mosquera could not impose his will on congress or the ruling groups. When a "military" caudillo—and because of the regional groupings of population there were many—took political action, with very few exceptions he did so in the name of one or the other political party. No leader or third party has successfully challenged the two traditional parties, although there have been splinter groups in each.

The party demanded an individual's total commitment and allegiance. Membership in a Colombian party, with time and the sedimentation of traditions and family links, became an all-encompassing allegiance permeating all facets of an individual's life, his vereda's and often his municipio's whole existence. The boundaries between political and nonpolitical roles became blurred and confused. And yet, membership did not mean participation or reciprocity. Robert H. Dix's analysis deserves attention here:

Actually, the signal characteristic of Colombian politics, and of its system of parties, has been precisely that it has worked to exclude most Colombian citizens from the exercise of any substantial political influence, including any real share in the selection of their political leadership.

The structure of Colombian society in itself helps to assure this exclusion of the majority. Intimately related to the pattern of social power, the political system works to the same end.²²

The parties have served as instruments of domination rather than means of political expression. Instead of accommodating or providing the mechanism for compromise and settlements of hatreds and resentments built up in a social structure such as that of Colombia, they have actually served to exacerbate and intensify such conflicts by acting as instruments not of caudillos, but of powerful groups. This has taken place on the grass-roots level, where the cacique or gamonal operated, as well as in the top strata of the society where groups with equal socioeconomic status split along party lines and, along with them, their entire families, farm laborers, or whomever might be under their power and influence.

Given this tradition, where political affiliation and allegiance were passed on with the first milk, Colombian society could not peacefully accommodate the major issues of the nineteenth century or the twentieth century which were dominated by two radical changes of power after long periods of hegemony by one party or the other. The violence that resulted from the Liberal assumption of power in 1930 found some sort of "escape valve" or relief in the "war" with Peru soon after. The nation's attention was directed thereto and a veritable wave of patriotism briefly, but mercifully, swept the nation. After the 1946 change to Conservative rule and the 1948 assassination of the popular leader, Jorge Elfeceer Gaitán, the Korean War was too distant to have the same "escape valve" effect and the violence reached proportions

which defy description. Since 1948 Colombians have lived with a total or partial state of siege. Recourse to Article 121 of the constitution (state of siege power) has become something of a functional necessity of the system.

With no membership other than in a political party and in a religious institution, which in most cases were themselves identified with a particular party, the Colombian was caught in a snowballing mode of behavior from which there seemed no escape.²³

Although apparently the period of large-scale violence has ended, there is considerable apprehension about the future in many of the areas which were hardest hit. During a study tour of areas of past violence in the Quindío, this author repeatedly asked military and civilians alike if it could happen again once the military surveillance is removed. The latter were more emphatic than the former, but invariably the answer from both was "Yes, it could happen again." With the massive migration to the city as a result both of the rising standards of living and the displacement from rural areas due to the violence, the city also shows indications of becoming an area where conflict, finding no other outlet, will generate violent forms of behavior.

One of the striking features of the Colombian political system and its attendant political culture is the fact that although in the past there has been a tremendous dichotomy of political party affiliations and loyalties, today this dichotomy is showing definite signs of erosion, a trend apparent in the attitudes of the university students²⁴ and the electorate.²⁵ The increasing strength among the dispossessed urban classes of such movements as ex-dictator Rojas Pinilla's ANAPO, a party whose campaigns and political behavior are characterized by their bellicose and aggressive nature, could be an indication of new forms of political affiliation and networks of personal loyalties based on the realities of the "subculture" of poverty which now characterizes both the rural and the urban sectors. There is something suggestive about the findings of the Belgian-trained sociologist, Rev. Camilo Torres, which show two different types of responses to similar words or concepts:²⁶

TABLE 14
CLASS RESPONSES TO CONCEPTS

<u>Expression</u>	<u>Meaning for the Upper Class</u>	<u>Meaning for the Lower Class</u>
Oligarchy	Insult	Privilege
Violence	Banditry	Nonconformism
Pressure groups	Select caste	Exploiters
Revolution	Immoral subversion	Constructive change
Agrarian reform	Unwarranted expropriation	Acquisition of land by the poor
Political parties	Democratic political groups	Oligarchies
Church	Institution for order	Reactionary force
Army	Feared and utilizable force	Violence
Pacification	Elimination of delinquents	Death of guerrillas

Within this context of a past history of violence, of yet undetermined forms of political legitimacy and of signs of new forms of conflict developing in the society, the role of the military takes on increased importance. How are the military, being an integral and especially a subordinate part of the system, affected by that psychological orientation toward politics called the political culture of conflict?

In 1934, Tomás Rueda Vargas, who had been one of the few deviants from the Colombian intellectual tendency to be critical of the military, wrote one of his last pieces on that institution. "The old concept of confidence as applied to the officer corps," he stated, "has been transformed, but has not disappeared. Despite the glittering appearances it lives, prospers and tends to eternalize itself not without causing serious prejudice to the state."²¹ By "confidence" Rueda Vargas meant that military leaders were selected from men who showed allegiance either to the president of the republic or, at least, to the political party in power. This, as we shall see, has traditionally been the case in Colombia and, according to Rueda Vargas, continued to be so in 1934. But, he asked, if the social and political conditions, which formerly made such bonds of allegiance seem necessary, not to mention politically logical, no longer existed, why did this tradition continue? Had not Colombia after all enjoyed a twenty-year or more stretch of uninterrupted democracy? Had not the army respected the transition from a Conservative hegemony to Liberal rule in 1930? And was it not true, he continued, that the Liberal government of Olaya Herrera and its minister of war had so far given no indication of attempts at political manipulation within the army? Why then was there so much apparent discontent and apprehension? Every time there was a routine change of command it was sufficient cause for a long series of rumors. "So and so is a godo"; "so and so is a Liberal"; "so and so is really a godo in disguise"; "there are so many Liberals among the captains, so many among the lieutenants," etc. In addition, noted Rueda Vargas, officers he had once known as piously practicing Catholics were now, since the Liberal victory, joining the Masonic lodge, following the example of the main political leaders of the Liberal Party. The only explanation that this concerned intellectual could give was that "the principle of neutrality that we Republicans proclaimed in 1910 was either not understood or else has today been prostituted."²²

It did not occur to Rueda Vargas, however, to ask whether "neutrality" was indeed possible as a form of political behavior given the political culture of the society. To put it differently, was a neutral role possible given the status of the military in Colombian society? Without realizing it Rueda Vargas provided an answer to this broader question when he explained the particular motivations which seemed to be activating the individual officer:

The discontent among the officers consists in the fear that the pendulum in personnel and advancement could shift at any given moment to the question of political party, and this fear has been accentuated recently.²³

Fear is the key word here, a fear stemming from unpredictability and unpredictability stemming largely from a subordinate status in a highly hierarchical society with a political culture stressing intensely conflictive competition at all levels, from the level of the campesino entering a tienda to that of political parties preparing for a campaign. An astute American observer, writing early in the century and having used the term "chronic instability" to describe Colombian politics, attempted to explain that what he meant was not that there had been many successful revolutions (read coups d'état), "because there had not," but that "there has been, however, chronic fear of revolution with all its paralysis."²⁴

It would seem logical that as an institution which monopolizes the means of violence, the military would play a fundamental role in a political system characterized by such a political

culture. This would especially be so if the standard interpretations of the role of the military in nineteenth century Colombia were to be considered as valid. These interpretations see the military as emerging with a reinforced social and political status and position of power from the Wars for Independence to become nearly omnipotent throughout the nineteenth century. The reality, however, seems to have been otherwise.

THE MILITARY SYSTEM

Historical Antecedents

The role of the military in Colombian politics can be said to have begun in 1810. Criollo patriots won over the allegiance of key officers of the Auxiliary Battalion, in the Santa Fé (Bogotá) garrison, guaranteeing thereby the safety of the assembly which went on to establish the foundations for nationhood on July 20th.³¹ The behavior of the military at this time can partly be explained by reference to the social composition of the officer corps. Oswaldo Díaz Díaz notes that the "renovating breeze of the revolution" had penetrated the ranks of the military, but also tells us that "one of the companies of the Auxiliary was commanded by don Antonio Baraya, a creole of reknowned adherence to the movement and brother of doña Josefa Baraya de Santamaría, an ardent Patriot."³² But if the peculiarities of Colombian social structure had been instrumental in providing the motivation for the behavior of creoles against the Spanish authority, factors in this same unchanged social structure provided many of the conditions motivating the behavior of the upper class against the government of first President Antonio Nariño, and the betrayal of Nariño by three of his military leaders.³³

The centralist-federalist war that began with the first dawn of nationhood, and which led to the collapse of the so-called Patria Boba, was the first of a series which indicated that the threads of legitimacy keeping the colonial political system together were broken before substitute channels of national problem-solving could be constructed. It also pointed to the fact that, despite the small number of actual participants in the political system, the hatreds and distrusts engendered by social, regional, economic, and philosophical cleavages within this sector were intense enough to inhibit peaceful settlements of differences. The early stages of nationhood indicate this rather clearly; the outlines of a distinct political culture were already becoming visible.

The pattern of civil-military relations, as opposed to the general political culture established during the period of the Patria Boba, does not seem to have survived beyond that 1810-1816 stage. There are three factors pointing to this conclusion: first, there is the strictly generational fact that many of the original patriots forming the civil and military backbone of this first movement were killed off either during the civil war or by the "pacification" of the reconquering Morillo in 1816. Although some did survive to join Bolívar in Venezuela or in Colombia, these were few; the roster of fallen granadinos reads like the roll call of the elder sons of Nueva Granada's first families.³⁴

The second aspect is directly related to the status of the military—social and occupational. The composition of the officer corps of the Spanish army stationed in Santa Fé included a high percentage of "Nobles"; Spanish regulations, which remained in force, gave specific instructions for the recruitment of officers, instructions which showed great concern with questions of status. Two-thirds were recruited from the Cadetes, who were in the vast majority hijosdalgo, and the other third from worthy sergeants.³⁵ Thus the bulk of the officer corps of the first Colombian army was composed of those creole military hijosdalgo, some Spaniards, and enthusiastic creole civilians of the upper class. It is important to keep in mind that the social

structure changed little with the Wars of Independence and that the Spanish military structure was intensely status-conscious, a fact reflected in the separation of white and pardo (colored) regiments. And even in the colored regiments positions were filled by the ayudante mayor veterano, "selecting the men he believed to have the best breeding and social position." This was in line with the Crown's great concern with the "public image" of the militia, which, as one study indicates, "even influenced matrimony."³⁶

That at this "pre-national" period of the Patria Boba status-consciousness continued to be a part of the military occupation, even at the rank of noncommissioned officer, is evidenced by the following exchange of órdenes:

Order of the 27 of May, 1813: Since there has been an enquiry as to whether sergeants and corporals of the unit can become actors in the theatre, the President [Nariño] lets it be known that since actors are of no less social status (condición) than cobblers, tailors, carpenters and other mechanics which form the greatest part of the Milicias . . . even though the [Spanish] ordenanzas are still in effect, such a prohibition would go against the provisions of our constitution as regards the Rights of Man.

Order of the 28 of May, 1813: In order to avoid any "dissenting interpretations which disturb the peace," let it be known that the Commander will be in charge of establishing the distinctions in occupations since mechanics cannot become officers.³⁷

These attitudes survived the collapse of Colombia's initial attempt at autonomy, and after the first generation of officers had been decimated, changed the pattern of recruitment of military leadership.

This change was reflected in the third aspect of the period which differentiated it from the subsequent ones; the general civilian attitude toward the military both as an ideal and as a corporate group and institution. Invested by the constitutional charter of 1811 with power to raise and organize an army for the common defense of the state, congress called on the provinces to make a weekly drill a matter of "religious duty,"³⁸ and even attempted to regularize military instruction through the establishment of a military academy.³⁹

The civilian attitude altered radically in the next decade, turning into a deep-rooted and generalized anti militarism. The causal nexus between a status-conscious society, the base of recruitment and the attitude of literate sectors toward the military profession are described by Tomás Rueda Vargas:

With the promotion to the highest ranks or death of the first officers taken from the first families of the capital and provinces, the first contingent of officers was exhausted (se agotó) . . . [recruitment came from different sectors now] so that at the end of the war one found in positions of high rank not a few men who could hardly sign their names or could only crudely draw the initials of their names at the bottom of the proclamations which others drew up for them.

This system [of recruitment] continued after the peace and even more so than during the war; to the extent that upper class youth turned, with the creation of colegios and universities, to the liberal professions, there began to be formed a garrison officer corps (oficialidad de cuartel) which was lazy, uncouth, and which slowly but surely destroyed the prestige of the army and created problems of difficult solution.⁴⁰

While it is true that there has been an institutional continuity in terms of constitutional provisions for an armed force, and its representation in the governmental structure,⁴¹ it would at best be tenuous to argue that the mere presence of such institutional continuity was a guarantee of continuity in status.

The defeat of the army of the Patria Boba was one of a number of generational breaks which tend to indicate that continuity in Colombia's political culture, including the pattern of civil-military relations, had its roots not so much in the military structure as in other groups and institutions of the society that did not experience these breaks. Those elements immediately suggesting themselves are the family and other primary groups that performed the socialization functions in the system, groups that reinforced and perpetuated the status-consciousness of Colombian society.

The first Colombian army was a product of the Spanish military structure and tradition and of the peculiar sociological conditions of the population of the Colombian nation. However, the Wars for Independence took a turn which began to introduce a whole system of styles and behavior patterns quite alien to the elegant world of Colombia's upper class, at least those who were left after the past bloodletting. With the generation of Spanish-trained officers reduced to a minimum, it was becoming increasingly clear that what was needed was a group of men, not with some military skill acquired in Sunday afternoon drills after church, but men whose whole life and outlook contained the ingredients and spirit of the warrior. The Spanish infantry, though certainly no longer the best in Europe, could nevertheless be defeated only by a warrior people led by men who understood and even admired those pugnacious qualities which as a whole were contrary to certain precepts of urbane behavior as defined by the Colombian upper class.

This warrior people and those leaders were provided by Venezuela, which is not to say that the granadinos did not contribute their share to the new independence armies. But there is more truth than poetry in the oft-repeated Colombian assertion that of the three regions which formed the state of Gran Colombia, in Venezuela the soldier was important; in Colombia, the university; while in Ecuador it was the monastery. In a sense this assertion is a reflection of a social as well as an historical reality. Historically, it had been Venezuela, where Bolívar inaugurated his "guerra a muerte" as a strategic, military, and political necessity as much as in answer to Spanish atrocities, which experienced warfare so intense and so all-encompassing that there could not but emerge a certain "type." This "type" was exemplified by José Antonio Páez. His distrust of urban intellectuals and his enormous political suspicion and drive have been explained in terms of his mixed racial origin⁴² and the socializing influence of his llano environment.⁴³ In Colombia on the other hand, the avant garde had been intellectual, the pen rather than the sword serving as the principal weapon. Though no less damaging to Spanish armor in the long run, it brought to the top a different type of man, one who in a sense was already at the top, the civilian intellectual elite of Bogotá, best exemplified in the members of the Academia de Nueva Granada.

It is in the encounter of these two intrinsically distinct groups, distinct in their traditional style of life as well as in their immediate personal experiences, motivation, and goals, that civil-military relations of lasting import can be said to have begun. It was not long before there developed between the writers and lawyers of Colombia and the officers and llaneros of Venezuela an "open and avowed antagonism."⁴⁴ This antagonism was not limited to the civilian elite in Bogotá, nor was it a matter of party loyalties; it was rather, "a general, popular phenomenon."⁴⁵ And no one better understood the nature of the clash between these intrinsically different political cultures and styles of life and aspirations than did Bolívar. "If it is not the Llaneros who will bring about our ruin," he wrote Santander, "then it will be the gentle philosophers of Colombia."⁴⁶

It can hardly be disputed that the Bolivarian party did in fact establish a military dictatorship in Colombia, though one could conceivably argue that given the conditions of war this might have been unavoidable. Colombian reaction to that harsh rule was a cause of national antagonism toward the military as a group in space and time. The presence of military dictatorship can only be considered a condition for the emergence of a negative stereotype of the military as a career and as an institution. The causes of the crystallization of that stereotype have to be sought in the clash of two different styles of life, with all the complexity of factors that involves, both claiming the right to rule socially and be politically supreme.

The ingredients of this clash, the elements composing the different "styles of life," were many. In one sense it was the clash between the city and the frontier, a clash equally important in Colombia as in the rest of Latin America.⁴⁷ Santander must have had this in mind when he wrote Bolívar, who was returning from Peru, that he should not bring his army to Bogotá; that their presence in the city would be "both scandalous and superfluous,"⁴⁸ though certainly there must have also been political and economic reasons for his apprehensions.

Adding to the sources of tension and conflict by accentuating the differences between the two styles of life was an ethnic distinction between the Venezuelan and the Colombian, a distinction made clear from the following approximate figures. At the beginning of the Wars for Independence the distribution was:⁴⁹

TABLE 15
ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION IN ECUADOR, COLOMBIA, AND VENEZUELA

<u>Country</u>	<u>Whites</u>	<u>Indians</u>	<u>Colored (Pardos)</u>	<u>Negro Slaves</u>
Ecuador	157,000	393,000	42,000	8,000
Colombia	877,000	313,000	140,000	70,000
Venezuela	<u>200,000</u>	<u>207,000</u>	<u>433,000</u>	<u>60,000</u>
	1,234,000	913,000	615,000	138,000

The geographic distribution of these ethnic groups is very significant, especially in the case of Colombia. It was in Bogotá that the issues giving shape to the pattern of civil-military relations that developed were played out. Bogotá, with a population of some 20,000 in 1827, was a city in which the top families (familias raizales or familias de abolengo) demonstrated the most intense aristocratic spirit in the social sense. They strongly believed in "the purity of blood" (limpieza de sangre) and the importance of rank and status.⁵⁰ Whether out of virtue or hypocrisy, they adhered to a very circumspect style of public behavior, one emphasizing reserved and conservative personal comportment.⁵¹ The behavior of the llaneros, in their majority pardos or mestizos, on the other hand, was anything but circumspect and reserved. Even the life of their leader, of aristocratic birth himself, was a source of shock and gossip to the delicate inhabitants of the highland city. "A mistress in the palace and soldiers in the streets!" was the indignant utterance over dinner from house to house.⁵²

In an officer corps which included 74 Venezuelan generals and colonels as compared to 15 from Colombia, 19 "foreign," and 4 Ecuadorean,⁵³ the vast majority were recruited from the lower orders of society.⁵⁴ Also, the destruction of a generation of Colombian officers, the mere size of the army, and the desperate need for men who knew the terrain and were willing

to put up with the hardships of the kind of war being fought, had opened the door of the military to all on the basis of achievement. The army was, at the time, a "democratic" institution. But it was such only in comparison with the other social institutions. José María Samper, remarking on the mixed composition of the officer corps, noted how the differences between the hombres eminentes de sangre pura española (who must have been few) and those of the clases inferiores de la sociedad formed two distinct social groups. "While some criollos rose to very high ranks and dignities, by virtue of their genius and patriotism," he recalls, "the promotions of the men of color were due exclusively to their heroism."⁵⁵ A comparison between the figure of Bolívar and that of Páez is made to represent each major group, the latter typifying the large numbers of mestizos and mulattoes who rose to the top through rigorous stages of promotions.⁵⁶

The commonly held interpretation, expressed in the statement that "Certainly much the best way for a man of mixed race to obtain a high place in the administration, social esteem, or a seat in Congress was to rise up through the armed forces,"⁵⁷ might have been true in a comparative sense. But even if it was the "best" way, it still seemed to have been a difficult one in Colombia. Social status, being broader and more inclusive than status within an institution, depended on attributes which did not include that of being a military man. On the contrary, an officer could have a given social status in Colombia despite the fact that he was a military man only if he possessed other attributes such as land or political status independent of the military. The military enjoyed little social status in Bogotá, much less "social esteem."⁵⁸ Thus the death of a military member of the Colombian social upper group, General Juan José Neira, elicited this comment from one of his peers:

It is necessary to understand that Neira should not be confused with the mass of military men with whom we are commonly acquainted, those without law or restraints . . . he was very dedicated to the business of agriculture and never meddled in public affairs.⁵⁹

And in Colombia, contrary to the case in Venezuela, there is no evidence to indicate that military men were ever provided with the opportunity to acquire these attributes of status, such as land or marriage into a prominent family, on any significant scale. No "new" class of landholders emerged in that country.

Bolívar understood the situation in which the majority of the military men of his army found themselves, especially the restless llanero. Called upon to provide the military services prescribed in the constitution and desired by the citizens, their occupational and social status was not commensurate with their political responsibilities and societal functions, and more importantly, from the point of view of their behavior, to their own perception of their merits and deservedness. This, Bolívar correctly realized, was a dangerous disparity and he so expressed himself to Dr. Pedro Gual on the subject:

You have no idea of the spirit which animates our military leaders. They are not the same men you know. They are men you do not know, men who have fought for a long time . . . who believe that they have greatly merited and who are now humiliated, miserable, and hopeless of ever gathering in the fruits of their labors. They are llaneros, determined and ignorant, men who have never considered themselves the equals of others who know more and make a better appearance than they. . . . I treat them with the greatest consideration, yet even this consideration is not enough to give them the confidence and frankness which should exist among comrades and compatriots. We find ourselves at the edge of an abyss, or rather on top of a volcano that may soon erupt. I fear peace more than war.⁶⁰

Whether what was involved was a real case of status inconsistency between the military acceptance of political responsibilities on the one hand and the lack of social compensation of the llanero officer on the other, or whether it was a matter of the perception thereof, the behavioral results were the same. The "determined and ignorant" Venezuelans continued their arrogant and uncouth behavior so offensive to polite Bogotá society.⁶¹ The financial demands of the war took up two-thirds of the Gran Colombian budget,⁶² taxing the Bogotá's pocketbook and his tolerance, and reinforcing his sense of social effrontery. Threads of philosophical republicanism wove themselves into this matrix, rationalizing a pattern of prejudice and hatred against Bolívar and his "military party."

The spread of the "violent unpopularity"⁶³ of military service throughout Colombia was one aspect of the unfavorable image of that profession. The hardships naturally involved in military service also contributed to this distaste. While in the pre-national period (1810-1816) the Granadino had reached for the weapons of defense with enthusiasm, from the Venezuelan occupation on, military service in Colombia became something to be avoided like the pest.⁶⁴

Civil-military relations in Colombia were being shaped throughout a series of crises starting with the "Colonel Infante" case⁶⁵ and continuing with the crisis of legitimacy of Bolívar's authority and the aborted attempts of the military (especially the Venezuelan military) under Rafael Urdañeta and later Sarda to reimpose Bolívar's rule. At the same time, the status of the military, as an institution and career, was being fixed in the social structure.

Eduardo Caballero Calderón provides a three-way explanation of the Colombian reaction, an explanation which gives a clear picture of the existing social and occupational status of "the military":

The reaction of the bogotano had a three-fold cause: the civilian spirit in conflict with an arbitrary military spirit that reigned over the whole area of public administration; an incipient regional and national spirit in opposition to the retinue of Venezuelans that Bolívar took with him everywhere; and the profound displeasure at the intrusion of the mulatto and mestizo bearing swords in a society that was tranquil, prudish, and haughty in its racial prejudice . . . In his last years, when he became a dictator, Bolívar represented these three things: the arbitrariness of the sword, the insolence of the Venezuelans who were regarded as intruders, and the rebellion of the mixed bloods.⁶⁶

This identification of the military career with the worst aspects of the social order was to last throughout the century, since the social structure that in 1828 and 1830 entertained these ideas changed but little during that time. By mid-century a keen Colombian commentator noted that the President had expressed hope that the military institution might be brought out of its terrible state and continued:

To this we add that it will never be greatly improved because the whites and the educated men will never go and form ranks with the ragged and the negroes and mulattoes. This has been so, is so, and will continue to be so in the Republics of Spanish America regardless of how much democracy is preached. This would be contrary to certain acts of the private and public life and of the traditional customs and habits of a large sector of granadinos [Colombians].⁶⁷

The elite looked down on the military, and avoided military service. An interlocking "vicious circle" was reinforced. Lower class men were recruited and rose to the top of the army. But

the top of the army was still the bottom of Colombia's social structure in terms of the national ranking system.

An important part of prejudice and of stereotyped thoughts is that they exist despite the reality of the situation or object they pass judgment on. Thus, at mid-century, when the radicals proposed as their objective number one the abolishment of the military and engineering school, José María Samper had to admit that it was "more because of its name, then held to be very repugnant, than because of any serious reasons."⁶⁸

While the military's low social and occupational status is significant, there still remains the fact that the realities of Colombia's social structure and stratification do not by themselves explain the lack of political power on the part of the Colombian military. It is conceivable that these despised military men could have imposed themselves on the system. They could acquire the attributes of status in the short run, by destroying the upper class and creating their own system, as happened largely in Venezuela; or in the long run for their progeny. For the military to have remained in a position of subordination socially and politically, power had to be monopolized by the civilian sector⁶⁹—and this is what happened in Colombia.

Expulsion of Officers

A keen Swedish observer noted in 1837 that Colombia possessed two characteristics which guaranteed its political stability: one was the great number of competent civilian functionaries well versed in public administration, and the other, "a nearly total absence of the many military chieftains, which in these recent times have been the cause of numerous internal disturbances in these countries." Gosselman then related the story of the expulsion of the large number of military men from Colombia, calling it "one of the most profitable exports that country could have ever made."⁷⁰

The extent of this "profitable export" is apparent from the figures in Table Number 16. The fact that the Colombian constitution then went on to specifically limit entry into the officer corps to Colombian born gives another indication of the thoroughness of this export and change. The expulsion of the Venezuelan military caused as much happiness, if not more, than the expulsion of the Spaniards. One Colombian minister put it this way describing the entry of the Colombian troops into Bogotá:

This day of redemption has been the most satisfactory one for Nueva Granada. No function, in twenty-one years of great events, has been as solemn: the good people of Bogotá have never had a day of more satisfaction, nor another army such demonstrations of happiness; such had been the sufferings, and such the desires to be free from the worst and most denigrating domination.⁷¹

The number of colonels in 1826 was 50; in 1832 at the beginning of Colombian nationhood there were only 16. Along with the 13 generals expelled from Colombia there were also 26 colonels, 15 primeros comandantes, 10 segundos comandantes, 61 capitanes of different gradations, and 83 lieutenants of different ranks, making a total of 208 officers⁷² who left Colombia at that time with the bulk of the army.

It is important to note that the Colombians who survived the struggle with the Spaniards, the internal civil-war of the Patria Boba, the reconquest of Morillo, the Wars for Independence, and then the struggle to expel the Venezuelans in 1830, were to a large extent a different "type" than the military caudillo as commonly interpreted in Latin American history. José María

TABLE 16
MILITARY MEN EXPELLED FROM COLOMBIA (1831)

<u>Top Command of Army in 1826*</u>	<u>Expelled, 1831†</u>	<u>Top Command, 1832‡</u>
<u>Generales en Jefe:</u>	<u>Generales en Jefe:</u>	
1. Juan Bautista Arismendi (V)	1. Rafael Urdaneta	
2. Rafael Urdaneta (V)		
3. José Antonio Páez (V)		
4. José Francisco Bermudez (V)		
<u>Generales de División:</u>	<u>Generales de División:</u>	
5. Carlos Soublette (V)	2. Mariano Montilla	
6. José Tadeo Monagas (V)	3. Laurencio Silva	
7. Manuel Valdes (V)	4. Manuel Valdéz	
8. Mariano Montilla (C)	5. José María Carreno	
9. Francisco Estaban Gómez		
<u>Generales de Brigada:</u>	<u>Generales de Brigada:</u>	<u>Generales Efectivos:</u>
10. Miguel Guerrero (V)	6. Mauricio Encinosa	1. Antonio Obando
11. Juan Páez del Castillo	7. Justo Briceno	2. Juan N. Moreno
12. José M. Carreno (V)	8. Cruz Carillo	3. Ignacio Luque
13. Pedro Briceno Mendez (V)	9. Domingo J. Espinar	4. José María Obando
14. Pedro Fortoul (V)	10. Daniel F. O'Leary	5. José Hilario López
15. José de Jesús Barreto	11. Diego Ibarra	
16. Manuel Antonio Valero	12. Julian Infante	
	13. José F. Blanco	

*"Decreto (10 de junio) que determina el número de oficiales generales y coroneles efectivos del ejército," Codificación Nacional, Vol. VII (Bogotá, 1826), pp. 350-351.

†"Decreto (12 de abril) sobre generales y coroneles," Codificación Nacional, Vol. VII (1832), p. 553.

‡"Relación de los generales, jefes y oficiales que han sido expulsados de la Nueva-Granada, por traidores a la causa de la LIBERTAD, estando por consiguiente borrados de la lista militar," Documento No. 2, Exposición que el Ministro Secretario de Estado en el Departamento de Guerra y Marina dirige a la convención de la Nueva-Granada, en 1831 (Bogotá: Tipografía de B. Espinosa), p. 31.

Obando, who was Minister of War in 1831, himself set the tone of the 'new' army when he noted that the Bolivarian military structure had been totally dismantled and the new army created from a "scrupulously purified" base.⁷³

Limits on the Military

The very size of the army, reduced to 2,370 men, despite the fact that even the not very militaristic Obando felt quite strongly that at least 4,200 were needed, indicated a reduction in the bargaining power of the military sector. Obando's own ideas concerning military organization and mission, and the role of the army in society, showed the influence of European philosophical liberalism and republicanism. His recommendations, such as depriving young officers of their horses so that "they may better understand the conditions of the footsoldier," had parallels neither in the Spanish system nor in the Bolivarian one. Other aspects which

indicated a changed situation, both in terms of the ideas and reflections of the limitations of the military as a corporate group, were: (1) the military's surrender to the new congress of jurisdiction over military promotions and certification of ranks, as well as the annual regulation of the army's size; (2) the abolition of the fuero de guerra for the milicias and its curtailment for the regular army. Other measures adopted included the cutting of full salaries of those officers who were not engaged in actual command of troops, the rest being given licencia with only one-third of their full salary.⁷⁴

Thus by 1839 an inventory of the conditions of the army shows that its size was below that voted by congress, military administration in "chaos," equipment very deficient, military hospitals a threat to the health of the patients, severance pay very much in arrears, and the lack of uniforms such that the troops were described as being "nearly naked." Lacking their own courts and code (fuero), military justice was totally disorganized, while the difficulty of recruiting officers was creating a serious situation.

The difficulty of recruiting soldiers was such that the old Spanish practice of drafting vagabonds was reinstated in 1839. One of the very important functions the army would serve in the nineteenth century and even later, and which, of course, did nothing to improve its status, was that of a correctional institution for social outcasts.⁷⁵

By 1853 the status of the military had reached a critical stage. No longer were civilian efforts restricted to limiting its size and autonomy; now the very existence of the military institution in the society was being seriously challenged, a challenge which took on the ideological overtones of European philosophical radicalism. The minister of war's defense of the army is perhaps the best indication of its condition. His exposition may be reduced to three principal points:⁷⁶

1. An army which fluctuated in size between 1,000 and 2,000 could scarcely be called by that name;
2. One could hardly talk about "militarism," since the army enjoyed none of the prerogatives or privileges of the other Latin American armies. The philosophy of Liberal President José Hilario López opposed anything but an absolute minimum in military size and prerogatives. The military had not regained the fuero abolished at their own request in 1832.
3. The functions performed by the military, carrying the mails, guarding jails and leprosy asylums, etc., could not be performed at as low a cost by any other state agency.

The main target of the radicals (gólgotas) at that time became the commander of the army, the only general in active service, José María Melo. To the charge that Melo was living in the Bogotá garrison and keeping his horse at government expense, the Minister answered that by living in the cuartel Melo had brought some semblance of discipline and sanitation to it. Besides, he was paying his own expenses.⁷⁷ The fact that Melo was a cavalry officer did not seem to dawn on his critics.

The Melo coup which took place in 1854 has to be seen in the context of the conservative-radical-moderate strife at the time and the yet-unknown part played by President Obando. What is important for our purposes is that the military-artisan regime of Melo lasted only seven months. It had the support of the urban class and was opposed by the civilian elite who, regardless of party affiliation, recruited their own armies and defeated Melo. The significance of the Melo coup and the defeat of his military-working class government was that the conditions established by the defeat of the "military party" in 1830 were now fully crystallized. Any chances the military might have had prior to that, of conquering a position of greater political power or social status, were definitely destroyed in 1854.⁷⁸

What followed Melo's defeat can best be described as a total "demilitarization" of Colombian society. On November 3, 1855, José María Restrepo, who had opposed Melo, wrote in his diary:

What is called the army of Nueva Granada is a small contingent distributed over several provinces, which, . . . does not exceed 400 men. It seems as if the Executive power wants to destroy everything military in Bogotá. Among those buildings ordered to be auctioned off is the building called "Parque de Artillería" which was built in the time of the Spaniards at a cost of over 40,000 pesos. Nevertheless, it is said to be offered for public sale for 8,000 pesos. We do not know what our government is thinking about when it wants to do away with a building as important as the "Parque."⁷⁹

The decreasing size of the military budget also provides a clear idea of this demilitarization trend (see Table 17).

TABLE 17
MILITARY EXPENDITURES IN PESOS⁸⁰

1853	548,924.80	} 75 percent reduction in 5 years
1854	519,635.00	
1855	305,355.00	
1856	192,281.70	
1857	184,941.10	

The 400 men of the standing army in 1857 were located only where there were prisons to be guarded, and there was a small contingent in Panamá. Bogotá's total garrison was 75 men strong.

Such was the general attitude toward everything military at the time, that one member of Bogotá's elite recalled the outlandishness of a uniformed diplomat in a totally civilian environment:

I remember that at the time there arrived a Peruvian diplomatic delegation, and we all looked with curiosity at the Secretary of that delegation because he wore a military uniform every day: not that there was any hatred against the military any more, rather they were regarded as members of an archaic and improper institution according to modern ideas.⁸¹

The Colombian rejection of the military institution was complete—physical, by reducing it to minimal size, limiting its function to performing perfunctory police duties and cutting its budget to an inconsequential sum; philosophical—by rationalizing it as an archaic and outdated institution. Table Number 18 indicates that regardless of the fiscal situation of the nation, the army was held at a bare minimum in size during the nineteenth century and into the twentieth. At mid-nineteenth century there emerged a whole generation of intellectuals, luminaries of the Colombian press, politics, legal studies—in short, the "reference groups" of the whole society. At this time there was relative peace during which the two major sectors of the

TABLE 18
SIZE OF ARMY AND FINANCES OF COLOMBIA (1831-1930)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Legal Size</u>	<u>Actual Size*</u>	<u>National Revenue†</u>	<u>Balance or Deficit</u>
1831	2,370	Same		
1832	3,880	Same	2,485,015	(+) 244,707
1833	3,230	--	1,749,775	(-) 8,871
1834	3,230	--	2,337,835	(+) 175,342
1835	3,230	--	2,275,900	(+)1,421,013
1836	3,230	--	2,192,572	(-) 105,774
1837	3,330	--	2,449,284	(+) 76,156
1853	1,500	Somewhat less	1,791,682	(-) 940,168
1855	-- ‡	--	2,309,756	(+) 286,515
1856	--	--	1,916,508	(+) 77,432
1857	500	400	2,106,300	(+) 98,312
1858	1,000	400	1,910,500	(-) 167,858
1867	1,000	2,000	5,444,498	(-) 519,439
1868	1,500	1,700	2,774,000	(-)1,043,172
1869	1,420	Same	4,139,600	(+) 337,070
1870	1,000	Same	4,399,000	(+) 264,778
1871	1,000	Same	3,642,000	(-)1,004,358
1872	1,500	1,246	4,012,000	(-)1,202,969
1874	1,200	--	4,003,728	(-) 572,375
1909	15,500	Same	15,992,863	None
1910	5,300	Same	16,600,000	None
1911	5,869	Same	10,831,500	None
1912	5,585	Same	9,779,500	None
1913	5,182	Same	14,070,652	None
1914	5,695	Same	17,404,010	(-)2,314,844
1915	5,812	Same	20,876,000	(+)2,781,391
1916	6,000	Same	14,860,000	(-)2,255,265
1917	6,000	Same	14,885,000	(-)1,484,965
1918	5,000	Same	17,811,000	(+) 262,529
1919	6,000	Same	13,455,850	(-)2,658,436
1920	--	Same	23,845,250	(-)3,947,331

TABLE 18--Continued

<u>Year</u>	<u>Legal Size</u>	<u>Actual Size</u>	<u>National Revenue</u>	<u>Balance or Deficit</u>
1921	6,000	Same	25,962,800	(-)8,829,725
1922	--	Same	23,903,580	(-)4,308,242
1923	6,000	Same	33,535,104	--
1924	--	--	33,470,338	--
1925	--	--	46,517,757	--
1926	6,000	Same	55,648,914	--
1927	8,682	Same	63,267,488	--
1928	8,266	Same	64,607,203	--
1930	6,170	Same	49,358,000	--

* Memorias or Informes from the Ministro de Guerra of the respective dates.

† Memorias or Informes of the Ministro de Hacienda of the respective dates. The great disparity found in the reporting of these figures indicates that they should be regarded as approximations at best. Amounts are in pesos.

‡ Information not provided.

Colombian political system gathered their forces into more clearly ideologically defined parties and there was no army in Colombia. In a sense it can be said that Colombia began its national political life at a time when the military institution was for all practical purposes non-existent. The system of social sanctions and rewards, controlled by civilians, kept the military subordinate from then on. "One has to recognize," stated the minister of war in 1874, "that in this [military] matter Republican customs and practices have been considerably ahead of the laws; that the confidence in the Army rests more on the sanctions which society exerts on it than that of the laws."²

The "sanctions of society" were facilitated by the pattern of recruitment of the military--the political subordination of the officer was facilitated by his social subordination. The Western ideal of an army subordinate to the civilian power was not involved in this case. What occurred in Colombia was the subordination of the military institution to given political groups, becoming nothing more than an instrument of their political plans. The military are praised or condemned, admitted the minister of war, according to whether they at that time serve the political aspirations of a particular party.³ When in 1871, by a politically-inspired law, the military career was made just another "occupation" in the civil bureaucracy, the officer found himself totally at the mercy of equally politically appointed judges.

Without any guarantees for a stable career, without much in the way of education, and recruited from sectors marginal to the dominant social, economic, and political class, the officer was at the mercy of the party in power; he had little recourse but to become its instrument. "Today those officers who do not participate in the political ideas of those who appoint them are marked as being weird,"⁴ wrote an officer who himself tried to change this situation with little success.

Since a strong military presence has traditionally been regarded as the *sine qua non* of political instability and violence in Latin America, the question as to the kind of political culture that developed in this relatively "demilitarized" Latin American nation takes on a significance larger than the Colombian situation alone. However, in the case of Colombia, the peculiar status that the military have enjoyed in the society and in a sense continue to enjoy today, must be seen in light of the historical antecedents just described.

In the early decisions of Colombian nationhood the military institution was relegated to a secondary position in the system both socially and politically. In a system characterized by a culture of political conflict, however, the armed forces did have a role to play; in Colombia that role was as the armed instrumentality of the political groups. These groups, acting under either of the two traditional party labels, were numerous, as a Swedish observer noted in 1837. In 1882 an able minister, Eliseo Payán, noted that while the number of able and illustrious political and administrative leaders that the nation had since its inception was a matter of national pride, "It is no less true that that same circumstance has been a stumbling block for public tranquility and social repose, because of the difficulty of arriving at a convenient choice."⁸⁵ Such was the evidence surrounding politics in the civilian-dominated nineteenth century that another minister suggested elections be made less frequent, "with this the occasions of our battles (*luchas*) will be less frequent too."⁸⁶

Tomás Rueda Vargas often stated that all the great social and political problems of Colombia were directly related to the "military problem," i.e., the army's politicized, non-professional nature. He noted in 1910 that one of the great needs was to bring the effects of the recently started military reform to units stationed outside of Bogotá by sending trained officers to them. But, being the knowledgeable observer of the political system that he was, he wished to banish whatever fears might exist concerning the behavior of these officers by noting that "these [educated] officers, of whom there are now many, all belong to the Conservative party, so that their presence will not be a novelty nor need it frighten any except the ignorant of all parties." In other words, even the most ardent supporters of the military reform found political affiliation of officers a most normal matter.⁸⁷ What they were objecting to was the exploitation of these ties by the civilians. More than a decade later Rueda Vargas was still attempting to do his part in making a professional army a reality, and that meant an army removed from political control but operating as a bargaining group in its own right.⁸⁸

By 1930, neither the hopes and endeavors of the military reform initiated in 1907 to depoliticize the military nor many of the other aspirations of the reformers had been realized. This was made quite plain in a presentation behind closed doors by the Chilean-trained José Miguel Silva Plazas. Silva Plazas, then a captain, noted that the purpose of the meeting was to further a spirit of unity and camaraderie among the officers. In particular, he asked the minister of war to meet "at least once a month with us and hear from our lips . . . all those matters which deal with the army."⁸⁹ The young captain observed that this was the custom in nearly all armies and was especially needed in Colombia where the minister was usually a civilian not acquainted with military matters. With that, Silva Plazas delivered a fifteen page, single spaced memorandum listing a series of ills afflicting the military institution. His most bitter critique was reserved for the officer corps which he found badly trained and lacking even the weakest semblance of a spirit of comradeship. "There does not exist among our officer corps that unity, that solidarity, and that community of aspirations, ideas and sentiments, that affection and mutual respect which in vulgar terms is called camaraderie."⁹⁰

This lack of a sense of group identity, of cohesiveness, was critical in further determining the position of the military. Lacking status as an occupation because of the base of its recruitment, this situation was perpetuated by the lack of cohesion of the officer corps. Thus it was

made virtually impossible for it to function effectively as an institutional interest group, and even more so as an associational one. Individual officers could attain an improvement in status, depending on the other attributes they already brought with them into the career. The career, the profession, however, stagnated and remained marginal to the power circles of the political system. It was mere illusion, noted one annoyed colonel, to believe that young men who had the privilege of a secondary school education would choose the military career given the present conditions when there were other professions of a much more promising nature attracting them. Of the highest rank in the profession, that of general, the colonel noted that "it is so lacking in prestige, so vilified, so ridiculed that it is not a summit attracting one, but rather an abyss which horrifies."⁸¹

In a situation such as that, the effect on the individual officer was to create an attitude of independence from the institution, of a certain opportunism on their own, and, as one officer put it, of dilettantism:

If we synthesize, we shall see that there exists in us a desire to evolve but without action, . . . an atrophied will. That is, we are affected by dilettantism.⁸²

If the military institution did not satisfy the desire for status, the search for that sense of social esteem would be carried on outside the institution.

Why this should have been so, after three different Chilean missions and one Swiss mission, as well as the strong efforts made by those who favored the military reform and professionalization in general, is clear: the army, or better, the officer corps, being an integral part of the political system cannot easily divest itself of the general political culture which characterizes that system and forms its context. The following analysis of the reasons which affected the military adversely is quoted at some length because it is made by an officer fully competent to judge and is as accurate an historical and sociological analysis of the situation as may be found:

[Those of us pushing the military reform] did not know at that time the intimate relationship which exists between the general environment and the institutions which are derived therefrom, and, judging with simplistic criteria, we thought that [the military] was entering into an era of definite and undetainable progress. In our platonic enthusiasm of infantile ingenuity we came to see the Army modernized and as a modernizer, as a factor which would induce the national spirit to reach the most beautiful synthesis of a civilized country which is the peaceful alternation of the two parties in the holding of power. Soon the reaction against that fundamental principle of the Reform began to manifest itself: a National Army as the Chileans conceived it was incompatible with the general Colombian political context, filled as it was with hatred, stupidly cultivated during one hundred years of independent existence during which Conservatives and Liberals had held the military institution as the greatest asset in their hegemony of power and as the best means of getting at [power]. . . . Thus, through the pressure of its environment, the Army returned to the polls; officers lost the freedom of thinking without danger to their position, and military effort was supplanted in merit by the evaluation of political work. With the purpose of the war machine changed there had to be warpings in its spring and leverages (palancas); and while in other countries the dictates of justice are jealously guarded, here the parties are organized militarily and from that internal posture, the Army is purged of everything which does not have a certain [political] root.⁸³

In the United States, "The party neutrality of the military has been assisted by the social and political consensus of American society";⁸⁴ the lack of such a consensus produced exactly the reverse effect in Colombia. When the Liberals came into power in 1930, after four and a half decades in the opposition, one of the first measures taken by the Liberal-dominated congress was the disenfranchisement of the military. The institution would no longer serve as an overt electoral bludgeon; no longer would the citizenry see the local military commander marching his troops to the polls to vote according to his "command." Gone were the days when polling stations were quite frequently the local military garrison. But, if in 1930 the military had to abide by certain rules—specifically the reinterpretation of the constitutional provision of "no deliberation," and there appeared a clear gap between private and expressed political beliefs—there can be no doubt but that those beliefs were there. "The political beliefs of the military," states Janowitz, "are not distinct from those that operate in civilian society. On the contrary, they are a refraction of civilian society wrought by the recruitment system, and by the education and military experiences of a professional career."⁸⁵

In a political culture of violence, "the professionals of violence," as the military are called, have a role to play. In a social system where social status largely determines stratification, and where such stratification correlates highly with political power, the role of an institution with a low occupational status will probably be that of an instrumentality of the dominant elites. This was the case in Colombia.

Professionalization: Education and Recruitment

In a very real sense the state of military education at any given period of Colombian history has reflected both the occupational status of the military career as well as the professional level of the military institution. Both are determinants of the role the military played in the society. All attempts at some form of organized and continuous education of officers in the nineteenth century ended in failure. Perhaps the first such attempt was the effort of Juan del Corral in 1813 and of the Spanish-Colombian savant José de Caldas in 1815 to establish an engineering school also teaching the basics of "military architecture or fortification" and ballistics.⁸⁶ This was, however, not a national school but a regional one having been established by the Republic of Antioquia. As would occur on other occasions, the immediate demands of war, whether civil or against a foreign invader, pulled the young men from the classroom to the battlefield. The pattern for the nineteenth century had been established: the same fate caught up with the feeble attempt of Santander to formalize military education as part of the university system and of Tomás Cipriano de Mosquera who was more determined in his efforts, but not any more successful. No cadets completed the course of the school founded in 1848 and it was closed for lack of funds and interest in 1853. Through Mosquera's efforts it was initiated again in 1861 as the Escuela de Ingeniería Civil y Militar only to be abolished in 1867 following the civilian coup d'état that toppled the caudillo Mosquera. Following the collapse of Mosquera's educational plans, attempts at military education during the nineteenth century centered for some time around a retired American colonel, Henry Lemly, who on various occasions was given private contracts by the Colombian government to establish regular schooling for future officers. In 1891, Lemly actually had 64 cadets under one roof following a course of studies of military utility. Up to that time the general attitude toward the establishment of a military educational institution can be summed up in the words of the minister of war in 1855. Pleading for the retention of some form of institution with a military spirit, he stated that:

The utility of such an establishment does not depend on whether there is or not a permanent army in the Republic, but on the need that exists for engineers.

geographers, civilian and military, and of agronomists who perform studies of Nueva Granada.

What was important, the minister continued, was not that the institution be a military school or that its purpose be the formation of officers for the army, but that there be an atmosphere of discipline which the minister felt could best be achieved by organizing the school on a semi-military basis.⁹⁷

This attitude toward the preparation of officers changed under the government of the stern Conservative-independent Miguel Antonio Caro, one of the key ideologues of the Constitution of 1886 and of the "Regeneration of Núñez." The new Escuela Militar established by Law 127 of 1896 was supposed to be the "Sancta Sanctorum" of our military institution and of the Army.⁹⁸ The cadets would be recruited from the "most distinguished youth of our society" without political distinctions. The military career would be elevated to the status it enjoyed in Germany and France, a very noble career worthy of "the highest esteem and of the most honorific distinctions,"⁹⁹ something on a par with university studies in medicine, engineering, or law. That is how it looked on paper.

Again, however, despite the hope of making the career an established and respected one, the constant pressures of the political culture of violence made this impossible. Having survived a Liberal rebellion in 1895, the Caro government was apprehensive about the future and desired a standing army with better trained officers. The need for trained officers to sustain the government was immediate. A French mission of three officers who with three Colombians formed the staff of the Escuela Militar began teaching 45 junior grade officers taken from the existing army the basics of military science. There were no graduates from this new school since the War of a Thousand Days began in 1899. The French mission returned home, and cadets entered immediate combat in what was to be the most ferocious civil war Colombia had experienced.

Even three years of warfare did not seem to impress in the minds of many Colombians the need for a professional officer corps for the army. While the government forces did in fact defeat the Liberal rebels, one of the critical events of the war was the defeat of the government's standing army at the outset. The Colombian pattern of civilian armies defeating the professionals had repeated itself. Formal military education still did not seem necessary for victory, and again, the government was saved by the formation of volunteer civilian armies of Conservatives, especially guerilla type groups.¹⁰⁰ The Colombian officer corps and professional military, constantly overruled by civilian "advisors" in the field, made nothing short of a shameful showing in the long and bloody conflict.¹⁰¹ Whether any army, no matter how well-trained, could have performed better given constant political interference with its operations is open to serious question. The military showing of the Colombian army in the Thousand Day War, including the subsequent role played by the Panama garrison in the loss of that state, was a reflection of its political impotence and its existence as an instrument of a political elite.

It was largely this fact, the poor showing of the professional officer and the existence of large numbers of civilian non-professional commanders, which, in combination with traditional Colombian anti-militarism, provided serious obstacles to the reforma militar initiated by Rafael Reyes in 1907. The tenacity of its defenders, who became known as cismáticos (schismatics) because of their deviations from the norm in Colombian attitudes toward the armed forces, was the main reason for its ability to survive the first critical years.¹⁰²

The establishment of a stable military career was the keystone of the military reform and its base was the founding and maintenance of a military academy. Executive Decree No. 434

of 1907 ordered the establishment of the Escuela Militar and classes began on June 1, 1907. The history of the Escuela Militar since then is the history of the changing role of the Colombian army in the society, and the changing perception of its mission. It is difficult to say whether the Escuela was instrumental in bringing about these changes, or merely reacting to outside forces.

Although the Escuela Militar did indeed have periods of near crisis, it never discontinued its operation after its establishment in 1907. This cannot be said of the Escuela Superior de Guerra (founded in 1910) and the Escuela de Suboficiales (established in 1916). These found their activities suspended on different occasions nearly always due to insufficient funds or, not infrequently, due to simple lack of interest.

If the state of military educational institutions can be held to be an adequate gauge of the level of military professionalism throughout the nineteenth century, starting in 1907 it is the socialization process of the officer which can be utilized as a gauge. The interplay which existed between the occupational status of the military and military education and level of professionalism during the nineteenth century was expressed by a Colombian general in 1883:

The majority of Colombian officers have made their career during our frequent civil wars, but none have made previous studies because there was no military school or academy. . . . this has been a result of the fact that there is no real military career in the country, because the stimulus and the considerations for the military end with the smoke of the last battle, and after that the military become nothing but audacious macheteros in the eyes of the civilians. Convinced that the career of arms is the most unappreciated, the majority of the military have taken little care to dedicate themselves to the study of a science so vast and important. . . .¹⁰³

As noted above, the last decade of the nineteenth century witnessed the real first attempt at creating an educational program tailored more for the soldier than for the engineer. The curriculum for the Escuela Militar in 1891 reflected the changed perception of the role of the officer and his educational needs. Basically it reflected the immediate need for trained officers. Every year of the four year program was heavily military in nature. Topics to be studied beginning the first year were infantry tactics and fencing as well as more general subjects.¹⁰⁴

It was not until the arrival of the Chilean mission in 1907, however, that the Escuela Militar developed a curriculum based on the need for well-trained professional officers who could look forward to a stable career. This curriculum was further elaborated by the second Chilean mission and put into effect in 1910. The education of the officer would be composed of four years of training in the humanities and sciences and a final year called the curso militar during which he specialized in military subjects.¹⁰⁵ Starting in 1910 the Escuela Militar went through several changes of curriculum depending upon which training mission was there at the time (see Table 19).

The three decades, 1907-1930, with significant changes brought about through such events as World War I, and not least of all through the long period of national peace (though there was regional conflict), had created a diversification of views in the officer corps regarding military education. By 1930 it was said that there were essentially three schools of thought on how the officer should be trained: the "traditionalists," those who seemed not to have learned anything from World War I; the "Europeanists," those who wanted to introduce the latest European teachings; and those who "desired to nationalize" military teaching and tactics.¹⁰⁶ This often

TABLE 19
FOREIGN MILITARY MISSIONS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

<u>Mission</u>	<u>Achievements</u>
<p style="text-align: center;"><u>First Chilean (1907)</u></p> <p>Capt. Arturo Ahumada Bascunan, Director of Escuela Militar Capt. Diego Guillen Santana (Grupo Modelo de Artillería) Teniente de Navío Alberto Asmussen (1907-1910)</p>	<p>Founding of the Escuela Militar. Establishment of weak, but critical sense of solidarity and pride in the military career. Formulations of plans and regulations in all military fields—infantry, artillery, and so forth. Directed the Escuela Naval in Cartagena (closed in 1910) with eight graduating as Guardias Marinas.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Second Chilean (1909-1911)</u></p> <p>Maj. Francisco J. Díaz Valderrama, Director of Escuela Militar Capt. Pedro Charpín Rival</p>	<p>Major Díaz (who, like Captain Charpín, as a general later occupied the ministry of war in Chile) is perhaps the greatest influence on the Colombian army in the sense that his views affected the behavior of many later important officers. The sense of a "national army" was his constant theme. This mission drew up the fundamental organic decrees for the Military School, the army, and the Comando General.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Third Chilean (1912-1913)</u></p> <p>Maj. Washington Montero, Director of Escuela Militar Capt. Pedro Vignola Capt. Manuel Aguirre Capt. Carlos Sáenz J. (1914-1915)</p>	<p>Kept up the work done by the Díaz-Charpín mission. Promoted instruction and education among troops. One of the missions was accused of participating in a local conspiracy. As director of the Escuela Militar, Sáenz experienced the brunt of the change in attitude toward the military starting in 1915. After a clash with French-trained Minister of War Lujan, he resigned.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Swiss (1924-1927)</u></p> <p>Hans von Werdt Hans G. Juchler Paul Gautier Henry Pillichody Plinio Pessina</p>	<p>Arrived at a time when the morale of the corps was at a very low level. Began difficult task of weeding out the numerous nonprofessional officers in the corps. Reorganized the Escuela Militar, putting greater emphasis on the military aspect of the education. Lent badly needed prestige to the career.</p>

Sources: Twenty-fifth Anniversary Issue of the Revista Militar del Ejército, XXV (May-June 1932); Memorias or Informes of the ministry of war for the respective years; interview with the director of the Escuela Militar, Bogotá, August 3, 1965.

TABLE 20
FIVE-YEAR STUDY PROGRAM AT THE ESCUELA MILITAR

(Each school year consists of two semesters. Courses are listed by year with number of class hours per week following the course.)

<u>1st Year of General Course</u> (Equal to 5th year of <u>bachillerato</u>)		<u>2nd Year of General Course</u> (Equal to 6th year of <u>bachillerato</u>)	
Physics	4	Physics	4
Geometry and Trigonometry	3	Mathematics	2
Religion	2	Religion	1
Philosophy	4	Philosophy	4
Chemistry	4	History of Colombia	2
Spanish and Literature	4	Geography of Colombia	2
English	2	Chemistry	4
French	3	Spanish and Literature	3
		English	2
		French	3
 <u>1st Year of Military Course</u> (Equal to 1st year university studies)			
<u>Economics</u>		<u>Engineering</u>	
Military Philosophy	2	Military Philosophy	2
Economics I	3	Drawing I, II	2
Mathematics I	5	Descriptive Geometry I, II	2
Accounting I	3	Mathematics I, II	5
Political Science	3	English I, II	3
Sociology	3	Spanish I, II	2
Spanish	3	Chemistry I, II	4
English I	3		
Colombian Problems and General Culture	2		
 <u>2nd Year of Military Course</u> (Equal to 2nd year university studies)			
<u>Economics</u>		<u>Engineering</u>	
Military Penal Justice	2	Military Penal Justice	2
Statistics I, II	3	Topography I	3
Money and Banking	3	Trigonometry	3
Economic Geography	3	Mathematics III	5
Economics II	3	English III	3
Mathematics II	5	Humanities I	4
Accounting II	3	Physics I	5
English II	3		
Colombian Problems and General Culture	2		

TABLE 20--Continued

3rd Year of Military Course

<u>Economics</u>		<u>Engineering</u>	
Topography	2	Economic Geography	2
Knowledge of Regulations	2	Knowledge of Regulations	2
Tactics	5	Tactics	5
R. I. A. M.	2	R. I. A. M.	2
Military History	4	Military History	4
Military Administration	3	Military Administration	3
Military Legislation	1	Military Legislation	1
Weaponry	2	Weaponry	2
Military Pedagogics	2	Military Pedagogics	2

Sources: Escuela Militar de Cadetes. Prospecto, 1963 (Bogotá: Sección Imprenta y Publicaciones de las Fuerzas Militares, 1963). "Estudios Universitarios en la Escuela Militar," El Espectador, September 14, 1962, p. 3. Escuela Militar de Cadetes de Colombia. Prospecto, 1963, 1964, 1965 (Bogotá: Sección Imprenta y Publicaciones de las Fuerzas Militares, 1965).

led to some confusion in the mind of the young officer who studied the most advanced European ideas in his school texts but was trained and commanded in the field by older "traditionalist" officers. While there was considerable debate surrounding this matter, it is well to remember that the disagreement was over tactics, procedure, and curriculum, not over the army's mission.¹⁰⁷ The question of the proper role of the military in society was little debated at this time. One has but to look at the list of officers who received extensive training abroad and returned in 1930 to realize that such assignments played a significant role in the socializing process of key officers. The "innovator" at this time tended to be educated abroad; General Miguel Silva Plazas was perhaps the outstanding example but there were others.¹⁰⁸

In 1942 the Escuela Militar adopted the last two years of the bachillerato clásico as its first two years of general training. Certainly this move reflected the increasing complexity of the military profession, a complexity which the Colombians were increasingly being made aware of by the naval and air force missions from the United States that the Santos government had agreed to receive. It also reflected a changing notion of the mission of the army which was quite apparent under the López government, and which Santos tried to put across in less antagonistic terms. "The elevation of the level of their studies and consequently the intellectual level of our army, constitutes one of my greatest preoccupations," Santos had stated in 1939.¹⁰⁹ There can be little doubt that Santos was one of the few Colombian presidents since Reyes who took an active interest in the military institution. Of course, World War II helped that concern along considerably for it can hardly be said that Santos was "pro-military."

The third major change in the plan of studies came in 1962 when the curriculum was expanded to include two years of university level studies in engineering or economics and a last year during which the military and specialized fields were combined. The young man entering before finishing his secondary education completes it in two years at the Escuela Militar and then chooses between economics and engineering for the last three years at the Escuela. These three years are now recognized by the Colombian Association of Universities as equal to two years at any accredited Colombian university offering similar programs.

Starting in 1966 the Escuela Militar will be offering a third field of specialization, that of international law and diplomacy. The intention is to finally extend it to two years of study. There can be little doubt but that the expanding role of the Colombian military is reflected in the curriculum of their major institute. "The contemporary concept of what the officer of the Army should be," states the official catalogue of the Escuela, "in the midst of the innumerable problems which face the nation in the national and international fields and which affect the mission which the Constitution provides for the Armed Forces, compels the Escuela Militar to perfect more every day the preparation of the future officers."¹¹⁰

Aside from the naval school in Cartagena and the military school of aviation in Cali, the army's educational and professional training is handled by the following educational structure, the comprehensiveness of which is an indication of the degree of technical professionalization to which the Colombian army has finally arrived.

TABLE 21
ARMY EDUCATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL INSTITUTIONS

<u>Institution</u>	<u>Date Established in Present Form</u>
Escuela Militar	1907
Escuela Superior de Guerra	1910
Brigada de Institutos Militares	1941
Escuela de Infantería	1935
Escuela de Caballería	1936
Escuela de Artillería	1961
Escuela de Ingenieros	1957
Escuela de Transmisiones	1944
Escuela de Sanidad	1958
Escuela de Lanceros	1955

Colombia now has the school system necessary to carry out the provisions of Law 126 of 1959, which reorganized the military career. Article 21 states that:

The promotion of an officer of the Armed Forces implies the existence of professional knowledge commensurate to his rank, a fundamental preparation in his speciality, a general culture in humanities, the character, aptitude and authority required to fulfill his functions, and the legal conditions which the Institution demands.¹¹¹

A quick analysis of the 125 short biographical sketches provided by the Revista de las fuerzas armadas for 1960-65 indicates that the Colombian officer today shows a regular and well ordered career pattern,¹¹² the technical requirements of which are indicated in Table 22.

TABLE 22. TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR OFFICER RANK (COLOMBIA)

Rank	Professional Requirements*	Minimum Years in that Rank	Maximum Legal† Number in that Rank	Obligatory Retirement Ages in Rank
Second Lieutenant	Graduate from Escuela Militar and be recommended by the director thereof. Two years as instructor of troops.	4	861	32
Lieutenant	Take and pass the curso de capacitación. Two years as instructor of troops.	4	613	35
Captain	Two years as commander of a Unidad Fundamental. Take and pass the capacitación course.	5	585	43
Major	One year as second in command of a tactical unit, or of an Escuela de Preparación, or as commander of a battalion or group. Take and pass the advanced course of capacitación.	4	174	47
Lieutenant colonel	One year as commander of a battalion or group or as commander of an Escuela de Preparación. Take and pass the curso de estado mayor in the Escuela Superior de Guerra.	4	96	51
Colonel	One year as commander of a brigade, director of the Escuela Militar or Centro de Preparación Militar. Congressional approval. Present and defend a written thesis.	4	32	53
Brigadier general	Chosen by the government.	3	15	56

*República de Colombia Ejército nacional, Ley 126 de 1959 reorgánica de la carrera de oficiales de las fuerzas militares (Bogotá, n.d.).

† Decreto No. 1435 de 1963 (June 27, 1963).

It was not too long ago that a Colombian ex-president—one who during his own regime had seen the military assume more and more political-administrative functions—could write that,

The military profession is poor schooling for learning the difficult art of government, for to govern well means to interpret, to reconcile, to respect the rights of all, to give freedom of expression to every opinion, to abide by the laws and never subordinate them to personal caprice, to have the courage to rectify mistakes, to ask for and listen to advice, to have patience, to realize that one owes one's power to the will of the people. . . . All this is difficult for the military to understand and accept, accustomed as they are to the blind obedience of their inferiors, the dry voices of command, and the narrow horizon of their profession which rarely encompasses the element of humanism.¹¹³

Aside from the clear Colombian stereotyped image of the military which it indicates, there is something intrinsically pathetic about this view. As will be explained later, starting in the 1940's, the military have had to assume more and more functions of government and take on more and more political, and even judicial, responsibilities. Since 1962 a key sector of the institution has made a determined and self-conscious effort to provide an education commensurate with those responsibilities. The obligatory one-year course termed "Military Philosophy" was designed by Minister of War General Alberto Ruiz Novoa, to provide the officer with a clearer conception of his mission in society.¹¹⁴ Unfortunately for Colombia the innovations of officers of the Ruiz Novoa type of 1962-1964 suffered a setback in 1965—partly because of the persisting stereotype of the dominant elite.

In attempting to provide a causal explanation of the social and political subordination of the Colombian military it was stated earlier that there emerged at the inception of nationhood a vicious circle of the social discrediting of the military career and the consequent type of individual recruited into the officer corps. Throughout the nineteenth century, when there can hardly be said to have existed a stable professional military career, the permanent army was served by a highly irregular officer corps, most of whom seldom had any contact with the troops under their command. Only during periods of overt violence or strong anticipation of violence would the officers move to the cuartel and take command of the troops. The officer corps was divided into oficiales efectivos, who were considered to be in command of units at permanent bases, and the more important oficiales en disponibilidad, who were elected by congress and were available to the army should the government find it necessary to call up the troops. Most of the significant political caudillos of the party in power were on this list. If open strife occurred they returned immediately to the region of their power base and recruited ad hoc civilian armies which they then took into the field.¹¹⁵ Perhaps as a result of the strong sense of masculine identification in the Colombian political culture, courage to the extent of recklessness was a critical part of the caudillo's behavior. This courage was demonstrated in the political battlefield, not by joining the army. Status consideration set a limit to the causes for which risks were to be taken, something recognized by the minister of war in 1853. He explained that he would have no trouble recruiting the most promising sons of upper class families for exciting and dangerous political missions, but could not find a single one willing to carry out equally important but less "glorious" functions of a "military" nature. These tasks are tolerated (es soportable) only by those who make the army a career,¹¹⁶ the so-called oficiales de cuartel.

The attitude of these part-time officers and the way in which they were recruited is clearly related by one of the supporters of the military reform:

The officers of the Army in their largest extent—and among those I include myself—never thought that in order to become an officer special knowledge

was needed and that they had to acquire these through studies and special interest in one's work; rather it was enough, in order to obtain a military rank and a position within the Army, to have presented oneself to the Commander of a garrison on the unfortunate day when public order had been declared to be perturbed, and receive command over fifty men to go out to the killing of brothers. This easy way of becoming an officer of the Army also made us enemies of the Military Schools.¹¹⁷

Recruitment was put on a systematic professional basis beginning with the first Chilean mission in 1907. For the first time since 1810, the prospective officers of the army were recruited from prominent families starting with the son of President Reyes, several of his relatives, and the two sons of the Liberal caudillo, Rafael Uribe Uribe.¹¹⁸ For a short period during Reyes' regime, which was brought to an end in 1909, being a cadet at the Escuela Militar was a fashionable thing.¹¹⁹ But going to the Escuela Militar and even graduating did not necessarily mean that the young man went into the army, as the following figures clearly indicate:¹²⁰

TABLE 23
NUMBER OF MILITARY SCHOOL GRADUATES IN ARMY (1907-1915)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number of Graduates</u>	<u>Did Go into Military</u>	<u>Did Not</u>
1907	22	8	14
1908	15	5	10
1909	19	5	14
1910	20	8	12
1911	23	8	15
1912	18	4	14
1913	16	6	10
1914	18	5	13
1915	19	9	10

In this eight year period, therefore, 66 percent of the graduates never entered the army. Some, like one of Uribe Uribe's sons, left the army after their training mission in Chile (at government's expense). It was only during periods of national emergency such as the conflict with Peru in the early 1930's that young men from "better" families entered the military.

It was because of the difficulties of recruiting adequate young men for the Escuela Militar and because of the increasing extramilitary functions of the institution, creating changes in the school system, that in 1963 a private public relations firm was called in to assist the director of the Escuela in formulating a recruitment program. This program consisted of two essential phases. The first was that of propagandizing or advertising the Escuela. This was done by officers of considerable prestige in their native region who were sent out for informal talks on various levels. They would report back to the director of the Escuela Militar. Also, the commanders of the different brigades held informal meetings with civilian leaders of the different areas stressing the need of recruitment for the Escuela Militar. Another aspect of

this campaign was a personal note from the director of the Escuela Militar directed to different civilian leaders and retired officers, formerly quite withdrawn from any contact with their institution, asking them to participate in the recruitment campaign. The director of the Escuela Militar reported an 85 percent response offering cooperation from civilians and a 100 percent response from retired military men.¹²¹

A second phase of the recruitment drive was the detailing of specially trained officers to different regions of the country to speak at secondary schools describing the Escuela Militar and its program. The results of this campaign have been considerable. One index of success is the wide geographic distribution of recruitment. Where formerly the cadets came heavily from the Boyacá and Cundinamarca areas, today the following broad regional distribution pertains: Antioquia, 36; Bolívar, 36; Caldas, 57; Córdoba, 6; Chocó, 6; Guajira, 6; Magdalena, 31; Nariño, 32; Valle, 44; Amazonas, 4; Atlántico, 20; Boyacá, 98; Cauca, 11; Cundinamarca and Bogotá, 226; Huila, 33; Meta, 9; Norte de Santander, 91; Santander, 65; and Caqueta, 8.¹²² While in some areas such as that of the Atlantic coast, formerly one of the quite antimilitary sections of the country and one providing few recruits, there are signs that more interest is developing in the Escuela Militar.¹²³

Recruiting publicity is disseminated through the media of television, radio, and the press and through slides presented at theatres in Colombia, all provided without cost. The Escuela Militar also printed very attractive brochures, including one by the well-known columnist, Gonzalo Canal Ramírez, who like Tomás Rueda Vargas, is one of the few Colombian intellectuals to take an interest in the institution.

According to the director of the Escuela, one of the problems had been that the civilian sector was quite ignorant of the Escuela Militar, its curriculum and function. The reaction in favor of the Escuela Militar by civilian and ecclesiastical authorities and leaders of society and industry of the country, once they learned of the capacities and the characteristics of the institution, apparently came as a pleasant surprise to military planners. However, as we shall see, this support was conditioned by these sectors' own interests in preserving the status quo. That the recruitment drive began to produce results is indicated by the 1965 figures which were as follows:¹²⁴

TABLE 24
ESCUELA MILITAR ADMISSIONS DATA FOR 1965

Aspiring to the Escuela Militar	2,965
Presenting themselves at the examination	1,442
Presenting applications and required documents	791
Accepted and matriculated for 1965	528

An interesting item that turns up in these statistics is that, of the 528 new cadets incorporated in 1965, 122 are sons of active or retired officers and another 86 are the sons of men who had at one time or another attended the Escuela Militar. That is, 25.5 percent of the new cadets come from military fathers. These figures might do something to change the fairly widespread notion among officers that the most antimilitary elements of society are those who are best acquainted with the trials and tribulations of that profession—their own immediate relatives.¹²⁵

Organization, Size, and Distribution

The Colombian military structure today is a far cry from the 400 man "army" the Liberals in the 1850's thought sufficient to guard the nation's institutions. While in 1923 the percentage of Colombians serving was only 0.1 percent of the total population, and in 1958 0.15, today it is closer to 0.4 percent. In 1964 the minister of war gave the following figures: army, 30,000; navy, 5,000; air force, 5,000; and national police, 24,000 to 25,000.¹²⁶

The army troops are organized into eight military brigades (brigadas) and one institute of military brigades, which serves a pedagogical function as well as that of guardian of public order in the Department of Cundinamarca with its city, Bogotá.¹²⁷ The brigades, which in turn are composed of varying numbers of battalions, the basic Colombian unit, are distributed as follows:¹²⁸

TABLE 25
THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE COLOMBIAN ARMY

<u>Brigade</u>	<u>Headquarters City and Department</u>
First	Tunja (Boyacá)
Second	Barranquilla (Atlántico)
Third	Cali (Valle)
Fourth	Medellín (Antioquia)
Fifth	Bucaramanga (Santander)
Sixth	Ibague (Tolima)
Seventh	Villavicencio (Meta)
Eighth	Armenia (Caldas)

Brigades, usually commanded by a colonel, are directly subordinate to the commanding general of the army who is also a member of the joint chiefs of staff (Estado Mayor Conjunto). The commanding general of the armed forces is the direct link between the military organization and the minister of defense who, though usually the highest ranking officer, is a political appointee in the executive's cabinet of ministers. In fact, the minister of war, since 1948 invariably a military man, maintains a great deal of contact with the command structure, so much so that considerable friction has developed within the institution because of perceived infringements on given command jurisdictions.

No one who has had occasion to visit the spacious and ultramodern ministry of war building can fail to see the enormous civilian bureaucracy it takes to keep this military machine going. The building, which also houses the general commands of the army, navy, and air force as well as numerous other functions such as a good military library, is perhaps the greatest factor in the social visibility of the military. The rows of brown, dark blue, and light blue Mercedes-Benzes create the illusion of a massive and permanent structure. The foreign observer's stereotype of the all-powerful and "reactionary" military might easily be reinforced by that sight. Should that observer venture inside, however, he would find an atmosphere of the greatest informality,¹²⁹ and even cordiality. Up to mid-1965, should he have further

explored and entered the library of the general command, he would have found quite a few of-
ficers researching for articles to be published in one of the military journals and always eager
to engage the visitor in a discussion over the economy, land reform, or international politics.
This, however, was early 1965, and the innovators in the institution had caught the imagination
of some officers. Things would change.

Salaries and Living Conditions

A Colombian colonel, noting the difference between the salary scales of Bolívar's army
in Colombia and those in 1922, exclaimed: 'It should not come as a surprise . . . that in those
days the military career was the preferred one of the people of noble birth and of great worth.'¹³⁰
This type of historical wishful thinking perhaps characterizes the members of many institutions,
not just the military. Complaints over salary scales form a large part of the officer's dissatis-
faction syndrome.

At no time does the Colombian officer seem to have been satisfied with his salary. While
in the past the officer often had more than ample reason to complain, the same is not so ap-
parent today, since many of the irregularities have been corrected. In the twentieth century,
salaries have shown the following increases:

TABLE 26
MONTHLY SALARIES* OF COLOMBIAN MILITARY (1913-1965)

<u>Rank</u>	<u>1913¹³¹</u>	<u>1959¹³²</u>	<u>1963¹³³</u>	<u>1965 (proposed)¹³⁴</u>
General de división	200	-	-	-
General	-	1,850	2,500	3,000
Major general	-	1,650	2,250	2,800
Brigadier general	180	1,550	2,100	2,600
Colonel	160	1,450	1,950	2,400
Lieutenant colonel	130	1,350	1,800	2,200
Major	120	1,250	1,650	2,000
Captain	100	1,150	1,450	1,750
Lieutenant	75	1,000	1,250	1,550
Second lieutenant	65	900	1,100	1,350

* Minimum basic monthly expenses for a middle-class family in 1954 were 765.51, and
in 1963, 1,830.96. All amounts are in pesos.

Colombian officers like to observe that civilians frequently point to the military's 1959 pay
raise, noting that it nearly doubled the previous scale. Civilians, however, fail to realize that
it was their first increase since 1941 and that in real purchasing value it really did not com-
pensate for the 18 inflation prone years since 1941. The figures cited above indicate that the
same holds true for the 1963 pay raise. While in 1955 a second lieutenant's pay was more

than the minimum average monthly expense calculated for a "middle class" family, by 1963 the minimum cost could be covered only by a salary of colonel or above.

The Colombian officer calls the rank of captain el doctorado de la milicia meaning that the officer has "graduated or made it." He is then at least 30 years old and probably has been married for three or four years. The captain's family can perhaps be regarded as equivalent to the skilled laborer in industry or the middle range bureaucratic functionary. We find that his basic salary in 1963, \$1,450 pesos, was less than the average wage of the skilled laborers in the following industries: bottling plants, tobacco, paper, rubber, electrical equipment factories.¹²⁵ On a civil service scale of 25 grades, the captain's salary is equivalent to that between grades 10 and 11.¹²⁶ A brigadier general made a basic salary of \$2,100 compared to the congressman's \$3,300 (plus \$3,300 "representation expense" account),¹²⁷ while a skilled laborer in the petroleum industry earned \$217 more per month than either of the two full generals in the army in 1963. These are the "basic" comparative compensations in the system, and they do tend to lend some substance to the officer's complaints.

While one could hardly argue that the Colombian officer is highly paid, gone are the days when the officer on assignment outside Bogotá would spend months without seeing the paymaster, or would have up to a third of his pay withheld "voluntarily." Today compensation for the officer's services are highly regulated and guaranteed by law. All officers today enjoy, besides their base salary, a prima de actividad equivalent to 25 percent of their salary, a 30 percent subsidy for married officers, 5 percent for the first child, and 4 percent for the others. A prima de antigüedad of 10 percent is added after 15 years' service.¹²⁸ Thus, a brigadier general who in 1963-65 had a base monthly salary of \$2,100 pesos had a "real" salary of \$4,900 pesos. There are no longer premiums for officers in combat; the celebrated prima de orden público, around which civilians wove stories of military connivance to show combat situations where there were none,¹²⁹ have been abolished.

Aside from pay benefits the officer enjoys what is perhaps the best medical service in Bogotá through Colombia's most modern hospital, the Hospital Militar, which however is not a "military" hospital. Medical attention, severance pay (cesantía), vacations, death premiums (a general's family gets \$2,500 pesos for his burial; a second lieutenant, \$1,500 pesos), and a solid pension system (which can reach up to 95 percent of his active salary) are all thoroughly regulated by law. A well-organized system of PX's (Fondos Rotatorios) provides a wide assortment of goods at moderate prices. Two critical aspects of the officer's style of life, his residence and the possession of an automobile (both strong determinants of status in Colombia), have also been part of the general improvement in the material compensation of the military career. It is hypothesized that these affect the individual's social status more than the occupational status of the profession.

While the providing of official automobiles to high-ranking officers began during the Ospina Pérez government, it was under Albert Lleras Camargo that the government acquired the well-known fleet of Mercedes-Benzes for the armed forces. These chauffeur-driven cars have become a target for many civilian jokes, and their high social visibility an irritant to latent Colombian anti-militarism. One upper class intellectual told the author that he was paying for their free rides yet he had to take the bus.

The Caja de Vivienda Militar can today provide mortgages up to \$40,000 pesos for any officer with over 15 years' service and who has deposited at least 10 percent of the value of the house or, in lieu of that, owns the lot on which it is to be built. The officer who has not managed to accumulate those qualifications will probably live in military housing, apartments resembling the married student housing at large American universities. This of course is the

case of the majority, a fact which does nothing to enhance the status of the career as a whole. Besides being a strictly cooperative effort with no government allocations made to it, the Caja is dependent on the executive branch and enjoys legal, administrative, and fiscal autonomy. The following figures demonstrate the type of participant in this cooperative venture:¹⁴⁰

TABLE 27
CONTRIBUTIONS OF PARTICIPANTS IN THE CAJA DE VIVIENDA MILITAR

<u>Category of Participant</u>	<u>Amount Contributed, 1947-1964</u>
Officers	42,644,555
Noncommissioned officers	42,507,005
Policemen	8,793,062
Civilian employees of the ministry of defense	8,974,382

An important item to be considered in the analysis of the officer's style of life is the Club Militar. This club, built during the Rojas Pinilla period, has to be considered one of the greatest morale boosters among the officer's prerogatives. The young captain who takes his friends to the Club for drinks and dinner and signs the check is engaging in a style of social behavior formerly identified solely with the upper class. "The one thing the oligarchs will never forgive Rojas for," remarked another captain, "is the building of this military club." Of course it is only when in Bogotá that the officer enjoys its facilities. It has become the practice, however, to have officers' clubs in each of the eight military brigade areas. In at least one case, Armenia (Caldas), the city donated such a facility to the army in gratitude for its services in pacifying the area. That club has become a key factor in the exemplary civilian-military relations existing in Armenia and surrounding towns.

While the concern for improving living conditions of the officer corps began with Ospina Pérez in the late 1940's, the improvements at that time of intense political conflict have to be regarded as being close to the traditional "buying" of military favors. During the Rojas Pinilla period it became a matter of "taking advantage" of a situation. Beginning in 1959 and certainly by 1963, the emoluments of the military profession were put on a strictly legal-rational basis in line with the changes and improvements in military education and training--of the professionalization of the military.

The Budget

One might well ask what all this cost the nation and what it does to the military budget. In 1964 the minister of war noted that of the total budget of \$592,844,255, \$127,349,907 was destined to "social grants, indemnities to civil and military personnel, disability pensions and others." That the military was not to have it both ways is indicated by the fact that in that same year the air force had to return 10 of the 12 F-80 planes recently purchased from the United States. The armed forces, stated the press report, were going through a "grave budgetary crisis."¹⁴¹ The enormous growth of military as well as total governmental expenditures is indicated by the fact that in one and a half decades the former had increased over ninefold, keeping its relative percentage of the total budget, while education increased its share threefold. See Table 28.¹⁴²

TABLE 28
PERCENTAGE OF BUDGET ALLOTMENTS FOR EDUCATION AND MILITARY,
1950-1965

<u>Year</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Percentage for Military</u>	<u>Percentage for Education</u>
1950	83,198	15.7	5.3
1951	110,921	15.5	4.5
1952	151,364	19.8	5.0
1953	221,909	22.5	4.8
1954	250,931	24.4	5.9
1955	242,799	19.9	5.4
1956	265,466	21.1	6.0
1957	256,408	20.5	5.6
1958	285,571	18.4	8.7
1959	309,000	17.2	8.3
1960	325,500	15.9	9.7
1961	351,000	13.23	...
1965	781,000	15.1	14.1

Up to 1951 the expenditures on defense remained below 16 percent. Beginning in 1952 the increasing participation of the armed forces in the civil war that was raging in many areas of Colombia began to show in budgetary increases. High expenditures continued until the fall of Rojas Pinilla in 1957. Both military and civilian authorities explained the reductions after 1957 as the military sector's contribution to the austerity program of the Frente Nacional.¹⁴³

In a military structure where the army comprises 86 percent of the effective force, the navy 9 percent, and the air force only 5 percent, the bargaining power of each varies, as is apparent from the following figures:¹⁴⁴

TABLE 29
INCREASED MILITARY BUDGET, 1956-1960

	<u>Percentages</u>				
	<u>1956</u>	<u>1957</u>	<u>1958</u>	<u>1959</u>	<u>1960</u>
Increase in the defense budget over previous years	27.4	0.87	3.9	12.9	14.5
Increase in the army's share	9.3	5.9	2.2	11.9	6.7
Increase in the navy's share	9.0	0.3	4.0	-2.1	1.9
Increase in the air force's share	8.5	-5.3	1.9	1.4	5.4

According to General Rueda Terán, the increases in the navy's and air force's shares reflect purchases of new material and equipment, the increases in the army's share reflect increases in manpower. These increases in manpower in turn are related to the fact that by 1959 the planning and programming of Colombian military expenditures was increasingly based on the conviction that "Internal Security represents today the basic problem for the Armed Forces, particularly the Army."¹⁴⁵ It cannot be said, however, that by then that line of thought had crystallized into a totally different perception of the mission of the army—this was not to occur until after another two years of serious internal warfare.¹⁴⁶ This internal situation fairly well put an end to the military's "contribution" to any austerity program, and while they did not always get what they wanted (the air force did have to return the planes in 1964)¹⁴⁷ they were more successful in pressuring congress for the desired appropriations. When congress cut \$30 million from the 1964 budget it took one day to have it reinstated.¹⁴⁸

Regardless of the increasing share of the military budget spent on pacification, civic action, or what might be termed system maintenance, the Colombian civilian continues to react hostilely to the size of the defense budget and to the social visibility of the prerogatives enjoyed by the military. In just one issue of the magazine *Sistema* are found three letters to the editor complaining about military inefficiency in keeping public order, all making reference to the size of the military budget.¹⁴⁹ The following letter illustrates the type of sophisticated complaint frequently heard in the civilian sector:

1. There is not enough police protection. The army should move out of areas where there is no violence and into areas of insecurity.
2. It is "inconceivable" that there are 22 generals ("which not even Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela or Peru has"). Five would be enough.
3. The military should "comply with a decree limiting the number of official cars. It is also incredible that the ministry of war in Bogotá alone should have 30 Mercedes Benzes which cost \$10,000 pesos daily, according to the confidential report of a high official in the accounting department. This not counting the cars of police officers which are used to go to the market, take the children to school and to go to Zipaquirá to buy the household meat."
4. Cut down on the number of military attachés abroad. "Each one earning an average of THREE THOUSAND DOLLARS, or more than THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS. . . ."¹⁵⁰

Though the situation of internal violence created a more tolerant attitude toward the size of the military budget, it is probable that as the "pacification" of the countryside moves more and more toward completion, traditional Colombian anti-militarism will mix with the increasing fear of urban unrest to create new demands for reducing the army and increasing the police—certainly not a new demand in Colombia. How the argument is presented is illustrated in the columns of an influential Liberal journalist, Dr. Antonio Panesso Robledo ("Pangloss"), of *El espectador* (emphasis added):

May 17, 1966: The military should not form part of the Executive Cabinet since the Ministries are "organs of political decision-making in a liberal democracy." The Minister of Defense should be a civilian.

May 19, 1966: It is "time to think about something even more radical: the complete abolition of the Ministry of Defense." The mission of the Army is to protect the nation's frontiers and this is now guaranteed by O. A. S. agreements. While at one time internal insecurity made it necessary to have recourse to the Army, the idea was not then and is not now a good one. "It would be infinitely better to have an excellent National Police. . . ." Of the

Armed Forces proper we can keep the Air Force. . . . Money invested in military hardware can be directed toward development. "All this will be possible when the pacification of the country is completed, something that is near."

May 26, 1966: [Responding to military criticism of his previous columns]. . . . The Army has not always defended the National Institutions, they created Rojas' military dictatorship. "And as for our National History, the best pages have not been written by the Armies. . . . They are made by writers and artists, apostles and statesmen. The great martyrs of our liberty were civilians such as Caldas, Torres and the gallery of heroes some of whom were military officers only through force of circumstances but certainly not because they were professionally formed in the career of arms."¹⁵¹

July 2, 1966: The Ministry of Defense budget should be reduced.

Lest it be assumed that "Pangloss" is expressing a strictly personal feeling, the opinion of 130 political leaders was polled in 1965 on whether the army should be reduced, with the following results:

TABLE 30
POLITICAL LEADERS' OPINION ON WHETHER THE ARMY SHOULD BE REDUCED

<u>Answer</u>	<u>Liberals</u>	<u>Conservatives</u>
Augmented greatly	1	4
Augmented	1	11
Remain as is	22	30
Reduced	23	16
Greatly reduced	11	9

Averaging the results, the Liberals were found to be moderately in favor of reduction and the Conservatives weakly-moderate in favor of reduction. "But the general conclusion that can be drawn is that both groups are in favor of reduction. . . ; the Liberals somewhat more than the Conservatives."¹⁵²

The Fuero Militar and the Military's Sense of Group Identity

The fuero militar, as it existed in Spanish military regulations, had evolved into more than a legal provision. The fuero had symbolized the whole status of the military, endowing it with a sense of corporate honor and prestige. It was abolished in Colombia in 1830, just one aspect of the institutional and behavioral break that took place at that time. It was an important political change. Not only did the removal of the fuero reflect a reduction in military influence by removing a very important attribute of prestige, it also contributed to the continued low occupational status of the career. Civilian courts, always political appointments, had within their jurisdiction the authority to punish military offenders so that a critical determinant of military arrogance all through Latin America was amputated early in Colombia. It

was not until the Constitution of 1886 that the fundamental aspects of the fuero militar were reinstated, Article 169 stating:

Military personnel may not be deprived of their rank, honors, or pensions, except in the cases and in the manner which the law shall determine.

Article 17C goes into the more specific aspects of the fuero militar:

Courts-martial or military tribunals shall take cognizance, in accordance with the provisions of the Military Penal Code, of all offenses committed by military personnel in active service, and in relation to that service.

Despite these constitutional provisions it was not until 1945, following the attempted golpe de Pasto, that appropriate specific legislation on military penal justice was enacted.¹⁴³ Today military penal justice is highly regulated and institutionalized¹⁴⁴ and there seems to be general agreement on its convenience and necessity.¹⁴⁵

The fuero militar, however, does not leave the military immune from political pressure. How that pressure, in combination with internal military schisms and personal antagonisms, can affect even the highest ranking officers can be seen in the case of Brigadier General Hernán Medina Mendoza, Commander of the Air Force. Medina was first dismissed by the Minister of Defense General Rebéiz Pizarro, then tried and absolved by a court martial for his part in a whiskey smuggling case in 1965. Now, in Colombia smuggling has become so much a part of life as to have created new institutionalized forms of behavior such as the "gentlemen's agreement." This exists between customs and government authorities, and smugglers on the auctioning and open sale of what one correspondent calculated to be up to 70 percent of the capital's street trade.¹⁴⁶ Having one's private contrabandista has become something of a status symbol in genteel Bogotá society as well as a definite functional necessity. In this context the trial of General Medina and other high ranking officers takes on a special meaning. Apparently tipped off by professional smugglers, members of the opposition MRL political faction opened a debate in congress on the smuggling, a debate punctuated by questions about the military's role in pacification (which they have consistently attacked).¹⁴⁷

This case was not significant because members of congress attacked the military, nor because the air force was involved in smuggling, but, rather because the considerations of this court martial were made in private despite its implications for the public.¹⁴⁸ That so much public debate should have been facilitated by the military's top command, who had it in their power to proceed with a more dignified "behind closed doors" solution to the incident, reflects on the military's self-esteem and collective sense of dignity. In the Colombian context of status-consciousness this was to be expected. Rather than exhibiting the defensive unity one would expect from a Latin American military corporation, the trial became a public carnival. The main feature was the infighting of the high command. Although the association of retired air force officers (ORFAC) did publish a protest against the "disrespectful" treatment of their branch and the injuries to Medina's "personal and family honor," few other such protests were heard. An observant journalist noted the "festive atmosphere" pervading the Club Militar, comparing it to the sombre tension in the room where the court martial was being held.¹⁴⁹ If the military collectively resents affronts to their corporate honor as assumed by many scholars, it certainly was not reflected in the Medina case.

Medina's defense attorney was the retired naval Captain, Francisco Palacio Terán. After noting 40 charges of contraband against individuals ranging from congressmen, officials close

to the president, down to merchants and housewives, as well as other major scandals never investigated, Palacio stated:

Every time a General is thrown up to ridicule and made a victim of insults, they are cracking the structure of the military institution.¹⁶⁰

The question is, why is it so much easier in Colombia for the societal and legal system of sanctions to affect a high military officer than a member of another corporate body of the society? The answer lies in large measure in the weak position of the military as an institutional pressure group, but also in the lack of internal cohesion and sense of group identity of the military institution.¹⁶¹

The armed forces' lack of political bargaining power and internal cohesion can be seen in another case of considerable influence in the recent institutional history of the Colombian army. In 1962 the Minister of War, General Alberto Ruiz Novoa, ordered the Commander of the Escuela de Infantería in Bogotá, Lieutenant Colonel Alvaro Valencia Tovar, to make a study of the general implications for military policy of a recently published and quite controversial book, *La Violencia en Colombia*. He little realized that the resulting report—supposedly of an internal secret nature—would touch off a series of reactions of dire consequences for the whole group of military officers¹⁶² bent on redressing the past mistakes of their institution. Colonel Valencia's report recommended a break with the partisan past of the institution and the adoption of independent measures to improve the population's image of the institution.

Conservative members of congress, already entangled in a debate with Liberals over the book, regarded Colonel Valencia's report as politically biased and dangerous. A committee of prominent Conservatives made a personal appeal to the president for Colonel Valencia's dismissal. Though no action of this sort was taken (the president "passed the buck" to the minister of war), the debate brought into the open the existence of a new pattern of thought and a new sense of the military's mission existing in certain sectors of the armed forces. It also indicated that certain political sectors still had access to the highest circles of the military command, a situation which they have historically exploited when convenient. The fact that a top secret report could reach the hands of politicians clearly demonstrated the continued vulnerability of the institution. This fact, of course, has made successful military conspiracy very difficult in Colombia.¹⁶³ Labelling Colonel Valencia, who is himself from a Conservative family, "the Liberal chief of the Colombian army," Conservative members of congress have never relented in their persecution of this officer, refusing since then to ratify his promotion to full colonel.¹⁶⁴

The Commander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Manuel Prada Fonseca asked the spokesman of the senate group to reveal the name of the officer who had violated military secrecy and to return the document. The senator indignantly stated that in making such a request, "the respect of the congress had been violated." The senator was protecting himself with the *fuero parlamentario* interpreted in its broadest sense. This was a natural and legitimate reaction in the Colombian social and cultural context which has been described as highly sensitive to matters of status, honor, and prestige, personal and institutional. Colombian jurisprudence recognizes the right of an individual to defend not only his personal honor but also that of the *gremio* (corporation) of which he is a member. "Action in the legitimate defense of honor," proclaimed Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in one of his most famous court defenses, ". . . is an attempt to defend one's patrimony which is the social concept, and the internal conscience [personal and corporate]. . . . We are defending the social position and prestige which we acquire in society, that is what we defend in the legitimate defense of honor . . . that is, the concept of dignity which a society has of an individual. . . ." ¹⁶⁵ Gaitán then successfully

persuaded the jury that a military officer would react differently from a civilian in the face of an objectively similar affront:

The exactions which society makes of a civilian are not the same as the exactions of personal dignity which are made of a military man in a similar situation . . . the military is injured in his honor when the civilian feels no injury to his honor. Why? Because of the nature of his career . . . a military man, upon entering and following his career cannot have a passive notion of his dignity and honor, he is obliged to take an active and positive attitude towards valor.¹⁶⁶

Ortíz was certainly arguing about an idealized position of the military as it existed in Spanish society and in some other Latin American countries. In Colombia the situation has been different.

In the nineteenth and into the twentieth centuries the Colombian officer simply did not have enough sense of group identity to respond to attacks against his corporation. It was not until about two decades after the first Chilean missions had instilled a semblance of professionalism that complaints about the "indifference" and "quasi-hostility" of the environment to the noble profession of arms began to appear in military journals. The following editorial was one such:

No one sings its praises; for it there are neither "dreams" nor "colloquies" (*paliques*), the press does not mention it except to censure it and procure its loss of prestige; when public opinion turns its gaze toward the *cuartel* it is to ponder on the unproductiveness of that budgetary expenditure or to discredit obligatory military service; to the improvement of the military hardly anyone turns their energies or good will; the Ministry of War is a universal nightmare.¹⁶⁷

When I asked the ex-Minister of War, General Rufz Novoa, what the officer's attitude was toward the status of his institution in Colombian society his answer is significant both because of the situation he describes and the particular manner in which the military man is viewed—as a member of a minority group:

During the present century the Colombian civilian ruling class has kept the military institution and its members in a state of complete submission. A constant indoctrination concerning the intellectual, social and political superiority of the civilians has been carried out which has produced an inferiority complex in the military. The political and social subordination of the military to the civilians is manifested even in private matters. In case of a conflict between a civilian and a military man, the military would lose, even if in the right, in the face of the political and social influences exercised by the civilian.¹⁶⁸

While the *fuero militar* does provide the Colombian officer with legal protection and rights, legal protection is not enough to guarantee the invulnerability of an institution in the Colombian political system with its conflict-prone political culture. Caught between Conservative-Liberal antagonism, the military institution, internally divided and lacking a strong sense of institutional pride and collective *pundonor*, more often than not has been utilized as a convenient weapon against the political opposition or against military dissidents or innovators themselves.

Recently a general challenged a politician to a duel because of insults to his manliness,¹⁶⁹ a colonel refused to take orders from a group of politicians during a hunt for kidnappers considering their attitude a desafuero to the institution,¹⁷⁰ and a colonel verbally and publicly chastised a politician who accused him of failing in his military duty by being too humanitarian with bandits.¹⁷¹ These officers were reflecting a new attitude, something unprecedented in the history of Colombian civil-military relations.

Already in 1962 a Colombian journal, taking note of the Colonel Valencia Tovar case, editorialized:

What is this all about in reality? About something very simple yet of transcendental importance to all Colombians. . . . Colombia's Army is acquiring a consciousness of its own, of its role in national development. . . . This attitude prohibits it from following the orders of political directorates . . . which has infuriated the political castes. . . . There is a new Army whose mentality is changing; an Army which does not want to be the praetorian guard of anyone.¹⁷²

There can be no doubt but that there were clear signs of a changing perception of mission and a new sense of institutional dignity in important sectors of the military structure. The questions were whether this new attitude was widespread enough in the institution, did it reflect the new socialization process of the officer, was it representative of a majority of officers, or merely of a few "mavericks"? Events were to prove the latter to be closer to the truth. The slow evolution of an autonomous military perception of their status and role in society clearly indicates that the military "innovator" is a rare phenomenon in Colombia. That these innovators can do much to change long-standing antagonisms in the civilian sector when, and perhaps only when, the ideas of these innovators conform with the ideas and images of the future of these sectors, is indicated by the following survey carried out among 73 university students of three different Bogota universities (Table 31). While the scale is too limited to be of much scientific value in establishing the exact occupational status of different professions, one additional question that went with the survey showed the following:

A. Compared to the way in which the society ranks the Army officer:

23 students or 31.5% felt that the military should have more status (prestige)
44 students or 60.2% felt that they should stay in same status position
6 students or 8.2% felt that they should enjoy less status.

In discussing the military with a good number of the students it was discovered that few of them actually knew any military men intimately. As a matter of fact, they were very ignorant about the military institution. The names they could all readily mention, however, were those of General Rufz Novoa, who had just "resigned" and Colonel Valencia Tovar. These two innovators had struck the university student's imagination. Not long after the survey, a group of students and professors at the Universidad de los Andes invited Colonel Valencia Tovar to give a talk. "Actually," confided one of the professors, "we wanted to see whether this official civilista could really handle himself in a University atmosphere." The feedback was that he handled himself "surprisingly" well.

Today students in Colombia are somewhat alienated from the system; their attitude should be interpreted not as representative of the dominant elites of the system but as innovative. In the summer of 1965 they felt they had something in common with these two officers who in their minds had been "victimized" by the system.

TABLE 31
PRESTIGE ACCORDED VARIOUS OCCUPATIONS IN COLOMBIA

<u>Occupation—Position</u>	<u>Simple Rank</u>	<u>Condensed Rank</u>	<u>Mean Score</u>
Ministro del Gabinete (cabinet minister)	1	1	1.68
Senador de la República (national senator)	2	2	2.04
Industrial (big businessman, manufacturer)	3	3	2.41
Jefe de ventas de gran empresa (sales chief for large firm)	4	3	2.49
Representante a la Cámara (representative)	5	4	2.52
Arquitecto (architect)	6	5	2.58
Médico (physician)	7	5	2.62
Profesor universitario (university professor)	8	5	2.63
Ingeniero (engineer)	9	5	2.65
Odontólogo (dentist)	10	6	2.87
Abogado (lawyer)	11	6	2.92
Hacendado (rancher, hacienda owner)	12	7	3.07
Rentista (<u>rentier</u>)	13	7	3.08
Sacerdote (priest)	14	7	3.10
Diputado a la Asamblea Departamental (Departmental, i.e., state deputy)	15	8	3.19
<u>Oficial de la armada (navy officer)</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>3.31</u>
Estudiante universitario (university student)	17	9	3.34
Comerciante (shop/store keeper, commercial activities)	18	9	3.36
<u>Oficial del ejército (army officer)</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>3.59</u>
Periodista (journalist)	20	11	3.72
Funcionario público (public official/employee)	21	11	3.81
Contador (accountant)	22	12	3.97
Empleado particular (private employee, white collar)	23	13	4.11
Empleado público (public employee, bureaucrat)	24	14	4.25
Oficial de la policía (police officer)	25	14	4.26
Concejal (municipal councilman)	26	14	4.29
Maestro de escuela (schoolteacher)	27	15	4.91
Agricultor (farmer, small farmer, farm work)	28	18	5.34

TABLE 31--Continued

<u>Occupation--Position</u>	<u>Simple Rank</u>	<u>Condensed Rank</u>	<u>Mean Score</u>
Carpintero (carpenter)	29	17	6.24
Obrero (blue collar worker, skilled and unskilled)	30	18	6.56
Campeſino (peasant)	31	18	6.65

Source: James Payne, Anthony Maingot, and Mauricio Solaun, "Occupational Prestige in Colombia." Unpublished paper. Research performed in Bogot , Summer 1965. Scoring for emphasis.

The Mission of the Military: A Changing Concept

Throughout most of the nineteenth century the mission of the military was essentially that of a guardian or policeman. With the military reform of 1907, the military was assigned a traditional mission: guarantor of the national security and integrity. Real efforts were made, especially by the foreign training missions, to see that the old conception of the military as "messenger boys" for the political structure was changed. Yet, there continued to be much ambiguity in the military leadership's conception of the army's mission in society.

In 1926 the departmental assembly of Valle petitioned the ministry of war to have the military garrisons function also as firefighting units in the area. The minister consulted with the head of the Swiss mission there at the time who answered him thus:

... It is indispensable that in the future the Army be exempted from all tasks which do not correspond strictly to the ends delineated in the Constitution and the laws. Only in this way can the Army continue its course, quickly but seriously, and reconquer the prestige which it merits.¹⁷³

The minister then answered the assembly that "the Army has a mission which does not allow it to be at the disposition and wishes of everyone."¹⁷⁴ The Swiss officer quite correctly realized that in a highly status-conscious society, the position of prestige and consideration of any profession is to some extent measured by the tasks that it performs and its relative independence in defining the nature and scope of its activities. Only a year later, however, the ministry of war ordered the army to intervene directly in the disputes and strife between labor and management in Colombia's banana zone. This intervention included not only the keeping of order and the legitimate protection of the foreign company's property but also direct participation in labor-management affairs, including the loading and unloading of ships and trains.¹⁷⁵ In general, the army acted as regular strike-breakers with officers apparently taking orders directly from private concerns.¹⁷⁶

This incident is important because the labor conflict of the 1920's can be said to have been the beginning of a type of violence other than strictly political, though responding to similar cultural factors of the system.¹⁷⁷ Regardless of the sphere and regardless of the military's definition of its mission, its role was, in the final analysis, determined by the political party in power. The status of the military in Colombia has never been such that it could perform a role in total conformity with its defined mission. In short, if power is held to imply effective control over policy,¹⁷⁸ then the Colombian military corporation has never had power for they themselves have not controlled military policy.

This factor, a critical aspect of the military's status, has twice in the last two decades led to serious confrontations between part of the military top command and the political sector. The first was the confrontation of Conservative officers with President Alfonso López in the 1930's and the second in 1943 and 1944. When López launched his reform-minded government in 1934-1938, he found a military structure increased in size from 5,000 to 14,000 men due to the recent Colombian-Peruvian conflict over Leticia. The officer corps of this enlarged army, which was almost totally Conservative, was not favorably disposed toward López' "República Liberal." What the role of the army would be in this "new" republic was made clear by López in his inaugural address:

The Republic now has resources which it formerly did not have; among these, the first one, a National Army disengaged from political conflicts, interested in its own technical advancement, and one to which the Government has no need to entrust the guarding of institutional stability which does not rest in armed arbitrariness but in the strict exercise of public liberties; and with it, with its troops and officers, it is necessary to attempt the reincorporation of national territories into the nation, confiding to them the honorable mission of extending the Colombian territory within its own boundaries.¹⁷⁹

In 1935 López amplified his proposals on the new mission for the army. In essence he felt that Colombian society could not afford an army which did not have social utility during peace time. Its social function should be that of opening up new regions of Colombia for colonization—the "colonial army" he termed it.¹⁸⁰ Whether it was true, as López proclaimed, that political opponents had "maliciously" distorted his proposals for the new mission of the army¹⁸¹ or whether these ideas needed no distorting but were well understood, the fact is that the majority of the officer corps was opposed to the very idea of a "colonial army," especially one within the context of the "Liberal Republic." The officer corps itself, it seems, had not been consulted on their new mission and functions but had been presented with a political fait accompli. The army was to take its place within López' scheme for changing the physiognomy of the nation. That he was well aware of the immediate military opposition to his plans is apparent:

The surprise and even the visible disgust with which some of the proposals in this area enunciated by me as a Candidate and later as President-elect aroused in me fear that I had committed an irreparable technical mistake.¹⁸²

López went on to claim, however, that from the expressions of some officers he was now convinced he was on the right path.¹⁸³

Where initially there did seem to be some support in the officer corps this support tended to vanish with the increasing intrusion of non-military individuals in affairs now considered to be strictly military. Thus General Efraín Rojas, Inspector General of the Army and a man who, though a Conservative, frequently appeared in photos accompanying the president, stated in 1936 that the army supported the president in his reform program.¹⁸⁴ The next year, however, Efraín was warned against "individuals who are strangers to the military profession" fixing the norms of behavior for the army in defense matters.¹⁸⁵ Those who did write favoring the new mission were low ranking and unknown military figures.¹⁸⁶ No major figures, it appears, publicly supported the ideas, at least not in the military organs of expression.

The military's opposition to López' ideas for a new colonizing mission was apparent almost immediately. It must be seen in the context of the Conservative orientation of the officer corps, which made it more susceptible to the subversive invitations of a violent opposition.

Political reasons as much, or more, than institutional indignity seem to have comprised the basis for the different attempts against the López regime.¹⁸⁷ But neither in 1936 nor in 1943 and 1944 did the army manage to accomplish anything more than to have itself purged by the Liberal government. From a severely weakened position they saw the police force strengthened beyond what the army thought was necessary. As the 1948 "Bogotazo" proved, strengthening of the police was not beneficial for the nation since they were even more politicized than the army.

This then represented a case where the status of the military did not allow it enough power to defend its conception of its traditional mission, or at least to be seriously consulted and considered in any changes therein. The next development to be described, however, ironically finds the military themselves attempting to change their role in society, redefining their mission from the traditional one to that of modernizer—and again failing in their efforts.

Civic Action and Modernization

The Lebrete Report

Colombians have never been hesitant in seeking the advice of foreign experts in different matters; from Italian consultants in penal matters, American experts in finance and taxation, to Spanish advisors for the police, and Chilean, Swiss, English, and American missions for the military institutions. One such foreign mission, which has had a considerable impact on the developmental orientation of many Colombian intellectuals, civilian and military, was that of the French economist-clergyman Lebrete. With recommendations ranging all the way from economic development to the humanities and social concerns, the Lebrete report also concerned itself with the role of the army in Colombia's developing society. Lebrete's argument was that of the French rural economist, Jean Marius, who advocated the "creative army" concept. In essence this meant

... the optimal utilization of the armed forces to assure the harmonious development, particularly in what refers to the more rapid establishment of the infrastructure, for the preparation of technicians at different levels for the purpose of exploiting the territory, and for the cultural elevation of the whole. Stated in another fashion, the armed forces of a developing country do not have only a defense function; they should be ... "a creative army."¹⁸⁸

Regarding the officer, the report noted that to "conceive of the officer as a man separated from the great necessities and the great general problems of the nation does not make sense today." The trained officer should be a "superior and disinterested" man who could contribute to the global aspects of the development of the nation. Indeed, the report visualized these trained officers as giving the civilian elites, "too much inclined as in all Latin countries to seeking refuge in phraseology,"¹⁸⁹ a sense of efficiency and a contact with the concrete social reality of the nation. With both officers and enlisted men trained in necessary technical fields, Lebrete visualized the army as providing "a transitional social layer from which will emerge new elites for which a developing nation has much need."¹⁹⁰

Just what was the immediate influence of this expert's call for a new mission and role for the military is difficult to determine. There is evidence, however, that this along with his other recommendations served as a stimulus to those who were already thinking along those lines. From intellectual circles there was already an inkling of some thought being given to the military, something not heard of before in Colombia.¹⁹¹

A New Mission

Thus by 1960-61 the military had begun to engage in activities which were not strictly military in nature, such as providing medical services and building schools and similar social services even though on a small and regional scale.¹⁹² In 1960, the armed forces began to publish a journal which had the expressed purpose of examining social, political, and economic problems which were related to national defense.¹⁹³ In the first number, the editors stated that through this approach they hoped to compensate for the "indifference" with which Colombians viewed matters of national sovereignty and for their "one sided" concern with petty politics.¹⁹⁴ No explicit mention was made, however, of a modernizing role for the military. To the standard question of how they repaid the state for the investment made, a standard answer was still being given: by serving as an "example" of "outstanding moral virtues."¹⁹⁵ The sense of a new mission in the society, therefore, was only vaguely becoming apparent.

It was not until the end of the first government of the Frente Nacional in 1962 that there was specific mention in higher political circles of a new mission and role for the military in society. This came as part of the so-called "Programa de los Cuarenta" or the program presented by the spokesmen of the Frente Nacional for the government of Guillermo León Valencia.¹⁹⁶ Concerning the role of the military, in terms taken apparently verbatim from the Lebret report cited above, the program stated that

The organization, equipping and technical preparation of the military forces should correspond every day more decidedly with the importance of their defensive mission and to the contribution which they can provide to national progress in other fields such as in popular education, community development and land reform.¹⁹⁷

The program went on to note that the increasing pacification of the country and the increasing number and quality of the police forces would permit the channeling of military money and energies into these endeavors. It also advocated that political sectors should refrain from interference in internal military matters.

Minister of War Rufz Novoa

Guillermo León Valencia and the political power structure of the Frente Nacional coalition had as their first Minister of War, Alberto Rufz Novoa, an officer who displayed some firmly established notions about the role of the military in society. Rufz Novoa embodied all the different aspects which went to form the new perception of mission and role of the military innovator. He had been one of the many young men from what might for descriptive purposes be called Bogotá's upper middle class who, in the atmosphere of patriotism created by the conflict with Peru in the early 1930's, entered the Escuela Militar. He served as commander of the Colombian contingent in Korea and later as an effective comptroller general of the republic under Rojas Pinilla. That Rufz Novoa at least thought of implementing some of the knowledge he had acquired in Korea is apparent from his thesis for graduation from Colombia's Escuela Superior de Guerra.¹⁹⁸ A man with a strong intellectual bent, he was not one to disregard foreign teachings and experience. French and American thought had an apparent influence on his perception of the role of the military and in the adoption of tactics.¹⁹⁹ A trip to Israel in April 1964 seems to have jelled his thoughts on civic action.²⁰⁰

Military Perception of the New Mission

Already as commanding general of the army, Rufz Novoa had utilized the service periodical, Revista del ejército, as a means of expressing his ideas on the need for a clearer conception of the military mission. These were stated mostly in such traditional and symbolic terms as moral example and guardianship of national sovereignty. As Minister of War, Rufz Novoa made the Revista de las fuerzas armadas his main vehicle for communicating his ideas on the new modernizing mission to his fellow officers as well as to the literate Colombian civilian community. For internal instruction, especially among the noncommissioned officers and the enlisted men, the weekly news sheet Ejército was initiated. A content analysis of these two periodicals (see Table 32 following) shows a breakdown in terms of the military's concept of mission, and clearly reveals the dramatic emergence in 1963 of a perception of the modernizing functions of the armed forces. The data, however, indicate that the trend was ephemeral. It reached its peak the following year and reversed itself in 1965.

TABLE 32
PERCEPTION OF A MODERNIZING MISSION BY MILITARY JOURNALS

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number of Articles</u>	<u>Number Indicating Perception of a Modernizing Mission</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
1956-1959	257	1	0.39
1960	116	4	2.57
1961	179	9	5.0
1962	209	7	3.35
1963	155	11	7.1
1964	241	36	14.93
1965	103	4	3.88
1966	52	1	1.92

Sources: Revista militar, Revista del ejército, Revista de la infantería, Revista de las fuerzas armadas.

A few indicative titles of articles appearing in the major military journals are "La geopolítica y la labor social del ejército," "El ejército y su influencia en la educación del pueblo colombiano," "Fuerzas militares: un instrumento al servicio de un propósito nacional," "Tres conceptos sociales a través del ejército," and "La organización militar y la economía."

Reason for the New Mission

It is quite important to make a clear distinction between a modernizing role and a change of military tactics. The fact that the Colombian army became aware of the need for purely military reforms as early as 1954²⁰¹ and started to develop the necessary organizational and doctrinal changes did not mean that it had emerged as a force for change. It was rather the

internal situation of violence which finally convinced some officers of the need for structural reforms in the countryside. Rufz Novoa expressed his thoughts on the matter as early as 1962:

The duration of the violence which has so intensely struck the towns and villages of Colombia, and the analysis of the military situation of the world, lead us to believe that a change in the Colombian military mentality is necessary. . . .²⁰²

From this position Rufz Novoa appears to have developed his later conviction that basic structural changes in Colombian society were needed and that the armed forces should play a positive role in the transformation.

A basic influence in the reorientation of military thinking was the fact that the Colombian army had been tested in internal war. The proverbial cliché of the "for parades only" Latin American army did not apply to it. The army's fatalities for 1952-1962 included 35 officers, 129 noncommissioned officers, and 1,135 soldiers. The police had lost 9 officers, 73 non-commissioned officers, and 779 policemen.²⁰³ Overall fatalities in this struggle over a recent two year period have been estimated as follows.²⁰⁴

TABLE 33
DEATHS DUE TO THE VIOLENCE

<u>Category</u>	<u>Number of Deaths</u>	
	<u>1962</u>	<u>1963</u>
Armed forces	210	118
Civilians	2,310	1,284
Bandits	396	460

The reaction of part of the officer corps to this situation was the adoption of a modernizing mission.

The Consequences of a Modernizing Mission

Writing in 1947, a Colombian officer made this perceptive remark about a very real problem:

Because of the duties of military service I have had to tour some regions of the two Santanders [Departments], and the majority of the towns visited wish to have a military mayor. This same thing is happening in other regions of the country because the people say that they [military mayors] are signs of tranquility, order and progress. This system of civil administration carried out by military men has caused a loss in prestige to the civilian element while the military elements gain ground right and left. For the Armed Forces this situation is beneficial and we are all proud of it; but if this continues indefinitely as a means of remedying the difficult situation of the majority of the towns, the Armed Forces would have to

confront a dilemma: either the officer corps specializes in public administration, abandoning the technical-military field, or they return to the cuartel to continue the functions which are appropriate to them.

The officer ended with a plea to civilians to "abandon violence" and let the military return to their proper functions. "In this country, democratic par excellence and civilianist by tradition, it seems that the roles are being inverted; one has the feeling that the military are civilianist and that the civilians are the warriors."²⁰⁶

This officer was not exaggerating. By 1946 there were in Colombia a total of 202 military mayors (alcaldes militares) distributed as follows: Antioquia, 18; Atlántico, 2; Bolívar, 23; Boyacá, 46; Cauca, 8; Cundinamarca, 18; Huila, 11; Magdalena, 8; Nariño, 19; Norte de Santander, 13; Santander, 18; Tolima, 10; Valle, 8. The public's reaction was reported to be one of "gratitude" toward the military.²⁰⁷

Gratitude turned into open hatred as the heavily Conservative army became more and more the politicized strong arm of the repressive Conservative governments of Ospina Pérez and Laureano Gómez. As the conflict between the two traditional parties assumed the proportions of a civil war, the military appeared to lose control of their own destiny. At the moment of greatest need, Colombia had no army that could act as a neutral buffer between the two contending factions—something the authors of La violencia en Colombia amply document and which the modernizing officers took as a lesson not to be repeated.

The New Mission of Civic Action

With the political agreement between the two parties in 1957, the military found itself not only furnishing the mayors in many towns, but also rehabilitating ex-guerrillas. The rehabilitation of bandits had actually been initiated by General Alfredo Duarte Blum in the Llanos Orientales at the beginning of the Rojas Pinilla government (1954). It was continued by the government of Lleras Camargo (1958-1962). The "Plan Lazo" and the "civilian-military programs" initiated in 1962 differed from earlier efforts in some fundamental respects. One of these was the political effect and implications of the civic-action programs. Entering the most abandoned areas of Colombia, the military directly carried out reforms which won the gratitude of the people.²⁰⁷ When the minister of war visited the site of a rural civic-action program and gave a speech reiterating the military's role in modernization, he was answered by the president of the Junta de Acción Comunal who stated that none of the promises of the politicians had ever been kept and that the locality was in dire need of a medical center and a school. "I therefore want to explain all this in order to influence the Minister of War and the military commanders who are accompanying him on this trip."²⁰⁸

The military-directed development and assistance programs also reached urban areas on a massive scale. In just one day 25,000 persons were given medical attention in one form or another, medicines, food, and even 4,000 toys for the children. Haircuts in the number of 1,208 and 148 pairs of shoes mended were accomplishments of this one campaign. These jornadas cívico-militares became more frequent.²⁰⁹ All through the country civilian-military committees were organized composed of the local military commanders and prominent civilians. This type of action had become such an important part of general developmental programming that, in 1964, \$5 million of a \$39 million United States grant were earmarked for civic action programs.²¹⁰

In a government recognized for its inaction and vacillating nature, Minister of War Rufz Novoa survived each consecutive cabinet crisis and began to draw public attention to himself and to the eminently successful pacification campaigns. The "new army" was catching Colombia's imagination. In the course of his first press conference as minister, the general proclaimed that: "In the name of the Armed Forces I invite the ruling classes to facilitate the reforming of our socio-economic structure." Rufz Novoa placed the "new army" in the midst of the Colombian political system and its political culture of conflict.²¹¹ For the first time in Colombian history a military man by his own right and representing no political party or group was proclaiming the right of the armed forces to help define and set national goals and assist in carrying them out.

With the military civic action programs reaching Colombian political grass roots with an impact traditional politicians could not fail to grasp, the controversial minister's pronouncements could not be dismissed lightly. "Civilian politicians of the traditional parties," wrote Philip B. Taylor from Bogotá, "are disturbed over the improving reputation of the Army with the lower classes."²¹² The *New York Times* noted that, "It is generally believed that the Liberals are in doubt about their candidate's [now President Carlos Lleras Restrepo] popular support. For this reason it is noted that the Liberals' fear of Rufz's position has prompted them to react sharply against him."²¹³

Despite the mounting pressures for the dismissal of the minister of war, President Valencia defended his policies. Noting the advances made in the professional education of the officer, the president remarked that, "There are many people who believe that the education of the Armed Forces can eventually become a factor toward imbalance in the role of democratic institutions." Valencia expressed his dissent and went on to state that the armed forces could "no longer restrict themselves solely to the exercise of their military activities" but had a duty to commit themselves more and more and with greater and greater enthusiasm to the study of national problems.²¹⁴

Return to the Traditional Mission

The process, which had started with the political attacks on Colonel Valencia Tovar in the 1962 congress, had come to a head. During the 1962-1964 period, Colombians in decision-making or opinion-forming positions aligned themselves into two identifiable positions regarding the nation's most pressing problem. There were those who demanded quick and effective military action against the guerillas, and those who advocated basic social and economic reforms at the local level and a slow "rehabilitation" of violent areas. With the former position were identified powerful groups and newspapers such as *El siglo*, *La república*, and some columnists from *El tiempo*, most notably "Calibán." The latter position was held by the so-called progressive sectors of society but mainly identified with two military men: Minister of War Rufz Novoa and Colonel Alvaro Valencia Tovar, head of the key E-3 department of the army, which was in charge of psychological warfare.²¹⁵

On January 27, 1965, General Rufz Novoa was dismissed in sensational fashion. As in the past, powerful political groups with access to members of the armed forces high command through kinship ties and common political sentiments won over key military leaders for an internal coup against the minister.²¹⁶ At first glance it seems an enigma how the new mission and role of the military, which was initially suggested in 1962 by a powerful political programming committee and which seemingly had executive approval and the support of intellectual, student, labor and certain peasant sectors through the Juntas de Acción Comunal, could come under such sudden and violent attack. The explanation appears to lie in the realities of

Colombian political culture. As in 1936, 1943, and 1944 the proponents of the new functions of the armed forces found themselves early in 1965 on the losing side in a political power play. Rufz Novoa's "resignation" as minister of war had a dramatic effect on the military attitude toward a modernizing mission. This change is clearly reflected in the content of the military journals in 1965 and 1966, as indicated in Table Number 32, and is summarized in one of the articles.²¹⁷

If it is the duty of the Armed Forces to remain vigilant so that nothing bad happens, if its essence is the protection of the social order, then by its very nature it cannot take part in permanent discussion about the orientation of the State. . . .

The armed forces had reverted to a traditional function. The military career was again seen as una especie de sacerdocio, allowing no activities "allies to our mission which is none other than to provide security to the Nation."²¹⁸

Although the new military command denied press reports that the civic-action campaign and other programs of a non-military nature had been abandoned, there are signs that important civilian sectors believed that such activities should be abandoned or reduced. Those who had argued that "first the bandits have to be eliminated" before other actions could be taken²¹⁹ were now satisfied that the "demagogic formula of General Rufz Novoa . . . has disappeared."²²⁰ Those who had hoped for a new modernizing army at the service of the nation and had worked towards that end now changed their minds.²²¹ Although there might have existed legitimate fears of a coup by the military in conjunction with other popular forces,²²² a more obvious explanation of Rufz' fall is to be found in Colombia's political culture.

Once the modernizing officer began expressing opinions and making decisions which had political implications or effects, he was automatically regarded as a power contender in the system. Whether he so regarded himself or not, he had to face traditional Colombian opposition. Military personnel were neither able nor willing to place themselves in this position. As one officer put it, the officers would rather resign than reb Rufz Novoa resigned.²²³ "All the dissenting generals are now out" read the headlines of Colombian newspapers.²²⁴

CONCLUSION

It is a widely held sociological assumption that conditions of prolonged internal or external warfare or strife lead to an increase in military power and a weakening of civilian supremacy in democratic states.²²⁵ Military crisis intervention is frequently seen as a result of the gap which eventually materializes between the effective organization of legitimate violence in the nation and the diminishing ability of the civilian components of the system to manage the situation.²²⁶ The functions of system maintenance pass to military hands. The question arises as to why, given the prolonged state of internal violence in Colombia and the rise in military effectiveness, there has not been a fundamental weakening of the supremacy of the dominant civilian elites over the military sector. Probing into the persistence of certain behavioral and attitudinal patterns can provide a partial answer.

It is a fundamental mistake to regard social change in Colombia as affecting all aspects of that society's structure and ethos, a process generally connoted by the terms "modernization," "Westernization," or in a more limited aspect, "urbanization." "Some features of the past," states Wilbert Moore, "are always relevant to the present, and the historical heritage persists in some form even in post-revolutionary regimes." One of these features is the characteristic

tensions of the political system and the ways in which these tensions are "managed."²²⁷ In analyzing political systems, one must look for continuities and changes.

In this study an interpretation was advanced that the Colombian social system remains highly status-conscious in character, ranking individuals to a large extent on the basis of social prestige. In such a society the concept of personal and corporate pundonor is highly regarded and forms a major part of the primary demands made by the Colombian. He, the Colombian, wants to be satisfied by his surroundings not only in the sense that he personally enjoys social esteem, but also that his profession or career is prestigious. This is not to say that the Colombian officer is unique in this respect. Janowitz discovered that for the American officer, "Honor comes to be combined with and dependent upon public prestige and popular recognition. The military must be afforded sufficient prestige and respect to insure a sense of self-esteem. . . . [Today] the military man's self-esteem and self-image [depend] to a greater extent on public attitudes and popular opinion."²²⁸

It is here contended, however, that in Colombia dependence of the military on outside sectors is greater in degree than in most other countries. Lacking a strong sense of brotherhood, of intense group solidarity and pride in the institution vis-à-vis a latently hostile environment, the Colombian officer seeks the satisfaction of certain primary personality demands. High among these is the need for affection and esteem—for social status—outside the institution. This dependence further weakens the institution's ability to satisfy primary demands of the group.²²⁹ The root of this "vicious circle" has to be found in the atypical historical development of the Colombian military institution.

Edwin Lieuwen, who maintains that "the nineteenth century histories of the sixteen Spanish-American nations were essentially military," with the military dominating politics in all but Chile and Costa Rica, has offered what amounts to the standard explanation for the "origins of militarism."

Since eligibility for a commission was restricted to the creole elite, the officers naturally tended to identify themselves with the upper classes from which they came. This aristocratic identification continued even after independence, when the officer corps began to be drawn more and more from the middle groups in the society. Also, the fuero militar, which exempted personnel of the armed forces from the jurisdiction of civil courts, tended to raise the army above the law, creating a privileged caste exempt from public liability and civil responsibility. Here, then, was the origin of the military caste system and the praetorian tradition in Latin America.²³⁰

Whatever validity this causal explanation might have for the rest of Spanish America, it does not apply for Colombia.

Early in Colombian national history the military profession was reduced to a very low level in terms of social status and prestige. The persistence in certain key civilian sectors of adverse stereotypes of soldiers was somewhat overcome during the late 1950's and early 1960's by improvements in military organization, training, and styles of life, and by a deliberate public relations campaign to change that image. Civilian sectors contributed to the change because of a conviction that the "new army" was needed to eliminate Colombia's number one problem—violence. Today the direct tangible threat of violence has been reduced due to the efforts of that new army. In the process, however, something happened to certain segments of it. They desired to make their role in Colombian society a meaningful and permanent one.

For this to take place, the status of the military would have to crystallize on all levels—social and economic as well as political in the sense that system maintenance is a political function in Colombia. Accompanying their improved status would be a role in the decision-making process of the system. This type of innovation poses too great a threat, both political and social, to the dominant elites; thence, their reaction.

Despite the beginnings of professionalism, or at least the establishment of preconditions for it in 1907, the Colombian military institution still did not meet the primary personality needs of a large sector of its officers—especially the need for social esteem and prestige. They continued to seek these outside the institution by membership and participation in other groups. Formerly these were primarily of a kinship and political nature with the two largely overlapping in the case of Colombia. Today the officer, enjoying a higher standard of living, finds more and more activities of a social type in which to spend his hours of leisure. With the reduction in guerilla activity the military career presents less of a risk than it once did. The status quo must not look at all bad from the balcony of the Military Club. Of course the club was built by a military "innovator," but as occurs in most Colombian historiography, military historians have a way of glossing over the periods of innovation to dwell on the "heroic" period of independence—building a mythology based on a few outstanding figures. The problem is that the Colombian civilian historian will not even grant them that—those "heroes," they claim, were really civilians who fought for higher ideals, they were not "military men." The real social history of the regular army is ignored in Colombia.

In the final analysis this status-dependence on outside groups is a guarantee against the direct "crisis" intervention of the military, a guarantee of civilian constitutionalism. But two additional results of that dependence should also be noted: it makes innovation, e.g., a modernizing role, virtually impossible, and, more serious, should the felicitous coalition of the two traditional parties collapse, or should there emerge a large enough opposition group posing a real challenge to the status quo, will the military institution be its "own man"?

Given Colombia's political culture, a professional but also "independent" military force might be the only guarantee of peace. This independence can come only with a strong sense of group identity and a clear concept of military mission. Both seem somewhat lacking in Colombia as of 1966.

NOTES

THE PROBLEM

1. This incident took place in Bogotá, July 22, 1965. It is important to note that the officer involved was then taking the author to a meeting with university faculty and students where he would represent the Army Engineer Corps in a forthcoming joint university-army civic action program.
2. Cf. ". . . I have never seen more melancholy people than our officers and soldiers. In parades and as individual pedestrians during leave or at graduation ceremonies, they all look sad." Letter to the editor, La Nueva Prensa, Vol. II, No. 79 (November 3, 1962), p. 11.
3. Antonio García, "Servicio Militar," Daniel Arango (ed.), Los Mejores cuentos colombianos, Vol. II (Bogotá, n.d.), p. 715.
4. Senado de la república. Comisión Instructora, El proceso contra Gustavo Rojas Pinilla ante el Congreso Colombiano (Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 1960), Vol. II, p. 491. For a similar case, see the account of the period of 1854 below.
5. Alberto Ruz Novoa, El gran desaffo (Bogotá, 1965), p. 120.
6. Ibid.
7. "Me gustaría ser Ministra de Guerra; declara doña Bertha," El espectador, June 6, 1965, p. 3.
8. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (Glencoe, Ill., 1960), pp. 215-231.
9. Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. Trans. by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons. Ed. by Talcott Parsons (Glencoe, Ill., 1964), pp. 428-429; Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber; an Intellectual Portrait (New York, 1962), pp. 85-86.
10. Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (New York, 1958), p. 8.
11. Gabriel Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," Journal of Politics, Vol. XVIII (1966), p. 24.
12. Sidney Verba, "Comparative Political Culture," Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.), Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton, 1965), p. 555.

THE SOCIAL SYSTEM; ITS POLITICAL CULTURE

13. For an account of how major issues in Colombia worked themselves out in major constitutional revisions, see William Marlon Gibson, The Constitutions of Colombia (Durham, N. C., 1948), passim.
14. Eduardo Riascos Grueso, Geografía guerrera de Colombia (Cali, 1950), p. 335. These figures should be taken as approximations; the 1810 figure seems excessive, while the 1899-1902 figure is 50,000 more than that given by a standard reference text.
15. Lewis A. Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (Glencoe, Ill., 1956), pp. 151-156; Germán Guzmán Campos, Orlando Fals-Borda, and Ernesto Umaña Luna, La violencia en

Colombia, 2 vols. (Bogotá, 1962, 1964), rely heavily on Coser's interpretation. See especially Vol. I, pp. 406-411.

16. Misión "Economía y Humanismo," Estudio sobre las condiciones del desarrollo de Colombia (Bogotá, 1958), pp. 35-37. For a similar view see Robert M. Dix, "Colombia: Two Party System in Crisis," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1962, pp. 91-92.

17. These conclusions are based on personal observations in Colombia and on the works of T. Lynn Smith, especially his contribution to Theodore Crevenna (ed.), Materiales para el estudio de la clase media en la América Latina (Washington, D.C.: Pan American Union), Vol. VI; and "Social Stratification in Colombia," manuscript, Gainesville, Florida, November 1965; see also Orlando Fals-Borda, Peasant Society in the Colombian Andes (Gainesville, Florida, 1958), pp. 154-163.

18. Andrew H. Whiteford, Two Cities of Latin America; A Comparative Description of Social Classes, Logan Museum of Anthropology, Monograph No. 9 (Beloit, Wisconsin: Beloit College, 1960).

19. On the Colombian socialization process see Fals-Borda, Peasant Society, Part 3; and also his "Bases for a Sociological Interpretation of Education in Colombia," A. Curtis Wilgus (ed.), The Caribbean: Contemporary Colombia (Gainesville, Florida, 1962), pp. 183-210.

20. Hernández (pseud.), "Boyacá," unpublished autobiographical manuscript in possession of relatives of author, Bogotá, August, 1965.

21. The two best descriptive studies of the Colombian political system are Dix's previously cited dissertation and Ben G. Burnett, "The Recent Colombian Party System: Its Organization and Procedure," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Los Angeles, 1955.

22. Dix, "Colombia," pp. 65-66. Emphasis in original.

23. The documentation of Colombian violence is already considerable, but most of it deals with the more recent phenomenon known as "la violencia" rather than with the political culture of the society. Some of the better studies are Guzmán, Fals-Borda, and Umaña Luna, La violencia; James M. Daniel, "Rural Violence in Colombia Since 1946," unpublished manuscript, Princeton, New Jersey, 1964; F. Guillén Martínez, Rafz y futuro de la revolución (Bogotá, 1963).

24. El espectador, August 29, 1965, p. 11.

25. Ibid., February 28, 1964, p. 1.

26. For a statistical study of the existence of a subculture of poverty in Bogotá see Father Camilo Torres, La proletarianización de Bogotá: Ensayo de metodología estadística, Monografías sociológicas No. 9 (Bogotá, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 1961).

27. Tomás Rueda Vargas, El ejército nacional, August 30, 1934, p. 257.

28. Ibid., p. 261.

29. Ibid., p. 259. Emphasis added.

30. Phanor James Eder, Colombia. Third impression (London, 1917), p. 44.

THE MILITARY SYSTEM

31. Copiador de ordenes del Regimiento de milicias de infantería de Santa Fe (1810-1814). Transcripción, índices y comentarios de Oswaldo Díaz Díaz (Bogotá, 1963), pp. 80-83; Capt.

Camilo Riaño C., "Las milicias del 20 de julio de 1810, origen del ejército nacional," Revista de las fuerzas armadas, Vol. II, (October 2, 1960), pp. 91-106.

32. Díaz Díaz, Copiador, p. 21.

33. Indalecio Liévano Aguirre, Los grandes conflictos sociales y económicos de nuestra historia (Bogotá, n.d.), p. 36.

34. Díaz Díaz, Copiador, p. 73.

35. Luis Felipe Acevedo, "Bosquejo de la organización militar de la Nueva Granada," Memorial del Estado mayor general, Vol. XII (June 1919), p. 164.

36. Allan James Kuethe, "The Military Reorganization of New Granada, 1763-1803," unpublished M. A. thesis, University of Florida, 1963, p. 40 and passim.

37. Díaz Díaz, Copiador, pp. 231-232. Paraphrased from text.

38. "The Constitution of 1811," Gibson, The Constitutions, p. 17.

39. The title of the following proposal for its establishment is indicative of the "aristocratic" view of the war and the military still predominant at this time: "Método que podrá seguirse para instruir a los caballeros oficiales de nueva creación en la Tactica Militar, y puntos mas esenciales de su servicio, dirigido por el Teniente Coronel don José Ramón de Leyva, segun lo que a propuesta de la sección de Guerra ha determinado la Suprema en su Cuerpo Ejecutivo en diciembre de 1810," reprinted in Revista militar del ejército, Vol. XXV (July-August 1932), pp. 499-504.

40. Tomás Rueda Vargas, Escritos (Bogotá: Antares, 1963), Vol. I, p. 237.

41. The first legislative body to function in Colombia, the Junta Suprema del Reino (July 20, 1810) provided for a Sección de Guerra as one of the six sections established. Of the three sections set up by Bolívar at Angostura in 1817, Guerra y Marina was one. In 1819, it became the Ministerio de Guerra y Hacienda. From then on, Secretaría de Guerra (1823-1827); Secretaría de Guerra y Marina (1831-1843); Secretaría de Guerra (1844-1858); Secretaría de Gobierno y Guerra (1859-1865); Secretaría de Guerra y Marina (1865-1887); Ministerio de Guerra (1888-1965). Raimundo Rivas, "Apuntes sobre organización de las secretarías de estado, 1810-1914," Boletín de historia y antigüedades, Vol. XIV (February 1923), pp. 293-311. On December 22, 1965, the name was changed to "Ministerio de las Defensa Nacional" (El espectador, December 30, 1965, p. 1).

42. José Gil Fortoul, Historia constitucional de Venezuela (Berlin, 1907), Vol. I, p. 397.

43. Raymond E. Crist, "Desarrollo político y origen del caudillismo en Venezuela," Revista de geografía americana, Vol. VII (1937), pp. 253-270, provides a geographical explanation.

44. Gerhard Masur, Simon Bolívar (Albuquerque, N. M., 1948), p. 500; Fortoul, Historia, Vol. I, p. 483.

45. David Bushnell, The Santander Regime in Gran Colombia (Newark, Del.), p. 258.

46. Cited in Masur, Bolívar, p. 442. Masur complements Bolívar's words by repeating a question once raised by Páez, "The literati of Bogotá, the men of the highlands, who wore warm woolen clothing and who sat around the braziers in their houses, what did they know of the waters of the Orinoco, of the fishermen of Maracaibo, of the courses of the Magdalena, or the deserts of Colombia—of all the wild and terrible contrasts so familiar to the fighting forces?" (Ibid.).

47. José María Samper recognizes this when he notes that there were two categories of land, that in the surroundings of the cities and villages and towns, and that beyond, "los espacios entre unas y otras localidades, tierras baldías, incultas, es decir, el desierto, la soledad, el silencio de la barbarie . . ." (Ensayos sobre las revoluciones políticas [Bogotá, n.d.], p. 63). For a general treatise on the significance of this rural-urban dichotomy in Latin American history, see Richard M. Morse, "Some Characteristics of Latin American Urban History," American Historical Review, Vol. LXVII (January 1962), pp. 317-338.

48. Masur, Bolívar, p. 620.

49. Samper, Ensayos, p. 75. On p. 295, Samper gives the same figures for the year 1809, except for slaves of whom he states there were 78,000 in Nueva Granada.

50. Samper, Ensayos, p. 85; for a generalized sociological interpretation see Fals-Borda, Peasant Society, pp. 154-158.

51. Masur, Bolívar, p. 626.

52. Ibid. The woman in the palace was Manuela Sáenz, Bolívar's mistress. Masur notes that "the people of Bogotá had no sympathy with the army—especially an army whose ranking officers were in many cases foreigners. They abhorred military dictatorship, and they detested Manuela" (ibid., p. 642).

53. Bushnell, The Santander Regime, p. 250.

54. Samper, Ensayos, p. 186.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid., pp. 186-187; Fortoul emphasizes the fact of Páez' mestizaje in his behavior (Historia, Vol. I, p. 397).

57. Bushnell, The Santander Regime, p. 250.

58. Gustavo Arboleda, Historia Contemporánea de Colombia (Bogotá, 1928), Vol. I, p. 111.

59. Samper as quoted in Ensayos, Vol. I, p. 448. Emphasis added.

60. Quoted in Masur, Bolívar, p. 441. Masur claims that Bolívar had Páez especially in mind, and this sounds reasonable since Páez had already written complaining of those civilian lawyers who "flatter the military when they are possessed with fear, and insult them in the prosperity of peace" (cited in Fortoul, Historia, Vol. I, p. 397). That material benefits were not enough to satisfy these officers' sense of their own worth is indicated by the fact that Páez had received an estate worth \$200,000 as bonus, as had other high-ranking officers in Venezuela (Bushnell, The Santander Regime, p. 277). Personal and social esteem (status) was a strong determinant of behavior or at least of attitude. To what extent was this attitude, which Bushnell claims Bolívar identified as a "kind of inferiority complex" (ibid., p. 279), shared by the rest of the military sector is an important question. It must be remembered that the civilians were critical of the military as an institution, not solely of the llaneros. Civil-military relations of the times should be studied with that in mind.

61. For a llanero's own later admission of numerous insults and affronts to Bogotá civilians, especially the resented intellectuals, and the violent reaction of these through the press, see José Antonio Páez, Autobiografía del General José Antonio Páez (New York, 1946), Vol. II, p. 14.

62. Bushnell, The Santander Regime, p. 250. For contemporary reactions see José María Restrepo, Diario político y militar, Vol. II, p. 71; Arboleda, Historia, Vol. I, p. 25.

63. Bushnell, The Santander Regime, p. 251.

64. A fact lamented in nearly every one of the 120 Memorias de guerra consulted.
65. Fortoul, Historia, Vol. 1, pp. 363-364. On the importance of this case see Pedro M. Ibañez, "El Coronel Infante," Boletín de historia y antigüedades, No. 32 (December 1905), pp. 449-466, and No. 33 (January 1906), pp. 513-533.
66. Eduardo Caballero Calderón, Historia privada de los Colombianos (Bogotá, 1960), p. 67.
67. Restrepo, José Manuel, Diario político y militar, 4 vols. (Bogotá, 1954), Vol. IV, p. 276.
68. José María Samper, Historia de un alma 1834 a 1886 (Bogotá, [1881], 1946), Vol. 1, p. 127.
69. Cf. Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset: "A society is characterized not only by the facts of social stratification, but also by a system of power-relations between conflicting social groups. Hence the fact that a dominant social group possesses most of the power in a society may be a more important reason for the apparent stability of that society than the fact that people accept privileges and burdens which are theirs by virtue of their social and economic position." ("Introduction," Class Status and Power [Glencoe, Ill., 1964], p. 13.)
70. Carl August Gosselman, Informes sobre los estados sudamericanos en los años de 1837 y 1838. Intro. and notes by Magnus Mörner (Stockholm, 1962), p. 117.
71. José María Obando, Exposición que el ministro secretario de estado en el Departamento de guerra y marina dirige a la Convención de la Nueva Granada, en 1831 (Bogotá, 1831), p. 16.
72. "Relación de los generales, jefes y oficiales que han sido espulsados de la Nueva Granada, por traidores a la causa de la LIBERTAD, estando por consiguiente borrados de la lista militar," Documento No. 2, ibid., p. 31.
73. Obando, Exposición, pp. 19-21.
74. Ibid., pp. 19-20.
75. Exposición que el secretario de estado en el despacho de guerra y marina del Gobierno de la república de la Nueva Granada hace, sobre los negocios de su departamento, al Congreso en sus sesiones de 1839 (Bogotá, 1839), p. 30.
76. The defense made by Valerio F. Barriga, Minister of War in 1853 (Informe del secretario de estado del despacho de guerra de la Nueva Granada al Congreso constitucional de 1853 [Bogotá, 1853], pp. 8-9).
77. For the debate on Melo and the army, see the Gaceta oficial, No. 1660 (January 18, 1854) through No. 1723 (April 8, 1854).
78. Angel y Rufino Cuervo, Vida de Rufino Cuervo y noticias de su época (Bogotá, 1946), Vol. II, p. 258.
79. Restrepo, Diario, Vol. V, p. 592.
80. Informe que el Secretario de guerra de la Nueva Granada dirige al Congreso de 1857 (Bogotá, 1857), p. 10.
81. Angel Cuervo, Como se evapora un ejército (Bogotá, 1953), p. 2. The fact that Cuervo belonged to a Conservative family indicates how widespread this feeling was.
82. Informe del Secretario de guerra y marina, para el Congreso de 1874 (Bogotá, 1874), p. 17.

83. Ibid., p. 14.
84. Alejandro B. Rufz, "Milicia," El ingeniero, Serie I, No. 12 (October 1, 1883), p. 346.
85. Memoria del Secretario de guerra i marina, 1882 (Bogotá, 1882), p. 5.
86. Memoria del Secretario de guerra i marina, 1880 (Bogotá, 1880), p. 45.
87. Tomás Rueda Vargas, El ejército nacional, Oct. 4, 1910, p. 25. There is not enough evidence on hand to give an exact account of the political composition of the officer corps at that time or any other time in Colombian history. But that composition can fairly closely be judged from the political party in power in the nineteenth century. Because the Conservatives held power during the critical 1886-1930 period the Army took on a definite Conservative composition, though there must have been some Liberals since Rueda Vargas noted in 1912 that the Liberal newspapers La crónica and La sociedad kept "a scrupulously exact count of them, classifying them by their family names in the traditional fashion." Ibid., March 26, 1912, p. 57.
88. For Tomás Rueda Vargas' suggestion that the military, in active service and retired, should form an associational interest group, see his "En un Banqueta Marcial," El ejército nacional (November 1924), pp. 191-199.
89. Capt. Miguel Silva Plazas, "Algunas necesidades del ejército en materia de organización, elementos, cuarteles, legislación, instrucción, administración, reservas, etc., etc. Conferencia leída en la Escuela Militar el día 11 de agosto, 1930 ante el Señor Ministro de Guerra, varios Generales y numerosos oficiales" (manuscript made available by family of the late General Plazas, Bogotá, July 1965).
90. Ibid.
91. Lt. Col. Jorge Mercado, Refutación al proyecto de ley reorgánico del ejército, presentado al Congreso nacional de 1922 por los HH. SS. Luis Samper Sordo y Salvador Iglesias (Bogotá, 1922), p. 20. This was a critique of another of the periodic attempts of legislators to legislate on military matters without having the most basic knowledge or acquaintance with the institution. It was also a further sign of the military's inability to keep the politicians out of military matters.
92. G. Ocampo, "Dilettantismo," Revista militar del ejército, Vol. XXV (March-April 1932), p. 83.
93. Colonel A. Uribe G., Artículos militares publicados por el "Diario nacional" (Bogotá, 1922), pp. 39-40. Emphasis added.
94. Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, p. 233.
95. Ibid., p. 234.
96. Francisco José de Caldas, "Discurso Preliminar que leyó el ciudadano Coronel de Ingenieros Francisco José de Caldas el día en que dio principio al curso militar del cuerpo de ingenieros de la República de Antioquia," (1815) reprinted in El ingeniero, Bogotá, July 20, 1883, pp. 3-24.
97. Informe del Secretario de guerra al Congreso de la Nueva Granada en sus sesiones de 1855 (Bogotá, 1855), p. 23.
98. Informe del Ministro de guerra al Congreso de 1898 (Bogotá, 1898), p. xxvii.
99. Ibid., p. xxviii.
100. For accounts of actual participants in this type of warfare, see Gen. Aurelio Mazuera y Mazuera, Memorias de un revolucionario (Bogotá, 1903); Tulio Arbelaez, Episodios de la guerra de 1899 a 1903. Second edition (Bogotá, 1936).

101. Lt. Col. Leonidas Flórez Alvarez, Campana en Santander (1899-1900) (Bogotá, 1938), *passim*.
102. A fact fully recognized by the chief of the second Chilean mission, Col. F. J. Díaz in his "Informe presentado por la dirección de la Escuela militar, 1910-1911," Informe del Ministro de guerra, 1911 (Bogotá, 1911), pp. 124-125. In his previously cited work Tomas Rueda Vargas, one of the most tenacious *cismáticos*, provides a good eye-witness account of the years of battle to save the military reform and the Escuela Militar (Escritos, *passim*).
103. Letter of General R. Lesmez dated June 5, 1883 to El Ingeniero, September 15, 1883, pp. 307-308.
104. Escuela militar, Reglamento de la Escuela militar . . . aprobado por el Ministerio de guerra el 15 de septiembre de 1891 (Bogotá, 1891).
105. Escuela militar, Reglamento orgánico de la Escuela militar. Edición Oficial (Bogotá, 1910).
106. Major Torres Durán, "Dificultades doctrinarias," Revista militar del ejército, Vol. XXIII (1930), pp. 36-38.
107. Capt. P. E. López, "Dificultades de procedimiento," Revista militar del ejército, Vol. XXIII (1930), pp. 727-729.
108. Lt. Col. Miguel J. Neira, "Oficiales enviados en comisión de estudios que regresan al país," Revista militar del ejército, Vol. XXIII (1930), pp. 569-570.
109. Eduardo Santos, "El gobierno y el ejército," Memorial del Estado mayor, Epoca II, Año XXIX (1939), p. 9. See also Dr. José Joaquín Castro M. (Santos' minister of war), "Política militar colombiana," *ibid.*, pp. 21-28.
110. Escuela militar de cadetes de Colombia, Prospecto: 1963, 1964, 1965 (Bogotá, 1965), p. 20.
111. República de Colombia. Ejército Nacional, Ley 126 de 1959, Reorgánica de la carrera de oficiales de las fuerzas militares (Bogotá, n.d.), p. 22.
112. These short biographical sketches are given to introduce articles by the individual officer.
113. Eduardo Santos, "Latin American Realities," Foreign Affairs (January 1956), cited in Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America (New York, 1961), p. 143.
114. Rufz Novoa, El gran desaffo, p. 121.
115. For a good account of this process, see Cuervo, Como, *passim*.
116. Informe del secretario . . . de Guerra . . . 1853 (N.p., n.d.), p. 8.
117. Colonel R. Negret, "Observaciones sobre la instrucción de la oficialidad en Colombia," Memorial del Estado mayor del ejército de Colombia, Año I (March 1, 1912), p. 169.
118. See the speech by Capt. Eduardo Bónitto, reprinted in Revista militar del ejército, Vol. XXV (May-June 1932), p. 418. Bónitto was himself a member of this first group and even today is a man well aware of his status and with a definitely aristocratic view of the military career (Interview with Gen. (Ret.) E. Bónitto, Bogotá, July 20, 1965).
119. Sergio A. Burbano, Misión militar (Bogotá, 1916), p. 6; Luis Eduardo Nieto Caballero, Hombres del pasado, Bogotá, 1944, p. 48.
120. Lieutenant Colonel Jorge Mercado, Bases para una ley de sueldos militares (Bogotá, 1924), p. 23.

121. Interview with General Pinzon Calcedo, Director of the Escuela Militar, Bogotá, August 19, 1965.
122. El espectador, June 1, 1965, p. 10.
123. "Crece interés en la costa atlántico por ingreso a la Escuela militar," El espectador, September 15, 1965, p. 9.
124. "Estadísticas de la Escuela militar," provided by the Director of the Escuela Militar, Bogotá, August 19, 1965.
125. For a humorous, though factual, account of some of the reasons why wives and mothers, especially, tend to be antimilitary, see Colonel Plazas Olarte, Crónicas militares (Bogotá, 1963), Vol. II, pp. 105-111.
126. El espectador, May 10, 1964, p. 5.
127. As in the rest of Latin America, the greatest concentration of troops is found in the capital city, nerve center of the political system. There the Institute of Military Brigades comprises, aside from the specialization schools, the three best units of the army: the Batallón "Colombia" of Korean repute, the Compañía de Lanceros, trained by U. S. Special Forces, and the Policía Militar.
128. Alberto Rufz Novoa, "Las fuerzas armadas," Colombia en cifras (Bogotá, 1963), p. 628.
129. This informality continued until the summer of 1965 when a terrorist bomb destroyed the whole third floor of the ministry. This author had then his first taste of the risks of being in the military in Colombia.
130. Colonel Vargas, "Datos para la historia militar," Memorial del Estado mayor del ejército (1922), p. 363, noting the difference between the salary scales of Bolívar's army in Colombia and those in 1922 exclaimed "It should not come as a surprise . . . that in those days the military career was the preferred one of the people of noble birth and of great worth." This remark is mere wishful thinking.
131. Ley 99, 1913; Diario oficial, No. 15063 (December 5, 1913).
132. Instituto colombiano de opinión pública, Factores colombianos, 1960 (Bogotá, 1960), pp. 57-58.
133. Decreto No. 252, 1963 (February 8).
134. El espectador, November 4, 1965, p. 7. The proposal is to give an automatic \$50 peso increase each year for three consecutive years in each rank. Instituto colombiano de opinión pública, Factores colombianos, 1964 (Bogotá, 1964), p. 272.
135. Factores colombianos, 1964, p. 271.
136. Ibid., p. 64.
137. Ibid.
138. This and other information in this section are taken from Ministerio de guerra, Secretaría general, Recopilación de leyes, decretos y resoluciones de interés general para las fuerzas militares y policía nacional (multilith, Relaciones Públicas Ejército, 1964); and Gonzalo Salguero Basto, Legislación social del ramo de guerra (Bogotá, 1964).
139. See for instance the Laureanista attack in congress on the armed forces, "the only beneficiaries of the violence" (El tiempo, September 14, 1962, p. 23).

140. Servicios técnicos, administrativos y especiales de las fuerzas militares de Colombia (Bogotá, June 12, 1964), p. 42.
141. El tiempo, August 15, 1964, pp. 1, 31; August 19, 1964, p. 1.
142. Dirección nacional del presupuesto, Análisis económico del presupuesto, 1960 (Bogotá, 1960), Anexos 1 and 9. These figures exclude expenditures on police. Comparison with other sources shows great disparity.
143. Memoria del Ministro de guerra al Congreso de 1960 (N.p., n.d.); A. Lleras Camargo, "Discurso," Revista del ejército, Vol. I, No. 1.
144. Brigadier General Alberto Rueda Terán, "Nuestras fuerzas armadas y la defensa nacional," Revista de las fuerzas militares, Vol. I (April 1960), pp. 3-4. The priority given the army over the other two branches was offered as one of the reasons for the internal institutional tension by the ex-commander of the air force (Latin American Times, July 16, 1965, p. 1).
145. General Rueda Terán, Revista de las fuerzas militares, Vol. I, p. 37.
146. See the article by Brig. Gen. Alberto Rufz Novoa, "Doctrina de Guerra," Revista de las fuerzas militares, Vol. I, pp. 25-31.
147. As Minister of War, Rufz Novoa never failed to complain about the lack of budgetary resources, citing internal problems and the expenditures of Colombia's neighboring armed forces. See the Memoria del Ministro de guerra al Congreso de 1963 (N.p., n.d.), Memoria del Ministro de guerra al Congreso de 1964 (N.p., n.d.).
148. El espectador, October 24, 1963, p. 2; El tiempo, October 25, 1963, p. 1.
149. Sistema (Bogotá), No. 11, June 1, 1965, pp. 5-7.
150. Ibid., p. 6.
151. Fuerzas armadas, June 3, 1966, p. 5.
152. El espectador, July 2, 1964, p. 5.
153. Ley 3, 1945 (February 19) sobre Código de justicia penal militar.
154. See the exhaustive treatment on court procedure in Oscar Bonilla Echeverri, Consejos de guerra verbales y Código de justicia penal militar (Boyacá, 1963).
155. For a discussion of attitudes in the legal profession, see Lt. Heraclio Fernández Sandoval, "El Fuero militar en el derecho penal," Revista de las fuerzas armadas, Vol. III (April 1961), pp. 125-130. The police are not covered by the fuero, and whether they should be is a matter of some debate in Colombia.
156. New York Times, August 30, 1964, p. 33; see also H. J. Maidenbergs's description of the contraband trade in Bogotá, ibid., September 11, 1965, p. 9. Only the most sensational stories are now reported in the Colombian press.
157. El espectador, July 17, 1965, p. 3; July 28, 1965, p. 12.
158. El tiempo, August 16, 1965, p. 24; Latin American Times, August 31, 1965, p. 6.
159. El espectador, September 22, 1965, p. 3.
160. Ibid., September 25, 1965, p. 3. Of course, Palacio Terán himself contributed to this destructive process by accusing the minister of war of covering up for the whiskey smuggling of the commanding general of the army (ibid.).

161. "Contrabando y 'Purga' en la F. A. C.," Semana al día, August 6, 1965, pp. 7-8; lader Giraldo, "Vendetta y Purga," El espectador, September 25, 1965, p. 4.
162. Guzmán Campos, Fals-Borda, and Umaña Luna, La violencia, describe this episode at length (pp. 30-38), so that only some of its critical aspects are cited here.
163. For example, the conspiracy of 1943 of Gen. Eduardo Bónitto, the 1944 "Pasto" attempt, and apparently the so-called "Conspiración de Plinio Mendoza Neira" of 1936.
164. In late 1963 the promotions of two generals of Conservative families, Contralmirante Porto and General Ayerbe Chaux, were twice returned to the congressional committee by objecting Liberal senators. Even Liberal commentators admitted the purely partisan reasons for the action (see "Pangloss," El espectador, December 12, 1963, p. 4). Political interference with the military is not restricted to one party in Colombia.
165. "Caso Cortes," Revista jurídica (October 1948), p. 498.
166. Ibid.
167. Editorial, "Ejército," Revista militar del ejército, Vol. XXII (January 1929), pp. 74-75 (emphasis in original). For similar complaints see Col. Miguel J. Neiva, "La prensa y el ejército," ibid., Vol. XXIII (1930), p. 483; Capt. Julio Lodoño y L., "Ataques al ejército y como se destruyen a la luz de nuestra democracia," ibid., Vol. XXIV (January-February 1931), pp. 123-129. See also reactions to civilian criticisms in editorials in Correño militar, Año 1, Nos. 1, 2, 3 (1947).
168. Interview with Gen. Alberto Rufz Novoa, Bogotá, June 28, 1965. For a similar view see Barrera M., Revista del ejército, Vol. I, No. 2, p. 163.
169. General Rufz Novoa's challenge to Senator Darfo Marín came at the height of the Senate's debate on Valencia Tovar's report (Guzmán Campos, Fals-Borda, and Umaña Luna La violencia), Vol. II, p. 35.
170. In a drama reminiscent of the nineteenth century campaigns in which the military commands played "second flute" to the pugnacious politicians, this refusal came during the search for a kidnapped upper class hacendado (landowner) ("Políticos y pitonisos intervienen," El espectador, May 29, 1965, p. 3).
171. Letter of Col. Alvaro Valencia Tovar to Senator Aurelio Caicedo Ayerbe, El espectador, June 2, 1964, pp. 1, 2.
172. "El Ejército y la casta," La nueva prensa, Vol. II (November 3, 1964), p. 25.
173. Memoria del Ministro de guerra al Congreso nacional de 1926, Anexo, pp. 11-12. Emphasis added.
174. Ibid., p. 12.
175. See the minister's own account in the Memoria del Ministro de guerra al Congreso nacional, 1927 (N. p., n. d.).
176. "Solicitously, on demand from the Company [United Fruit] the zone was declared in a state of siege and a military regime was established. . . . The overseers of the United Fruit directed the operations and pointed out the leaders of the strike, the survivors of which were tried by Courts Martial. . . ." (J. A. Osorio Lizarazo, Gaitán: vida, muerte, y presencia, p. 114; Vernon Lee Fluharty, Dance of the Millions; Military Rule and the Social Revolution in Colombia, 1930-1956 [University of Pittsburgh, 1957], p. 38).
177. "This was an isolated event, but it served to draw attention to the plight of the land laborer" (Albert O. Hirshman, Journeys Toward Progress [New York, 1965], p. 141).

178. Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven, 1963), p. 76.
179. Alfonso López, Inaugural Address (August 7, 1934), Manuel Monsalve, Colombia: Posesiones Presidenciales (Bogotá, 1954), p. 410. Emphasis added.
180. Presidential Address, 1935, in Mensajes del President López al Congreso nacional, 1934-38 (Bogotá, 1939), pp. 62-67.
181. "Discurso del excelentísimo señor Presidente de la república en el banquete que se efectuó el 4 de diciembre con motivo de la fiesta de la patrona del Arma de artillería," Revista del ejército, Vol. XXVI (September-October 1934), pp. i-vii.
182. Ibid., p. iii.
183. López cited the speech by General Jorge Mercado which preceded his as an example of that support. That speech is not available for study, but in a talk delivered just days prior to the above-mentioned banquet, General Mercado, while talking about the mission of the army, said nothing about colonization; rather on two occasions he noted that the army could serve the nation without leaving the sphere of action delineated by law ("El ejército ante el país," Revista militar del ejército, Vol. XXVI [July-August 1934], pp. 339-345).
184. "Banquete ofrecido por la oficialidad del ejército al excelentísimo señor Presidente de la república con motivo de su próximo viaje a las repúblicas bolivarianas," Revista del ejército, Vol. XXVIII (April-May 1936), pp. 257-264.
185. See the editorial by General Efraín Rojas, "Las Fuerzas militares," Revista del ejército (New Edition), 1937, p. 2. In the same issue Lt. Col. Domingo Espinel, later to be mentioned in an anti-López conspiracy, has a pointed article on the dire need for Colombia to start thinking seriously about its defenses (ibid., pp. 4-6).
186. Thus one lieutenant of the reserves, Darío Achuri Valenzuela wrote that "the Army has accepted with enthusiasm the task so clearly delineated by the President. . . ." ("El Presidente López y la incorporación de vastos territorios a la vida de la República," Revista del ejército, October 1936, p. 37). One captain of the engineer corps, P. Duarte García, also favored the mission but noted the "tremendous difficulties," ("El ejército y la colonización militar del sur," Revista del ejército [1937], pp. 24-35).
187. This conditional wording of the above conclusion is based on the fact that it derives from interviews with a limited number of actual participants rather than on firm data. See also, Eustorgio Sarria, La democracia y el poder militar (Bogotá, 1959), p. 39, and passim.
188. Father Louis J. Lebreton, O. P., Director, "Funciones pedagógicas de las fuerzas armadas, Misión 'economía y humanismo,'" Estudio sobre las condiciones del desarrollo de Colombia (Bogotá, 1958), p. 361.
189. Ibid.
190. Ibid.
191. See for example Eduardo Santa's call for an officer more aware of the social reality about him. The army, he states, should not be deliberative in partisan politics, but officers should be deliberative in the broader social and political aspects of the Colombian reality ("Bases para una interpretación de los partidos políticos," Revista jurídica [Bogotá], No. 28, September 1960). See also the call for a "modernizing" military officer, Carlos Lleras Restrepo, El tiempo, June 28, 1960, p. 1; Alberto Lleras Camargo, Semana, June 9, 1960, p. 43.

192. An account of General Navas Pardo's assistance program to the cotton growers in Tolima, Huila, Valle, and Cundinamarca is given in "Sensibilidad social," Semana, No. 743 (April 10, 1961), p. 21.
193. Inscription on the masthead, Revista de las fuerzas armadas, Vol. I (April 1960).
194. "Notas editoriales—Nuestros propósitos," Ibid., p. 3.
195. Col. Jorge Quintero y Quintero, "La organización militar y la economía," Revista de las fuerzas armadas, Vol. I (June 1960), pp. 33-45.
196. "Programa del Frente Nacional, 1962," reprinted in El tiempo, February 21, 1962, p. 13.
197. Ibid.
198. Col. Alberto Rufz Novoa, Enseñanzas de la compañía de Corea aplicables al ejército de Colombia (Bogotá, 1956).
199. Ibid. This interest also led him to distribute among the officers such works as that of the French expert on guerrilla warfare, Colonel Gabriel Bonnet, Las guerras de insurrección y las guerras revolucionarias (Bogotá, 1961).
200. "Métodos de acción cívico-militar de Israel implantarán en Colombia," El espectador, May 5, 1964, p. 2.
201. See the recommendations in Col. Gustavo Sierra Ochoa, Las guerrillas de los llanos orientales, 1954 (Manizales, 1954).
202. Brig. Gen. Alberto Rufz Novoa, "Editorial," Revista del ejército, Vol. II (April 1962).
203. El tiempo, September 19, 1962, p. 19.
204. El espectador, December 28, 1963, p. 1.
205. Capt. Darío L. Santacruz A., "Actualidad militar," Correo militar, Vol. I (November 3, 1947), p. 3. Interestingly this is the same officer who seventeen years later (after the fall of General Rufz), stated the position of the military towards nonmilitary functions.
206. Absalón Fernández Soto, Memoria del señor Ministro de gobierno, doctor Absalón Fernández Soto, al Congreso nacional de 1946 (Bogotá, 1946), pp. xix-xx.
207. The author had an opportunity to verify this in an extensive tour of El Quindío (Caldas) in July 1965, during which a series of interviews with farmers, schoolteachers, presidents of Juntas de Acción Comunal, and storekeepers, were made. For an account of how the army, during a civic action campaign, changed the conditions of near-slavery existing on certain estates in El Santuario, Tolima, see El espectador, August 24, 1963, p. 8.
208. El ejército, Vol. IV (November 1964), p. 5.
209. El espectador, September 24, 1962, p. 3.
210. Ibid., May 16, 1964, p. 1.
211. Ibid., May 10, 1964, p. 1.
212. "Rumors of Coup Echo in Colombia," The Christian Science Monitor, December 28, 1964, p. 2.
213. New York Times, December 20, 1964, p. 38.
214. El ejército, Vol. IV (December 1964), carried the president's words on its front page.

215. José Francisco Socarras, "Posición de civiles y militares ante el flagelo de la violencia," El tiempo, June 13, 1964, pp. 5, 11; Vicente Laverde Aponte, "La rehabilitación: amigos y enemigos," ibid., June 4, 1965, p. 4.

216. This version of the coup is presented by Richard Eder, New York Times, January 28, 1965, p. 8 and January 30, 1965, p. 5. It was confirmed fairly reliably by military and civilian figures to the author (Maingot) during his stay in Colombia in 1965. Two actors in the political drama were interviewed.

217. Brigadier General Darfo Santacruz A., "Qué somos y qué representamos," Editorial, Revista de las fuerzas armadas, Vol. XI (May-June 1965), p. 166; El siglo, July 8, 1965, p. 13.

218. Ibid., p. 167. For further expressions indicating a changed concept of mission, see Brig. Gen. Alfonso Mejía Valenzuela, "Las fuerzas armadas de Colombia," Revista de las fuerzas armadas, Vol. XI (July-August 1965), pp. 345-348.

219. "Calibán," the influential member of the Santos family which owned El tiempo, had been a vocal opponent of Rufz Novoa (El tiempo, April 2, 1965, p. 5).

220. Ibid., April 7, 1965, p. 5.

221. See the statements of Jorge Vernot S., President of the Centro de Acción Cívico-Militar Universitaria, in El tiempo, August 8, 1965, p. 26.

222. Cromos, June 21, 1965, pp. 26-30, 53.

223. Latin American Times, July 16, 1965, p. 1.

224. El vespertino, June 18, 1965, p. 1.

CONCLUSION

225. Harold Lasswell, "The Garrison State," The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. XLVI (January 1941), pp. 455-468; see also Lasswell's more recent, "The Garrison State Hypothesis Today," Samuel Huntington (ed.), Changing Patterns of Military Politics (Glencoe, Ill., 1962), pp. 53ff. Morris Janowitz finds that Lasswell's model has some applicability to the new nations, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations (Chicago, 1965), p. 4n.

226. See the analysis in S. E. Finer, The Man on Horseback (New York, 1962).

227. Wilbert E. Moore, "Backgrounds of Social Change," William H. Form and Albert A. Blum (eds.), Industrial Relations and Social Change in Latin America (Gainesville, Florida, 1965), p. 4. See also Moore's more extensive treatment, Social Change (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1963).

228. Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, pp. 225-226; Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II," The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. XII (Summer 1948), pp. 280-315.

229. It has been hypothesized that the ability of an institution or group to withstand disintegrative pressures from outside will depend to a fundamental extent on the satisfaction of certain primary personality demands of the members of the group—especially the satisfaction of the need for affection and esteem—by the group itself (Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II," The Public Opinion Quarterly, XII [Summer 1948], pp. 280-315).

230. Lieuwen, Arms, p. 18.

CHAPTER 5

MEXICO

by L. N. McAllister

ATTRIBUTES OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

Introduction

Like the other countries included in this study, the Mexican political system is also experiencing the strains of a socioeconomic drive toward modernity and "Westernization." Unlike those of Peru, Colombia, and Argentina, however, it is characterized by a marked degree of stability and continuity. Modern Mexican regimes, especially those of the most recent decades, have had considerable success in solving or postponing the various crucial stress-making situations which have beset them.

The political variance between Mexico and the other republics is due primarily to two separate but closely interrelated factors. The first stabilizing influence is the continuing existence and effect of the revolutionary past. The citizenry's general acceptance of revolutionary values and goals has given public authority the opportunity to devise and maintain a viable political infrastructure upon which to process demands and to amplify the effects of public acceptance. Effective mechanisms for elite power transfer and recruitment, for adequate administration of public obligations and ambitions, and for communications feedback and intelligence rest on the revolutionary and institutional nature of the political system. The peculiar character of the Mexican political system may be examined in more detail in terms of (1) the revolutionary mystique, (2) the official party, and (3) the presidency.

The Revolutionary Mystique

Before any discussion of the Mexican revolutionary past can be attempted, a clearer definition must be made of the revolutionary ethos. The mystique as expounded by the elite is not a concisely bound philosophical system. Rather, it exists within a very inclusive and flexible historical framework. It seeks to draw on what is "good" and "bad" from the past for the legitimization of current policies and projects. L. Vincent Padgett observes that the Mexican government and the regime it represents are constantly seeking to maintain and strengthen their legitimacy by disseminating a revolutionist nationalist mythology through official textbooks and nearly every means of political communication. The core of this mythology is a particular interpretation of history which blends major events and leaders of the revolution, the Indian, revolutionary ideology, and contemporary programs.¹

Of the past events which form a part of the nationalistic revolutionary character, the 1910 revolt against Porfirio Díaz and the subsequent ten years of civil wars are by far the most important. The struggles of the period resulted not only in the replacement of the former

regime with new personnel but also radically changed the political culture and structure of the nation. The revolution permitted the entry of new groups into political life. Robert E. Scott estimates that in 1910, nine out of ten Mexicans were "parochials" and had no knowledge of or effect on the national political system. By 1960, only 25 percent belonged to this category, the remainder being oriented as "subjects" (65 percent) or as "participants" (25 percent).² Labor, peasant, and other groups became better organized and were incorporated into the official party where they could more effectively voice their demands.

Research on the political culture of Mexico by Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba revealed a curious ambivalence in the nation's attitudinal character. Mexicans were found to be the lowest of the five nations included in the study in fair treatment expectations from their authorities. However, this alienation appeared to have little effect upon governmental input because those interviewed showed a marked pride in their political system, with their satisfaction centered primarily in the revolution and the presidency. Additionally, Mexicans felt highly confident about their potential influence over political affairs but, at the same time, their actual participation in the system was very low. Such reactions stem in great part from the impact of the revolutionary and civil war years and the mystique which they created for the present era.³

The 1910-1920 era also stimulated the "Westernization" process in the nation.⁴ Political structure became more clearly differentiated and the political culture more secular. The resultant added capabilities of the political system enabled the development of more effective structures for the processing of the increasing load of demands made by the new participants and groups that had emerged partly because of the revolution.

The Official Party

Fearing chaos and possible civil war after the assassination of President-elect General Alvaro Obregón, General Plutarco Elías Calles, then leader of the revolutionary elite, established an official party in 1929 in order to stabilize the various group rivalries of the period. The early party, christened the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR), was a very loose coalition of regional civilian and military caudillos, each supported by small labor and peasant factions and given sanction and recognition by the government. During the administration of President Lázaro Cárdenas, the organizational basis of party was changed from regional to functional and its name changed to the Partido Revolucionario Mexicano (PRM). Its component sectors were labor, peasant, military, and popular, but in 1940 the military sector was disbanded. A year later, although the component sectors remained the same, the party was reorganized under the name it presently bears, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI).

Party membership is automatically achieved through joining one of the component "functional organizations." These include the labor sector, presently dominated by the Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos (CTM) and, to a lesser extent, the Bloque de Unidad Obrera (BUO); the agrarian sector, represented mainly by the Confederación Nacional Campesina (CNC); and the popular sector, or the Confederación Nacional de Organizaciones Populares (CNOP), which is led by the bureaucrats' union, the Federación de Sindicatos Trabajadores de Servicios del Estado (FSTSE), and the teachers union, the Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores Enseñadores (SNTE). Since World War II, the popular sector has become the most influential element in the party.

The party bureaucracy is complex and rather cumbersome. Nationally, three organs—the national assembly, the national council, and the national executive committee—decide party

strategy and policy, select candidates, carry out electoral campaigns, and coordinate activities of party personnel and information. Similar structural patterns extend to regional and local divisions. The party has become increasingly specialized and centralized in recent decades, although Padgett contends that regional and local party units presently enjoy a large degree of independence from the dictates of national leadership.⁵

There is a general consensus that the party is dominated by the president, who acts as a balancer and arbitrator among the various component sectors.⁶ The inclusive nature of party organization serves as a framework within which group demands may be more effectively channeled to the political authorities of the system. Party organization functions to the mutual advantage of both the elite and the general membership. The former are able to benefit from the organizational support of the sectors and the sector interests are more easily adjusted and manipulated within such a framework. For the membership, the party serves as a convenient and necessary channel of access to the elite, and, by virtue of their position inside of government, their demands are more effectively articulated and aggregated. The coalition is held together first by the fear shared by both the elite and the general membership that disruptive rivalries may reduce their political control of the state; second, by the realization that the benefits of membership in an organization conveying mutual advantages far outweigh the disadvantage of dependency on the general group.

The internal function of the official party is threefold. It is first a coordinator and a clearinghouse for party programs and information. A second party objective is mediation of disputes and promotion of unity within the vertical and horizontal structure of the organization. Third, the party certainly serves an aggregative function by reducing sector demands so that they may be presented later as party policy to the decision-making apparatus. Externally, the party serves as a symbol of unity and continuity. It symbolizes the democratic electoral norm believed so essential for Western societies. Furthermore, its operation represents an electoral device whereby candidates are selected and campaigns are conducted to present to the public the party's policies and personalities. In such a capacity, the party serves as a mediator between the individual and the government.

It must be added that the party is not the only aggregator of political demands. It is not, moreover, the sole channel to the ultimate authorities. The president, as the primary rule-maker for the system, is responsive to pressures from nonparty elements. These include such informal or formal groups as business and industry, segments of the bureaucracy, minor parties, foreign influences and the church, and the armed forces.⁷

The Presidency

The president represents the apex of the Mexican political system. His formal and informal powers derive from the revolutionary mystique and pervade the various political structures of the nation. He personifies revolutionary legitimacy, social justice, and economic progress, and thus his office possesses a political aloofness transcending ordinary partisan quarrels. In addition, the president is the most important interest aggregator of the system, the sole rule-maker, and the ultimate arbiter in all major policy questions. The sole limitation on his authority is the six-year period of time that he remains in office.⁸

The executive's status also derives from the structure of the "revolutionary coalition" or the "revolutionary family." According to Brandenburg, this group is composed of those who have run Mexico for more than fifty years, who have made the policies of the revolution, and who still effectively hold the power to make decisions. The inner circle, located at the top

level of the "family," includes the president, as "father," and the various "favorite sons" or outstanding national and regional political figures of the system. Brandenburg states that it is at this level that decisions made at lower levels are either confirmed or changed. One family head wills his power to another; the power and prestige belonging to Mexicans on the inside and outside are discussed. At this level, the father and favorite sons of the revolutionary family determine Mexico's future.⁹

One of the most marked differences between the political system of Mexico and those of Peru, Colombia, and Argentina is the continuity and order of the presidential succession. In Argentina, for example, the struggles between Peronista factions and the military have made presidential-term longevity rather limited. Similar clashes in Peru, between the Apristas and the armed forces, and in Colombia, among dissident party splinter groups, have also spelled presidential instability. In Mexico, however, the orderly process of selecting a president appears to have been well established for several decades. Several interrelated factors have contributed to this phenomenon. First, an inclusive official party was successfully created that required the nomination of only one strong candidate. Second, the military was so successfully incorporated into the system that although individual officers might dissent, institutionally they have invariably supported the party candidate. Third, the party has continually won elections for the elite by aggregating a wide range of political demands and by monopolizing support from the most important groups in the system. Fourth, members of the "revolutionary coalition" have feared disunity within their ranks and have selected compromise candidates rather than broaden the scope of controversy beyond the bounds of the elite. This usually means that the president himself will select his own successor, given certain limits imposed upon him by important elite councilors. Finally, the political system itself has been relatively stable, the presidency has maintained its legitimacy and prestige, and no president has died while in office.

In the decades since the revolution, the presidential image has changed from that of a charismatic, personalist leader to that of a more sedate bureaucratic director. The office is now institutionalized rather than individual, and its principal function is to balance conflicting interests arising within and outside of the official party. Because of increased responsibilities in recent years, presidents have placed greater reliance on informal advisors who reduce and combine demands before they reach the final decision stage. Access channels to the president flow either through the party and bureaucracy or, to a lesser extent, to the president directly.

Scott characterizes the Mexican policy-making process as "government by consultation"; the chief executive "hears and considers the competing needs and desires of all the major functional interests concerned in any given policy decision" and later decides the best approach to take.¹⁰ Each president gives more attention to certain groups than to others. President Cárdenas, for example, tended to favor agrarian and labor factions. Conversely, President Miguel Alemán placed more emphasis upon industrial growth. Some interests, however, always have the attention of the chief executive. These include, of course, the sectors of the official party but also business, international influences, and the military.

THE FORMATION OF THE MEXICAN ARMED FORCES

In Mexico, the political role of the military has been and continues to be the political role of the army. It has been ground force officers who have traditionally made the military decisions influencing what that role was to be, who have issued pronunciamientos and initiated cuartelazos, and who today speak for the armed forces. The other services have supported or acquiesced to the army's political actions.

Historically, Mexico had, following the typology developed in Chapter 1, a national liberation army composed of the royalist and insurgent troops who, under the leadership of Agustín Iturbide, brought independence to the nation in 1821. The organic continuity of that institution, however, was interrupted by the French intervention and during the revolution beginning in 1910, the old army was completely destroyed.

The modern Mexican ground forces are a new institution, a revolutionary army which had its origins in the several armed bands which coalesced under the leadership of Venustiano Carranza in 1913 and which were formally designated as the constitutionalist army on July 4 of that year. Upon the defeat of the government forces and the triumphal entry of the constitutionalist forces into Mexico City on August 20, 1914, Carranza assumed the presidency and his armed forces became in effect the national army.¹¹

The subsequent history of the Mexican army has as its central theme the transformation of a loose federation of undisciplined warriors, which at the time of the constitutionalist victory numbered some 125,000 men, into a modern army capable of serving but not devouring the state. This achievement involved several simultaneous and closely interrelated processes: (1) a juridical definition of the status, organization, and norms of service and discipline of the armed forces; (2) the elimination or disciplining of the myriad nominal generals whose power rested on quasi-feudal interpersonal and regional loyalty systems; (3) the creation of professional military leadership through the systematic training of a new generation of officers and the retraining of revolutionary personnel who were willing to accept professional standards; (4) the reduction of the army to a strength which was manageable, controllable, trainable, and which could be supported by the revenues of the state.

Definition of Juridical Status

The definition of the juridical status and bases of organization of the army was a relatively simple undertaking. With the adoption of the revolutionary constitution and the designation of Carranza as constitutional president in 1917, the constitutionalist army became formally and legally the national army. For a number of years it subsisted under a series of provisional "proyectos de ley orgánica." In 1925, however, President Plutarco Elías Calles appointed a commission to study and reform existing military ordinances and regulations.¹² The commission's deliberations resulted in the following year in the Ley orgánica del ejército y armada nacionales,¹³ which wrote into law the armed forces' organization, mission, and relationship with the state and the general society. The commission also produced a set of supplementary regulations governing internal discipline, pay and allowances, promotion, and retirement and pensions.¹⁴

Elimination of Regional Chieftains

The taming of the revolutionary chieftains was a more formidable task.¹⁵ The initial steps were taken by General Alvaro Obregón, president of the republic (1920-1924). Obregón adroitly employed a combination of temptation, cajolery, pressures, and ruthlessness. A number of officers who had supported Carranza in the struggle for succession were summarily executed. Upon his assumption of the presidency, nominal revolutionary generals with the exception of known enemies were given federal commissions and placed on the federal payroll to assure some central control of their activities. If their demands for recompense were sometimes exorbitant, Obregón acceded to them if he felt that purchase of their loyalty was expedient.

Obregón also continued a procedure instituted while he had been Carranza's minister of war. "Excess" officers and particularly those whose loyalty was doubtful were encouraged to retire to the army reserve at existing rank and with full pay and allowances. To deal with the reluctant and the intransigent, a special commission was created to inquire into their professional competence. Those who did not meet the commission's standards of performance were arbitrarily retired to the reserve at existing rank but at half-pay.

A more indirect attack involved the division of the nation into thirty-three military zones for purposes of command and administration. This move, justified on the grounds that military necessity no longer required large concentrations of troops, was really aimed at fragmenting the personal commands of regional chieftains.

As might be expected, Obregón met strong resistance from the revolutionary chieftains who were not of a mind to relinquish their autonomy and who could draw support from the disgruntled officers and enlisted men who had been involuntarily retired. In 1923 the dissidents mounted a rebellion which nearly toppled him from power. After his eventual triumph, a number of those involved or suspected of complicity were treated in the same manner as the generals who had supported Calles. At the same time, however, Obregón found it expedient to create support in the army by promoting twenty-three generals and creating fifty-four new ones.

The still quite incomplete task of disciplining the revolutionary officer corps was continued by President Calles, who succeeded Obregón in the presidency in 1924. Calles' principal instrument was General Joaquín Amaro, his minister of war, who was the sponsor of the Ley orgánica and the laws governing discipline, pay, and retirement referred to above. Throughout his tenure he sought to implement rigorously the provisions of these ordinances and regulations. Amaro continued Obregón's policy of retiring excess or suspect officers but also proceeded more indirectly. Recruiting procedures, housing, and mess for enlisted personnel were improved and they were provided with recreational and educational facilities in the hope that betterment of the conditions of service would attract their loyalty away from their chiefs to the central government. And as a counterpoise to the regular army a peasant militia was organized.

As in the case of Obregón's efforts, Amaro's reforms encountered resistance from the revolutionary generals. After three years in office, however, Calles felt strong enough to risk a showdown and challenged them by shifting key commands that were regarded by their holders as personal fiefs. The anticipated cuartelazo came in 1927 and was immediately suppressed. The leading conspirators were dismissed from the service. Two years later another military rebellion under the leadership of General Gonzalo Escobar broke out and was put down just as promptly, this time with the assistance of the armed peasantry.

The complete failure of the Escobar uprising indicated that the power of the revolutionary chieftains was declining. It continued to be manifest, however, in the politicomilitary crises which appeared with each presidential succession and which forced even reform-minded leaders to seek the support of the generals. Thus, soon after his election to the presidency in 1934, General Lázaro Cárdenas felt compelled to assert his independence from the still powerful Calles. The latter had the support of most of the surviving revolutionary generals, but the new president was backed by key commanders and the younger professionals who had emerged in the previous decade and were in direct command of troops. Cárdenas proved to be more astute than his old chief and, in December 1935, he felt strong enough to begin dismissing Calles' supporters in congress and the army. Calles was unable to counter. Among the victims of the purge was General Amaro. Cárdenas' triumph was completed in April of

the following year when he forced the ex-president and a number of his military supporters into exile.

Cárdenas' position, however, was not entirely secure. In addition to the personal ambitions of the surviving revolutionary generals, many of them had prospered as hacendados, businessmen, and industrialists. In the process they had lost much of their revolutionary zeal and opposed the president's quasi-socialist reforms. Others such as Amaro were less personally motivated but felt that his program would create domestic disturbances and thus threaten the progress made since 1917 toward pacifying the nation and consolidating the revolution. Cárdenas, therefore, sought to undermine the bases of their influence and to establish countervailing sources of power. As Amaro had done before him, he shifted key military commands, organized agrarian and workers' militias, and bid for the support of enlisted personnel through further improvement of conditions of service. In December 1937, he adopted the original device of incorporating the military into the reorganized revolutionary party as one of its four functional sectors. The strategy behind this move was revealed in his response to a critic who accused him of bringing the military into politics. "We did not put the army into politics," he pointed out. "It was already there. In fact it had been dominating the situation, and we did well to reduce its influence to one vote out of four."¹⁶

As he had anticipated, Cárdenas' military and social reforms were resisted by various generals. Nicolás Rodríguez, leader of the Mexican proto-fascist "Goldshirts" attempted a rebellion but could obtain no support from his fellow officers. A more serious challenge came from General Saturnino Cedillo, caudillo of the state of San Luis Potosí. Cedillo broke with Cárdenas, resigned from the cabinet, and began organizing an army in his home territory. Again, however, the federal army remained loyal and, in the spring of 1938, Cárdenas personally led it into the field where it crushed the rebellion. A third challenge from the old generals came during and after the elections of 1940 in which the Revolutionary Party candidate, General Avila Camacho, was opposed by General Juan Almazán, the regional commander of the Monterrey military district. Thirty-four senior officers, most of whom were old revolutionary generals, took leave from active service to campaign for Almazán. Realizing that he had little chance of winning against the established party, Almazán began charging fraud and promised to lead a revolt "in the event that the will of the electorate is not respected."¹⁷ After his inevitable defeat, however, he docilely went abroad. Like his predecessors who had successfully confronted military rebellion, Avila Camacho retired a number of generals.

The Almazán episode marks in effect the last challenge of the revolutionary generals and the culmination of the establishment of internal discipline within the officer corps. Lieuwen summarizes the process by pointing out that in the insurrection of 1923, nearly half of the officer corps defected to the rebels; in that of 1927, less than a quarter; and a decade later, the Cedillo uprising attracted practically no support from the regular officer corps.¹⁸ To these observations may be added the fact that the promised revolt of 1940 never materialized. After that date a substantial number of generals of the revolutionary army remained in active service, but their ambitions were channeled along routine lines within the party or in national and state administrations.

The process of "taming the generals" may be more subtly illustrated by comparing the public remarks directed to the army by Presidents Calles, Cárdenas, and Avila Camacho.

In an address to congress in 1930, Calles stated:

The many sacrifices that have been necessary to dignify this revolutionary institution, the army, and to elevate it to the enviable professional and moral

height at which it is found, . . . require that each member work jealously to maintain that position and that prestige.

Let all the members of the National Army, conscious of their role in these moments, cherish the fine and ennobling concept of their military career, in which honor and fidelity to legitimate governments ought to be the faithful norm and constant guide, inspiring them in the duties that their high mission imposes upon them; let them ignore and condemn vigorously the silent and perverse insinuations of ambitious politicians who may try to influence them; and let them choose between the intimate satisfaction of the accomplishment of duty, the gratitude of the country, the respect of the world and disloyalty, betrayal of the Revolution and the country in one of the most solemn hours of her life, a conduct that would never find justification before either society or history.¹⁹

In 1936, President Cárdenas addressed the army and described it thus:

. . . organized through battle, discipline and sacrifice, [the army] is the faithful sustainer of the conquests of the Revolution.

. . . With true patriotism and profound conviction it is cooperating with complete lack of self-interest in the development of Mexico, making more apparent to the other sectors of the country the tight dependency and the cordial relations that are normal in the structure of this revolutionary government.

Soldiers and officers are moved by the same goal: the collective good of the people. The revolutionary army is now twenty-five years old, and in the last years the program of incorporating the soldier into the social life of the community has been accentuated. . . . Because of the communion between the army and the Mexican people in these times, it pleases me to recognize with deep satisfaction that we again find the National Army steadfast in times of vicissitudes, straight and sure in times of agitation, faithful in the face of perfidy by the few, conscious of its purpose and faithful to the popular will.²⁰

The difference in tone between the two speeches is significant. Cárdenas, as did Calles, prefaced his speech by praising the army as a revolutionary institution. The praise, however, displays the confidence of a superior addressing his subordinates, but Calles' speech has the uneasy quality of an officer addressing his equals. Where Calles asks his fellow officers to remember their duties, Cárdenas praises them for having done so. The frequent use of progressive tenses in Cárdenas' speech indicates, nevertheless, that the tradition of loyalty is not yet well established. Eight years later, President Avila Camacho also addressed the army. The speech was brief and concise. On the occasion of commemorating Mexico's Independence Day, the praise was not effusive. Of special significance, in contrast to the subjunctive mood used by Calles and the progressive tenses that Cárdenas employed, are the simple present tenses which Avila Camacho used to describe the military. Here is the entire speech:

On this day, on which all we Mexicans remember with enthusiasm, the beginning of the fight for our independence, a free fight by that glorious army of the people, I send to our own army, which is also of the people by virtue of its personnel, my most effusive greetings and most cordial congratulations for the discipline, martiality and efficiency demonstrated in the parade which we have seen.²¹

Comparison of the three addresses indicates the stages of the gradual limitation of the army's power. During the years of Callismo, the foundations of military discipline in the face of general opposition within the army and uneasiness in the government were laid. Cárdenas' term marked real progress in the reformation of the army. However, not until the administration of Avila Camacho did Mexico see the fruition of the programs that were begun in 1924.

Reduction in Strength of the Army

The establishment of central control of the officer corps was accompanied by a reduction in the overall strength of the army from its revolutionary peak to approximately its present strength of 64,000. This was accomplished by the involuntary retirement or discharge of excess enlisted personnel as well as officers, by the natural dissolution of revolutionary bands after the establishment of constitutional government, and by the forced disbandment of disaffected units, particularly after unsuccessful rebellion against the federal government. The shrinkage of the army was accompanied by rapid population growth so that the ratio between military personnel and civilians has constantly declined. The results of these processes are shown in Table 34 following:

TABLE 34
MILITARY-CIVILIAN MANPOWER RATIO

<u>Year</u>	<u>Military Strength</u>	<u>Civilian Population</u>	<u>Ratio</u>
1920	100,000	14.33 million	1:143
1930	50,000	16.55	1:321
1940	50,000	19.65	1:393
1950	50,000	25.78	1:515
1960	55,000	34.20	1:684
1965	55,000	40.91 (est.)	1:818

Professionalization

The process of producing a new generation of professional officers proceeded simultaneously and interdependently with taming the old. It involved two primary themes: first, the creation of adequate training schools and, second, the normalization and standardization of the conditions and requirements of officership.

Again, the initial steps were taken by General Obregón in his capacity as Carranza's minister of war. In 1917, a general staff school (Academia de Estado Mayor) was established. Staffed by career personnel surviving from the Díaz period, it was designed to provide professional training for revolutionary officers. At the same time, Obregón initiated the practice of sending promising young officers abroad for advanced or specialized training. In 1920, the Colegio Militar, Mexico's historic military academy, which had ceased to function after the triumph of the constitutionalist army, was reopened and superseded the general staff school.²² Initially its effectiveness was inhibited by political interference in its management and by the

presence of nonprofessionals in its administrative and instructional staff. As a consequence, in 1925 Amaro closed it for a year while the staff was purged and its curriculum modernized. It was reopened the following year and subsequently became the principal source of new officers for the combat arms of the Mexican army.²³

In 1932, General Amaro, now functioning as director of military education, organized the Escuela Superior de Guerra to train company and field grade officers for battalion and higher unit command and staff duties and to develop and disseminate tactical and strategic doctrine.²⁴ In the same year Amaro established schools (*escuelas de aplicación*) intermediate between the military academy and the command and general staff school to train junior officers in the specialized functions of their arms.²⁵ These three institutions became the core of the professional education of the line officer of the Mexican army. For the formation of officers in the supporting services a series of special schools was established, including the distinguished Escuela Médico Militar, the Escuela Militar de Intendencia (finance), and the Escuela Militar de Enlace y Transmisiones (communications).²⁶ The production of the principal military schools during the Cárdenas administration is shown in Table 35 following:

TABLE 35
MILITARY SCHOOL GRADUATES, 1934-1940

<u>School</u>	<u>Number</u>
Heróico Colegio Militar	678
Escuela Militar de Aplicación	412
Escuela Superior de Guerra	1,000

Source: Mexico. Secretaría de gobernación, Seis años de gobierno al servicio de México (Mexico City, 1940), pp. 97-98.

During the Cárdenas administration additional efforts were made to improve professional expertise and military organization. In 1936, the Centro de Jefes y Oficiales en Instrucción was created to provide formal training for officers who had not graduated from the military academy or attended advanced service schools.²⁷ All infantry officers failing to pass a comprehensive examination in military science were given the option of retirement or assignment to the center for remedial training. Also, age in grade limits were established in an effort to dispose of officers who could not be retrained and who blocked promotion of the new generation of professionals.²⁸ In general, these norms appear to have been observed in the case of lower and medium grade officers. However, through political influence or sentimental appeals, many revolutionary officers managed to escape purging for professional reasons or avoid retirement for over-age in grade.²⁹

In the organizational sphere, the ministry of war and marine, which had exercised control over the armed forces since the early independence period, was replaced in 1937 by the secretariat of national defense. Although the reorganization was accompanied by important administrative and command changes, it was intended primarily to emphasize the essentially defensive character of the military mission in Mexico.³⁰ Two years later, marine activities were separated from the secretary of national defense and placed under an autonomous minister of marine. The new ministry included the navy as its major department as well as the merchant marine and the bureaus of maritime works, dredging and lighthouses, and fisheries.³¹

Organizational changes were accompanied by substantial improvements in the conditions of service. In 1934, a model army encampment was finished at Monterrey. This Ciudad Militar was equipped with underground natural-gas heating, purified water, modern electrical wiring, drainage systems, gardens, and an airport. The camp had its own crew of mechanics, ironworkers, carpenters, a cement-block factory, and a railroad station. A hospital, schools, a theater and cinema, a library, chess and billiard rooms, and a gymnasium were provided for the use of military personnel and their families. In addition, the base had its own cooperative, which included a restaurant, grocery store, meat market, bakery, pharmacy, small mills for grinding corn and wheat, and clothing and drygoods stores. The officers were provided with a social center which offered party rooms and a swimming pool.³² In all, the base quartered 14,000 men and their families, and all residences were equipped with electricity, gas, and baths. The base also had schools in which enlisted men could learn a trade to support themselves after discharge and an agricultural school where they learned the use of modern machinery and scientific agriculture, so that when they returned to their villages they could teach their neighbors.³³ The Monterrey installation became the prototype of other military communities which were constructed during the next two decades.³⁴

In summary, it may be said that by the end of the Cárdenas administration the basis of the modern Mexican military establishment had been established. Although powerful and recalcitrant regional military caudillos remained, discipline had been established in the bulk of the officer corps; a modern system of service schools was in operation and was turning out a new generation of officers; finally, the institutional organization and status of the armed forces, which had been expressed in a general way in the Constitution of 1917, had been defined more precisely in a series of regulations and ordinances.

THE ARMY AS A FUNCTIONAL INSTITUTION

The Military Mission

The mission of the modern Mexican armed forces is formally defined in much the same way as that of the military in other Latin American republics. They are responsible for defending the sovereignty, independence, and integrity of the nation, maintaining the rule of its constitution and laws, and conserving internal order.³⁵

External Defense

Mexico's geographical situation and her revolutionary heritage have determined the relative importance attached to each component of the mission and the way in which it is interpreted and defined. In contrast to Peru and to a smaller extent Argentina and Colombia, less emphasis is placed on external defense. In the case of the northern border, major points of contention with the United States have been resolved and, although many Mexicans fear economic and cultural imperialism emanating from their powerful neighbor, they have little apprehension of physical invasion. Upon his arrival in Mexico City in May 1966, U. S. President Lyndon Johnson made it a point to affirm, "There are no armies that patrol our borders, there are no guns that protect the frontiers of Mexico and the United States."³⁶ His words were received by applause. Mexican civilians and military leaders, moreover, are realists enough to perceive that despite the maximum defense preparations they might make, they would be impotent to withstand the overwhelming power of the United States should the latter wish to exercise it. Mexico's defense posture vis-à-vis her northern neighbor consists of maintaining coastal patrols to prevent the invasion of her territorial waters by North American shrimpers.

On the south, a reverse situation pertains. Although minor tensions with Guatemala exist over conflicting boundary claims, Mexico sees no military threat developing from that direction and should one appear, she is confident that she could contain it without any significant increase in defense outlays. As one Chilean laughingly observed, "The country on its north—the United States—is much too big to attack, and the country on the south—Guatemala—is too small to worry about."³⁷ The Mexican position was semi-officially stated by Gilberto Bosques in 1937:

It is [the army's] duty, naturally to prepare to defend the country against foreign aggression. But Mexico is so situated that no aggression is likely. The steadfast trend of its foreign policy, based as it is on the principle of non-intervention, has proven to be its best defense. In case of aggression, the Army would be but shock troops to withstand the first attacks, the population rising as one man to meet the foe.³⁸

With respect to defense of the hemisphere against invasion from without or subversion within, Mexico's historical tradition has led her to assume an almost unique posture within the inter-American system. Her revolution was strongly nationalist, anti-imperialist, and anti-interventionist largely as a result of her historic relations with the United States. It was aimed at destroying an exploitative political, economic, and social order and replacing it with political democracy and social justice. It was accomplished, moreover, largely by Mexicans with minimal external assistance, an achievement which has provided the nation with a well-developed sense of national pride and self-reliance.

Mexico, therefore, has pursued a highly independent foreign policy and has particularly avoided official identification with United States military objectives in the hemisphere. She has consistently opposed intervention in another American state whether it be unilateral or multilateral, and has refused to take a stand against apparent social revolutionary movements in other American states lest she be charged with betrayal of her own tradition. Thus, a proposed bilateral military assistance pact with the United States became an issue in the elections of 1952 and was rejected at least partly on the grounds that it subordinated Mexico's sovereignty to policies of her northern neighbor.³⁹ Today, in contrast to other major Latin American nations, military assistance from the United States has been limited to loans for the purchase of equipment—which are promptly repaid—and arrangements for the training of Mexican military personnel in United States installations.⁴⁰ Earlier, at the Bogotá Conference of 1948, Mexico led the opposition to a standing military component within the OAS, and since then has continued to resist the creation of an inter-American military or police force.⁴¹ And Mexico refused to withdraw diplomatic recognition or employ economic sanctions against Cuba in the 1960's.⁴²

Police Functions

In the absence of a national gendarmerie such as exists in Argentina and Peru, the police functions of the Mexican army are extensive and in the Federal District there is a significant interlocking of the military and police organizations. There, army officers serve as chiefs of the judicial police, security police, district police, riot police, motorized police brigade, traffic police, and the federal penitentiary. Units of the armed forces are regularly engaged in the suppression of banditry, opium and marijuana production and traffic, cattle rustling, and smuggling; in the control of aftosis (hoof and mouth disease); and in the protection of forest and fishery resources, irrigation and power complexes, and transportation and communications facilities. The army has also been used to suppress or control labor and student

disturbances. Thus, during the 1956-1957 disturbances in the National Polytechnic Institute, army troops occupied the dormitories and classrooms.⁴³

Perhaps the army's principal police function in recent years has been the control of agrarian disturbances and the ejection of squatters (paracaidistas), a type of action which has resulted in many casualties among both troops and campesinos. The most famous encounter of this type centered on Rubén Jaramillo, an agrarian leader of the state of Morelos for some twenty years and known among the peasants as a Mexican Robin Hood. On May 23, 1962, he, his wife, and three stepsons were murdered. His daughter, who escaped the massacre and fled to the home of ex-President Cárdenas, charged that a captain commanding some fifty army troops had taken her father and family from their home to see "el general" and then killed them in the tradition of the ley fuga.^{*} Campesinos maintained that the murder was a military act of reprisal for the deaths of soldiers in rural strife.⁴⁴

At some point, not always clear, support of the constitution and the laws shifts from simple police functions and riot control to action against political manifestations hostile to the government. One aspect of this mission is counterinsurgency. Mexico has not been seriously afflicted by ideologically inspired guerrilla activity and for reasons discussed earlier has preferred to assume a somewhat benevolent attitude when it develops in other countries. When, however, it occurs within the national territory, it is dealt with promptly and efficiently. Thus, on September 23, 1965, an insurgent attack on the military garrison at Ciudad Madero resulted in the death of the commanding officer, five soldiers, and three civilians as well as eight of the attackers. Within twenty-four hours, three hundred troops and four jet fighters were on the scene under the command of a brigadier general. The guerrillas were efficiently hunted down and virtually destroyed.⁴⁵

A second politically related aspect of the army's internal mission has to do with opposition parties. This subject will be discussed below.

Civic Action

In Mexico, military civic action is an important component of the military mission. It did not originate, however, as a counterinsurgency measure but as part of the revolutionary tradition of the armed forces. Their function has been not only that of guarding the heritage of the revolution but active participation in the achievement of its goals. As early as 1921, General Obregón created nineteen labor battalions to be employed in road construction, irrigation projects, and the repair and maintenance of railroad and telegraph lines. General Amaro continued the practice, and it was formalized by including in the Organic Law of the army an article which provided that the active forces, in addition to performing traditional-type missions, could be used for the construction of communications systems and other works of a public character that had some relation to military needs.⁴⁶ The latter qualification may, of course, be interpreted to include any public service construction.

Military civic action as a doctrine and a program appears to have assumed a more definite form during the Cárdenas administration. In 1937, Bosques observed:

As shaped by the Revolution, Mexico's Army is part of the educational system of the country rather than merely a fighting machine. It is an institution of

^{*} The law of escape: an individual may be shot while attempting to escape, but if he successfully escapes he is considered to have regained freedom.

social service doing a vast piece of work. Its schools, its various cooperation with rural communities in building school houses, in realizing village projects, engineering works, sanitation works, its cheerful association with communal land holders, its police work along the highways and roads, its wardenship over forests and fisheries, are features that must be considered in any inquiry to determine what color its influence gives the country. By and large that influence is a civilizing one. By and large the huge bit of the Federal Budget that it consumes is amply justified. A goodly portion of what is appropriated for it should, in any fair consideration of what Mexico spends, be set down in the accounts for public works, for education, and for police service.⁴⁷

The public service function of the armed forces has been reiterated in successive administrations. In 1946, Othón León L. wrote:

The social discipline of the army, an attribute which has been carefully sustained and developed by successive revolutionary administrations is perfectly assured. . . . The Mexican Army is identified with the ideals of the people . . . it is also an army of builders and represents a formidable reinforcement in the work of collective betterment.⁴⁸

Since World War II, in addition to continuing the activities enumerated above, the army played an important role in the antimalaria campaign of the 1950's which virtually eliminated fatalities from that disease. In the area of disaster relief, in 1962 it provided assistance, food, and supplies to Guamachil, Sinaloa, when that community was struck by a hurricane and to flood-ravaged Huehuetla, Guerrero.⁴⁹ In 1966 it was designated as the coordinating agency in a national disaster relief emergency plan.⁵⁰ In still another sphere, the army played a leading role in taking the national industrial, commercial, and transportation census of 1961.⁵¹ The level and scope of such activities led the journal Hispanoamericano (Mexico City) to report that in the mid-1960's, sixty percent of the budget of the ministry of defense was devoted to civic action-type projects.⁵²

Cultural Integration

Perhaps the most pervasive developmental function of the Mexican military has been in the area of education. In its broadest aspects this has involved integrating men from folk and even tribal cultures into the national society. Thus, in the official survey of accomplishments of the Avila Camacho administration, Luis Alamillo Flores wrote that the national military service law not only provides a reserve of trained manpower for the army, but turns the individual into a citizen. Civic education provided in the "cuartel hecho escuela" subordinates the particularistic sentiments of each recruit to concepts of national unity, welfare, and prosperity. The mixing of all social classes through military training, moreover, makes the army a truly national institution.⁵³

The process of socialization that takes place within the military is delightfully illustrated by a passage from Gregorio López y Fuentes' El Indio. An Indian was drafted for military service from his native village. His father heard nothing of him for two years and decided that he was lost forever. However, one day a merchant of the district who traveled widely told him that the boy was alive and serving in the garrison of a distant city. With great hope the father set about accumulating enough money to buy a substitute and arrange for his son's discharge. He scrimped and saved and finally sold everything he owned. At length he acquired

the necessary fee and commissioned the merchant to negotiate the discharge. The merchant carried out his commission faithfully. Together with the captain of the company, he went to the barracks to talk to the boy. They spoke in Spanish rather than the language of the village. The boy listened without enthusiasm, and replied that although he appreciated the effort and sacrifice that his father had made to obtain the money to enable his return, he was returning it so that his father could use it. The young soldier felt contented with his new life, the opportunity for education, the clothing that was provided, and the prospect for advancement. He believed that he would be unhappy in his native village.⁵⁴ In short, he was no longer an Indian; he had become a Mexican.

Literacy Training

More specifically, the revolutionary armed forces have been concerned since their establishment with education of their own personnel. Thus their Organic Law provides that "primary instruction will be obligatory for soldiers and noncommissioned officers of the army and the navy without prejudice to military instruction."⁵⁵ The basic element in such instruction was literacy training. As in the case of other civic action activities, President Cárdenas provided a major impetus to military educational programs and included in them not only service personnel but also their dependents. In 1937, the army claimed to have created in the preceding two years 14,000 literates among its personnel and also provided them with basic agricultural and mechanical training. Its goal for the year of the report was to produce 45,000 literates. Principal instruments in this effort were five "children of the army" schools. These were free boarding institutions for the offspring of soldiers then enlisted or who at some time during the revolutionary period were in service. In 1937, it was reported that 3,000 children, formerly barracks loiterers, were being trained as skilled workers and "proud citizens." Thirty such schools was the aim of President Cárdenas.⁵⁶ Emphasis on literacy training within the military family has continued and the army reported that in 1960, 36,053 soldiers, paramilitary personnel, and dependents were taught to read and write; 35,465 in 1961; and 31,099 in 1962.⁵⁷

In 1965, the army's role in literacy training was redefined and given new impetus by Secretary of National Defense General Marcelino García Barragán in response to President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz's exhortation to eliminate illiteracy from the nation. The effort involves not only instruction for military personnel and dependents in alfabetización centers throughout the nation, but also for civilians who wish to learn how to read and write, particularly campesinos. "Each soldier," announced García Barragán, "is being converted into a teacher of at least two persons who do not know how to read."⁵⁸

Strength and Organization

The Mexican regular army of the 1960's has a strength of approximately 64,000, including some 9,500 active officers.⁵⁹ Enlisted personnel are provided largely by volunteers serving six-year terms. Volunteer strength is supplemented from annual classes of inductees selected under the provisions of the National Military Service Act of 1942. The regular component is backed by a territorial reserve (rurales) of some 100,000 officers and men composed of discharged or retired regulars and national service inductees who have completed their year of compulsory military training.

Tactically, the regular army is organized into 2 brigades, one of which is the presidential guard, 1 infantry group, 1 mechanized cavalry regiment, 20 horse cavalry regiments, and 50 separate infantry battalions.

Following the pattern established by Obregón, 35 military zones serve the needs of overall command and administration. Most of these correspond roughly with state boundaries. They are commanded by major generals (generales de brigada) or lieutenant generals (generales de división). Zone headquarters are located as shown in Table 36.

TABLE 36
MILITARY ZONE HEADQUARTERS

1. México, D. F.	19. Tuxpan, Veracruz
2. El Cíprés, B. C.	20. Colima, Col.
3. La Paz, B. C.	21. Morelia, Michoacán
4. Hermosillo, Sonora	22. Toluca, Mex.
5. Chihuahua, Chih.	23. Tlaxcala, Tlax.
6. Saltillo, Coahuila	24. Cuernavaca, Morelos
7. Monterrey, Nuevo León	25. Puebla, Pue.
8. Tampico, Tamaulipas	26. La Boticaria, Vera.
9. Culiacán, Sinaloa	27. Acapulco, Guerrero
10. Durango, Dgo.	28. Oaxaca, Oax.
11. Zacatecas, Zac.	29. Ixtapex, Oax.
12. San Luis Potosí, S. L. P.	30. Villahermosa, Tab.
13. Tépíc, Nayarit	31. Tuxtla Gutiérrez, Chiapas
14. Aguascalientes, Ags.	32. Mérida, Yucatán
15. Guadalajara, Jalisco	33. Campeche, Camp.
16. Irapuato, Guanajuato	34. Chetumal, Q. R.
17. Querétaro, Qro.	35. Chilpancingo, Gro.
18. Pachuca, Hidalgo	

About 40 percent of the regular army, including most of its mechanized strength, is stationed around Puebla and in the Federal District; that is, within a hundred-mile radius of the capital. The rest are distributed in smaller garrisons throughout the country with at least one battalion of infantry assigned to each military zone. There are no significant concentrations of troops on the nation's land or sea frontiers.

The personnel strength of the air force is about 4,200, of which some 900 are officers. It is organized into 7 air groups with 12 operational squadrons. Its air strength is composed of some 250 fighters, fighter-bombers, transports, trainers, and helicopters, including a number of T-33 jets. Air units are supported by a battalion of paratroops, another of combat engineers, and service and maintenance units.

The Mexican navy functions primarily as a coast guard rather than a combat arm. It has a personnel strength of approximately 2,300 officers and 7,700 enlisted men and includes a

marine regiment of 3 battalions. The backbone of its forces afloat consists of 4 ex-U. S. APD's (high speed transports) and 20 ex-U. S. PCE's (escort vessels). The command and administrative structure of the department of the navy includes a naval staff, a set of functional bureaus, and eight territorial commands whose numerical designations and headquarters are listed in Table 37.

TABLE 37
NAVY TERRITORIAL COMMANDS

<u>Gulf Coast</u>	<u>Pacific</u>
I. Tampico, Tamaulipas	II. Puerto Cortés, Baja California
III. Veracruz, Veracruz	IV. Guaymas, Sonora
V. Ciudad del Carmen, Campeche	VI. Manzanillo, Colima
VII. Isla Mujeres, Quintana Roo	VIII. Icacos, Guerrero

General command of the armed forces pertains to the president of the republic in that the constitution authorizes him "to dispose of the permanent armed forces, including the land Army, the marine Navy and the Air Force for internal security and exterior defense of the Federation." In peacetime, however, command and administration are delegated in the case of the army and air force to the secretary of national defense, and in the case of the navy, to the secretary of marine.

The basic components of the secretariat of national defense are: (1) a general staff, (2) major commands, and (3) a series of specialized functional departments, bureaus, and sections. The general staff which includes representatives from all three services is charged with the traditional and universal functions of long range mobilization, strategic and logistical planning, and training. Major commands directly responsible to the minister include the territorial units listed above and the concentrations in and around the capital with the exception of the presidential guards which are under the direct command of the chief executive.

The functional departments and bureaus are concerned with the affairs of the several combat arms and supporting services, and with military justice, general inspection, personnel, military education, and military social services. Among them is military aviation which, after various changes in organization and denomination, became, in 1944, the Mexican air force. Although not possessing separate ministerial status, the air force enjoys a quasi-autonomous position within the defense secretariat. It is commanded by a chief who is a general officer, in direct command of air units and assisted by an air staff and heads of administrative and service sections.

The order of battle, command structure, and equipment of the Mexican armed forces clearly indicate the priority given to the internal components of the military mission.

The Military Budget

During the early years of the revolutionary government, problems of pacification together with the irresistible and often irresponsible demands of the armed forces produced military

budgets which accounted for major proportions of the total national outlay. In 1914, the year of the triumph of the constitutionalist revolution and the metamorphosis of the constitutionalist army into a national army, the figure was 31 percent; in 1917 it rose to 72 percent.⁶⁰ Thereafter, as civil strife diminished and the size of the army was reduced, the percentage began to drop until in 1948 it was 13. Thereafter, although showing a small overall decline, it has remained fairly stable, ranging from 9 to 14 percent and averaging 11.3 percent (see Table 38 following).

The variations in the proportions of total defense outlays received by the army, navy, and military industries indicate that the navy's share has increased at the expense of the army with its most prosperous years coming during the presidency of Adolfo Ruiz Cortines. The reasons for this pattern, if it can be regarded as such, are not clear but may represent the expansion of the nonmilitary functions of the ministry of marine. In evaluating the data, it should also be remembered that a substantial proportion of the army's budget is consumed by civic action.

In the pre-Cárdenas years budgetmaking involved a rather informal "cutting up the pie" with the military demanding and receiving any amount they decided upon. Within amounts allocated, governmental departments enjoyed wide latitude in the disbursement of funds. Today, however, the process has become highly routinized and bureaucratized with economists and fiscal experts in the several departments preparing systematic estimates of goals and requirements. The armed forces, moreover, are but one of many agencies competing for a share of always limited resources. After the experts in the defense department have prepared a set of estimates they must be presented, advocated, defended, and ultimately compromised or adjusted. And amounts allocated must be spent within categories approved and ultimately accounted for.⁶¹ The supreme arbiter in the process is the president of the republic and, in the case of the military, the relationship is between him and the service secretaries. The legal and administrative norms of budgetmaking and budget administration, however, are modified in effect by personalistic relations that penetrate and bypass bureaucratic structures. Thus, Scott observes that

Administrative controls are less meaningful in [Mexico] where the relationship between the president and cabinet officers is on a personalistic basis. Department heads hold office because the president trusts them; so long as this is true they can usually by-pass fiscal regulations to accomplish a goal to which both the secretary and the president aspire. . . . Budget estimates, accounting, purchasing, personnel practices—none are as good in practice as the machinery available should or could produce, if the political system permitted it.⁶²

Furthermore, while governmental departments must in general adhere to a line item budget and are fiscally accountable, revolutionary political custom winks at leakage of funds, often into private accounts.⁶³

THE OFFICER CORPS

The "Estado Militar"

The Mexican armed forces are a permanent public agency charged with a special function in the performance of which they are conceded a virtual monopoly of organized violence within the republic.⁶⁴ By virtue of their peculiar functions and attributes, they possess a distinct and

TABLE 38
MILITARY BUDGETS, 1948-1966

Year	Federal Budget	Defense Budget		Army and Air Force		Marine		Military Industries	
		Amount	% of National Budget	Amount	% of Defense Budget	Amount	% of Defense Budget	Amount	% of Defense Budget
1948	2,551,258,319	349,483,000	13	262,000,000	74	69,300,000	20	18,183,000	6
1949	2,746,057,000	355,210,000	12	262,000,000	73	73,620,000	21	19,590,000	6
1950	3,102,901,695	376,101,000	12	275,320,000	73	77,700,000	20	23,081,000	7
1951	3,102,901,695	376,101,000	12	275,320,000	73	77,700,000	20	23,081,000	7
1952	3,999,203,000	542,480,000	11	328,713,000	73	95,600,000	21	28,167,000	6
1953	4,160,328,300	507,316,000	12	370,270,000	73	106,190,000	20	30,856,000	7
1954	4,827,681,000	683,614,000	14	408,614,000	60	241,000,000	34	34,000,000	6
1955	5,681,399,000	716,919,000	12	451,715,000	63	226,244,000	31	38,960,000	6
1956	6,696,374,000	820,465,000	12	507,000,000	61	272,255,000	33	41,210,000	6
1957	7,577,874,000	912,016,000	12	556,700,000	61	308,075,000	33	47,241,000	6
1958	8,009,485,000	1,009,485,000	12	591,300,000	59	369,320,000	36	48,665,000	5
1959	9,385,756,000	1,008,860,000	10	662,500,000	66	291,570,000	29	54,790,000	5
1960	10,256,341,000	1,149,491,000	11	751,500,000	65	339,379,000	30	58,612,000	5
1961	10,041,481,000	1,174,175,000	10	760,000,000	65	353,215,000	30	60,960,000	5
1962	12,319,783,000	1,217,682,000	9	821,601,000	67	326,371,000	26	69,710,000	7
1963	13,801,440,000	1,418,109,000	12	958,026,000	67	368,581,000	26	71,502,000	7
1964	15,953,541,000	1,561,523,000	9	1,062,197,000	68	422,078,000	27	77,248,000	5
1965	17,854,220,000	1,789,853,000	10	1,229,865,000	68	481,480,000	26	78,508,000	6
1966	20,132,252,000	1,940,959,000	10	1,333,067,000	68	525,940,000	27	81,952,000	5

Source: Diario oficial for appropriate years. Amounts are in pesos.

juridically defined corporate status within the state.⁶⁵ While much of the defining legislation applies to all uniformed military personnel, the concept of the estado militar as used here refers primarily to officers since it is their long term career interests and commitments and their monopoly of command which give "military status" its particular significance within the context of this study.

The most fundamental definition of the estado militar is found in article 73, part IV, of the constitution which states that congress has the power "to raise and maintain the armed forces of the Union, to wit: Army, Navy and Air Force, and to regulate their organization and Service." Article 123, part B, XIII, asserts that "military and naval personnel . . . shall be governed by their own laws." Subsumed under article 73, however, is the right of congress to define the military jurisdiction. Article 88, part I, empowers the president of the republic "to promulgate and execute the laws enacted by the Congress of the Union. . . ." These provisions mean in effect that the armed forces are governed by laws, ordinances, and regulations enacted by congress and promulgated by the president and are thus subject to what Samuel P. Huntington defines as "subjective civilian control," that is, "maximiz[ed] civilian power."⁶⁶

Enabling laws, ordinances, and regulations proceeding from these constitutional provisions invest members of the armed forces with a distinct set of obligations and rights as well as subjecting them to a number of civil disabilities.⁶⁷ The obligations imposed on military personnel are much more extensive and rigorous than those affecting nonuniformed citizens. First, the soldier's code requires him to place duty to his country above all personal interests and, if necessary, to give his life in its defense.⁶⁸ Second, he must accept a degree of regulation and discipline which circumscribes his freedom to a much greater extent than do the police powers affecting civilians.⁶⁹ Violations of military codes of conduct and discipline, moreover, tend to be more Draconian than is the case with offenses governed by civil codes.⁷⁰

With respect to rights, military personnel are provided by law with a standardized system of pay and promotion, and their career security is protected by due process as defined in military regulations. These conditions will be treated in more detail below. A second category of rights is contained in the fuero de guerra or the fuero militar. From the late colonial period to the liberal reforms of the mid-1850's, the Mexican armed forces possessed exclusive jurisdiction over their personnel in cases of both military and common crimes and in certain classes of civil litigation. The competence of their tribunals also extended to civilians when the latter committed offenses against military law or in cases where military personnel were defendants.⁷¹

Defenders of the fuero de guerra argued that it was not properly a right and much less a concession of special privileges to military personnel but rather a special code which, by imposing quick, sure, and rigorous justice, ensured the maintenance of discipline in the armed forces.⁷² In Spanish law, however, it was defined as a fuero privilegiado,⁷³ and in fact it operated as such, since officers generally received more lenient treatment in tribunals composed of members of the corporation than they would have if their cases had been heard by civil justices. At an institutional level, moreover, the amplitude of the military fuero limited control of the armed forces by the government.⁷⁴ As a consequence of its abuse, it came under repeated attacks by Mexican liberals culminating in the Ley Juárez of 1855 which, as incorporated into the Constitution of 1857, transferred jurisdiction over common crimes and civil cases involving military personnel to civil courts.⁷⁵

The Constitution of 1917 further limited the military jurisdiction. Article 13 provides:

No one may be tried by private laws or special tribunals. No person or corporate body shall have privileges or enjoy emoluments other than those given

in compensation for public services and which are set by law. Military jurisdiction shall be recognized for the trial of crimes against and violation of military discipline, but the military tribunals shall in no case have jurisdiction over persons who do not belong to the army. Whenever a civilian is implicated in a military crime or violation, the respective civil authority shall deal with the case.

Provisions for implementing this article are contained in the Código de justicia militar. Although the code does not specify crimes against military discipline, they are commonly held to include absence without leave, desertion, insubordination, abuse of authority, self-inflicted injuries to avoid service, treason, rebellion, and violations of military honor.⁷⁶

The military fuero is further circumscribed by the condition that in case of disputes over whether a crime is military or common, competence pertains to the supreme court, and by the provision that military personnel may seek an injunction (amparo) from the supreme court if they feel that their rights are being violated by military tribunals.⁷⁷

The fuero de guerra to which Mexican military personnel are subject today appears to conform to the position that it is not a privilege but simply a special jurisdiction. Corona maintains that it is not a concession of rights to a particular class of persons but a "social guarantee," that is, a guarantee to the general society that the military will not abuse its power and that it will subsist in a state of firm discipline.⁷⁸ Indeed, he argues, the military fuero should be regarded as a disability rather than a right or privilege since it excepts service personnel from many individual guarantees of the constitution and imposes on them swifter and more rigorous justice than does civil law.⁷⁹

In the latter connection, the constitution and the laws impose certain civil disabilities on members of the armed forces. These have to do primarily with their political activity and undoubtedly reflect a concern deriving from earlier experiences with the military in politics. Article 129 of the constitution prohibits military personnel from performing (on active service) in time of peace any functions that are not directly related to their institutional mission. More specifically, they are enjoined against involving themselves in politics on pain of losing "their constitutional rights,"⁸⁰ against expressing political opinions publicly, and against using moral or physical means to influence the opinions of subordinates in political matters. The injunctions apply particularly strongly against general officers because of their powerful position within the military institution.⁸¹

Legal provisions exist, however, for military personnel to engage in politics and to occupy essentially political posts if they relinquish active status. Officers who are appointed by the federal or state executive to fill nonmilitary posts may take leave of absence for the period of their appointment as may those who run for president or congress. In the latter situations, however, presidential candidates must begin their leave at least six months and congressional candidates ninety days after election.⁸² Officers may also take leave to campaign for an aspirant for elective office. In the presidential elections of 1940, which pitted General Avila Camacho, against General Juan Andreu Almazán, over thirty generals did so to support the latter.⁸³ Upon the completion of a term of elective office or a politicoadministrative assignment, officers revert to active status. Time spent on leave is given full credit for purposes of seniority and retirement.⁸⁴

The legal status of the Mexican officer corps is today severely circumscribed in comparison with the virtual autonomy it enjoyed during the early decades of the republic. It is still sufficient, however, to endow officers with an awareness of corporate identity. The

juridical dimension of the estado militar is supplemented, as in the case of military establishments elsewhere, by a sense of unity imposed by the relative physical isolation of military personnel, a tendency toward social herding, and a pervasive process of institutional socialization.

Officer Recruitment

Admission to the officer corps is, in effect, by cooption, since it is accomplished through graduation from an officer formation school (escuela de formación de oficiales) whose standards of admission and performance are determined largely by military leadership itself.

The principal institutions of this class are the Heróico Colegio Militar, the Colegio Militar de Aviación, and the Colegio Naval. The three academies are today the exclusive sources of infantry, cavalry, artillery, combat engineer, and administrative (intendencia) officers for the army; flying officers for the air force; and line officers for the navy. These institutions are complemented in each component of the armed forces by specialist schools for training commissioned personnel of the supporting services.⁸⁵ Approximately 90 percent of the officers of the Mexican armed forces are today the products of officer formation schools.⁸⁶

The most important of these schools is the Heróico Colegio Militar, since officers of the combat arms of the army largely monopolize military and political leadership not only of their own service but also of the armed forces collectively. The military academy, located today in Popotla, D. F., offers a four-year curriculum which includes military, general liberal arts, and physical education. During the first year all cadets take a common program. In the remaining three they specialize in one of the five arms and services curricula. The specialization to which the student is assigned is determined by the projected officer requirements of the several arms and branches, the particular aptitudes of the student, and, when possible, his preference.⁸⁷ Upon graduation the cadet is commissioned as a second lieutenant (subteniente) in his arm or service.⁸⁸

Cadets for the academy are recruited directly from civilian youths. Aspirants must be Mexican by birth, single, between sixteen and twenty-one years of age, at least 1.60 meters in height, and must have completed secondary, prevocational, or equivalent training. Persons meeting these general qualifications must pay an application fee of 500 pesos; present documentary proof of language and mathematical competence; and pass a set of physical, psychological, and aptitude tests. Cadets to fill the authorized strength of each first-year class are selected from applicants rating the highest on examinations and documentary evidence of preparation.⁸⁹ In addition to the curriculum provided for cadets, the academy offers an officer preparatory course for a much smaller number of first sergeants who have graduated from the army's noncommissioned officers school (Escuela militar de clases) and who have demonstrated exceptional capacity for leadership. As in the case of cadets, graduates are commissioned as second lieutenants.⁹⁰ Table 39 following provides partial data on numbers of graduates.

Tables 40 through 42 provide data on the educational, family, and regional background of 446 aspirants for admission to the military academy in 1955.

In a subsequent study, Romero provides more recent but somewhat less detailed data on 5,218 aspirants for the years 1953-1962.⁹¹ Their common denominator was completion of a secondary school education. Only a small number had begun vocational or university level programs; even fewer had completed either.

TABLE 39
GRADUATES OF THE HEROICO COLEGIO MILITAR

<u>Graduates</u>	<u>1949</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1962</u>
Cadets	89 (3)†	140 (2)	184 (2)	137	158
Sergeants	*	*	*	20	21
TOTAL	89	140	184	157	179

Source: SDN, Memorias.

†Figures in parentheses are foreign cadets (mostly from Central American countries) and are included in the annual totals.

*Sources did not indicate whether the figures for 1949, 1950, and 1951 include first sergeants.

TABLE 40
EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND OF ASPIRANTS (1955)

<u>Education</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Secondary or prevocational complete	369	82.73
Secondary or prevocational incomplete	18	4.03
<u>Bachillerato</u> or vocational complete	10	2.24
<u>Bachillerato</u> or vocational incomplete	49	10.99
TOTAL	446	99.99

Source: Javier Romero, Aspectos psicobiométricos y sociales de una muestra de la juventud mexicana, Dirección de Investigaciones antropológicas, 1 (Mexico City, 1956), p. 52.

TABLE 41
OCCUPATIONS OF PARENTS OR GUARDIANS OF ASPIRANTS (1955)

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Occupation</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Military	77	19.11	Mechanic	11	2.73
Shopkeeper	72	17.87	Physician	8	1.98
White collar employee	65	16.13	Accountant	7	1.73
Manual laborer	59	14.64	Lawyer	5	1.24
Agriculturalist	31	7.69	Artist	2	0.50

TABLE 41—Continued

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Occupation</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Teacher	14	3.47	Other	5	1.24
Engineer	12	2.98	- - - - -		100.00
Peasant	12	2.98	Fathers		
Railroad			deceased	26	
worker	12	2.98	Female		
Chauffeur	11	2.73	guardians	4	
			Without in-		
			formation	13	
			TOTAL	446	

Source: Romero, Aspectos, p. 49.

TABLE 42
REGIONAL BACKGROUND OF ASPIRANTS (1955)

<u>Region</u>	<u>Birthplace</u>		<u>Residence Previous Five Years</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Federal District	174	39.10	209	46.97
Central Zone (11 states)	127	28.54	97	21.80
South Pacific Zone (4 states)	58	13.03	39	8.76
Northern Zone (7 states)	40	8.99	28	6.29
Gulf Zone (5 states)	33	7.41	27	6.07
North Pacific Zone (3 states)	12	2.70	6	1.35
Other	1	0.23	39	8.76
TOTALS	445	100.00	445	100.00

Source: Romero, Aspectos, p. 47.

With respect to family background, Romero gives no specific figures but in order of decreasing percentages of the total, he identifies fathers as merchants and shopkeepers, public employees, military men, workers, and farmers. In terms of regional origins, 38.07 percent were residents of the Federal District; 33.02 percent of the rest of the Central Zone; 11.19 percent of the South Pacific Zone; 8.48 percent of the Gulf Zone; 6.63 percent of the Northern Zone; and 2.61 percent of the North Pacific Zone. These percentages were in general constant for the years under examination. The states which provided the most aspirants were

Hidalgo, México, Michoacán, Morelos, Puebla, Guerrero, Oaxaca, and Veracruz. Those furnishing the fewest were Quintana Roo, Tabasco, Campeche, Sonora, Sinaloa, and Zacatecas.⁹²

Assuming that the data on aspirants are reasonably representative of those who were actually admitted, it appears that new officers for the Mexican army are drawn heavily from families in the middle and lower levels of the middle class living in urban areas in the central and most thickly populated sections of the republic. The inference about middle class origin is supported by other observers.⁹³

This pattern of recruitment derives from several circumstances. Educational levels of aspirants are undoubtedly linked to admission requirements. In the case of regional distribution, the predominance of candidates from central Mexico might be expected in view of the concentration of population in this area. The number from the Federal District, however, is disproportionate to population distribution in the republic and may reflect (1) the superior preparatory education available there, (2) the physical presence and visibility of the academy in the District, and (3) the fact that qualifying examinations are given only in the District, so that aspirants from other regions must anticipate travel and living expenses while away from home.

The family background of officers is undoubtedly related to Mexican social value systems, career preferences, and career opportunities. While existing sociological literature is deficient in studies of these subjects, partial and peripheral investigations as well as the author's informal observations during visits to Mexico over the past seventeen years suggest that the primary impulse of the middle class and the more sophisticated and regularly employed urban working class is toward improved economic and social status. This aspiration includes or subsumes such values as career success; knowledge, particularly as it may apply to career availability and development; honor and respect; and economic security. It is accompanied by a powerful interest in the acquisition of the material amenities of modern life both as sources of physical and psychological satisfaction and as visible indicators of status and success.⁹⁴

This value system does not appear to differ substantially from that prevailing among middle sectors elsewhere in Latin America, or indeed, in any modern secular society. It has, however, certain special characteristics. First, it appears to be more genuinely and exclusively middle class than is the case among middle sectors in Latin American countries that still possess traditional type elites. Studies of the middle classes in Peru and Colombia, for example, suggest that their values are largely derivative from those of the oligarchies.⁹⁵ Second, Mexico possesses the social and economic conditions which make middle class values and aspirations realistic. Both characteristics very likely derive from the revolution, a holocaust which virtually destroyed a ruling class and a traditional value system and laid the foundations of an open society providing both economic and social opportunity.

With respect to Mexican occupational preferences, a professional career (the career designated in Mexico profesionista) offers the greatest attraction.⁹⁶ From this it may be inferred that Mexicans believe that a profession is most likely to provide the combination of career success, security, and affluence which they desire. Officership differs in many ways from such civilian professions as engineering, architecture, and medicine but it still conveys professional status. Moreover, it possesses a number of advantages which might be attractive to lower social sectors: a completely subsidized university level education;⁹⁷ a system of routinized career advancement that promises at least moderate career success without requiring unusual intellectual preparation, capacity, or effort; and an exceptional degree of career security.

There is, in fact, evidence that officership as a career holds some attraction for Mexican youth, particularly those of lower and lower middle class origin. A survey of occupational preferences conducted in 1948 indicated that Mexicans in the lower and the lower middle income group (200-399 pesos monthly) found military careers and positions as owner and director of business enterprises the most attractive.⁸⁸ Although these findings are somewhat dated, they are supported by the fact that in 1964 some 1,800 youths applied for admission to the military academy, but only 300 were admitted. In the case of the naval academy the ratio was 900 to 60.⁸⁹

More direct evidence tends to confirm the above observations. Interviews and conversations with thirty-six company and field grade officers, all graduates of the military academy, indicated that (1) they were from families that could be placed in the lower half of the middle class or among the working class, and (2) at the time of admission to the academy most of them and/or their families were not moved primarily by romantic notions of military glory or a strong attraction to the military profession *per se*. Rather, they regarded officership as a career that offered opportunities for upward social mobility and security without the capital outlay required in civilian professions. Thus, twenty-eight indicated that army commissions offered a more secure existence and greater opportunities to "get ahead" than did the occupations of their fathers. Moreover, alternative careers such as medicine or law were beyond their means or ambitions. Of the remaining eight, five indicated a genuine preference for a military life as against careers in business and the civilian professions. Two were prompted by the fact that their fathers were senior officers who wanted their sons to follow in their footsteps. One stated that his wife was the daughter of a general and that during the couple's courtship the father intimated that the young man's suit would be viewed more favorably if he, too, became an officer.

The obverse of the preceding observations is the attitude of upper middle class young men toward a military career. Those interrogated generally expressed some surprise that the question should have been raised. They had never thought about it. When pressed, however, they stated in effect that they regarded officership as a low status profession and, moreover, one whose pecuniary rewards were quite unattractive in comparison to the alternatives available.

With reference to officer recruitment among the lower and poorer classes, it may be hypothesized that in comparison with white collar families, a general lack of awareness of opportunities and weaker motivation may work against the selection of a commissioned career in the army. In the author's judgment, however, more important inhibitory factors exist. First, the 500 pesos deposit required for the entrance examinations and, for aspirants living outside the Federal District, expenses incidental to taking them, discriminate against the poor. Second, despite progress made since the revolution, the poor suffer from preparatory education disadvantages. In short, lower middle class youth possess a combination of motivations, preparation, and resources that facilitates their domination of the officer corps.

Two final observations are offered about the social sources of recruitment of Mexican officers. First, the fact that one of the main occupational groups from which officers are drawn is armed forces personnel themselves, suggests that the military profession is becoming stabilized and to some degree self-perpetuating. Second, and more speculatively, if the Mexican economy continues to expand at its present rate, a wider range of alternative and possibly more attractive careers may open for lower middle class youth and educational opportunities for the working classes will improve. Thus, recruitment may come more extensively from lower social sectors.

Career Development

As late as the 1950's and early 1960's, senior Mexican officers tended to conform to the type, "revolutionary general." That is, most were commissioned directly from the enlisted ranks of the armed forces or from civilian life. Many were referred to rather derisively as "generales de dedo," meaning that they became general officers abruptly when a senior field commander pointed a finger at them and announced, "You are now a general." It should be added that the term "revolutionary officer" can not be taken too literally. It refers not only to those who participated in the armed struggles of the revolution between 1910 and 1917, most of whom are now dead or retired, but also to officers entering the service in the 1920's and the 1930's and who were commissioned and advanced their careers through political influence.

Such officers have traditionally tended to combine military service, politicoadministrative assignments in the government or party and, often, private business enterprise or the practice of a civilian profession. During the early, free-wheeling years of the revolution, the officer-businessman was quite common, and many "socialist generals" amassed fortunes. Thus, during the Calles administration, General Abelardo Rodríguez became wealthy through his interests in horseraising, gambling, and the liquor business in the northwestern border cities of Mexicali, Tijuana, and Ensenada. Subsequently he invested his earnings in more respectable enterprises such as real estate, banking, and food production. By the time he became president of the republic in 1932, he was estimated to be worth over 100,000,000 pesos. This level of entrepreneurship has virtually disappeared in the Mexican armed forces. Officers remain, however, who devote part of their time to business or to a profession while retaining active status and drawing base pay.

Career lines of the generation described above may be illustrated by the following biographical sketches.¹⁰⁰

Army General Gabriel Leyva Velásquez. Born of an important Sinaloa family which was close to the Maderos, Leyva was commissioned by Francisco Madero in 1911 and in 1914 joined Obregón's forces. By 1927 he was a colonel and by 1943 a brigadier general. During the 1930's he served as governor of his native state and as one of its deputies in congress; during the 1940's, as senator. From 1953 to 1957 he was the national president of the PRI and, in 1957-1963, again governor of Sinaloa. Leyva was a very powerful political figure because of his friendship with Presidents Miguel Alemán and Adolfo Ruiz Cortines and his influence in the peasant sector of the PRI.

Army General Alfonso Corona del Rosal. Corona was born in 1900. Although he graduated from the Heroico Colegio Militar in the 1920's, his career has been primarily that of a lawyer and politician. In 1940 he was a member of the senate committee supporting the presidential candidacy of Manuel Avila Camacho. Subsequently he served as president of the Federal District committee of the PRI and in 1953-1954 as chief of military industries (then a cabinet post). He was governor of the state of Hidalgo from 1954 to 1958 and national president of the PRI from 1958 to 1964. In the latter year he became secretary of national properties (bienes nacionales) in the cabinet of President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, and in September 1966, he was appointed mayor of Mexico City. General Corona has also published several studies on the juridical status and role of the armed forces in modern Mexico, including Moral militar y civismo (Mexico, 1952), and the previously cited El estatuto militar.

Army General Matías Ramos Santos. Born in 1891, Ramos joined the revolution as a private in 1910 and was a colonel by the end of the following year. In the course of his military career, he served as commander of several military zones; as secretary of war and

marine in 1929-1930, and as secretary of national defense from 1953 to 1958. In his non-military capacity he was a deputy from the state of Zacatecas (September 1918-August 1920), governor of the same state (1933-36), and president of the official party in 1935. He retired in January 1959.

Army General Donato Bravo Izquierdo. Born in the state of Puebla in 1890, Bravo joined the revolutionary command of General Barbosa in 1913. By 1924 he was a brigadier general and by 1942, a lieutenant general. His military career included assignments as zone commander and army inspector general. In the politicoadministrative sphere he was a deputy to the constitutional convention of 1916-1917, congressional deputy from Querétaro and governor of the state of Puebla in the 1920's and senator from the same state in 1958-1964.

Army General Agustín Olachea Aviles. Olachea was born in 1893 in what is now the state of Baja California del Norte. He joined the revolutionary forces of General Manuel Dieguez in 1913 and, after reaching the rank of general, served as the commander of several zones. Between 1958 and 1964 he was secretary of national defense. His political offices included the governorship of the territory of Baja California (1925-1932) and of the state of Baja California del Norte (1931). He was national president of the PRI, 1956-1958.

Air Force General Roberto Fierro Villalobos. Born in Chihuahua in 1897, Fierro received his pilot's wings in 1922 and advanced in the aviation arm until he became chief of the air force in April 1959. He also founded and operated for several decades the Roberto Fierro Aviation Company. His career, moreover, extended into the politicoadministrative sphere by virtue of his service as governor of Chihuahua from November 1931-July 1932.

Air Force General Antonio Cárdenas Rodríguez. Cárdenas was born in the state of Coahuila in 1905, and graduated from the Colegio Militar in 1923. In 1927, he received his pilot's wings and thereafter served as flight instructor in the Escuela Militar de Aviación, made various good will flights abroad, and during the early years of World War II was a military adviser to the president of the republic. In 1943, he was attached to the U. S. 97th Heavy Bomber Group serving in the Mediterranean and later attended U. S. Air Force schools in San Diego and Colorado Springs. From 1946 to 1952 he was chief of the Mexican air force. Deviations from a purely professional career line included assignments in the ministry of education and the national railway administration and, in the 1940's, the governorship of Coahuila.

Army General Fernando Pamanes Escobedo. Pamanes, who was born in 1909, graduated from the Heróico Colegio Militar in 1925 and from the Escuela Superior de Guerra in 1936. After a series of command and staff assignments he became, in 1958, oficial mayor of the army. From 1955 to 1958 he was a congressional deputy from Zacatecas and in 1965 he was named Mexican ambassador to Cuba.

Army General Marcelino García Barragán. Born in Jalisco in 1895, García began his military career as an enlisted man in the pre-1917 revolutionary forces but won an appointment to the Heróico Colegio Militar in 1921 and graduated with a commission in 1923. After various troop duty and command assignments he was named director of the Colegio in 1941. In 1964 he became secretary of national defense, the first graduate of the Colegio to hold this post. His military career was interrupted briefly when he served as governor of his native state in 1943.

With the death and retirement of the revolutionary officers and the emergence of a new generation trained during the Cárdenas regime and World War II, the career of the

representative Mexican officer is tending to conform to a prescribed line that is more or less universal in modern armies.¹⁰¹ It includes preparation for officership in a military academy after a process of competitive selection, advanced schooling interspersed with staff and troop assignments, and a system of promotion based on a combination of seniority and merit and accompanied by standardized pay scales.

The hierarchy of Mexican commissioned grades and their United States equivalents are shown in Table 43 below.

TABLE 43
MEXICAN ARMY COMMISSION GRADES

<u>Mexican Grade</u>	<u>U. S. Equivalent</u>
General de división	Lieutenant general
General de brigada	Major general
General brigadier	Brigadier general
Coronel	Colonel
Teniente coronel	Lieutenant colonel
Mayor	Major
Capitán primero } Capitán segundo }	Captain
Teniente	First lieutenant
Subteniente	Second lieutenant

Source: Pedro Pereyra González, Pueblo y ejército (Mexico City, 1963), p. 112; SDN, Memoria, 1961/1962, p. 39.

After graduation from the military academy, the newly commissioned officer spends two years as a second lieutenant. If he performs satisfactorily during this period he is automatically promoted to first lieutenant and remains in that grade for three years. After five years of service he has the choice of resigning or continuing in the service. If he opts for the latter, further promotion is subject to the regulations governing annual promociones generales (to captain, major, and lieutenant colonel) and promociones superiores (to colonel, brigadier general, major general, and lieutenant general).¹⁰² In general, promotions are based on the completion of specified numbers of years in grade plus professional competence as demonstrated by performance of duty and, in some cases, examinations. Advancement to the grade of colonel and above, however, is limited to some extent by available vacancies in the several grades.¹⁰³ It also requires ratification by the senate.¹⁰⁴ Promotion procedures are complemented by provisions for voluntary retirement and for compulsory retirement based on maximum age in grade. The latter runs from 48 for first lieutenant to 65 for lieutenant generals.¹⁰⁵ At the same time the officer is protected from demotion or dismissal except by due process under military law.¹⁰⁶

Pay and Benefits

As in the case of promotion and retirement, the pay and official emoluments of Mexican officers are regulated by law and subject to periodic adjustment. All receive a base salary, and a substantial range of assignments carries supplements in the form of job rates and representational expense allowances. Base pay scales and supplements for key assignments are shown in Table 44 below.

TABLE 44
BASE PAY AND ALLOWANCES OF MEXICAN ARMY OFFICERS (1965)

<u>Base Pay</u>		<u>Position Rate</u>		<u>Representational Allowance</u>
Lieutenant general	450	Sec. of defense	792	176
Major general	367	Subsec. of defense	704	160
Brigadier general	286	Chief of staff	120	120
Colonel	224	Dept. chief	120	120
Major	188	Zone commander	120	80
Captain	150-170	Commandant of presidential staff	120	40
Lieutenant	134-143	Zone chief of staff	56	16
		Colonel of battalion	22	-
		Company commander	8	-

Source: Figures, obtained not from official sources but from interviews, are in U.S. dollars per month.

Adding appropriate combinations of direct income sources, a lieutenant general serving as secretary of national defense would receive U. S. \$1,418 monthly or some U. S. \$17,000 a year; a major general holding the post of chief of the general staff, \$607 a month or some \$7,300 annually; a captain commanding a company, \$151 monthly, or approximately \$1,800 a year. Thus a rather substantial differential in pay and allowances pertains between the highest and lowest grades in the hierarchy of command.

Income from the above sources may be further augmented for service in certain parts of the republic where living costs are higher than determined averages, and additional pay may be drawn for extra risk service such as flying, paratroop, and demolition units.

Direct income is supplemented by a variety of fringe benefits most of which are administered by the National Armed Forces Bank (Banco del Ejército y la Armada Nacionales), which functions as a department of the secretariat of national defense.¹⁰⁷ Military personnel are entitled to low cost medical and dental treatment in hospitals and clinics operated by the army medical service. The dependents of officers who die while on active duty receive the base pay of the deceased for four months and, in the case of veterans of the revolution, six months. A military life insurance plan provides lump sum payments to survivors at the rate of U. S. \$2,400 for general officers, \$1,440 for field grade, and \$960 for company grade.¹⁰⁸

Fringe benefits include provisions for low cost housing. With the support of the department of military pensions, the Armed Forces National Bank, and the National Hypothecary Bank, loans of up to U. S. \$4,000 may be obtained by military personnel for the construction of completely furnished homes. Terms include mortgage insurance and a very favorable interest rate of 10 percent. Houses are clustered in military residential areas (colonias) such as that in El Huizchal, D. F.¹⁰⁹ The Armed Forces Bank also administers for service personnel pharmacies that sell at one half commercial rates and merchandise-food commissaries which operate at cost.¹¹⁰

Retirement benefits for officers are provided through the Armed Forces Bank, the scale depending on length of service. For those with less than 20 years, payments are in lump sums ranging from 6 months' pay for those with 5 years, to 32 for those with 19. Those with over 20 years' service receive monthly payments for life with the amount determined by grade at retirement in connection with length of service. For example, an officer with 20 years receives 75 percent of his base pay at the time of retirement; one with 29 years, 95 percent; one with over 30 years, 100 percent. Automatic promotion to the next higher grade is made upon retirement to those with over 20 years of service who have completed sufficient time in the grade held at the time of retirement.¹¹¹

The income of military personnel acquires more meaning when compared with that of civilian occupations. Such a comparison, however, is difficult because of complexity of the military system of pay and emoluments and variations in civilian wages and salaries by region.¹¹² Until the implementation of legislation enacted in 1962, no national minimum wage existed. Instead, rates varied according to local supply and demand, the status of the employer (foreign, government, private Mexican), and the strength of union influence. In 1962-1963, for example, the daily minimum average wage for urban workers in Baja California was U. S. \$2.32; in the Federal District, \$1.06; and in Chiapas, \$1.58. In a single state, Sonora, comparable urban wages in the various municipios ranged from U. S. \$1.24 to \$2.08.¹¹³

A second problem is that although there are many high individual incomes in Mexico, civilian wages and salaries are very low. In the majority of Mexican states, over 70 percent and in some as high as 90 percent of the economically active population earned in 1962-1963 less than U. S. \$60 a month.¹¹⁴ This type of data, however, distorts the relationship between civilian and military incomes since it includes all wage earners, thus lowering the civilian average and exaggerating the income of officers.

It is possible, however, to roughly equate the direct pay of the several officer grades with the incomes of categories of civilian employment using data published by the Secretaría de Industria y Comercio,¹¹⁵ and the figures on military pay and allowances given in Table 44 above. Thus, lieutenants' salaries are roughly equivalent to those of minor supervisory and office white collar employees (empleados) in lower paying unionized industries including hosiery, metal furniture, fertilizer, matches, footwear, cigars, meat packing, bakeries, and wheat milling. Captains' salaries compare with those of empleados in middle pay range unionized industries such as textiles and iron and steel. The salaries of majors and lieutenant colonels are in the same range as those of upper level empleados in industry, while those of colonels and generals compare with incomes of lower and medium managerial personnel in industry and successful professional people. The income of even the highest paid general officer is quite modest compared with those of the business and industrial elite.

In summary, it may be estimated that officers up to and through the grade of lieutenant colonel who depend on their military incomes alone live from spartan to modest existences roughly equivalent to that of the lower and middle levels of the middle class. Their situation

is mitigated by substantial fringe benefits but it is not until they reach the grade of colonel that they can enjoy a really comfortable life. Their relative affluence is not only a matter of higher base pay but also is affected by the larger supplements attached to senior command and staff assignments.

Military Education

Duty assignments follow a more or less prescribed pattern involving troop command at levels commensurate with rank, staff appointments in tactical or administrative units, attaché service abroad, and a range of specialized functions. Like his counterparts in other modern armies, the Mexican officer also spends a substantial part of his career in school.

Mexican post-graduate military educational institutions include specialized arms schools for infantry, cavalry, and artillery officers that are grouped together in the Centro de Aplicación y Perfeccionamiento para Oficiales de las Armas. Courses are of one year's duration.¹¹⁶ The Colegio de Aire in Zapopan, in addition to its officer formation schools, provides advanced and specialized training for air force commissioned personnel.¹¹⁷

The apex of the military educational system for both the army and the air force is the Escuela Superior de Guerra, which combines the functions of a command and general staff school and a war college. The institution offers four basic courses: advanced arms and services, command and general staff, air force command and general staff, and superior war.

The advanced arms and service course has two subdivisions: a one-year curriculum designed to prepare first lieutenants and captains for admission to the command and general staff course and one of six months' duration which prepares captains and majors for the command of battalion size units. The command and general staff course, lasting two years and open to graduates of the preparatory curriculum, trains: (1) officers of the combat arms for command and staff duties in tactical and territorial units and in the general staff of the secretary of defense; (2) officers of the supporting services for technical staff assignments. The air force general staff course, open to flying and non-flying officers, also lasts two years and prepares students for the air force equivalents of the army assignments just described. The superior war course of six months' duration is intended to prepare selected civilians and officers from the rank or equivalent rank of lieutenant colonel to general in all the services for collaboration with the high command in the study of problems related to national security.¹¹⁸

Data on the number of graduates from the arms schools and the Escuela Superior de Guerra are provided in Table 45 following.

In addition to training received in national institutions, selected Mexican officers are sent abroad for specialized or advanced study. As Table 46 following indicates, most of them go to the United States.

At a less formal level Mexican officers are also subjected to the influence of U. S. military doctrine. Although there is no U. S. military mission in their country, they are in regular professional and social contact with the U. S. military attaché group,¹¹⁹ and there is a constant interchange of service personnel between the two countries from the level of enlisted men to that of general officer. In 1966, Secretary of Defense General García Barragán accompanied by a group of Mexican officers made a twelve-day tour of U. S. armed forces installations at the invitation of his U. S. counterpart, Robert MacNamara.¹²⁰ Reciprocally, U. S. officers such as the commanding general of the Fourth Army with headquarters at Fort Sam Houston, Texas,

TABLE 45
GRADUATES OF ADVANCED MEXICAN MILITARY SCHOOLS, 1948-1962

<u>School</u>	<u>Year</u>					
	<u>1948</u>	<u>1949</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1962</u>
Centro de Aplicación y Perfeccionamiento para Oficiales de Armas†	-	-	-	-	87	88
Escuela Superior de Guerra†						
1. Battalion command course	21	-	-	-	58	64
2. Command and general staff, preparatory course	28	35	-	-	21	31
3. Command and general staff course	20	18	17	14	22	15
4. Command and general staff, air force course	(25)	(25)	22	-	-	-

Source: SDN, Memorias.

†The Center was not established until after 1951.

*Dashes indicate that no figures were given. In the case of the command and general staff, air force course, the first class graduated in 1950. Figures in parentheses indicate students enrolled rather than graduates.

TABLE 46
MEXICAN ARMY AND AIR FORCE OFFICERS STUDYING ABROAD, 1960-1962

<u>School</u>	<u>England,</u>							<u>United</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>Year</u>	<u>Argentina</u>	<u>Brazil</u>	<u>Germany</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>Peru</u>	<u>Switzerland</u>	<u>States</u>	
1960/1961	1	0	0	1	2	0	1	53	58
1961/1962	0	1	1	0	2	1	0	51	56
TOTALS	1	1	1	1	4	1	1	104	114

Source: SDN, Memorias, 1960/1961, p. 59; Memorias, 1961/1962, p. 57.

make frequent visits to Mexico.¹²¹ The foreign news section of the Revista del ejército is dominated by items on military developments in the United States, and most military equipment is purchased from that country.

Among the various assignments available to Mexico officers, certain posts are eagerly sought because of the prestige and prospects for favor and advancement they offer. These include duty with the presidential guard and the staffs of military schools and assignment to

the general staff course at the Escuela Superior de Guerra. The career of a successful officer, that is, one who achieves general rank, will normally include all of these and with rare exceptions must include the latter. A diploma del estado mayor is the key to further promotion and entrance into the nuclear elite of the armed forces. Quite aside from the status conveyed by them, certain command and staff assignments and foreign duty are sought because of the extra pay and allowances they provide.¹²²

Attitudes and Values

The Mexican officer's attitudes and values are shaped by both institutional and general societal influences as well as by interactions and tensions between the two environments. From the day he enters the military academy he undergoes a continuous process of military socialization. This is accomplished through instruction in service schools, the content of service publications, ceremonies, exhortatory addresses by military leaders, and constant association with brother officers in school, home, garrison, and field. The more formal aspects of socialization involve deliberate institutional efforts to instill in the officer traditional and universal military values. In the words of the academy's Instructivo de admisión of 1965:

the cadet from the date of his admittance until his graduation as an officer of the Mexican army, from reveille to taps, lives in an atmosphere in which his activities have been carefully planned so as to encourage the development of those physical and moral qualities which the institution tries to imprint on its students such as loyalty, honor, chivalry, valor, a sense of responsibility, and a spirit of sacrifice, uniting all of them in a healthy, agile and strong body.¹²³

Universal military values, however, are given a peculiarly Mexican flavor, by associating them with glorious episodes in the nation's and the army's past. In the academy, special emphasis is placed on the heroic behavior of past generations of officer aspirants. Thus, on November 30, 1828, the cadets were employed in the construction of barricades during an uprising against the constitutional government. In the words of General José María Tornell y Mendiola, "This they did under enemy fire. . . . There they fought as experienced veterans from the windows and roofs." In 1840 the cadets again confirmed their loyalty to the constitution and the laws by defending the government against insurrection. On this occasion one cadet was killed at his post in the tower in the Templo de Jesús, while one second lieutenant and four cadets were gravely wounded. This was the first blood shed by students and for their sacrifices the academy received its first medal on which is inscribed: "In its youth it saved the Capital of the Republic during the glorious event of July 15, 1840."

After its reconstitution in 1920, the academy continued its tradition of honor and loyalty. When in that year a part of the army arose against President Carranza, the government evacuated the capital and the cadets formed its guard of honor. In the accompanying skirmishes, one was killed and two wounded. The record of the academy was further embellished during World War II when a number of its sons enrolled in Squadron 201 died in action in the Pacific.¹²⁴

The greatest reverence, however, is reserved for the niños héroes ("heroic children," i.e., cadets) who died in September 1847, in the defense of the Molino del Rey and Chapultepec against the U.S. invaders. Their sacrifices are commemorated on the first Thursday of each month of the academic year. On this solemn occasion the director of the academy reads the names of the young heroes to the corps of cadets assembled in parade formation. As each name is pronounced, all respond "in a voice vibrant and full of emotion," with the words, "he died for his country."¹²⁵

In short, "Neither treason nor illegality has ever had a place in such a pure institution." For this reason the Colegio Militar has traditionally furnished the guard of honor of the president of the republic.¹²⁶ Its immaculate record was recognized in 1949 by a presidential decree that placed the word "Heróico" before its traditional name, "Colegio Militar."¹²⁷

After graduation, officers are constantly reminded of the glories of Mexican military tradition. Thus, on the morning of May 5th, 1963, the 101st anniversary of the defeat of the French invaders in the Battle of Puebla, 58,000 soldiers of the 1944 military service class formed in the Plaza of the Constitution. "With hearts thrilled," they saw the president of the republic, Adolfo López Mateos, raise the national banner to the tip of the monumental flagpole in the Plaza. Shortly thereafter there appeared in solemn parade and escorted by the corps of cadets of the Heróico Colegio Militar, the battle flags of the nation and the colors of the divisions present and the military schools of the nation.

As the ceremony reached its culmination, the president, flanked by Secretary of National Defense General Olachea Avilés and Secretary of Marine Admiral Manuel Zermeno Araica, called out to the soldiers:

"Do you swear to follow this flag, our nation's emblem, with loyalty, and to defend it even to the point of giving your life?"

A chorus of 58,000 voices responded, "Yes, I swear!"

Then General Olachea Avilés said, "If thus you do, let the nation reward you; and if you do not, may it call you to task."¹²⁸

One of the central themes in patriotic exhortations is the role of the army and its leaders in the revolution which created the new Mexico. In his 1960 New Year's greetings to the armed forces General Olachea Avilés pronounced:

The Mexican army, by virtue of its traditions of loyalty and sacrifice and by the sublime example of the paladins of the Mexican Revolution, will always follow the path of honor and glory, adding day by day to its vigor and spirit, from the soldier to the general of division so that, complying with its constitutional obligations, it contributes to the greatness of Mexico.¹²⁹

Inculcation of the romantic military values is accompanied by efforts to instill those traits of character which will enable the officer to perform effectively his elemental and ultimate function, command of men in battle. The cadet not only receives instruction in the cloisters of the academy but in camp and field where "he acquires the strength of spirit which comes only from the fatigues of labor and marches, in the domain of the beast, in contact with nature and in the face of the inclemencies of weather. It is here [in the field] that his will is tempered and disciplined so that it can triumph over the obstacles which it encounters in life."¹³⁰

Through the processes of training and socialization, formal and informal, the officer is constantly reminded that he is a member of a corporate body which by virtue of its peculiar and essential social function possesses an extensive degree of self-regulatory power, a mechanism for self-perpetuation, and a monopoly of a set of specialized and complex skills. It expects from its members, moreover, a total commitment and imposes on them obligations and patterns of action and response that are more demanding than those prevailing among civilians.

Deterrents of Professionalism

The Mexican officer corps, in short, has over the past thirty years developed to a substantial degree those attributes and values—expertise, responsibility, and corporativeness—which Samuel Huntington identifies as the essential elements of modern professionalism. Huntington's definition of professionalism, however, constitutes an ideal type whose perfection is inhibited in Mexico by both geographical and historical circumstances.

As Harold Lasswell points out, "The function of a military force is successful armed combat."¹³¹ The bulk of the training of Mexican officers is directed toward preparing them for that mission. Yet, as indicated earlier, the likelihood that they will have to defend their country against invasion is remote, and their obvious present and future mission is limited to police functions and civic action. Officers are well aware of this limitation. Although they recognize that the internal components of their mission are legitimate and essential, many feel a sense of frustration because the expertise they have acquired appears to be superfluous.¹³² This situation tends to subvert a strong professional ethic.

In compensation, the armed forces have been anxious to play a larger role in hemispheric defense and in the Cold War. Thus, in World War II the high command welcomed the opportunity to participate alongside the allies. A joint United States-Mexican Defense Commission was established,¹³³ and Mexico sent Fighter Squadron 201 to the Pacific theatre, a contribution of which Mexicans were very proud. More extensive active participation, however, was overruled by President Avila Camacho and his Secretary of Defense, General Cárdenas.¹³⁴

Subsequently, at the time of the meeting of the Organization of American States in Bogotá in 1948, a number of Mexican officers favored a standing military agency within the organization,¹³⁵ and in 1950 there was some sentiment among military leaders for at least token representation of Mexico in the United Nations forces in Korea.¹³⁶ Two years later, the armed forces favored a military assistance pact with the United States which would provide new military equipment in return for undertaking expanded hemisphere defense responsibilities.¹³⁷ In 1962, a number of navy and air force leaders favored Mexican participation in the naval blockade and air surveillance of Cuba.¹³⁸

As stated above, however, the postwar efforts of the armed forces to expand their hemispheric defense role have been consistently overruled by civilian leadership. While the latter's position is in accord with its view of the military as strictly a defensive instrument, with its noninterventionist foreign policy, and with its reluctance to appear subservient to the United States, there is some evidence that it fears that military commitments abroad would encourage an arms buildup which in turn would adversely affect economic development and, perhaps, increase the prestige and influence of the military.¹³⁹

The army and the air force also appear to be making an effort to develop some influence among the Central American armed forces through their attaché groups in the several countries, military missions, and the training of Central American cadets and officers in their military schools.¹⁴⁰ If this is, in fact, a deliberate policy, its rationale and implications are not clear to the author.

Another set of factors which has adversely affected professionalization derives from the revolutionary tradition of the armed forces. As suggested earlier, from the outset the army was regarded not as an institution separated from the general society but as a people's army whose personnel and ideals faithfully mirrored the nation as a whole. The popular origin of

the armed forces is an integral part of the revolutionary mythology. In 1937, Lieutenant Colonel Ignacio Beteta affirmed:

Our Army is composed of elements that have come up from the masses of the people; men who yesterday left the fields they husbanded or the shops where they worked, in pursuit of justice and redemption. They have not abandoned that desire. They are the same men they ever were. But they have undergone selection, they have been duly organized, they have been technically trained. They have not broken away from the people but are bound to the people by close ties.¹⁴¹

Although this is really a statement of doctrine, the Mexican army has been and is closely linked to the society from which it derives. This linkage, moreover, does not take the form of penetration of the civil by the military sectors as was posited in the case of the Peruvian armed forces, but it tends rather toward integration. With respect to the officer corps in particular, the boundary between the two sectors is permeable and officers' aspirations, values, and attitudes toward the existing order appear generally to coincide with the Mexican middle class value system.

Functionally, this relationship has taken the form of an easy interchangeability of military and civilian roles. As shown in the career sketches presented earlier, officers have traditionally engaged in business activities while in active service or taken leave to hold elective or appointive offices in national, state, or local government. Such activities have not been regarded as abnormal or bad. Although they appear to be declining, the tradition persists.

Larger scale entrepreneurial activities have been supplemented in recent years by extensive moonlighting by younger officers who seek to augment their service incomes. One Mexican officer estimated in 1965 that about a quarter of his colleagues held part-time civilian employment, and an American observer believed that the figure ran as high as 50 percent.¹⁴²

Dissatisfaction with military pay and allowances also induces a substantial number of junior officers to resign their commissions for more lucrative civilian employment after the mandatory five years of service. One military informant estimated that the attrition rate varied between 10 and 15 percent annually.

Interchangeability of military and political roles is encouraged by the variety of public service functions which the armed forces are expected to perform and which extend beyond normatively defined military spheres of action. Such activities may compel or attract officers into extra-service assignments while the broadly educative functions of the service schools provide military personnel with skills that permit them to engage in civilian occupations. Thus, Gilberto Bosques wrote, 'It is possible in Mexico to enlist as a private and [through the service school system] graduate as a physician or engineer.'¹⁴³ It may be added that personal associations developing from politicoadministrative posts facilitate an officer's entry into private business ventures.

Although the integration of the military and the general society may be desirable from the standpoint of revolutionary doctrine and mythology, conditions which lead officership to be regarded as temporary or part-time employment detract from a strong sense of corporateness and responsibility which, according to the definitions used in this paper, are essential elements of professionalism.

A second set of factors adversely affecting professionalism has to do with career development. Up to and through the rank of lieutenant colonel, promotions appear to be based in fact

as well as in law on seniority and professional competence, although as in all armies they may be influenced by personal connections within and without the service.¹⁴⁴ Above that grade, however, advancement and career lines are strongly influenced by extra-service political considerations. This circumstance is also a universal phenomenon but is more obvious and more subversive of professional standards where the loyalty of military leadership is a critical factor in the stability of the government. The question of whether this condition exists in Mexico will be discussed in the following section. It has existed in the past, however, and the president continues to see that promotions to general rank go to loyal officers and that key assignments such as secretary of national defense and important zone commands are held by generals in whom he has personal confidence. He may also draw on this group to fill important politico-administrative posts, particularly that of state governor. These circumstances are reflected by the jockeying for position among military leadership, which goes on before the selection of the PRI presidential candidate. An officer who has or who establishes personal connections with the heir apparent is in a strong position to advance himself, but one who has neglected or misjudged political trends may find that his prospects are circumscribed.¹⁴⁵

The promotion system is also adversely affected by an excess of generals, largely of "revolutionary" origin. Their number is uncertain. In 1945, Excelsior reported that there were 682 and that President Avila Camacho planned to reduce the number to 84.¹⁴⁶ Subsequently, however, another observer wrote in 1952 that there were 527 generals in the army,¹⁴⁷ and a Mexican officer reported to the author in 1965 that ten years earlier there were about 900 but that they had been reduced to less than 500. In any case all sources agreed that their number is still quite disproportionate to the size of the army and the officer corps. They are reluctant to retire, moreover, and manage to hold on through their political influence and the sentimental appeal of their alleged services to the revolution.¹⁴⁸ As a consequence, a serious promotion blockage exists at the general officer level.¹⁴⁹

Finally Huntington's model of corporativeness limited by responsibility is somewhat marred by traditional attitudes toward the estado militar. As indicated earlier, in Mexico the military jurisdiction is in law and in fact substantially reduced in comparison with its past extent and with its present amplitude in a number of Latin American republics. Officers, nevertheless, still tend to conceive of the military as a benevolent and protective organization enjoying special privileges and immunities. In instances where it is not clear whether an offense is military or common, the civil courts normally do not challenge and the accused is tried by courts-martial. Furthermore, in crimes and misdemeanors which are clearly common the officer enjoys some degree of de facto immunity. If the offense is not too flagrant, charges may not be made in civil courts, or if they are, they may not be pressed because of the unwillingness of the military to deliver up the accused, or the reluctance of the accuser, the police, or the magistrates to become involved in an unpromising situation. If the military itself acts, punishment may take the form of a reprimand only.¹⁵⁰

In August of 1964, retired General Humberto Mariles Cortés, an Olympics hero and a politically influential officer, shot and killed a laborer as a result of a traffic accident in which both parties were involved. Despite public clamor for his arrest,¹⁵¹ Mariles quietly and conveniently "escaped" to Europe. Another such case involved General Raúl Caballero Aburto, who from 1958 until 1961 was governor of the state of Guerrero. President López Mateos reluctantly removed him from office after mobs in that state had threatened extensive violence as a protest against the governor's alleged corruption.¹⁵² Immediately thereafter, Caballero was appointed by the president to the relatively important post of military attaché to El Salvador.¹⁵³

THE ARMY AND THE STATE

Depoliticization and Civilian Control

As suggested in earlier sections of this paper, internal professionalization has been accompanied by a substantial depoliticization of the military and the establishment of civilian control over them. The bases of this relationship are established in the constitution and the laws; the armed forces or factions among them have not issued a serious pronunciamiento or executed a successful cuartelazo since Alvaro Obregón's "Plan of Agua Prieta" in 1920, nor have military personnel threatened the continuity of constitutional government since opposition presidential candidate General Almazán contemplated rebellion in 1940. The election of President Miguel Alemán in 1958 served to mark symbolically the triumph of civilianism because many Mexicans viewed this event as a definite break in the "long chain of militarism, and with it, the end of the power of the generals."¹⁵⁴

Today, the Mexican armed forces unequivocally take the position that in accordance with the constitution and the laws they and any of their members on active duty are politically neutral and subordinate to the civil government. This position is maintained in the curricula of military schools from the Heróico Colegio Militar to the Escuela Superior de Guerra, in service journals, and in the public utterances of military leaders. Thus, in recent years the Revista del ejército has featured the motto "Militar si, militarista, nunca." The official view was stated more explicitly in a Revista editorial of 1964:

The Mexican army, with complete awareness of its obligations to support the rule of law and maintain internal order in the nation, is an impartial institution. As such, it does not express opinions in political matters, but only complies with the dispositions of the government which in accord with the democratic norms of our people, offers guarantees—on an equal basis—to all political parties and to all the citizenry, reaffirming in the process the revolutionary principle that the populace will decide who will be the governor.¹⁵⁵

The official position of the armed forces is shared by and large by individual officers. Most of them adhere to the "revolutionary left" policies and ideology of the PRI. In general, however, their attitude toward PRI represents acceptance of a set of conditions and achievements rather than a doctrinaire or programmatic commitment, and they resist direct involvement in party affairs.¹⁵⁶ The same nonactivist attitude prevails among the smaller number of officers sympathetic with the programs of PAN and other opposition parties.

Adherence to "revolutionary left" policies of PRI, moreover, should not be taken too literally. Official references to leftist components in the party's program is more of a bow to the mythology of the revolution than recognition of a dynamic ideology. Some officers occasionally assume a leftist posture. In 1965, Mexico's Ambassador to Cuba, the influential General Fernando Pamanes Escobedo, praised Castro as "a humanist and a patriot fully devoted to his country's well-being . . .," and added, "Our wishes and aspirations of liberty and progress are identical."¹⁵⁷ In 1965, another influential general, Heriberto Jara, made an unofficial visit to Peking.¹⁵⁸ Leftist sentiments, however, are largely limited to the rapidly disappearing revolutionary generation of officers whose political ideas were formed during the more radical period of the revolution and among whom a feeling exists that the principles for which they fought have been betrayed. There is little radicalism among the new generation of professional officers, and they are almost entirely free of Communist influence. They are in fact a conservative group in the sense that they are committed to the status quo.¹⁵⁹ This position appears in part to represent a conviction that the revolutionary system despite its

shortcomings has accomplished more and offers more for the nation than more radical alternatives. It also derives from institutional self-interest in that the present system is the one which has given the armed forces a form and status which they find acceptable. Thus, an institution that began as a revolutionary force now fears that radical change might subvert or destroy it.

Professional observers of the Mexican scene all agree that the armed forces are no longer a threat to political stability and constitutional government. Professor John J. Johnson observes that militarism is a negligible force in Mexican politics.¹⁶⁰ John D. Powell, updating the typologies of Edwin Lieuwen and Theodore Wyckoff, places the Mexican military in the category where they are never a political force.¹⁶¹ Howard Cline wrote that "the disciplined Mexican Army is now an influence for stability,"¹⁶² and Lieuwen emphatically affirms that "Mexico has unquestionably solved its problems of militarism. . . . Militarism has been dead for over a generation."¹⁶³

To assert, however, that the Mexican army no longer plays an overt or crisis role in the Mexican political system, or that it eschews a supermission, is not to say that it or its individual members are completely apolitical. In revolutionary doctrine the army is regarded as the prime forger of the revolution and as a popular institution attuned to the national ethos. It was, therefore, entitled to be regarded as a legitimate member of the family of interests which governed the nation. After its more praetorian propensities were tamed, this status endowed it with a set of closely interdependent political roles which by and large were normatively acceptable. It retains vestiges of its position as a functional sector within the official party; it is a significant institutional interest group; and it is the armed defender of the revolutionary political system.

Linkages Between the Army and the Party

The Army as a Political Sector

Integration of civilian and military elements of the revolutionary elite was institutionalized as early as 1929 in the first official party, the Partido Nacional Revolucionario, which included not only various national and regional political associations but also, as individuals, the caudillos who led sections of the still quasi-feudal army. When, in 1938, President Cárdenas reorganized the party as the Partido Revolucionario Mexicano, the army, this time as an association, was included as one of the party's four functional sectors. As such it maintained a voice in high party councils, enjoyed representation in the party's nominating conventions, and was allocated elective and appointive offices in the national and state governments.

This arrangement proved unsatisfactory to all concerned. Members of civilian sectors feared or resented the overt presence of the army in party councils, and civilian leaders felt that formal involvement in politics diverted the attention of the army from its primary function. Military leadership, also, felt that institutional representation in the party was incompatible with its aspirations toward professionalism and feared that the political visibility thus acquired made it overly vulnerable to criticism and attack. In 1940, therefore, the military sector was abolished.¹⁶⁴

The concept of the military as a political sector, however, did not entirely disappear nor did linkages between the party and the army dissolve. The former is careful to eulogize the preeminent role of the latter in forging and maintaining the revolutionary system.¹⁶⁵ The ministry of defense reciprocates with expressions of respect and praise for the PRI.¹⁶⁶ An

unwritten agreement, furthermore, appears to exist between the two as to their political relationships.¹⁶⁷

One aspect of the arrangement, Brandenburg asserts, is that when a civilian occupies the presidency of the republic, an army general would assume the leadership of the PRI.¹⁶⁸ In any case, an unbroken series of generals served as president of the party from 1946 until 1964 when a civilian was appointed. These were Rodolfo Sánchez Taboada (1946-1953), Gabriel Leyva Velásquez (1953-1957), Agustín Olachea Avilés (1957-1958), and Alfonso Corona del Rosal (1958-1964). These appointments, moreover, do not represent a form of honorary retirement from public service. Olachea went on to be minister of defense (1958-1964), while General Corona in 1964 joined President Díaz Ordaz's cabinet as secretary of national properties (*bienes nacionales*). It is also widely believed that the military has had substantial influence in the selection of the PRI's presidential candidate, and, more particularly, that no person can hope to attain the presidency without the army's acquiescence.¹⁶⁹ Despite constitutional prohibitions reinforced by injunctions from the ministry of defense at election time,¹⁷⁰ officers have actively campaigned for the PRI's nominee for president as well as its candidates for other public offices.¹⁷¹

Military Personnel Holding Public Office

With the abolition of the military sector, the aspirations of officers to elective public office was channeled through the popular sector. As late as 1964 about 12 percent of PRI's candidates for congress were selected from among commissioned armed forces personnel and there is some evidence that this figure represented an informal allocation¹⁷² (see Table 47 following). Likewise, a substantial number of officers hold appointive positions in the executive branch (see Table 48 following), and generals continue to be appointed to state governorships (see Table 49 following).

Although the data in the tables does not reveal distinct trends except in the case of governorships, it suggests that the number of officers holding appointive and elective offices is gradually declining. This phenomenon appears to be attributable to natural causes rather than to any explicit policy of removing the military from politics. It reflects on one hand the disappearance through death or retirement of the older, politically oriented "revolutionary" officers whose military and political careers were almost indistinguishable. On the other hand, it is an indication of the professionalization of the armed forces and the lack of interest of the "school" officers in partisan politics.¹⁷³

In any case, it is doubtful whether over the past two decades the holding of public office by service personnel really represents the military functioning as a political sector. The decisive question is whether the officer is selected by and represents the military institution or whether he seeks or holds office because of his personal motivations and acts according to impulses from the party and/or a civilian constituency. The latter appears to be the case. Brandenburg observes that none of the officers in congress were outstanding as army officers, but that all are politically strong in their congressional districts, much as the former *caciques* (chieftains). He notes that there were only three senators with military titles who did have prestige in the regular army during the prior decade, but that these men were also politically strong in their districts.¹⁷⁴

Informants stated categorically that officer-congressmen are not chosen by the defense secretariat nor do they maintain political contact with it after election. One deputy could not pick out from a list of congressmen those who held military ranks. Those who do, appear to

TABLE 47

OFFICERS SERVING AS DEPUTIES OR SENATORS IN THE NATIONAL CONGRESS

State	Deputies				Senators		
	1955- 1958	1958- 1961	1961- 1964	1964- 1967	1952- 1958	1958- 1964	1964- 1970
Aguascalientes							
Baja California (Norte)						1	1
Campeche		1					
Chiapas	1		2				
Chihuahua						1	
Coahuila					1	1	
Colima		1				1	
Distrito Federal			1				
Durango						1	1
Guanajuato			2				
Guerrero	1	1	1				1
Hidalgo	1	1			1	1	1
Jalisco	1		1				
México	1						
Michoacán							
Morelos	1				1	1	
Nayarit			1		1		1
Nuevo León					1		
Oaxaca	2		1		1		1
Puebla	1	1	2			2	
Querétaro							
San Luis Potosí							
Sinaloa			1		1	1	1
Sonora							
Tabasco		1			1	1	
Tamaulipas		1			1		
Tlaxcala							1
Veracruz		1				1	
Yucatán							
Zacatecas	1	1					1
Baja California (Terr.)							
Quintana Roo (Terr.)		1					
Total by Term	10	10	12	7*	10	12	9

Sources: Mexico. Camara de diputados, Directorio de la Camara de diputados for 1957, 1958, and 1963; Mexico. Secretaría del patrimonio nacional, Directorio del poder legislativo for 1962; Mexico. Camara de Senadores, Directorio, XLVI legislatura, 1964-1970; Brandenburg, Modern Mexico, p. 295; Scott, Mexican Government, p. 193; Revista del ejército, various numbers.

*Constituencies not indicated.

TABLE 48

OFFICERS HOLDING APPOINTIVE POSITIONS IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

Office	1947	1948	1961
Cabinet	2 in cabinet of 17	2 in cabinet of 17	2 in cabinet of 24
Secretaría de la Presidencia	1 senior, 1 subordinate	1 senior, 4 subordinate	3 senior, 9 subordinate
Departamento del Distrito Federal	2 senior	2 senior	4 subordinate
Secretaría de Sanidad y Asistencia	2 senior, 1 subordinate	2 senior, 1 subordinate	2 senior
Secretaría de Comunicaciones	3 senior	1 senior	1 senior, 1 subordinate
Secretaría de Educación	2 senior, 1 subordinate	2 senior	none
Secretaría de Gobernación	1 senior, 1 subordinate	1 senior	1 senior, 1 subordinate
Procuraduría General	none	1 senior, 1 subordinate	none
Secretaría de Recursos Hidráulicos	1 subordinate	1 subordinate	none
Secretaría de Hacienda	none	2 senior	none
Secretaría de Industria-Comercial	none	none	1 senior, 1 subordinate
Ferrocarriles Nacionales	1 senior	none	none
Secretaría de Agricultura-Ganancia	none	1 senior	none
Secretaría de Patrimonio Nacional	none	none	1 subordinate

Sources: World Handbook of Government, Politics and Press, various years; Mexico. Secretaría de bienes nacionales, Directorio del Gobierno federal for various years; Mexico. Secretaría de patrimonio nacional, Directorio del poder legislativo for various years.

TABLE 49. GENERALS SERVING AS STATE GOVERNORS

State	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	Total by State
Aguascalientes															-
Baja California (Norte)		X	X	X	X	X	X								6
Baja California (Sur)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	14
Campeche										X	X	X	X	X	5
Chiapas	X														1
Chihuahua											X	X	X	X	4
Coahuila						X	X	X	X	X	X				6
Colima	X	X	X												3
Durango															-
Guana juato															-
Guerrero						X	X	X	X						4
Hidalgo						X	X	X	X	X	X				6
Jalisco															-
México															-
Michoacán	X	X	X	X											4
Morelos	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			12
Nayarit															-
Nuevo León															-
Oaxaca	X	X	X	X											4
Puebla	X	X	X	X	X							X			6
Querétaro	X	X	X												3
Quintana Roo															-
San Luis Potosí															-
Sinaloa						X	X	X	X	X	X				6
Sonora															-
Tabasco				X	X	X	X								4
Tamaulipas															-
Tlaxcala															-
Veracruz															-
Yucatán															-
Zacatecas															-
TOTAL BY YEAR	8	8	8	7	5	8	8	6	6	6	7	5	3	3	

Sources: Data compiled from a wide variety of sources including *World Handbook of Government, Politics and Press*, *Diario oficial*, and *Excmo.*

be aware of their common background because they dominate the military affairs committees and assemble for periodic audiences with the president of the republic.¹⁷⁵ The balance of the evidence, however, suggests that the party has the determining voice in selecting military nominees and that its choice is affected primarily by local situations rather than recommendations from the secretary of defense. The fact that up to 1964 an allocation of nominations was made to the military appears to have been more of a vestigial survival of an older practice than recognition of a de facto military sector in the party.

In the case of other offices, there is a serious question whether generals serving as party presidents actually represent the army in any formal sense. A knowledgeable colonel who was a professor at the military academy contended that these officers in general enjoyed little prestige among the military professionals and that any "understanding" about their appointment was a symbolic recognition of the army's role in the revolution rather than a significant political linkage. With respect to appointive positions in the executive branch, it appears likely that officers are selected not primarily as a form of party patronage but because of particular skills they possess.¹⁷⁶ In the case of state governors, selection falls partly within party cognizance. Generals, however, do not appear to be selected as representatives of the army but in recognition of their long service to the revolution and the party and, more basically, with reference to state and regional political situations combined with the confidence of the president in their personal loyalty.

Although vestiges of the military sector concept survive, the armed forces as a political interest group functions today in a different manner. What might be called "normal" personality and policy clashes occur within them, but internal discipline and cohesion are such that interests are articulated and aggregated through the formal command structure culminating in the secretary of defense. The latter serves as the agent for presenting military demands to the real source of power which is the president rather than the party.¹⁷⁷

The question is, how powerful is the military as an interest group in modern Mexico. There is no doubt that national leaders acknowledge the debt of the revolution to the army and recognize the latter as a power factor. The secretary of defense is a member of the inner circle of the cabinet and his opinion may be considered not only on matters related to national security but on other public issues.¹⁷⁸ The president, like the party, is careful to cultivate good relations with the army and to cater to its self-esteem. Alemán initiated a military presidential staff which had as one of its functions, the maintenance of closer liaison between the chief executive and the armed forces.¹⁷⁹ On ceremonial occasions such as Army Day, Navy Day (June 1), and Cinco de Mayo, the president salutes the services, affirms his esteem for them, and expresses his appreciation for their past and present contributions to the nation.¹⁸⁰ He expresses the same sentiments in his annual messages to congress and his praise is usually accompanied by announcements of new or increased benefits for them.¹⁸¹ He spends a substantial portion of his time inspecting military installations, reviewing troops, conferring decorations, and receiving and entertaining officers, individually and collectively. On public occasions he is frequently seen and photographed with them.¹⁸² Deference to the military is also indicated by the substantial measure of self-government accorded to them and particularly by a permissive attitude toward abuses of the military jurisdiction and the financial peccadillos of influential officers.

Despite a respectable position within the national power structure, however, the military are but one of several competing interest groups and there are very definite limits to what they can demand or expect. In contrast to Peru and a number of other Latin American republics, the Mexican service ministers are not selected by the armed forces themselves but rather by the president on the basis of friendship or demonstrated loyalty. As observed

earlier, in the matter of budgetary allocations the military are not starved but neither are they coddled. Although their counsel may be sought in the formulation of national policy, such a procedure is not regarded as essential in matters which do not affect them directly.¹⁸³ Even where their own immediate interests are involved, their wishes may be overridden, as evidenced by the consistent refusal of the government to permit them to expand their hemispheric defense or Cold War role.¹⁸⁴ Professor Lieuwen believes that Mexico's refusal to withdraw diplomatic recognition from Cuba was contrary to the armed forces' wishes and is another indicator of their subordination to civilian control.¹⁸⁵

System Maintenance

The principal political role remaining to the Mexican military—and it is an important one—has its rationale in a revolutionary interpretation of their responsibility for defending the constitution and the laws. In 1937, General Ramón Beteta affirmed:

Mexico's army is a natural, healthy and necessary growth of long years of Revolution. It made the Revolution possible. It is a revolutionary organization, and no effort is omitted to have it retain that character. . . . Should the revolutionary regime ever be threatened, the people would rise in arms, to be sure. But the task of guarding the institutions which the revolution has created is assigned mainly to the Army . . . Mexico's Army . . . is designed chiefly to support a government created by the people's Revolution.¹⁸⁶

General Corona del Rosal put it more bluntly:

The Revolution . . . has dismounted from its horse in order to take its hands to the plow, the drill, or the bulldozer. . . . But you may be certain that the Revolutionary horse is there, always ready, with muscles and nerves tense, ready to be mounted once more if the enemies of the people make it necessary.¹⁸⁷

Although the army has lost much of its "revolutionary" character, in 1966 President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz could still state that its:

eminently popular origin and its Revolutionary tradition binds it permanently to watch over the independence of the nation, to safeguard our institutions and to maintain the liberties of the Mexican people, because it was the people, converted into the Revolutionary army, who fought resolutely to win them. . . . The Mexican Army, a basic institution of our democratic regime, is a permanent sentinel to the countersign of 1917: the General Constitution of the Republic.¹⁸⁸

In these statements it is implicit that the mission of the army is not to defend and support just any constitution or set of laws but a particular political system: that based on the Constitution of 1917 and the enabling legislation and practices deriving from it. Furthermore, as Bosques affirmed, the PRI is the self-designated heir and guardian of the revolutionary tradition:

In our country the determination to maintain the National Revolutionary Party [the predecessor of the PRI] in power springs from the constant impulsion of the people toward social and economic changes designed to establish ever higher and more ample living standards for the entire nation. So long as

there is a revolutionary party in power safeguarding the government for the people, the Revolution shall carry on peacefully and constructively through political action. But when a party is lacking, then the Revolution shall manifest itself through violence, in civil war.¹⁸⁹

Finally, the president of the republic is the patriarch of the revolutionary family and the real head of the party. The political implications of this situation are clear. Despite the military's protestations of impartiality, an important component of their internal mission is to maintain the party and its leader in power. Though they enjoy a respectable status in part through revolutionary mythology, in part as a symbol of sovereignty, and in part because of their public service functions, their remaining political influence derives principally from their contributions to system maintenance.

The president and the party employ the military for purposes of political control in several ways. First, they are used to insure PRI victory at the polls. In the months preceding election day, the president, his successor-designate, his campaign manager, the secretary of government, and the secretary of defense work closely together to see that the electorate stays in line. This is accomplished through prudently placing trustworthy election officials, government-ministry agents, secret police, and army troops in the most auspicious areas.¹⁹⁰ Thus, in preparation for the national elections of 1952 and in anticipation of possible trouble from the opposition FPPM (Federation of Mexican Peoples Parties), the army conducted an intensive campaign to round up illegally held weapons. At the same time military assignments were shifted to ensure that key commands were held by officers loyal to the government.¹⁹¹ Six years later the same procedure was followed.¹⁹²

As elections approach, the army's role becomes more direct. It is officially charged with preserving order before, during, and after the voting; and with guarding the polling places, the ballots, and the ballot boxes. The control which it can wield is potentially enormous and despite official protestations of impartiality there is substantial testimony that in recent national, state, and local elections it has acted to intimidate or suppress the opposition and to influence voters and manipulate returns in favor of PRI candidates.¹⁹³ Though it may contend that the party's strength is such that it could win anyway, the fact that it can depend on military support gives it almost complete security and accounts in a large part for its care in maintaining cordial relations with the army.

Between elections and campaigns the army also performs important functions for the president and the party. Its security branches and its channels of communication provide it with a continuous and reliable source of political intelligence; it intimidates dissidents by threats or violence and provides invaluable assistance in controlling state governors and governments.¹⁹⁴ The key figures in this process are the zone commanders, whose functions are as much political as military. Their loyalty to the government is a critical factor in system maintenance and, as observed earlier, their selection is invariably based on presidential recommendation or approval.

The importance of the zone commanders rests not only on the fact that they are directly responsible for carrying out the military's electoral role and imposing sanctions on the opposition. They are also, along with the governor, one of the two power centers in state politics. Both officials take political orders directly from the president and are responsible for interpreting and implementing them. Both are major sources of political intelligence. Ideally their functions are regarded as complementary and they generally work together harmoniously. Their communications with the chief executive, however, follow quite different channels, and the zone commander can be and is used to check a recalcitrant or overly ambitious governor.

This may be accomplished by subtly shifting authority from the latter to the former, or the military commander may directly use the force at his disposal to chasten or depose his civilian counterpart.¹⁹⁵

CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS

Although the author and the several authorities he has cited may have differing opinions about the precise level or extent of the political role of the military in Mexico today, they are generally agreed that the armed forces no longer exercise a decisive voice in national political bargaining. Much less are they disposed to use the force at their disposal to attempt to impose any demands that they may have.

Two fundamental questions remain. First, how could this have happened in a country that was affected by almost uninterrupted praetorianism from 1821 until the rise of Porfirio Díaz in the 1880's and again during the first decades of the revolution? The answer is commonly expressed in terms of two simultaneous and mutually reinforcing processes: (1) "taming" the military by reducing their strength, cutting their budget, and eliminating or disciplining their leaders; and (2) professionalization. To describe the deliberate and successful efforts of successive governments to "tame" the military, however, does not entirely answer the question. Other Latin American governments have attempted to do the same thing without success. Why in Mexico did soldiers permit this to happen to them? What was unique or unusual in the Mexican situation?

With respect to professionalization, unquestionably substantial progress was made. Yet, unless professionalism is equated absolutely with apolitical attitudes, the Mexican military today are no more professional and perhaps less so than those of Argentina and Peru, where they remain dominant political forces.

Unquestionably, the "taming" and professionalization of the military were important influences in creating an approximation of the democratic-civilist model in Mexico. These processes, however, must be viewed in relation to a more fundamental experience, which was uniquely Mexican and which derived from the nation's revolutionary heritage. Although quite aware of its shortcomings, the author is convinced that the political system which evolved from the revolution is a work of genius comparable in magnitude to that wrought by the founding fathers in the United States. It ultimately provided a degree of stability unparalleled in Latin America; the various versions of the revolutionary party offered a structure through which the demands of all major interest groups could be, if not entirely satisfied, at least acknowledged and attended to; the system possessed a flexibility which permitted the accommodation of new groups and quick adaptation to new situations; representing, as it did, the struggles and aspirations of the majority of the Mexican people, it acquired an unchallengeable legitimacy which was supported by a powerful set of myths and symbols. Furthermore, as Professors William P. Glade and Charles W. Anderson observe, "in the 1950-1960 interval . . . one detects a growing awareness among virtually all observers that Mexico [has] become one of the handful of so-called underdeveloped nations to effect the transition to sustained, more or less self-generating economic expansion."¹⁹⁶ The revolution, Glade and Anderson go on to say, "can be taken, at the least, as a necessary though not a sufficient condition for development."¹⁹⁷

The Mexican military were a creation of the revolution and matured within it. Their leaders were first revolutionaries and only secondarily soldiers and, until the post-World War II era, civil and military leadership was almost indistinguishable. The armed forces shared the same basic ideology with other sectors and interest groups. In short, they were a

shareholder in the revolutionary corporation and a member of its board of directors. Thus, the dichotomy, army-state, did not exist and civil-military relations took the form of the interaction of armed and unarmed forces within the political system. The military pronunciamientos, plans, and rebellions of the early revolutionary decades were not properly "interventions" but violent forms of interaction. One of the most significant differences between Mexico and other Latin American republics was that this relationship was explicitly recognized.

As the revolution matured, the status of the armed forces within the system changed. On the one hand, with the establishment of internal order and in the absence of external threats, the demands on them for services stabilized so that no logical justification existed for increasing their absolute strength. On the other hand, the dynamic growth of the civilian sector proliferated and strengthened countervailing foci of political power so that the relative influence of the military diminished. Although they resisted limitations imposed on their strength and budget, they were disinclined to press their case to the point where they would threaten the system in which they had a vested interest. And, although they recognized the impact of burgeoning civilian interests on their role and status, there was little they could do about it without running the same risk. At the same time, professionalization internalized the interests of a generation of officers. In summary, the author offers the proposition that while the Mexican military were indeed "tamed" and professionalized, this could only have been accomplished because at a more basic level they were first admitted into the system, then absorbed, and finally outnumbered.

The second question to be examined is whether "militarism" is indeed dead in Mexico as Lieuwen believes, or whether, as Cline suggests, it remains latent.¹⁹⁸ With respect to possible changes in attitudes within the Mexican officer corps, a potential certainly exists. At the individual level, there is unquestionably disgruntlement, particularly among junior officers, with pay scales and promotion prospects. There is the usual impatience among them with the "fuddy-duddy" attitudes of their seniors. At a more politically affected level, some of the surviving "revolutionary" officers feel that the principles for which they fought have been betrayed. Among the younger officers, particularly in the air force, there is a group, the so-called pencilinos, who are the Mexican equivalent of Alba's militares de laboratorio, and who have close contacts with civilian intellectuals and technocrats. Though they are by no means Marxists, they believe that the government is not dealing effectively with the basic social and economic ills which still affect the nation; they resent the political and quasi-military tasks they are called upon to perform in its defense, and they speculate about revolutionary solutions in which the armed forces might play a part. A feeling is growing among the officer corps in general that the military should play a larger role in national life and General García Barragán, the present secretary of defense, represents this view.

Disgruntlement with conditions of service, however, is a universal military phenomenon. In the Mexican officer corps it is not powerful enough to generate attempts at redress except through established channels of negotiation and persuasion, and the government will see to it that it does not become so. With respect to politically or ideologically oriented grievances or aspirations, they are neither powerful enough nor cohesive enough to constitute discrete movements, and the high command will see to it that they do not become so. Moreover, the more general impulse toward an improved status and expanded role does not appear to be taking an overtly political direction. Rather, the thrust is toward greater involvement in civic action and more particularly in education. Such activities, of course, have political implications in that they improve the public image and credit of the armed forces and thus their bargaining power.

In summary, there appears to be little prospect in the foreseeable future that conditions within the armed forces themselves would induce them or factions among them to dictate political decisions. Furthermore, in view of their lack of militancy and their limited physical strength, even should they wish to do so it is doubtful whether they could impose their will on a nation of nearly 50,000,000 people who have a strong commitment to civilian supremacy.

Conditions which could develop in the societal environment might very well alter the relatively passive posture of the armed forces. Despite its very real achievements and its mass support, the PRI is vulnerable. The primary benefactors of the revolution have been the middle sectors and the skilled industrial workers. Dynamic economic growth coupled with a relatively slow rate of inflation have provided these elements with constantly increasing opportunities and levels of living. Many intellectuals, however, and the many millions of Mexicans who still subsist at the poverty level feel that the social principles of the revolution have been sacrificed to industrialization and an unbalanced economic development. Although these elements remain at least passively loyal to the system, they constitute a potential source of serious disaffection.

The official party also has certain built-in structural weaknesses. Its effectiveness has been based on the ability of sector and group leaders to reconcile differences internally. They have been able to do so because of a common ideological commitment to revolutionary principles, their small number, the powerful control they have exerted over their followers, and because of a realistic awareness of the fact that factionalism and open dissent would destroy the system which maintains them in power. The revolutionary mystique, however, is becoming tired; the emergence of new interest groups and subgroups makes the system increasingly cumbersome and dilutes its family character; growing political consciousness among the followers reduces the authority of leaders.

One may speculate about circumstances in which external pressures or internal tensions might produce significant changes in the Mexican political system. Any substantial slowdown in growth rate or the appearance of uncontrolled inflation would unquestionably affect adversely the Mexican masses and increase their disillusionment. It would, moreover, undermine the confidence of the more prosperous middle sector and labor elements in the efficiency and effectiveness of revolutionary leadership. If the impact was extreme enough, a political crisis might very well develop.

Second, either because of a crisis situation or through a slower evolutionary process, the political monopoly of the revolutionary party may be destroyed. The instrumentality might be the emergency of a significant opposition party or coalition drawing strength from an increasingly disaffected electorate or an open and definitive split within the PRI. In either case the essentially consensus, middle-of-the-road character of the Mexican political process would be shattered and would very likely be replaced by a left-right polarization.

The developments hypothesized above would produce situations that have classically caused the Latin American military to expand their political role. In the case of a severe political crisis, the party would undoubtedly call upon the armed forces for more direct and overt support than they now provide. They would then have to make a decision as to whether they should comply or maintain their nominal apolitical stance. Alternatively, such a choice might factionalize them along neutralist-activist lines as it has in Argentina. Or, if the crisis were severe enough and coupled with latent dissatisfactions and aspirations within the officer corps, it might incline the military to adopt a regenerative or redemptive role.

Should a crisis situation or a more evolutionary process involve the emergence of an organized opposition, the armed forces would find themselves in another classical situation in that they might have to make certain decisions about the legitimacy of a government. In view of their traditional membership in the revolutionary family and their announced support of revolutionary principles, could they permit an opposition party or coalition to come to power? More particularly, what would be their reaction if the opposition was rightist-oriented and opposed to the revolutionary ideology, or if it was a genuinely revolutionary movement which threatened not only the PRI, but also the stability of the system and thus the armed forces themselves? Or should the party split, which faction inherits revolutionary legitimacy?

A prediction as to whether such hypothetical political situations will actually develop is beyond the scope of this paper and in any case would be a mere guess. Nor would the author attempt to predict the precise response of the armed forces to them. He ventures the estimate, however, that any substantial challenge to the political monopoly of the PRI or to the party's unity will automatically increase the political role of the military. Their power within or without the revolutionary system will be more vigorously solicited, and they will have to make a political choice as to how they will employ it.

NOTES

ATTRIBUTES OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

1. L. Vincent Padgett, The Mexican Political System (Boston, 1966), p. 43.
2. Robert E. Scott, "Mexico: The Established Revolution," in Sidney Verba and Lucian Pye, eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton, N.J., 1965), p. 335.
3. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Boston, 1965), particularly pp. 310-312 and 363-365. The other nations studied were Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and the United States.
4. See Robert E. Scott, Mexican Government in Transition (Urbana, Ill., 1959), pp. 4-17, and Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, *passim* and particularly pp. 38, 155, 202-203.
5. L. Vincent Padgett, "Mexico's One Party System; a Re-evaluation," American Political Science Review, Vol. V, No. 57 (December 1957), pp. 995-1008.
6. In his Mexican Government, pp. 23-33, 173-176, Scott argues that the party acts as an important interest aggregator for the system. Contrariwise, Frank Brandenburg, in his The Making of Modern Mexico (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1964), *passim* and particularly pp. 141-145, finds this function exclusively handled by the president and his associates, with the party but an appendage to the executive. Padgett believes the truth of the matter lies somewhere in between; the party facilitating the chief executive in the "final aggregative" process (Mexican Political System, pp. 61, 155-156).
7. Frank Brandenburg, "Organized Business in Mexico," Inter-American Economic Affairs, Vol. XII (Winter 1958), pp. 26-50.
8. Enrique Parra Hernández, New York Times, July 23, 1953.
9. Scott, Modern Mexico, pp. 3-4.
10. Scott, Mexican Government, p. 279.

FORMATION OF THE MEXICAN ARMED FORCES

11. Gen. Othón León L., "Las fuerzas armadas de México"; Mexico. Secretaría de gobernación, Seis años de actividad nacional (Mexico City, 1946), p. 526.
12. Ibid., pp. 526-527.
13. Ley orgánica del ejército y armada nacionales (Mexico City, March 15, 1926).
14. Código de justicia militar, Ley de disciplina del ejército y armada nacionales, Ley de retiros y pensiones, Ley de ascensos y recompensas (Mexico City, 1926).
15. Except where otherwise indicated, the following account of the remolding of the Mexican officer corps is drawn from Edwin Lieuwen, "Curbing Militarism in Mexico," Arms and Politics in Latin America, Rev. ed. (New York, 1961), pp. 101-121; and Darrina Dee Turner, "The Changing Political Role of the Mexican Army, 1934-1940," unpublished Master's thesis, University of Florida, Gainesville, Fla., 1960.

16. William C. Townsend, Lázaro Cárdenas, Mexican Democrat (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1952), p. 212.
17. Brandenburg, Modern Mexico, p. 93.
18. Liewen, Arms, p. 112.
19. La democracia constitucional (Mexico City, 1930), p. 19.
20. Lázaro Cárdenas, Cárdenas Habla (Mexico City, 1940), p. 74.
21. Manuel Avila Camacho, México coopera con las Naciones Aliadas (Mexico City, 1944), p. 11.
22. Secretaría de la defensa nacional. Dirección general de educación militar. Heróico colegio militar (cited hereafter as HCM), Instructivo de admisión, 1965 (Mexico City, n.d.), p. 30; Virginia Prewitt, "The Mexican Army," Foreign Affairs, Vol. XIX (April 1941), p. 613.
23. Lt. Col. Francisco Lazcano, "Por qué fracasó el Colegio militar," Excelsior, October 14, 1924; Anonymous, "La enseñanza militar y la Revolución," Excelsior, October 19, 1925.
24. Mexico. Secretaría de guerra y marina. Dirección general de educación militar, Los estudios de la Escuela superior (Mexico City, 1934), pp. 25ff.
25. Prewitt, "The Mexican Army," p. 614; Mexico. Secretaría de guerra y marina, Memoria, 1930/1931 (N.p., n.d.), p. 10; Memoria, 1932/1933 (N.p., n.d.), p. 14.
26. Gen. José Mijares Palencia, El gobierno mexicano (Mexico City, 1936), p. 97; Mexico. Secretaría de gobernación, Seis años de gobierno al servicio de Mexico (Mexico City, 1940), p. 97.
27. Ibid.
28. Secretaría de guerra y marina, Memoria, 1934/1935, p. 14; Memoria, 1935/1936, p. 16; Prewitt, "The Mexican Army," p. 614.
29. Brandenburg, Modern Mexico, p. 160; interviews.
30. Seis años, p. 87; Felipe Tena Ramírez, Derecho constitucional mexicano, 2d ed. (Mexico City, 1955).
31. Seis años p. 405ff; Carlos R. Berzunza, "Mexico—National Defense," Encyclopedia Americana, Vol. XVIII (N.p., 1964), p. 799; Mijares Palencia, El gobierno, p. 93.
32. Enrique Lumén, Almazán (Mexico City, 1940), pp. 211-214.
33. New York Times, December 12, 1934, p. 14.
34. Arthur Goodfried, "Ejército mexicano," Infantry Journal, Vol. LX (May 1947), p. 49. For the further development of ciudades militares, see the annual Memorias of the secretary of war and marine and, after 1937, those of the secretary of national defense (cited hereafter as SDN, Memoria).

THE ARMY AS A FUNCTIONAL INSTITUTION

35. Mexico, Constitution, art. 89; Ley orgánica del ejército, Tft. preliminar, cap. único; Tft. I, cap. II, arts. 27-30; Tft. III, art. 72; Ley orgánica de la armada, Tft. II, cap. I, art. 4.
36. U. S. Department of State. "President Johnson Visits Mexico City; Remarks at Airport, April 14," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LIV (May 9, 1966), p. 726.

37. As quoted in William Benton, The Voice of Latin America (New York, 1961), p. 150.
38. Gilberto Bosques, The National Revolutionary Party of Mexico and the Six-Year Plan (Mexico City, 1937), Appendix XXIII, p. 353. See also Alfonso Corona del Rosal, El estatuto militar. El ejército como un servicio público (Mexico City, 1937), pp. 13-14.
39. Tomme C. Call, The Mexican Venture (London, 1953), p. 254.
40. U.S. Congress. House. Subcommittee on Appropriations, Hearings on the Foreign Operations for FY 1965, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 1964 (Washington, D.C., 1964), p. 523; U.S. Congress. Senate, Special Report on Latin America. U.S. Activities in Mexico, Panama, Peru, Chile, Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 1964, Senate Doc. No. 80 (Washington, D.C., 1964), p. 10.
41. John C. Dreier, The Organization of American States and the Hemisphere Crisis (New York, 1962), pp. 46-47.
42. Adolph A. Berle, Latin American Diplomacy and Reality (New York, 1962), p. 137; Edwin Lieuwen, Generals vs. Presidents (New York, 1964), p. 101.
43. A. W. Bork, "Mexico-1960," Arizona Quarterly, Vol. XVI (Winter 1960), p. 305; Karl M. Schmitt, "Communism in Mexico Today," Western Political Quarterly, Vol. XIII (March 1962), p. 123.
44. Hispanic American Report, July, 1962, pp. 397-398.
45. Latin American Times, October 10, 1964, pp. 1, 2.
46. Ley orgánica del ejército, Tít. III.
47. Bosques, Six-Year Plan, App. XXIII, p. 355.
48. Gen. Othón León L., "Las fuerzas," pp. 540-541.
49. Gen. Manuel Márquez Escobedo, "Cooperación del ejército mexicano con la población civil; campaña de erradicación del paludismo," Revista del ejército, January 1963, pp. 4-8.
50. "Los hay en dos continentes," Hispanoamericano (Mexico City), March 21, 1966, pp. 13-14.
51. Tiempo (Mexico City), April 3, 1961, p. 4. Detailed data on the public service functions of the army are contained in the annual SDN Memorias and in the sections dealing with the armed forces in the president's annual Informes.
52. "La patria es primero," Hispanoamericano, February 2, 1965, pp. 10-11; "El Ejército es el pueblo," Hispanoamericano, February 28, 1966, p. 4.
53. Gen. Luis Alamillo Flores, "La nación en la segunda guerra mundial," Seis años, p. 95.
54. Gregorio López y Fuentes, El Indio. Trans. by Anita Brenner (New York, 1961), p. 234.
55. Ley orgánica del ejército, Tít. III.
56. Bosques, Six-Year Plan, Appendix XXII, pp. 348-349.
57. Mexico. Secretaría de gobernación, Informe que rinde al H. Congreso de la unión (Mexico City, 1963), p. 21; SDN, Memorias, 1960/1961, p. 144; Memorias, 1961/1962, p. 148.
58. "Alfabetiza el ejército," El universal, March 1, 1965, Sec. 1, pp. 1, 15; "Cada soldado es maestro cuando menos de 2 personas," ibid., March 10, 1965, pp. 1, 7.

59. Much of the detailed information on the strength, organization, and order of battle of the Mexican armed forces is classified. The following overview is based on unclassified published materials supplemented by interviews in which, to the best of the author's knowledge, no information classified by either the Mexican or the U. S. government was revealed. Where discrepancies among the several sources existed, the author employed the data that in his judgment were the most reliable. Principal published sources used were: Berzunza, "Mexico—National Defense," pp. 779-780; Argentina. Ejército nacional, Manual de informaciones, Vol. VI, Nos. 1-2 (1964), pp. 16-17; William P. Tucker, The Mexican Government Today (Minneapolis, 1957), pp. 194-195; Othón León L., "Las fuerzas," pp. 525-544; Alamillo Flores, "La nación," pp. 94-97; SDN, Memorias, 1960/1961; Memorias, 1961/1962.

60. Figures are based on the Memorias of the ministerio de hacienda for the cited years.

61. Robert E. Scott, "Budget making in Mexico," Inter-American Economic Affairs, Vol. IX (Autumn 1955), pp. 3-20.

62. Ibid., p. 17.

63. The latter statement is almost impossible to document. I base it on repeated statements from a wide range of sources that I am disinclined to credit.

THE OFFICER CORPS

64. Ley orgánica del ejército, Tft. preliminar, cap. único; Mexico, Constitution, 1917, art. 10.

65. The juridical status of the Mexican armed forces is analyzed in detail in the previously cited Corona, Estatuto militar. See particularly pp. 15-18.

66. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, Mass., 1959), pp. 80-83.

67. These include Ley orgánica del ejército y armada nacionales, Ley de disciplina del ejército y armada nacionales, Ley de ascensos y recompensas, Ley de pensiones y retiros, Código de justicia militar, and Reglamento general de deberes militares.

68. Reglamento de deberes militares, Deber y Disciplina, Definiciones (Mexico City, 1963), p. 8; art. 41.

69. Ibid., Tft. I, cap. I.

70. Corona, Estatuto militar, pp. 17-18, 28; 98.

71. Lyle N. McAlister, The "Fuero Militar" in New Spain, 1764-1800 (Gainesville, Fla., 1957), particularly pp. 5-11; Mexico, Constitution, 1824, art. 154.

72. Ministerio de guerra y marina, Memoria, 1834/1835, p. 8.

73. "Fuero," Joaquín Escriche y San Martín, Diccionario razonado de legislación y jurisprudencia, 3 vols. (Madrid, 1847), Vol. I, p. 822; "Fuero de guerra," ibid., Vol. I, pp. 1, 122.

74. The best description of the abuses of the military fuero in the early Mexican republic may be found in José María Luis Mora, Ensayos, ideas y retratos. Selected and introduced by Arturo Arnáiz y Freg (Mexico City, 1941), pp. 101-117.

75. Governmental decree, November 23, 1855, Manuel Dublán and José María Lozano, Legislación mexicana . . ., Vol. VII (1876), pp. 603, 605; Mexico, Constitution, 1857, Tft. I, sec. I, art. 13.

76. Corona, Estatuto militar, pp. 78-79, 84.

77. Ibid., pp. 28-32.
78. Ibid., pp. 28-75.
79. Ibid., pp. 17, 27, 100.
80. Ley orgánica del ejército, art. 17.
81. Reglamento de deberes militares, Tít. I, Caps. I, II, IV. Corona, Estatuto militar, p. 54.
82. Mexico, Constitution, 1917, art. 55 and art. 82 as amended January 8, 1943.
83. New York Times, October 3, 1940, p. 9.
84. Ley orgánica del ejército, art. 79; Ley de servicio militar, August 19, 1940.
85. For a description of the army's officer training schools see SDN, Memoria, 1961/1962, pp. 141-148; for those of the air force, see SDN. Fuerza aérea mexicana. Colegio del aire, Instructivo de admisión (Zapopan, Jalisco, n.d.).
86. Interview.
87. SDN. Dirección general de educación militar. Heróico colegio militar, Instructivo de admisión, 1965 (Mexico City, n.d.), p. 36. Cited hereafter as HCM, Instructivo.
88. Ibid., p. 34.
89. Ibid., pp. 11-15.
90. SDN, Memoria, 1961/1962, pp. 141, 146.
91. Javier Romero, Doce años de investigación psicobiológica sobre la juventud (Mexico City: Sociedad mexicana de antropología, 1962).
92. Ibid., pp. 30-31.
93. See for example José de Iturriaga, La estructura social y cultural de Mexico (Mexico City, 1951), pp. 72-73; Frank Brandenburg, "Mexico: An Experiment in One-Party Democracy," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1956, passim; Lieuwen, Arms, p. 295.
94. See for example the conclusions of Robert F. Peck, "A Comparison of the Value Systems of Mexican and American Youth," Interamerican Journal of Psychology, Vol. I (March 1967), pp. 41-50; John J. Johnson, Political Change in Latin America. The Emergence of the Middle Sectors (Stanford, Calif., 1958), Chap. 7; Iturriaga, La estructura, passim; Lucio Mendieta y Nuñez, "La clase media en México," Revista mexicana de sociología, Vol. XVII, Nos. 2-3 (May-December 1955), pp. 63-111; Nathaniel L. Whetten, "The Rise of the Middle Class in Mexico," Materiales para el estudio de la clase media en la América Latina (Washington, D.C.: Unión panamericana, Oficina de ciencias sociales, Departamento de asuntos culturales), Vol. II, pp. 1-29; Oscar Lewis, Five Families. Mexican Case Studies in the Culture of Poverty (New York, 1959), particularly the chapter entitled "Lomas de Chapultepec; The Castro Family."
95. François Bourricaud, "Structure and Function of the Peruvian Oligarchy," Studies in Comparative International Development, Social Science Institute, Washington University, St. Louis, Vol. II, No. 2 (1966), pp. 26-29.
96. Laszlo Radvanyi, "What Occupations Would Mexicans Prefer?" Modern Mexico, Vol. II (September 1948), pp. 9, 18-19.
97. From the day the cadet enters the academy until he graduates, the nation provides food, housing, clothing and equipment, medical attention, healthy entertainment, and weekly spending allowance (HCM, Prospecto de admisión, 1965), p. 36.

98. Radvanyi, "What Occupations," p. 19.
99. Interviews.
100. Data were compiled from a variety of sources, including Ronald Hilton, ed., Who's Who in Latin America. Pt. I, Mexico. 3d ed. (Stanford, Calif., 1946); Scott, Mexican Government; Brandenburg, Modern Mexico; Revista del ejército; and Mexican federal government directories.
101. The concept of the prescribed career is developed in Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York, 1964), pp. 168-171.
102. HCM, Prospecto, pp. 33-35; SDN, Memoria, 1961/1962, p. 39.
103. Detailed regulations governing promotion are found in the Ley de ascensos y recompensas (Mexico City, January 7, 1956).
104. Mexico, Constitution, 1917, art. 76, II.
105. Prewitt, "The Mexican Army," p. 614; SDN, Reglamento general de deberes militares (Mexico City, 1963), Tft. V and passim.
106. Ley orgánica del ejército, arts. 6, 7; Ley de disciplina militar, art. 38; Corona, Estatuto militar, pp. 55-56.
107. SDN, Memoria, 1961/1962, pp. 33-34. This institution was established in 1946 for the purpose of "diverting military resources into productive activities," Ley orgánica del Banco de Ejército y la Armada Nacionales (Mexico City, 1946), art 1. The bases of its charter, however, have been largely ignored in recent years, and it serves primarily as the armed forces' social service agency.
108. SDN, Gufa para la obtención de beneficios que corresponden al militar y sus familiares (Mexico City, 1959), pp. 17-32. In 1959, prior to the adoption of a new plan, the families of 24 generals, 31 field grade officers, 75 company grade officers, and 154 enlisted men received approximately U. S. \$80,000 in insurance payments. In 1960 the amount jumped to some U. S. \$240,000. Mexico. President, Informe que rinde al H. Congreso de la Unión (N. p., 1959), p. 20; ibid., 1960, p. 21.
109. Ibid., 1956, p. 35; 1962, p. 12.
110. Ibid., 1957, p. 35.
111. SDN, Gufa, pp. 33-39.
112. For recent information on Mexican wage standards and labor conditions see U. S. Department of Labor. Division of Foreign Labor Conditions, Labor: Law and Practice in Mexico, Bureau of Labor Statistics Report 240 (Washington, D. C., 1963), especially pp. 43-47. See also same author, Labor in Mexico, BLS Report 251 (Washington, D. C., 1963), especially pp. 67-85.
113. Labor: Law and Practice in Mexico, pp. 45-46.
114. Mexico. Secretaría de industria y comercio. Dirección general de muestreo, La población económicamente activa de México en Abril de 1965, Vol. IV (Mexico City, June 1965).
115. Secretaría de industria y comercio. Dirección general de estadística, Revista de estadística (March 1962), pp. 277-310.
116. SDN, Memorias, 1960/1961, p. 138; Memorias, 1961/1962, p. 144.
117. SDN. Fuerza aérea mexicana. Colegio del aire, Instructivo de admisión (Zapopan, Jalisco, n. d.).

118. SDN. Estado mayor, Reglamento de la Escuela superior de guerra (Mexico City, 1961), passim.
119. Solfs Horowitz, "Members of the Country Team," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. I.III (August 16, 1965), pp. 268-269.
120. "Viaje de 12 días," Hispanoamericano, April 24, 1966, p. 8.
121. Details of exchanges and visits are contained in SDN, Memorias.
122. Interviews.
123. HCM, Instructivo de admisión, 1965, p. 36.
124. Ibid., pp. 24-31.
125. Ibid., p. 47.
126. Ibid., p. 31.
127. Ibid., p. 32.
128. Hispanoamericano, May 13, 1965, p. 13.
129. Tiempo, January 11, 1960, p. 10.
130. HCM, Prospecto de admisión, 1965, p. 37.
131. Quoted in Huntington, The Soldier, p. 11.
132. Interviews.
133. Gordon Connell-Smith, The Inter-American System (London, 1966), pp. 122-123.
134. J. Lloyd Mechem, The United States and Inter-American Security 1889-1960 (Austin, Texas, 1961), p. 227.
135. Dreier, The Organization, pp. 43-48.
136. Interviews.
137. Call, The Mexican Venture, p. 254; Hispanic American Report, September 1950, p. 13; January 1952, p. 8; July 1953, p. 10; New York Times, February 17, 1952, p. 27.
138. Interviews; Norman M. Smith, "The Role of the Armed Forces in Contemporary Mexican Politics," unpublished Master's thesis, University of Florida, 1966, p. 57.
139. Interviews.
140. SDN, Memorias.
141. Bosques, Six-Year Plan, App. XXIII, p. 359.
142. Interviews.
143. Bosques, Six-Year Plan, note, pp. 201-202.
144. Interviews.
145. Interviews; Brandenburg, Modern Mexico, pp. 149-150.
146. As cited in Newsweek, July 16, 1945, p. 58.
147. I. A. Langnar, "Mexico Today: Aspects of Progress Since the Revolution," World Today, Vol. XVII (April 1961), pp. 158-167.
148. An American officer informed the author that this situation still obtains in the Díaz Ordaz administration.

149. Brandenburg, Modern Mexico, p. 160; interviews.
150. Interviews.
151. New York Times, August 30, 1964, p. 35.
152. Ibid., January 5, 1961, p. 9.
153. Revista del ejército, June 1961, p. 51.

THE ARMY AND THE STATE

154. Alfredo Leal Cortés, "El gabinete del Alemán," Mañana, August 1, 1959, p. 24.
155. Revista, August 1964, p. 1.
156. Interviews. One informant gave the example of Gen. Tomás Sánchez Hernández who, while director of the Colegio Militar, attempted to force his staff to join the PRI. He was met with determined and successful resistance. See also Brandenburg, "Mexico: An Experiment," p. 295.
157. Latin American Times, September 14, 1965, p. 1.
158. Ibid., September 7, 1965, p. 1.
159. Interviews; Karl M. Schmitt, Communism in Mexico. A Study in Political Frustration (Austin, Texas, 1965), p. 225.
160. John J. Johnson, The Military and Society (Stanford, 1964), p. 102.
161. "Military Assistance and Militarism in Latin America," Western Political Quarterly, Vol. XVIII (June 1965), p. 383.
162. Howard Cline, Mexico: Revolution to Evolution, 1940-1960 (London, 1962), p. 176.
163. Lieuwen, Arms, p. 170.
164. Scott, Mexican Government, pp. 133-134; Brandenburg, "Mexico: An Experiment," p. 98.
165. Interviews. See also such pieces of party propaganda as PRI. Comité ejecutivo nacional, Compilación por materia del pensamiento político, social y económico del Lic. Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (Mexico City, 1964).
166. See for example SDN. Estado mayor, 1857. Homenaje a la constitución y el pensamiento liberal mexicanos (Mexico City, 1951).
167. Karl M. Schmitt, "The Role of the Military in Contemporary Mexico," The Caribbean: Mexico Today. Ed. by A. Curtis Wilgus (Gainesville, Fla., 1964), p. 57.
168. Brandenburg, Modern Mexico, p. 101.
169. See for example, Robert E. Scott, "Some Aspects of Mexican Federalism, 1917-1948," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1949, p. 43; Brandenburg, Modern Mexico, p. 160.
170. See for example Excelsior, January 16, 1958, pp. 1, 11.
171. Such activities are openly covered in the press. Thus Excelsior on March 27, 1958, reported that Gen. Xavier González Gómez, ex-military attaché to France, returned to the capital the previous day from Monterrey—where he functioned on the campaign committee of Adolfo López Mateos (p. 28)—and that the latter on a campaign visit to Guerrero was accompanied by Zone Commander Gen. Baltazar Leyva Mancilla (January 10, 1958, p. 4).

172. Interviews.
173. Interviews.
174. Brandenburg, "Mexico: An Experiment," pp. 295-296.
175. Schmitt, "Role of the Military," p. 58.
176. Scott, "Aspects," p. 42.
177. Brandenburg, Modern Mexico, p. 94.
178. Interviews; Jack B. Gabbert, The Evolution of the Mexican Presidency (Austin, Texas, 1963), p. 172.
179. Ibid., p. 228.
180. See for example Excelsior, February 19, 1958, p. 6; February 20, 1958, p. 4; May 7, 1958, p. 29A.
181. See for example Adolfo López Mateos, 5 informes de gobierno (Mexico City, 1964), pp. 17-19, 74-76, 132-134, 198-199, 264-266.
182. See for example, Excelsior, February 22, 1958, pp. 1, 4; May 10, 1958, p. 26A; May 16, 1958, p. 26A. See also the observations of Schmitt, "Role," p. 59.
183. Interviews; Lieuwen, Arms, p. 119.
184. Ibid.; Dreier, The Organization, pp. 46-47.
185. Lieuwen, Generals vs. Presidents, p. 101.
186. Bosques, Six-Year Plan, App. XXIII, p. 353.
187. PRI, "El caballo esta esperando," unlated pamphlet quoted in Gabbert, The Evolution, p. 352.
188. "Mensaje y gira," Hispanoamericano, June 6, 1966, p. 9.
189. Bosques, Six-Year Plan, p. 130.
190. Brandenburg, Modern Mexico, p. 149.
191. Ralph Eisenberg, "The Mexican Presidential Election of 1952," unpublished Master's thesis, University of Illinois, 1953, pp. 103-104.
192. Hispanic American Report, June 1952, p. 8.
193. Interviews; Eisenberg, "The Mexican Presidential Election," pp. 19-20; Scott, "Aspects," p. 42; Tucker, The Mexican Government Today, pp. 19, 193; Manuel González Hnájosa, "El derecho frente la fuerza armada," La nación, February 11, 1962, p. 3; Hispanic American Report, December 1963, p. 943.
194. For example, see Hispanic American Report, June-September 1962, pp. 493, 588, 789.
195. Interviews; Brandenburg, Modern Mexico, p. 152; Scott, "Aspects," pp. 206-207; Tucker, The Mexican Government Today, p. 193.

CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS

196. William P. Glade and Charles W. Anderson, The Political Economy of Mexico (Madison, Wis., 1963), p. 3.

197. Ibid., p. 24.

198. Cline, Mexico, p. 177.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS

DIFFERENT LEVELS OF POLITICAL ROLE

The preceding four chapters make it quite clear that in each country—Argentina, Colombia, Mexico and Peru—the military plays some political role in that they function within the political system defending and promoting the interests of their institution. Beyond this, however, their performance varies substantially from one country to the other.

Using only four cases, it is hardly feasible to construct a typology of military political role. A rough ordinal ranking may be made, however, based on the overt, observable political activity of the armed forces since 1940. For want of a better term, these manifestations will be referred to as "level" of political role. Level may then be related to the several factors identified and discussed in the Introduction and in the case studies. The use of the concept of level alone does not, of course, provide fully for variations in form such as, for example, military caudillismo as compared to the military junta. An effort will be made to deal with these variables descriptively in the course of the analysis.

Lieuwen identifies three groups of Latin American countries in terms of the political influence of the military or, in effect, the level of their political role. Group I consists of those in which the armed forces dominate politics, Group II, those in which they are in transition from political to non-political institutions; and Group III, those in which they are non-political. Argentina and Peru fall in Group II, Colombia and Mexico in Group III.¹ Theodore Wyckoff uses a somewhat similar typology: (1) countries "in which the military always" play a political role; (2) those in which they "never, or almost never," do so; and (3) those in which they "occasionally" do so. He places all four countries in category (3).²

The above classifications have a number of shortcomings. They are entirely judgmental; they provide no temporal dimension and, for purposes of this study, they allow no spread for the countries included. Thus, Lieuwen's system establishes only a 1-2 grouping while Wyckoff's permits no ranking.

Number and Duration of Interventions

The level of political role may be evaluated more precisely by counting and measuring the more overt forms of political activity: that is, the number and duration of interventions.³ Table 50 following tabulates successful military interventions for the period 1940-1967 as well as its component decades and ranks the four countries in descending order.

In calculating duration of interventions, a conceptual problem is encountered at the outset: When does a military intervention cease to be military? Colonel Juan Perón in Argentina, General Manuel Odría in Peru and General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla in Colombia all came to power via an initial military coup, but each subsequently became more or less constitutional presidents, Perón through a competitive popular election, Odría in an uncontested election

TABLE 50
SUCCESSFUL MILITARY COUPS
1940-1967*

<u>Countries</u>	<u>Decades</u>	<u>1940-1949</u>		<u>1950-1959</u>		<u>1960-1967</u>		<u>1940-1967</u>	
		<u>No.</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Rank</u>
Argentina		1	1	1	1	2	1	4	1
Peru		1	1	0	3	1	1	2	2
Colombia		0	2	2	2	0	2	2	2
Mexico		0	2	0	3	0	2	0	3

*See Figure 1 following for identification of coups counted.

(although he received some 500,000 votes), and Rojas Pinilla through election by congress. While all three were army officers, ruled dictatorially, and relied on the armed forces as their primary basis of support, each courted and won the backing of significant civilian groups. To rephrase the question: Should their elected administrations be regarded as continuations of military interventions and therefore be included in calculating duration?

This problem has been handled by offering two separate calculations. In Figure 1 following, the solid black sections of the bars represent periods which were initiated by military coups, during which countries were under extra-constitutional provisional governments dominated by the armed forces and which were terminated by other military coups or by the inauguration of a constitutional president. The solid white sections indicate the administrations of civilian presidents initiated by popular elections and terminated by military coups. The cross-hatched sections are "twilight" periods representing the elected administrations of Perón, Odría, and Rojas Pinilla. The numbers along the top of the bars refer to accompanying notes which identify the date and circumstances of initiation and termination of each period depicted.

Table 51 analyzes duration of military rule by decades for the same period and for its component decades in terms of (1) absolute length to the nearest month and (2) length as a percentage of the total span of months. Columns headed A refer only to provisional military dominated governments. B columns include the same periods, plus the elected administrations of Perón, Odría, and Rojas Pinilla. It turns out, however, that regardless of which columns are used, rankings are essentially the same. For each decade and over the entire period, Argentina is 1 and Peru 2. Colombia is 3 and Mexico 4 for the 1950's and the entire period. For the 1940's and the 1960's the latter two countries share No. 3 ranking since throughout both decades both were free of intervention.

The use of interventions alone as indicators of the political role of the military has a number of weaknesses. "Counting coups" does not provide a sufficient basis for ranking the four countries. As in the case of Lieuwen's typology, Table 50 does little more than reveal rough groupings. Duration provides a more precise basis for measurement in that it permits a 1-2-3-4 ranking. The number and duration of interventions taken out of their context, however, may be quite misleading as a measure of the political muscle of the armed forces. If the data in Figure 1 and Table 51 are used as the sole criteria, the Colombian armed forces during the decade of the 1950's appear to have played a greater political role than those of Peru and for the period 1940-1967 an equal one. Anyone familiar with Latin America will doubt that the former was the case and know that the latter was not.




FIGURE 1. DURATION AND IDENTIFICATION OF COUPS

TABLE 51

DURATION OF MILITARY INTERVENTION

Decade	Country	A			B		
		Rank	Duration in Months	Duration as Percent of Total Period	Rank	Duration in Months	Duration as Percent of Total Period
1940-1949	Argentina	1	36	30.0	1	79	65.8
	Peru	2	14	11.7	2	14	11.7
	Colombia	3	--	--	3	--	--
	Mexico	3	--	--	3	--	--
1950-1959	Argentina	1	31	25.8	1	100	83.3
	Peru	2	7	0.6	2	79	65.8
	Colombia	3	29	24.2	3	62	51.7
	Mexico	4	--	--	4	--	--
1960-1967	Argentina	1	36	37.5	1	36	37.5
	Peru	2	12	12.5	2	12	12.5
	Colombia	3	--	--	3	--	--
	Mexico	3	--	--	3	--	--
1940-1967	Argentina	1	103	30.6	1	215	64.0
	Peru	2	33	10.0	2	105	31.3
	Colombia	3	29	0.9	3	62	18.5
	Mexico	4	--	--	4	--	--

Columns headed A include only provisional military-dominated governments. B columns include the same periods, plus the elected administrations of Perón, Odría, and Rojas Pinilla. Regardless of which columns are used, ranks are essentially the same.

The tabulation of interventions, furthermore, does not take into account that the armed forces may act to depose a military regime as a prelude to the restoration of constitutional government and, presumably, a diminution of their own influence. This was the outcome of the Colombian military's ouster of Rojas Pinilla in May 1967. Moreover, frequent coups and prolonged interventions may very well indicate that the military feels insecure in its status or that it cannot accomplish its objectives through less direct action. It can be argued that despite the rankings in the preceding tables, the level of the political role of the Peruvian armed forces is equal to or greater than that of their Argentine counterparts. Existing in a more stable and less competitive environment which they themselves guarantee, and more secure in their status and prerogatives, they can protect or advance their interests through bargaining or threat without having to resort to frequent interventions.

Furthermore, it can be argued on the basis of the cases made in the chapters on Mexico and Colombia that the armed forces occupy a stronger and more secure position within the political system of the former country than of the latter. The Colombian intervention of the 1950's can be viewed as atypical, undertaken unwillingly in response to a total national crisis, launched from a position of weakness and, in view of hostile response, not likely to be repeated.

Defense Expenditure Percentage

Another possible indicator of the level of the political role of the military is defense expenditures as a percentage of total national expenditures (referred to hereinafter as Defense Expenditure Percentage or DEP). The assumption here is that when calculated for a series of years, this figure provides some measure of the basic bargaining power of the armed forces within the political system. Thus it supplements the number and duration of interventions in that the latter represent military power in crisis situations only.

Table 52 following shows national rankings of DEP alongside the rankings previously derived from interventions.

TABLE 52
RANKS OF LEVEL OF MILITARY POLITICAL ROLE
BASED ON INTERVENTIONS AND DEP

<u>Period</u>	<u>1940-1949</u>		<u>1950-1959</u>		<u>1960-1965</u>		<u>1940-1965</u>	
<u>Country</u>	<u>Interventions</u>	<u>DEP</u>	<u>Interventions</u>	<u>DEP</u>	<u>Interventions</u>	<u>DEP</u>	<u>Interventions</u>	<u>DEP</u>
Argentina	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	1
Peru	2	2	2	3	2	3	2	2
Colombia	3	4	3	1	3	1	3	3
Mexico	3	3	4	4	3	4	4	4

Rankings of DEP are based on figures in Joseph E. Loftus, *Latin American Defense Expenditures, 1939-1965* (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corp., January 1968), Table 5, p. 36.

The two sets show some correlation. In each decade Argentina ranks 1 or 2 for each indicator; Peru 2 or 3, and Mexico 3 or 4. In the 1950's and 1960's, Colombia provides the inconsistency. For the total period, 1940-1965, the two rankings are identical.

It should be pointed out that as in the case of interventions the use of DEP as a measure of military political role has certain shortcomings. First, the adequacy and quality of budget data are questionable. Published figures on military expenditures in Latin America vary substantially according to the source, the currency employed and its valuation, the purpose of presentation, and what is counted. In the latter instance, it is not always clear whether figures indicate amounts allocated or amounts spent. Furthermore, published budgets do not always include supplemental appropriations nor do they reveal funds available to the armed forces but hidden in other departmental budgets. In the judgment of this author, Loftus' work is the most recent and best adjustment and conciliation of existing sources. It is for that reason that his figures are used for rankings rather than the data in the case studies.

Even if the accuracy of budget data be accepted, the use of DEP as an indicator has limitations. While it may have some validity in peacetime, during the threat or reality of external or internal war, it is distorted by perceived national security requirements which transcend

the corporate interests of the armed forces alone. Thus, during the first half of the decade of the 1940's, considerations related to World War II undoubtedly affected the level of defense expenditures and in 1941 Peru fought a war with Ecuador, an episode which accounts for a sharp increase during the period 1940-1942. The impact of national security requirements has been the greatest in Colombia where internal war has waxed and waned since the late 1940's. Sharply increased outlays for military operations and civic action unquestionably account for the No. 1 rank of that country for DEP during the 1950's and the 1960's. Over the entire period, 1940-1965, however, it may be ventured that this factor was absorbed so as to account for the overall ranking of 3.

Aside from distortions provided by what nations perceive to be legitimate military needs, further questions exist about the validity of gross budget figures as indicators of the political strength of the military. It may reasonably be assumed that what really concerns the armed forces as interest groups is not so much their percentage of a total, but the extent to which their demands and needs are met. Except for Colombia, DEP over the period 1940-1965 showed an overall decline: 16.9 to 15.1 for Argentina, 18.3 to 10.5 for Mexico, and 19.7 to 12.0 for Peru. This trend, however, may not mean necessarily that the political role of the military has diminished. It more probably indicates that legitimate national security requirements—except in Colombia—have not expanded as rapidly as many more urgent national needs and therefore that expenditures for education, developmental activities, and social services have increased much faster than those for soldiers and military hardware. Furthermore, it may be hypothesized that the armed forces have accepted the growing disparity as in the general interest and also because they have continued to fare well in terms of absolute appropriations. In contrast to DEP, the military budgets of all four countries increased substantially over the twenty-six-year period: 117 percent for Argentina, 558.9 percent for Colombia, 94.3 percent for Mexico, and 188.3 percent for Peru.⁴

Despite these caveats, the author regards the rankings of level of military political role over the period 1940-1965 which were derived from interventions and DEP as reasonably accurate. In any case they are intended not as demonstrated fact but as an heuristic device. To recapitulate, they are: Argentina, 1; Peru, 2; Colombia, 3; and Mexico, 4.

VARIABLES AFFECTING LEVEL OF POLITICAL ROLE

In the following section rankings will be correlated with affecting variables identified in the Introduction. In doing so, it is theoretically possible in some cases to calculate nonparametric coefficients such as Spearman's ρ or Kendall's τ . This method, however, would give an impression of scientific exactitude which the quality of the data would simply not justify. Instead, only visual and descriptive correlations will be employed.

Legitimacy of the Political System

Turning first to attributes of the political environment, legitimacy is rather an elusive concept. Although some indicators exist, such as electoral participation, these are affected by so many special conditions or unknowns that, in the end, evaluation has to be judgmental.

In the case of Mexico, there are minority elements which deny the right of the existing regime to govern. As observed in the case study, however, since the institutionalization of the revolution, most Mexicans accept the present system as the most appropriate and proper one despite considerable apathy and cynicism toward its performance; and they concede theoretically that they owe it their obedience. Opposition to its mandates is pragmatic rather than

moral or doctrinaire and assume the form of law evasion rather than law defiance. The system's strength is enhanced by the absence of any serious competitor for legitimacy.

In contrast, Argentina has experienced an almost continuous legitimacy crisis since the 1930's. Disregarding periods of direct military rule which may be regarded as ipso facto illegitimate, the basic problem has been the Perón regime and its aftermath. Although Perón achieved the presidency in 1946 and again in 1952 by what most observers agree was popular choice, a large number of Argentines committed to parliamentary democracy did not accept his moral right to govern and gave obedience to his regime only under duress. After his overthrow in 1955, the situation was reversed. In the eyes of his numerous followers, Peronismo had acquired legitimacy, and they did not accept the moral authority of successor regimes, military or civilian. Moreover, those in power attempted to exclude Peronistas from the re-established parliamentary system, thus deepening and sustaining their alienation. In effect, therefore, Argentina is divided into two groups, which together constitute the majority of the people but which cannot agree on standards of legitimacy.

In Peru, a roughly comparable situation has existed. Its major political party, APRA, has been proscribed, persecuted and, finally legalized, denied in 1962 an apparent electoral victory at the polls. At least until World War II, Aprismo was a revolutionary movement which did not accept the legitimacy of a political system which it regarded as oppressive and immoral and it made strong efforts to subvert the established order. However, it has since moderated its posture and after its legalization it has participated in political life through the electoral process and through representation in congress, although somewhat less responsibly than some might wish. In view of the circumstances under which Belaunde came to power, Apristas may question his right to govern, but it may be ventured that they as well as most other politically aware Peruvians do not seriously challenge the legitimacy of the system itself.

Colombia presents a more complicated case. Historically, its political life has been characterized by a bitter rivalry between its two dominant parties, Liberal and Conservative. Although they may fight each other at the polls and by more violent means, neither denies the appropriateness and propriety of the system which permits them to do this. Moreover, their membership is drawn from the same socioeconomic class so that both have a deep vested interest in maintaining the present political order. The continued presence of la violencia, however, indicates that acceptance of legitimacy is not universal. Although violence was originally an outgrowth of the Liberal-Conservative conflict, it later assumed an independent form and dynamic and now represents the political alienation of an undetermined number of Colombians.

On the basis of the preceding analysis, the level of legitimacy in the four countries might be ordered and correlated visually with rankings of level of military-political role as in Table 53.

With the exception of Colombia, the preceding observations about legitimacy were based primarily on the beliefs and behavior of well established major political sectors. There exist in each country, however, numbers of individuals of a genuinely revolutionary disposition. These include not only doctrinaire Marxists and Fidelistas but intellectuals, students and representatives of the lower classes who for one reason or the other have concluded that the values of existing systems no longer conform to their own and that they have no moral obligation to obey the system's mandates. Their number is undetermined but in the opinion of the author is increasing. Standing behind them are rural masses whose political socialization is minimal and who are apathetic to the system. As their socialization proceeds, however, it

may very well lead to alienation rather than identification. Thus, the potential for new legitimacy crises is present in all four countries.

TABLE 53
LEVELS OF MILITARY POLITICAL ROLE AND
LEGITIMACY OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS

<u>Country</u>	<u>Political Role</u>	<u>Legitimacy</u>
Argentina	1	4
Peru	2	2
Colombia	3	3
Mexico	4	1

Effectiveness of the Political System

The evaluation of the effectiveness of a system is also essentially a matter of judgment. If, however, it is assumed that in developing nations a primary demand is for more goods and services and that the state is held responsible for their production, then developmental data provide rough indicators of the capacity of a system to satisfy demands upon it. The reservation is made of course that government is by no means solely responsible for development or its lack and that many variables intervene between what government undertakes and what it accomplishes. Table 54 following includes a typology of development, some key indicators and a visual correlation of military role.

The selected indicators simply confirm what everybody knows. By most socioeconomic standards Argentina for decades has been one of the two most highly developed nations in Latin America and still is. Among the four countries included in this study Mexico ranks second. The relative position of Colombia and Peru will depend on indicators used. Both, however, clearly fall into a third category. To the extent, therefore, that development reflects performance of a political system, Argentina could be ranked No. 1 in terms of effectiveness, Mexico No. 2 and Colombia and Peru No. 3.

A somewhat different picture emerges when the political role of the military is related to the developmental types identified by De Vries and Medina and listed in Column 3 in Table 54. Here Peru and Colombia fall into Group III; that is, countries in a balanced situation of slow development but characterized by the existence of modern structures side by side with antiquated and residual structures which are regionally localized. Mexico is in Group IV, which includes countries which although they began with serious ethnic, social, and geographical imbalances, are experiencing rapid balanced development in the various sectors. So far the typology is not inconsistent with the indicators and rankings in Table 54. Argentina, however, is in Group IV; that is, countries in a balanced situation of slow development but whose further progress is affected by the limitations of the entire Latin American situation.

The key concepts in the preceding sentence are slow development and limitations on further progress. In the case of Argentina, however, limitations have been imposed not only by

TABLE 54

LEVELS OF MILITARY POLITICAL ROLE AND EFFECTIVENESS
OF POLITICAL SYSTEMSRank in Effectiveness (Number in Parentheses
Is Actual Percent or Numerical Total)

	Country	Argentina	Peru	Colombia	Mexico
Socioeconomic Development	Military role rank	1	2	3	4
	Developmental types	Group VI	Group III	Group III	Group IV
Economy	Gross domestic product per capita	1 (645)	3 (285)	4 (265)	2 (435)
	Per capita income	1 (799.0)	4 (268.5)	3 (373.4)	2 (415.4)
	Percent urban population	1 (68)	4 (41)	3 (48)	2 (50)
	Percent of population in industry	3 (59)	2 (30)	2 (30)	1 (56)
Health	Mortality rate per 1,000 inhabitants	1 (8.1)	3 (17.0)	2 (9.9)	2 (9.9)
	Mortality rate per 1,000 live births	1 (60.7)	4 (88.5)	3 (82.4)	2 (60.7)
	Doctors per 1,000 inhabitants	1 (14.6)	3 (4.5)	4 (4.0)	2 (6.9)
	Per capita daily caloric supply	1 (2,660)	3 (2,240)	4 (2,130)	2 (2,640)
Education	Percent literacy	1 (91.4)	4 (60.2)	3 (62.3)	2 (72.1)
	School enrollment as percent of total population	4 (19.4)	3 (20.3)	1 (15.8)	2 (18.6)
	Students per teacher in primary schools	1 (20.0)	2 (31.9)	3 (34.6)	4 (50.2)

The developmental types and the percentages for urban population and employment in agriculture are taken from UNESCO, *Social Aspects of Economic Development in Latin America*, Vol. 1, edited by Egbert de Vries and José Medina Echavarría (New York, 1963), pp. 67-67, and p. 80 respectively. The figures for per capita income are from United Nations, *The Economic Development of Latin America in the Post-War Years* (New York, 1964), p. 51, Table 51. The rest of the data are from Inter-American Development Bank, *Socio-Economic Progress in Latin America. Social Progress Trust Fund. Sixth Annual Report, 1966* (Washington, D.C., 1967).

Dates for figures vary according to country and indicator but in general range from 1960 to 1966.

Figures for GDP and per capita income are based on then current U.S. dollars.

GDP equals gross national product minus net factor income from abroad.

the entire Latin American situation but by peculiarly national circumstances. What the indicators in Table 54 really mean is that the nation got off to such a massive head start among the Latin American republics that it still maintains a preeminent position. In recent years, however, the rate of Argentine economic development has slowed and, indeed, almost stalled while that of the other three countries has accelerated. The comparison is illustrated by the indicators in Table 55 following. Therefore, insofar as economic development accompanied by reasonable price stability is regarded as a primary national goal and government is held responsible for its achievement, the Argentine political system does not appear to have performed as effectively in recent years as have those of Colombia, Mexico, and Peru.

Development of Political Institutions

Correlations between the political role of the military and the development of political institutions are shown in Table 56 following. The Fitzgibbon ranking is concerned primarily with levels of democracy and democratic development. It is based on evaluations made every five years by a panel of experts employing a set of criteria developed by Professor Fitzgibbon. His rankings made within a 1-20 scale for all the Latin American republics are shown in

TABLE 55

CHANGES IN INDICATORS OF SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Indicator	Date	Argentina	Peru	Colombia	Mexico
Annual growth rate of gross domestic product	1950-1955	3.2	5.1	5.3	6.1
	1955-1960	2.7	4.8	4.0	6.1
	1960-1963	-0.8	6.7	4.7	4.8
Cost of living indices (1950=100)	1950	100	100	100	100
	1955	227	141	123	154
	1960	1,151	212	192	204
Percent of increase in cost of living	1951-1955	127	41	23	54
	1956-1960	399	50	56	32
Mean rate of annual income	1951-1960	27.7	7.8	6.7	7.4
Growth rates in school enrollment (ca. 1965)	Primary	2.0	4.2	6.6	9.2
	Intermediate	6.0	14.7	10.1	17.4
	Higher	7.2	9.5	10.7	9.1

Annual growth rate of gross domestic product is taken from United Nations, *Economic Survey of Latin America, 1963* (New York, 1965), p. 14.

Cost of living data are taken from Victor I. Urquidí, *Viabilidad económica de América Latina* (Mexico-Buenos Aires, 1962), p. 191, Table 33.

Growth rates in school enrollment are from Inter-American Development Bank, *Socioeconomic Progress in Latin America, Social Progress Trust Fund. Sixth Annual Report, 1966* (Washington, D.C., 1967), p. 35.

Gross domestic product equals gross national product minus net factor income from abroad.

TABLE 56
LEVELS OF MILITARY POLITICAL ROLE AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Country	Military Role	Political Development				
		Fitzgibbon		UNESCO	Almond and Coleman	Banks and Textor
		Average 1945-65	1965			
Argentina	1	3 (6.1)	2 (6)	1 (3)	1	1
Peru	2	4 (10.4)	4 (9)	4 (7)	2	2
Colombia	3	2 (5.8)	3 (7)	3 (6)	2	2
Mexico	4	1 (5.4)	1 (4)	2 (4)	2	1

Sources:

Russell H. Fitzgibbon, "Measurement of Latin American Political Phenomena: A Statistical Experiment," The American Political Science Review, XLV (June 1951), pp. 517-523; "A Statistical Evaluation of Latin American Democracy," Western Political Quarterly, IX (September 1956), pp. 607-619; Fitzgibbon and Kenneth F. Johnson, "Measurement of Latin American Political Change," The American Political Science Review, LIV (September 1961), pp. 515-526; Fitzgibbon, "Measuring Democratic Change in Latin America," Journal of Politics, XXIX (February 1967), pp. 129-166.

UNESCO, Social Aspects of Economic Development in Latin America, Vol. I, edited by Egbert de Vries and José Medina Echavarría (New York, 1963), p. 89, Table 1.

Gabriel Almond and James Coleman (eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton, N.J., 1960), p. 534, Table 1.

Arthur S. Banks and Robert B. Textor, A Cross Polity Survey (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), pp. 78-79.

parentheses. I have translated them into a 1-4 range. The UNESCO column derives from a typology provided by Renato Poblete B., S. J., and J. Luis Segundo Diaz, S. J. The criteria used were the viability of what are essentially democratic-constitutional political structures. The figures in parentheses are taken from the 1-10 ranking developed by the authors. As in the case of Fitzgibbon, I have translated them into a 1-4 scale. The basic criterion for the Almond and Coleman and Banks and Textor rankings is political modernization. The former classify political systems as follows: Group 1, "competitive"; Group 2, "semi-competitive"; Group 3, "authoritarian." Competitiveness is defined as "an essential aspect of political modernity, but not all competitive systems are 'modern' in terms of the characteristic structures and styles of performance of functions" (p. 533). The period evaluated is roughly 1950-1960. Banks and Textor use the following grouping: (1) "advanced," (2) "mid-transitional" (entering the transitional phase before 1945) and (3) "early transitional" (entering transitional phase in or after 1945). The transitional phase includes a will to modernize, a break with primarily agrarian institutions, and the formation of a politically organized society. The advanced phase is one in which all elements of the elite agree modernization is desirable and political

competition is between supporters of rival programs of modernization. Struggles may assume the form of coups d'état but not of fundamental social revolution.

There is a tautological element involved in correlating military role and Fitzgibbon's rankings in that in the latter the level of political activity of the armed forces is one of the criteria. Moreover, it is impossible to average apples and oranges to come up with a composite ranking. Nevertheless, most observers would agree with what an overview of Table 56 suggests: Despite dysfunctions within it, the Argentine political system has the most well-developed and modern structure. Mexico is rather a close second and Colombia and Peru provide a third category. In the last three countries the relation between level of political development and the political role of the armed forces is what might be expected. Argentina provides the anomaly.

Accepted Limits of Political Behavior

In the Introduction it was postulated that one of the environmental factors which influenced the political behavior of the military was the degree of public acceptance of violence as a de facto political instrument. While it might be possible to compare the four countries in terms of the incidence and intensity of political violence, there is insufficient data to permit comparisons or rankings of public attitudes toward the phenomenon. The author can only offer some observations and judgments. In each the use of violence for political purposes is proscribed by the constitution and the laws and most politically interested persons would prefer to avoid it. Nevertheless, historically, not only the military but civilian leaders, parties and factions have not hesitated to employ violence when they felt it necessary to protect or advance their vital interests. It appears that violence continues to be an accepted norm of the political cultures of the four countries. Further, this circumstance undoubtedly contributes heavily to the creation of an atmosphere favorable to military intervention in that the armed forces are aware that their behavior will not be regarded as abnormal.

Social Structure

In Table 57 following, level of military role is correlated with a typology of social structure developed by Gino Germani and Kalman Silvert in which the Latin American republics are placed in four groups, A-D, representing a descending order of modernity. The criteria used by the authors were: percent of the population in middle and upper social strata, in primary activities, in cities of 20,000 or more inhabitants and in the middle and upper urban strata; and university students per 1,000 inhabitants.

TABLE 57
MILITARY ROLE AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Argentina</u>	<u>Peru</u>	<u>Colombia</u>	<u>Mexico</u>
Military role	1	2	3	4
Social structure	Group A	Group D	Group C	Group B

Discussion

An overview of the preceding visual correlations shows that among the four countries studied, Mexico ranks either No. 1 or No. 2 in legitimacy and effectiveness of the political system, and in political and social modernization. At the same time the level of the political role of her armed forces is the lowest. The comparative ranking of Colombia and Peru in terms of environmental factors will depend on the indicators used but in general the two countries may be grouped below Mexico. However, they rank above the latter in terms of the political activity of the military.

These correlations seem to support the notion that as political, economic, and social development and modernization proceed, the armed forces become less political. Or to phrase it in terms of the propositions in the Introduction, modernization and development reduce the opportunities for the military to perform a significant political role.

Argentina presents an anomaly. In terms of the levels of development and modernization already achieved, the nation ranks No. 1 among the four countries and possibly among all the Latin American republics. Yet, the level of military political role is the highest of the four and among the highest in Latin America. This relationship suggests that while development and modernization may be necessary conditions for an apolitical military, they are not sufficient. This observation, however, is not very sustaining. A more positive attempt at explanation may be attempted by reviewing a couple of the environmental variables discussed earlier. First, as indicated in Table 56, among the four countries, Banks and Textor rank only Argentina and Mexico as "advanced." It will be recalled, however, that advanced does not necessarily mean stable or democratic-civilist. Rather it involves a relatively high level of competition which may include the employment of force and violence by supporters of rival programs for further development and modernization. In such a situation, the armed forces may very well be one of the competing groups with their own notions of an appropriate program. Indeed, as Professor Potash points out, the latter has been the case in Argentina.

The preceding exposition may offer some clue to why in one "advanced" nation, Argentina, the military has played a high level political role. It does not explain why in the other, Mexico, the same relationship does not prevail. The difference lies in part in differing historical patterns of civil-military relations in the two countries. More immediately, in contrast to Mexico, Argentina has experienced an almost continuous legitimacy crisis since the 1930's, and over the same period her political system has performed relatively ineffectively. Here it might be well to repeat parts of Lipset's definition of effectiveness, to wit, "...the extent to which it [the system] satisfies the basic functions of government as defined by the expectations of most members of a society, and the expectations of powerful groups within it which might threaten the system, such as the armed forces" [emphasis mine]. In short, the Argentina case provides substantial evidential support for the proposition that legitimacy crises or vacuums and/or ineffectiveness of a political system create expanded opportunities for the military to increase the level of their political role whether that role be designed or reactive.

Public Attitude Toward the Military

On the basis of observations made in the case studies, there appear to be substantial differences in public attitudes toward the military in the four countries. In general, the Peruvian armed forces enjoy the highest esteem. This status may be attributed to several factors. First, they are the principal and most visible mark of national sovereignty. Second, they are regarded as performing a useful and necessary social function. Because of historical circumstances, the perceived need for defense against external aggression is greater in Peru than in

the other three countries. Third, while there is a considerable social gap between the oligarchy and the officer corps, particularly in the case of the army, the majority of the population does not regard commissioned personnel as a socially inferior group and officership is still viewed as an important avenue of upward social mobility. Fourth, the only military intervention in recent years, that of July 1962, was brief and marked by moderation and restraint. Fifth, the participation of the armed forces in civic action programs has undoubtedly improved their public image. Finally, the effect of these influences has been enhanced by the armed forces' well-developed public relations program.

Mexico might be ranked second in terms of the level of public regard of the military. The absence of direct interventions over the several decades has served to dispel the once general image of the armed forces as a predatory group. Although their occupational status appears to be lower than in Peru, they are socially identified with the popular sector which today creates the values and standards of Mexican life and they still provide a route of upward social mobility for the lower classes. Finally, although Mexicans concede that no serious external threat to the nation exists, they accept the maintenance of internal security as a useful and necessary function, while civic action programs have undoubtedly improved the military's public image.

Regard for the armed forces appears to be lowest in Argentina and Colombia, although for different reasons. In the latter country, as Professor Maingot points out, historic social forces have relegated the military to a relatively low social and occupational status in the eyes of Colombians who set the standards. The fact that the services have performed a socially necessary function in combatting la violencia does not appear to have increased significantly the esteem in which they are held.

In Argentina, at least two factors have influenced public attitudes toward the military since 1930. First, relatively early modernization and development have been accompanied by the emergence of a wide range of opportunities for individual social and economic advancement, so that the social and occupational status of officership has declined relative to that of other professions. Second, a more immediate impact on public regard has been the frequent military interventions of recent decades. Although such actions have been in some cases applauded or at least accepted by civilian sectors, their overall effect has been to tarnish the public image of the armed forces. The effect has been strengthened by the sometimes arrogant and often insensitive behavior of military elements exercising governmental authority.

In terms of the level of public regard for the armed forces, the four countries might be ranked in the order (1) Peru, (2) Mexico, (3) Argentina, (4) Colombia and this ranking correlated with level of their political role. The results, however, are not very revealing. Without further research, about all that can be done is to redefine some of the rather speculative propositions offered in the Introduction. First, in non-crisis situations, the higher the public regard for the military, the greater will be the latter's influence within the political system. Second, in view of the intensive public relations programs undertaken by the armed forces in all four countries, it may be inferred that they are concerned about their public image and therefore that their sensitivity may discourage them from using force for political purposes. The Argentine situation, however, suggests that the effect is inhibiting rather than prohibitive. Third, while sensitivity to popular reaction may not forestall intervention, it may restrain and moderate the behavior of the military in power.

Finally, a caveat advanced in the Introduction bears repeating. The preceding comments on public attitudes and military status refer primarily to views of more traditional groups who, by and large, accept the legitimacy of the system. They do not take into account the attitudes

of the increasing number of alienated persons who regard the regular armed forces as a principal bulwark of the order they abhor.

INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES AFFECTING LEVEL OF POLITICAL ROLE

Turning now to factors, which may be regarded as primarily institutional, the armed forces themselves hold a set of values, attitudes and aspirations which motivate their actions toward and reactions to environmental conditions. Although the distinction is not always clear, for analytical purposes the military ethos in the four countries may be said to include (1) a set of primarily military values, and (2) a corpus of attitudes toward the general society and the proper role and status of the armed services within it.

Professionalism

As suggested in the Introduction, the more properly military values may be conveniently subsumed under the concept of professionalism. The immediate problem is how to evaluate the relative level of professionalization of the armed forces in the four countries. Here again, Huntington's three components—expertise, responsibility, and corporativeness—will serve as a basis for measurement. In the major military powers which provide the model for definition, expertise is conceived of in terms of the skills required to prepare for and fight an external war. In universal terms, however, it must be viewed in terms of competence to perform an assigned or generally accepted mission. In Latin America emphasis lies on internal functions including de facto, essentially political tasks.

If the Western normative standards are applied; that is, well-developed command and staff organization, proficiency in a wide range of technical skills, sophistication of military school systems and the like—then the Argentine and Peruvian armed forces might be regarded as the most professional. If, however, the criteria of demonstrated operational competence and fighting qualities are used, Colombia is unquestionably No. 1, with Peru following. In terms of efficiency in performing assigned military and paramilitary tasks, it would be difficult to rank the armed forces of any Latin American country above those of Mexico.

The concept of responsibility also presents difficulties. Huntington postulates that the professional soldier is responsible for performing not only a useful but an essential function when called upon to do so by his client. In Latin America, however, there are differences of opinion as to what that function might be or how essential it is. Also, because of the nature of existing political cultures, it is not always apparent what entity—the nation, the state, a de facto government or a political party—is the legitimate client.

As a point of departure for discussing corporativeness, it may be useful to repeat the essential elements of Huntington's definition:

Members of a profession share a sense of organic unity and consciousness of themselves as a group apart from laymen. . . the sense of unity manifests itself in a professional organization which formalizes and applies the standards of professional competence and establishes and enforces the standards of professional responsibility.

There is no doubt that the officer corps of all four countries possess these attributes, but, in general, they assume an expression which more closely resembles the traditional

Hispanic model of corporativeness than the responsible, controlled type envisioned by Huntington. That is, they involve more closely defined and guarded juridical boundaries between the military corporation and civilian society, a higher degree of corporate autonomy, and greater sensitivity about the rights, privileges, and immunities conferred by the *estado militar*. The defense of this type of corporate status has traditionally been a significant motivating factor in the political behavior of the armed forces and, in the opinion of the author, continues to be so. The level of corporate self-consciousness, autonomy, and sensitivity appears to be highest in the armed forces of Peru and Argentina, despite the political cleavages in the latter. It is lower in the case of Mexico and still more so in Colombia. Indeed, the latter may be an exception to the preceding generalization if Professor Maingot's interpretation is accepted. In Colombia, he argues, the military have failed to develop a solid sense of corporate self-consciousness and confidence and subsist on external values and patronage.

What emerges from the preceding discussion is that Huntington's definition of military professionalism has a restricted application to Latin America where the attributes of expertise, responsibility, and corporativeness assume different meanings in different political and military cultures. Relying on simple judgmental criteria, about all that can be said is that (1) the armed forces of the four countries are more professional than they were in 1940 and (2) that no significant differences are apparent among them in the rate of professionalization.

The conceptual problems involved in Huntington's definition carry over into the professionalization-depoliticization relationship he postulates. In Argentina the former process has been accompanied by an increase in the level of the political role of the military, while in Peru the armed forces continue to be a major, if not the dominant, political force. In Colombia, the only really significant intervention of the century occurred after professionalization was well under way. Only in Mexico has the process been accompanied by a decline in the political role of the military but whether this is a causal relationship is debatable.

The basic problem in using Huntington's theory is that in the Latin American context the attributes of responsibility, corporativeness, and even expertise have built-in political dimensions. It may, however, be reconciled with Latin American experience by offering the proposition that military professionalization in Latin America has been premature in that political systems have not matured at the same rate. Instead of encouraging the "militarization of the military and recognizing its independent sphere of action," insecure or factious civilian leadership has tried to use the armed forces for political purposes. As pointed out in the chapter on Peru, the military may therefore react politically to protect its professional and corporate status against civilian intervention. Thus the professionalization-depoliticization relationship cannot emerge.

An interesting alternative proposition is that there may be nothing essentially wrong with Huntington's thesis. Rather the wrong part of it has been applied to Latin America. That is, in Colombia and Mexico where a substantial degree of civilian control appears to exist, it is subjective rather than objective. In each case, the military has not been depoliticized or subject to civilian control in general. Rather in the former the armed forces have regularly been controlled by one or another party and more generally by the oligarchy. In Mexico, it has been the "revolutionary family" and its institutionalized form, the PRI, which have controlled and used the army.

In rapidly changing societies, the military ethos is likely to include not only professional values but views and attitudes about the proper kind and rate of change and the nature and level of military participation in it.

Speaking generally, the armed forces in all four countries are not only nationalistic but probably more so than most civilian elements. Their nationalism is not in the romantic and passive mood of the nineteenth century nor is it primarily the radical type which is essentially a reaction against North American influence, although the latter does exist in military circles in Argentina, to a lesser extent in Mexico and Peru, and still less in Colombia. Rather, the nationalism of the armed forces is based on a greater awareness of national identity and a stronger commitment to the concept of nationhood and sovereignty than prevails among most civilians. It also contains an integralist element; that is, the conviction that the military principles of hierarchy, discipline, and task orientation should be adopted by or imposed on the general society to encourage and expedite the growth of a genuine national identity.

Closely related to modern military nationalism is the armed forces' commitment to development and modernization, processes which they regard as essential to the well-being and ultimate survival of their nations. Some tension exists, however, between these goals which involve change and their devotion to order and social stability.

Despite certain Marxist or collectivist elements in their economic thinking, the armed forces are strongly anti-Communist. In general, however, their knowledge of Communist theory and practice is unsophisticated and, like other elements within the established order, they tend to identify any political elements left of center as Communist.

The positions and attitudes discussed above are reflected in the several armed forces' concept of their internal mission. They may conveniently be compared under that rubric.

In all four countries the military not only support modernization and development but, explicitly or implicitly, are committed to direct participation in these processes. The form of their involvement, however, varies among the several countries. In Colombia, Mexico, and Peru, it has emphasized community development in rural areas through programs of civic action. In Argentina, probably because of its advanced stage of modernization and urbanization, the armed forces have concentrated on higher level action such as industrial planning and management.

The formal commitment of the Latin American military to development and modernization is a relatively new development. It is therefore difficult to evaluate and compare its political effect. The author does not accept the hypothesis that preoccupation with civic action will divert the military's attention from political matters. On the contrary, such activities automatically involve them in areas of decision-making and action which are more political than military. As Professor Maingot points out in his Colombian chapter, apprehension about this prospect ultimately induced the government to discourage the developmental interests of the armed forces.

Probably the most important political aspect of the military's internal mission is how they interpret their duty to defend the constitution and the laws which means, in effect, their duty to support the existing system. In all four countries they accept responsibility for maintaining internal order against threats and actions which cannot be contained at the police level. Beyond that, there are significant differences. In Argentina and Peru, despite circumlocutions and tergiversations in their public pronouncements, the armed forces still maintain the right to take direct and forceful action when the constitution and the laws—or the system—are threatened. They reserve, moreover, the right to decide when such a threat exists. The doctrine of the "Supermission" appears to be more highly developed and intellectualized in Argentina, possibly because of the almost continuous legitimacy crises since the 1930's or

possibly to rationalize actions undertaken on pragmatic grounds. There has also been a strong redemptive strain in the political thought of the Argentine and Peruvian military. That is, elements within them have felt that the armed forces might properly intervene not only when they conceived the system to be threatened in a positive way but also when, in their opinion, it was not functioning effectively. Again, this view appears to be more highly developed in Argentina than in Peru or, at least, more apparently demonstrated. In the latter country, the "Nasserists" have not been able to impose their ideas on their institution or the nation. In the most recent intervention in Argentina, while the military saw the constitution and the laws threatened by subversive forces, they were also moved by the conviction that somehow the nation had strayed from the road to its destiny and that it was their duty to re-define that destiny and lead the way to it.

In Colombia and Mexico, the armed forces do not have an articulated interventionist doctrine. The Rojas Pinilla episode was in balance an ad hoc reaction to a specific situation. It cannot be said, however, that in either country their conception of their internal mission is completely apolitical. In Colombia, as Professor Maingot emphasizes, the traditional pattern of civil-military relations has forced them to regard themselves as the servants of a particular governing elite and, on occasion, of a particular political party. In the case of Mexico, as I pointed out, the military tend to think of their responsibility to defend the constitution and the laws in particular terms; that is, the constitution and the laws as defined and interpreted by the revolutionary establishment and its institutionalized expression, the PRI. In either case, therefore, an interventionist doctrine is implied; that is, the right or obligation to intervene when they perceive the particular institutions they support to be threatened.

It must be added that the military's concept of what is good and proper for the nation—nationalism, modernization, social order and stability, and the proscription of communism—coincides with their own institutional interests. This coincidence, however, does not necessarily reflect a deliberately selfish outlook. Rather it arises from a very common form of human rationalization; that what is good for one particular group is good for the general society. In the case of the military, this sort of reasoning is strengthened by their close identification with the nation.

In summary, it may be stated as a general proposition that although the political role of the armed forces in each country at a particular time is a response to a particular situation, the form of their reaction is conditioned by historically rooted conceptions of their internal mission, and of what is necessary for their own survival and well-being.

Social Origins and Military Socialization

A basic question remains to be discussed: What are the sources of the attitudes and values which shape the officers' political behavior? In the Introduction two principal theories were discussed. One found an explanation in the social origins of officers, the other in military socialization. With reference to the first, there seems to be little question that officers in all four countries are largely of middle or lower middle class background. Like middle class civilians, they are for modernization, development, social order, and stability and are against communism. With qualifications in the case of Colombia, civilian political leadership derives from the same social sectors.

With respect to the more formal aspects of military socialization, beginning with the military academy, officers of the four countries pass through a roughly comparable series

of service schools and undergo comparable garrison and field experiences. All are indoctrinated with the duties and responsibilities of officership and, as observed earlier, it is difficult to distinguish among them in terms of their professional qualities.

Yet despite these apparent similarities in social origins and career experiences of the officer corps of the four countries, their political role has been quite different. This correlation is of course simplistic. In the case of social origins it does not take into account differences in national social structures or the heterogeneous character of the middle class in each. In the latter instance, for example, the value systems of rural and urban sectors may differ significantly. With reference to military socialization, it does not consider the less formal but continuous and pervasive transmission of ideas, values, and myths which takes place within the military institution. The content of this kind of socialization varies substantially from country to country.

In short, the evidence is incomplete and a great deal of research will be necessary before any firm conclusions can be reached. On the basis of my own research and experience, I agree that the cadet carries with him into the service a set of values and attitudes which derive from his social background and, perhaps, retains many of them. I believe, however, that as his career progresses he becomes increasingly identified with the profession which provides him with a livelihood and status. Thus the primary reference point for his political attitudes and behavior is the well-being of his institution which, as observed earlier, he identifies with the well-being of the nation. The fact that he and middle-class civilians identify common national goals may simply mean that he believes that progress toward them is in the interest of the armed forces themselves.

On the basis of the country chapters, it may be ventured that the preceding observations are most valid in the cases of Peru and Argentina, less so of Mexico and Colombia. Indeed, the latter country may be an exception. The relationship here, however, does not appear to be the one postulated in the social origins theory; that is, a middle class officer corps identifying with and supporting a middle class government. Rather it is a case where a long standing status differential between a civilian elite and the military has reduced the latter to subservience.

Cleavages Within the Armed Forces

The preceding observations assume that in the case of each country, officers share a general corpus of attitudes, values, and aspirations. In fact, however, each shows cleavages along both institutional and noninstitutional lines. As Professor Potash observes, in the Argentine armed forces sharp interservice rivalries exist. These have been paralleled or intersected by divisions which derived from the great ideological conflicts of the 1930's and 1940's and the related issue of the proper posture for the nation during World War II. After 1945 a deep cleavage developed along the Perón-anti-Perón line, and after the fall of Perón, over the continuing existence of Peronismo. Still more recently, the officer corps has been divided on the proper role of the armed forces in modernization and development. These schisms have been supplemented by a division between political and apolitical minded officers. The result has been an almost continuous convulsion within the armed forces which frequently exceeded institutional boundaries. Such obtrusions have often been abetted by civilian elements supporting or seeking the support of military factions. The most obvious manifestation of internal crises has been numerous, abortive military coups over the past several decades.

In the case of Colombia, Professor Maingot observes that since the 1930's the officer corps has been divided along the traditional Liberal-Conservative lines and over the proper

role of the armed forces in a nation confronted by political malaise, acute social and economic problems, and internal war. Although there have been activist officers in the armed forces since the 1940's, they have not destroyed the internal cohesion of the corps. Should they threaten to do so, as in the case of General Ruiz Novoa and his followers, they are disciplined or purged by military leadership acting as agents of the civilian elite.

In Peru, the most persistent divisive influence in the armed forces has been the addiction of certain elements to Aprismo. It was these which precipitated the uprisings of 1945 and 1948. Anti-Aprista sentiments, however, were so widespread in the officer corps that the dissidents were ineffective. A second line of cleavage has been between the CAEM group of activists and traditional minded officers. Third, personalist cliques and factions such as those associated with General Odría have been important influences. Finally, as in the case of Argentina, conflicting positions on issues and persons have corresponded to or conflicted with political-apolitical groupings. In general, however, a self-renewing anti-Aprista and increasingly institutionally oriented high command has been able to keep cleavages in hand so that in critical situations the armed forces present a united front. An essential difference between Colombia and Peru appears to be that in the former internal discipline and cohesion are imposed through pressures from the outside, whereas in the latter they are maintained by the armed forces themselves.

In Mexico, relative political stability and the dominance of the official party have minimized external crises which might divide the armed forces, while discipline within them is such that institutional questions can be resolved through internal negotiation. Or, if disagreements should extrude, the structural linkage between the military, the party, and the government is such that they can be settled within the "revolutionary family."

HISTORICAL FACTORS

The final factor remaining to be examined was identified in the introduction as the "natural history" of armies. According to the classification adopted, the Peruvian and Colombian military have some claim to being liberation armies, although the institutional continuity of the latter has been in places tenuous. The modern Argentine army really dates from the unification of the nation in the 1850's. As Professor Potash remarks, however, the officer views himself as "the heir to the heroic tradition established by San Martín in the war for independence," and in terms of self-image the army belongs in the liberation category. Both the Argentine and the Peruvian armies show some conformity to the model in that their conception of themselves as liberators and principal defenders of the two new nations appears to have contributed to their broad interpretation of their contemporary internal mission. The attitudes and behavior of the Colombian army, however, do not fit the liberation type.

The modern Mexican army is clearly a revolutionary army and, as the Mexican chapter attempts to show, its identification with the revolution and its membership in the "revolutionary family" have been important factors in shaping the prevailing pattern of civil-military relations in the nation.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

The following general conclusions are offered:

1. The four case studies appear to support the position taken in the introduction that monistic explanations of the political role of the Latin American military are untenable.

2. In each case, the armed forces have been and continue to be de facto political interest groups and de facto components of the political system. Their behavior as such has been basically a set of reactions to environmental circumstances. The way they have reacted has been shaped by their conceptions of the national society and their role and status within it.

3. While it cannot be denied that they react to changing conditions and that they themselves are changing, their behavior is conditioned by historically derived patterns of civil-military relations.

4. The differences in the political role played by the armed forces in the four countries can best be understood in terms of the unique experiences in each. Thus, in the case of Colombia, the pattern was set by social differentiation between the early Venezuelan "army of occupation" and the Colombian civilian elite. The Argentine military's role emerged from the political malaise which settled on the country in the late 1920's and 1930's and was subsequently affected strongly by Peronismo. A key factor in the behavior of the Peruvian armed forces has been their relations within APRA, while the role of the Mexican armed forces has been shaped by the revolutionary experience.

5. While the political role of the military in the four countries may be deplored, it should not be regarded as abnormal or unnatural. Their political culture and its systematic expressions have tempted, invited or compelled the armed forces to exceed their constitutionally defined missions. Pragmatic behavior has been reinforced by a corporate current which runs through Hispanic political theory.

6. In view of the above arguments, the concept of "military intervention" is misleading. In logical terms, a component of a system cannot intervene in it.

7. The present level of the political role of the military in any of the four countries cannot be expected to decline in the medium term future. On the contrary it may very well be stepped up. In each case revolutionary potentials exist which may be realized at one level or another at any time. Although reformist elements exist within the several armed forces, they remain essentially conservative institutions. They may be expected to do what they feel needs to be done to support the basic structure of established systems. This posture, however, does not preclude the military themselves from imposing social and economic reforms which they regard as essential for the welfare of the nation and the armed institution. But in such instances they would insist on defining and controlling such reforms.

NOTES

1. Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America (rev. ed., New York, 1961), pp. 157-172.
2. Theodore Wyckoff, "The Role of the Military in Latin American Politics," Western Political Quarterly, Vol. XIII (September 1960), pp. 745-763.
3. See, for example, Martin Needler, "Political Development and Military Intervention in Latin America," The American Political Science Review, Vol. LX (September 1966), p. 619; Jacques Lambert, Latin America: Social Structure and Political Institutions, translated by Helen Katel (Berkeley, Calif., 1967), pp. 252-254.
4. Calculations are based on Joseph E. Loftus, Latin American Defense Expenditures, 1938-1965 (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, January 1968), Table 1, p. 11.

EPILOGUE

The analyst of contemporary affairs and trends faces the risk that in the interval between the termination of research and publication of findings, the unfolding of events may cast him as an unreliable prophet. Most of the research for this study was completed in 1966 and since that year events have indeed moved on with probably the most striking developments being the Peruvian military coup of 1968 and the muscle displayed by the army during the student demonstrations in Mexico in the same year. In Argentina significant structural rearrangements have occurred in the relationship between the military command system and the national executive power. In each country organizational and personnel changes have taken place within the armed forces themselves.

If the authors were to bring the study "up-to-date" they would undoubtedly introduce some changes in content, emphasis, and interpretation of specific situations. In the case of the Peru chapter I would probably pay more attention to nationalism in the armed forces, although it is not clear to what extent its recent manifestations represent a basic military philosophy and to what extent they are political moves intended to attract popular support for the armed forces regime. In general, however, we feel that while the roster of players may have changed, the name and rules of the game remain essentially the same and that our general interpretations and conclusions still stand.

L. N. M.
December 1969

Unclassified

Security Classification

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D		
(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified.)		
1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author) Center for Research in Social Systems (CRESS) (Prepared under subcontract by University of Florida)		2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified
		2b. GROUP --
3. REPORT TITLE The Military in Latin American Sociopolitical Evolution: Four Case Studies		
4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates) Technical report		
5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name) L. N. McAlister, Anthony P. Maingot, Robert A. Potash		
6. REPORT DATE January 1970	7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES x + 286	7b. NO OF REFS numerous
8a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO DAHC-19-70-C-0015	9a. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NO (S) --	
b. PROJECT NO. c. d.	9b. OTHER REPORT NO (S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report) --	
10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT This document has been approved for public release and sale; its distribution is unlimited.		
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES --	12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY Office, Chief of Research and Development, Department of the Army Washington, D. C.	
13. ABSTRACT The political role of the Latin American military is analyzed in four case studies—Argentina, Peru, Colombia, and Mexico. Data came from printed sources and informal interviews. The research method relies on objective description of the phenomenon and related variables rather than on analysis of the appropriateness of a political role for the military. Political action by the military in each country is discussed. Common variables assumed to have explanatory value for each case are: attributes of the political system, civilian image of the military, the military mission, professionalism, social origins, military socialization, internal cleavages, social structure, and historical factors.		

DD FORM 1473
1 NOV 65

Unclassified

Security Classification

285

14 KEY WORDS	LINK A		LINK B		LINK C	
	ROLE	WT	ROLE	WT	ROLE	WT
<p><u>Descriptors</u></p> <p>armed forces (foreign)—Mexico armed forces (foreign)—Peru armed forces (foreign)—Argentina armed forces (foreign)—Colombia Colombia—political science Argentina—political science Peru—political science Mexico—political science</p> <p><u>Open Ended Terms</u></p> <p>Mexico—politics Peru—politics Argentina—politics Colombia—politics</p>						